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“As the economy of incentives as a whole in terms of organization is not
usually stressed in economic theory and is certainly not well understood, I
shall attempt to indicate the outlines of the theory.”
Chester Barnard (1938)
Introduction
It is surprising to observe that Schumpeter (1954) does not mention the word of incentives
in his monumental history of economic thought. How is it possible when today, for many
economists, economics is to a large extent a matter of incentives: Incentives to work hard,
incentive to produce good quality products, incentives to study, incentives to invest,
incentives to save,... How to design institutions in order to provide good incentives for
economic agents is a central question of economics today.
Maybe, it is because economics has mostly concentrated on understanding the theory
of value in large economies. No eclassical economics in particular postulates rational in-
dividual behavior in the market. In a perfectly competitive market, this translates for
firms’ owners into profit maximization which implies cost minimization. In order words,
the pressure of competitive markets solves the problem of incentives for cost minimization.
Similarly, consumers faced with exogenous prices have the proper incentives for maximiz-
ing their utility levels. The major project of understanding how prices are formed in
competitive markets can proceed without worrying about incentives.
However, by treating the firm as a black box, the theory remains silent on how the
owners of firms succeed in aligning the objectives of its various members like workers,
supervisors, managers with profit maximization. When economists began to look more
carefully at the firm, either in agricultural economics or in managerial economics, incen-
tives became central. Indeed, for various reasons, the owner of the firm must delegate
various tasks to the members of the firm. This raises first the problems of managing infor-
mation flows within the firm. This was the first research topic for economists, once they
mastered behavior under uncertainty, thanks to Von Neumann and Morgenstern (1943).
This line of research culminated in the theory of teams (Marschak and Radner (1972)).
This theory recognized the decentralized nature of information, but postulated identical
objective functions for the members of the firm considered as a “team”. How to coordi-
nate actions among the members of the team by the proper management of information
was the central focus of this research. Incentive questions were still outside the scope of
the analysis.
However, as soon as one acknowledges that the members of a firm may have different
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objectives, delegation becomes more problematic as recognized early by Marschak (1955)
and also by Arrow (1968) when he observes:
“by definition the agent has been selected for his specialized knowledge and
the principal can never hope to completely check the agent’s performance.”
Delegation of a task to an agent who has different objectives than the principal who
delegates this task is problematic when information about the agent is imperfect. This is
the essence of incentive questions. If the agent had a different objective function but no
private information, the principal could propose a contract which perfectly controls the
agent and induces the latter’s actions to be what he would like to do himself in a world
without delegation. Again, incentives issues would disappear.
Conflicting objectives and decentralized information are thus the two basic ingredients
of incentive theory. That economic agents pursue at least to some extent their private
interests is the essential paradigm for the analysis of market behavior by economists. What
is proposed by incentive theory is to maintain this major assumption in the analysis of
organizations, small numbers markets and any kind of collective decision. This paradigm
has its own limits. Social behavior, in particular in small groups, is more complex, and
norms of behavior culturally inculcated play a large role in shaping societies. However, it
would be foolish not to recognize the role of private incentives in motivating behavior in
addition to these cultural phenomena. The purpose of this book is to synthesize what we
have learned from the incentives paradigm.1
We hope that the step by step approach taken here, as well as our attempt to present
many different results in a unified framework, will help the readers not only to know about
incentive theory, but to appropriate this indispensable tool for thinking about society.
The starting point of incentive theory corresponds therefore to the problem of delega-
tion of a task to an agent with private information. This private information can be of two
types : either the agent can take an action unobserved by the principal, the case of moral
hazard or hidden action ; or the agent has some private information about its cost or val-
uation that is ignored by the principal, the case of adverse selection or hidden knowledge.
The theory studies when this private information is a problem for the principal, and what
is the optimal way for the principal to cope with it. Another type of information prob-
lem has also been raised in the literature, the case of nonverifiability where the principal
and the agent share ex post the same information but no third party and, in particular,
no Court of Justice can observe this information. One can study to which extent this
nonverifiability of some piece of information is problematic for contractual design.
1How do private incentives interact with cultural norms of behavior might be the next important step
of research needed to be able to offer sensible advice on the design of institutions. It is our conviction
nevertheless that for such a goal the mastering of incentive theory is a must.
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We will discover that, in general, these informational problems prevent society from
achieving the first best allocation of resources which could be possible in a world where all
information is common knowledge. The additional costs that must be incurred because
of the strategic behavior of privately informed economic agents can be viewed as one
category of the transaction costs emphasized by Williamson (1975). They do not exhaust
all possible transaction costs, but economists have been rather successful during the last
thirty years, in modeling and analyzing this type of transaction costs, providing a good
understanding of the limits put by these new costs for the allocation of resources. This
work shows that the design of proper institutions for successful economic activities is more
complex than one could have thought. This whole line of research provides also a whole
set of insights on how to proceed to take into account agents’ responses to the incentives
provided by institutions.
As the next chapter will illustrate, incentive theory was pervasive in many areas of
economics, even though it was not central in economic thinking. Before describing how we
will proceed to present this theory, it may be worth mentioning how the major achievement
of economics, namely the general equilibrium theory, met incentives.
General equilibrium theory proved apt to powerful generalizations and able to deal
with uncertainty, time, externalities, extending the validity of the invisible-hand as long
as the appropriate competitive markets could be set up. However, at the beginning of
the seventies, works by Akerlof (1970), Spence (1974), and Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976)
showed in various ways that asymmetric information was posing a much greater challenge,
and could not satisfactorily be imbedded in a proper generalization of the Arrow-Debreu
theory. The problems encountered were so serious that a whole generation of general
equilibrium theorists gave up momentarily the grandiose framework of GE to reconsider
the problem of exchange under asymmetric information in its simplest form, i.e., between
two traders, and in a sense go back to basics. They joined another group trained in game
theory and in the theory of organizations to build the theory of incentives, that we take
as encompassing contract theory, principal-agent theory, agency theory and mechanism
design.
We will present incentive theory in three progressive steps. Volume I is the first step,
in which we consider the principal-agent model where the principal delegates an action
to a single agent through a take-it-or-leave-it offer of a contract.
Two implicit assumptions are made here. First, by postulating that it is the principal
who makes a-take-it-or-leave-it contract offer to the agent, we put aside the bargaining
issues which is a topic for game theory.2 Second, we assume also the availability of a
benevolent Court of Justice which is able to enforce the contract and to impose penalties
2See for example Osborne and Rubinstein (1993).
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if one of the contractual partners adopts a behavior which deviates from the that one
specified in the contract.3
Three types of information problems will be considered, adverse selection, moral
hazard and nonverifiability. Each of those informational problems leads to a different
paradigm and, possibly, to a different kind of agency costs. On top of the usual technologi-
cal constraints of neoclassical economics, these agency costs incorporate the informational
constraints faced by the principal at the time of designing the contract.
In this volume, we will assume that there are no restrictions on the contracts that
the principal can offer. As a consequence, the design of the principal’s optimal contract
reduces to a simple optimization problem.4 This simple focus will turn out to be already
enough to highlight the various trade-offs between allocative efficiency and the distribu-
tion of information rents arising under incomplete information. The mere existence of
informational constraints may generally prevent the principal from achieving allocative
efficiency. The main thrust of the analysis undertaken in this volume is therefore the char-
acterization of the allocative distortions that the principal finds desirable to implement
in order to mitigate the impact of informational constraints.
Volume II will be the second step of our analysis. We will consider there situations with
one principal and several agents, still without any restriction on the principal’s contracts.
Asymmetric information may not only affect the relationship between the principal and
each of his agents, but it may also plague the relationships between agents. Moreover,
pursuing the hypothesis that agents adopt an individualistic behavior, those organiza-
tional contexts require a new equilibrium concept, the Bayesian Nash equilibrium, which
describes the strategic interaction between agents under incomplete information. Three
main themes arise in this context. First, the organization may have been built to facili-
tate a joint decision between the agents. In such a context, the principal must overcome
the free-rider problems which might exist among agents when they must undertake a
collective decision. Second, the principal may attempt to benefit from the competition
between the agents to relax the informational constraints and better reduce the agents’
information rents. Auctions, tournaments, yardstick competition and supervision of an
agent by another one are all mechanisms designed by the principal with this purpose in
mind. Third, the mere attempt by the principal to use competition between agents may
also trigger their collusion against the principal. The principal must now worry not only
3Let us stress here the importance of this assumption which is apparently innocuous because, in
equilibrium, no penalty is ever paid and the role of the court looks minimal in what follows. However,
judges may have to be given proper incentives to enforce contracts. We rely here on the idea that in
repeated relationships the desire to maintain their reputation will provide the appropriate incentives.
This implicit assumption is a little bit problematic since once could also appeal to the same reputation
argument to justify that the principal-agent relationship may achieve allocative efficiency. It will be
relaxed in Volume III.
4Hence, solving for the optimal contract requires only the simple tools of optimization theory.
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about individual incentives, but also about group incentives in a multi-agent organization.
Volume III will be the third step and will analyze the implications of various imperfec-
tions in the design of contracts: Informed principal, limited commitment, renegotiation,
imperfect coordination among various principals, incomplete contracting on the value of
trade. The dynamics of some of these imperfect contractual relationships call for the ex-
tensive use of another equilibrium concept: the Bayesian perfect equilibrium. Equipped
with this tool, we will be better able to describe the allocation of resources resulting from
such imperfect contractual relationships.
In Volume I, we proceed as follows. Chapter 1 gives a brief account of the history
of thought concerning incentive theory. It will show that incentives questions have been
present in many areas of economics over the last century even though it is only recently
that their importance has been recognized and that economists have undertaken a sys-
tematic treatment of these issues. Chapter 2 presents the basic rent extraction-efficiency
trade-off which arises in principal-agent models with adverse selection. Extensions of this
framework to more complex environments are discussed in Chapter 3. Chapter 4 presents
the two types of trade-offs under moral hazard: the trade-off between the liability rent
extraction and allocative efficiency and the trade-off between insurance and efficiency.
Again, extensions of this basic framework are discussed in Chapter 5. Chapter 6 consid-
ers the nonverifiability paradigm which in general does not call for economic distortions.
Mixed models with adverse selection, moral hazard and nonverifiability are the subject
of Chapter 7. The extension of principal-agent models with adverse selection and moral
hazard to dynamic contexts with full commitment is given in Chapter 8. Finally, Chapter
9 discusses a number of simple extensions of the basic framework used all over the book.
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Chapter 1
Incentives in Economic Thought
1.1 Introduction
Incentive theory emerges with the division of labor and exchange.1 The division of labor
induces the need for delegation and the first historical contracts appear probably in agri-
culture when a landlord contracts with his tenant. It is then no wonder that Adam Smith
encountered incentive problems in his discussion of sharecropping contracts (Section 1.2).
Delegation was also needed within firms, hence the importance of the topic in the theory
of organizations (Section 1.3).
For private goods, competitive markets ensure efficiency despite the decentralized
nature of the information about individuals’ tastes and firms’ technologies. Implicitly,
yardstick competition solves adverse selection problems and the fixed-price contracts as-
sociated with exogenous prices solve moral hazard problems. However, markets fail for
pure public goods and public intervention is thus needed. In this case, the mechanisms
used for those collective decisions must solve the incentive problem of acquiring the pri-
vate information that agents have about their preferences for public goods (Section 1.4).
Voting mechanisms are particular incentive mechanisms without any monetary transfers
for which the same question of strategic voting, i.e, not voting according to the true
preferences, can be raised (Section 1.5).
For private goods, increasing returns to scale create a situation of natural monopoly far
away from the world of competitive markets. When the monopoly has private information
about its cost or demand, its regulation by a regulatory commission becomes a principal-
agent problem (Section 1.6).
Exchange raises incentive issues when the commodity which is bought has a value
1Actually, one could also argue that incentive issues arise within the family if one postulates different
objective functions for the members of the family.
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unknown to the buyer but known to the seller. It is the case, in particular, in insurance
markets when the insurance company buys a risk plagued with moral hazard or adverse
selection. The insurance company faces a principal-agent problem with each insured agent,
but may nevertheless have a statistical knowledge of the distribution of risks (Section
1.7). A similar situation occurs when a government attempts to redistribute income
between wage earners of different and unknown productive abilities (Section 1.8) or when
a monopolist looks for the optimal discriminating contract to offer to a population of
consumers with heterogenous tastes for its product (Section 1.9). Of course, incentive
issues were encountered in managing socialist economies as profit incentives of managers
were suppressed by public ownership of the means of production (Section 1.10). The
idea that, in non-competitive economies, it is necessary to design mechanisms taking into
account communication and incentives constraints was further developed by theorists
dealing with non convex economies and this led to the mechanism design methodology
(Section 1.11). The mechanism design methodology provides a useful tool to understand
the allocation of resources in multi-agent frameworks when information is decentralized.
A natural field to apply this methodology is the theory of auctions. Auctions are indeed
mechanisms used by principals to benefit from the competition among several agents
(Section 1.12).
1.2 Adam Smith and Incentive Contracts in Agricul-
ture
In his discussion of the determination of wages (Chapter VII, Book I in Smith (1776)),
Adam Smith recognized the contractual nature of the relationship between the masters
and the workmen. He put forward the conflicting interests of those two players and
already recognized that the bargaining power was not evenly distributed between them,
the master having in general all the bargaining power. In the modern language of the
Theory of Incentives, the masters are principals and the workmen their agents.
“What are the common wages of labour, depends everywhere upon the con-
tract usually made between those two parties,whose interests are not the same.
The workmen desire to get as much, the masters to give as little as possible.”
p. 66
Smith also stressed one of the basic constraints that we model later on: The agent’s
participation constraint which limits what the principal can ask from the agent:
“A man must always live by his work, and his wages must at least be sufficient
to maintain him.” p. 67
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Smith did not have a vision of economic actors as long-run maximizers of utility. He
worried about the consequences of high-power incentives for short-run maximizers.
“Workmen, [ . . . ], when they are liberally paid by the piece, are very apt to
overwork themselves, and to ruin their health and constitution in a few years.”
p. 81
He stressed the lack of appropriate incentives for slaves:
“the work done by slaves, though it appears to cost only their maintenance,
is in the end the dearest of any. A person who can acquire no property, can
have no other interest but to eat as much, and to labour as little as possible.”
p. 365
To explain the survivance of such highly inefficient contracts, Adam Smith also ap-
pealed to non-economic motives:
“The pride of man makes him love to domineer, and nothing mortifies him so
much as to be obliged to condescend to persuade his inferiors.” p. 365
Smith’s most precise and famous discussion of incentives appears in Chapter II, Book
III, when he wants to explain the discouragement of agriculture in the ancient state of
Europe after the fall of the Roman Empire. He describes the status of metayers (Coloni
Partarii in Ancient Time, steel-bow tenants in Scotland):
“The proprietor furnished them with the seed, cattle and instruments of hus-
bandry. The produce was divided equally between the proprietor and the
farmer.” p. 366
However, Smith did not conclude that metayers will not exert the appropriate level of
effort to maximize social value, as modern incentive theory would claim.
“Such tenants, being free men, are capable of acquiring property, and having
a certain proportion of the produce of the land, they have a plain interest
that the whole produce would be as great as possible, in order that their own
proportion may be so.” p. 366
20 CHAPTER 1. INCENTIVES IN ECONOMIC THOUGHT
At several place in this volume, we will see the fundamental trade-off between incentive
and the distribution of the gains from trade. Clearly Smith was not aware of this trade-off.
Rather, he saw the most serious incentive problems in the absence of invesment in the
land by tenants and the unobservable misuse of instruments of husbandry provided by
the proprietor.
“It could never, however, be the interest even of this last species of cultivators
(the metayers) to lay out, in the further improvement of the land, any part of
the little stock they might save from their own share of the produce, because
the lord, who laid out nothing, was to get one-half of whatever it produced...
It might be the interest of metayer to make the land produce as much as
could be brought out of it by means of the stock furnished by the proprietor;
but it could never be in his interest to mix any part of his own with it. In
France,..., the proprietors complain that their metayers take every opportunity
of employing the master’s cattle rather in carriage than in cultivation; because
in the one case they get the whole profits for themselves, in the other they
share them with their landlords.” p. 367
Note the ambiguous “might”, which shows that Smith envisioned probably under-
effort but that he considered it as secondary compared to the under-investment effect.
However, the alternative use of cattle is a typical example of what we will call a hidden
action problem or a moral hazard problem.
Smith’s criticism of sharecropping has been the point of departure of a large litera-
ture in agricultural economics, in history of thought and in economic theory trying to
understand the characteristics of sharecropping contracts. Following A. Smith and un-
til Johnson (1950), economists have considered sharecropping to be a “practice which is
hurtful to the whole society”, an unexplained failure of the indivisible hand that should
be either discouraged by taxation or improved by appropriate sharing of variable fac-
tors.2 A better understanding of the phenomenon was only achieved when the economists
reconsidered the problem equipped with the principal-agent theory.3
1.3 Chester Barnard and Incentives in Management
As we saw above Smith (1776) already discussed the problems associated with piece-rate
contracts in the industry. Babbage (1835) made a further step by understanding the need
2See Schickele (1941) and Heady (1947).
3See Stiglitz (1974).
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for precise measurement of performances to set up efficient piece-rate or profit-sharing
contracts.
“It would, indeed, be of great mutual advantage to the industrious workman,
and to the mastermanufacturer in every trade, if the machines employed in it
could register the quantity of work which they perform, in the same manner as
a steam-engine does the number of strokes it makes. The introduction of such
contrivances gives a greater stimulus to honest industry than can readily be
imagined, and removes one of the sources of disagreement between parties.”
p. 297
Also, Babbage proposed various principles to remunerate labor:
“The general principles on which the proposed system is founded, are
1. That a considerable part of the wages received by each person should
depend on the profits made by the establishment; and,
2. That every person connected with it should derive more advantage from
applying any improvement he might discover than he could by any other
course.”
Babbage (1989, Vol. 8, p. 177).
However, Barnard (1938) can probably be credited of the first attempt to define a gen-
eral theory of incentives in management, with Chapter 11 —the economy of incentives—
and Chapter 12 —the theory of authority— of his celebrated book “The Function of the
Executive” that he wrote after a long career in management, in particular as President of
the New Jersey Bell Telephone Company:
“an essential element of organizations is the willingness of persons to con-
tribute their individual efforts to the cooperative system... Inadequate in-
centives mean dissolution, or changes of organization purpose, or failure to
cooperate. Hence, in all sorts of organizations the affording of adequate in-
centives becomes the most definitely emphasized task in their existence. It is
probably in this aspect of executive work that failure is most pronounced.”
p. 139
Actually, Barnard had a large view of incentives, involving both what we would call
nowadays monetary and non-monetary incentives:
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“An organization can secure the efforts necessary to its existence, then, either
by the objective inducements it provides or by changing states of mind . . .
We shall call the process of offering objective incentives “the method of in-
centives”; and the processes of changing subjective attitudes “the method of
persuasion”.” p. 142
The incentives may be specific or general.
“The specific inducements that may be offered are of several classes, for exam-
ple: a) material inducements; b) personal non material opportunities; c) de-
sirable physical conditions; d) ideal benefactions. General incentives afforded
are, for example: e) associational attractiveness; f) adaptation of conditions
to habitual methods and attitudes; g) opportunity of enlarged participation;
h) the condition of communion.” p. 142
Barnard also stressed the ineffectivity of material incentives so far almost exclusively
considered by economic theory:
“even in purely commercial organization material incentives are so weak as to
be almost negligible except when reinforced by other incentives.” p. 144
“Persuasion includes: a) the creation of coercive conditions (as forced exclu-
sion of indesirables); b) the rationalization of opportunities (if the conviction
that material things are worth while... succeeds in capturing waste effort and
wasted time... it is clearly advantageous); c) the unculcation of motives.”
p. 154
Barnard pointed out the necessary delicate balance of the various types of incentives for
success. Furthermore, such a good balance is highly dependent of an unstable environment
(through competition in particular) and of the internal evolution of the organization itself
(growth, change of personel). Finally, in his chapter on authority, Barnard recognized that
incentive contracts do not rule all the activities within an organization. The distribution
of authority along communication channels is also necessary to achieve coordination and
promote cooperation.
“Authority arises from the technological and social limitations of cooperative
systems on the one hand, and of individuals on the other.” p. 184
In modern language, he is saying that the incompleteness of contracts and the bounded
rationality of members in the organization require that some leaders be given authority
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to decide in circumstances not anticipated precisely by the contracts. His main point is
then to stress the need to satisfy ex post participation constraints of members who accept
non contractual orders only if they are compatible with their own long-run interests.
“A person can and will accept a communication as authoritative only when...,
at the time of his decision, he believes it to be compatible with his personal
interest as a whole.” p. 165
Barnard’s work emphasized the need to induce appropriate effort levels from members
of the organization -the moral hazard problem- and to create authority relationships
within the organization to deal with the necessary incompleteness of incentive contracts.
We will then have to wait for Arrow (1963) to introduce in the literature on the control
of management the idea of moral hazard borrowed from the world of insurance. This
work will be further extended by Wilson (1968) and Ross (1973) who will redefine it
explicitly as an agency problem. The chapter on authority written by Barnard directly
inspired Simon (1951)’s formal theory of the employment relationship. Finally, Williamson
(1975) followed Barnard and Simon to develop his transaction costs theory for the case
of symmetric but nonverifiable information between two parties.4
Grossman and Hart (1986) modeled this paradigm and this led to the large recent
literature on incomplete contracts.5
1.4 Hume, Wicksell, Groves: The Free Rider Prob-
lem
Hume (1740) may be credited of the first explicit statement of the “free-rider problem”.
“Two neighbours may agree to drain a meadow, which they possess in common;
because it is easy for them to know each others mind; and each must perceive,
that the immediate consequence of his failing in his part, is the abandoning the
whole project. But it is very difficult, and indeed impossible, that a thousand
persons shou’d agree in any such action; it being difficult for them to concert
so complicated a design, and still more difficult for them to execute it; while
each seeks a pretext to free himself of the trouble and expence, and wou’d lay
the whole burden on others.” p. 538
4See Williamson’s citation in Section 6.1.
5See Hart (1995) for a recent synthesis.
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At the end of the 19th century, a lively debate over public finance took place among
European economists between the “benefit” approach and the “ability to pay” approach
to taxation. In particular, Mazzola, Pantaleoni, de Viti de Marco in Italy, Sax in Austria
used the “modern” concepts of marginal utility and subjective value, extending the benefit
approach implicit in the writings of many authors of the 18th century, such as Bentham,
Locke and Rousseau. Wicksell (1896), in his discussion of Mazzola’s contribution, pointed
out what became known later as the free-rider problem, which had been ignored in the
benefit approach to taxation.
“If the individual is to spend his money for private and public uses so that
his satisfaction is maximized he will obviously pay nothing whatsovever for
public purposes... Whether he pays much or little will affect the scope of
public service so slightly, that for all practical purposes, he himself will not
notice it at all. Of course, if everyone were to do the same, the State will soon
cease to function.” p. 81
Wicksell suggested a solution: The principle of (approximative) unanimity and volun-
tary consent. Each item in the public budget must be voted simultaneously with the de-
termination of its financing and must be accepted only if unanimity (or quasi-unanimity)
is obtained.6 If we could ignore strategic behavior, this process would lead to Pareto
optimality. However, which one of the Pareto optima will be reached depends upon the
sequential realization of the decision-making process. Indeed, this is the main reason jus-
tifying strategic behavior by the participants as they try to manipulate the path of the
procedure.
With the exception of Bowen (1943)’s voting procedure discussed in the next section,
nothing was proposed until the seventies to solve the free-rider problem which appeared
really formidable. Nevertheless, in 1971, Dre`ze and de la Valle´e Poussin extended to
public goods the literature on iterative planning procedures of the sixties. At each step of
the procedure, agents announce their marginal rates of substitution between public goods
and private good. They noted that revelation of the true marginal rates of substitution
is a maximin strategy, a weak incentive property.
Finally, Clarke (1971), Groves (1973), Groves and Loeb (1975), making strong re-
strictions on preferences to evade the Gibbard-Satterthwaite “Impossibility Theorem”,7
provided mechanisms with monetary transfers inducing truthful revelation of preferences
and making the Pareto optimal public good decision. The literature which followed8
developed substantially incentive theory and the mechanism design methodology.
6This notion was later formalized by Foley (1967).
7See Section 1.5 below.
8See Green and Laffont (1979) and Aspremont and Ge´rard-Varet (1979).
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1.5 Borda, Bowen, Vickrey: Incentives in Voting
Since the beginning of the theory on voting, the issue of strategic voting was noticed.
Borda (1781) recognized it when he proposed his famous Borda rule
“My scheme is only intented for honest men.”
We have to wait for Bowen (1943) to see a first attempt at addressing the issue of
“strategic voting”. For allocating public goods, Bowen (as we mentioned in Section 1.4)
was searching in voting an alternative to the missing expression of preferences in markets
that exists for private goods. He realized the difficulty of strategic voting:
“At first sight it might be supposed that this information could be obtained
from his vote... But the individual could not vote intelligently, unless he knew
in advance the cost to him of various amounts of the social good, and in any
case the results of voting would be unreliable if the individual suspected that
his expression of preference would influence the amount of cost to be assessed
against him.” Bowen (1943, p. 129 in Arrow and Scitovsky (1969)).
Bowen assumed that the distribution of the cost of the public good was exogenously
fixed (for example equal sharing of cost) and considered successive votes on increments of
the public good. He observed that at each step it is in the interest of each voter to vote yes
or no according to his true preferences. Such a procedure converges to the optimal level of
public good if agents are myopic and consider only their incentives at each step.9 Single-
peaked Black (1948), years after Borda, Condorcet, Laplace and Dogson, reconsidered the
theory of voting and exhibited a wide class of cases (single-peaked preferences) for which
majority voting leads to transitivity of social choice, a solution to the 1785 Condorcet
paradox. He eliminated, by assumption, strategic issues.
“When a member values the motions before a committee in a definite order, it
is reasonable to assume that, when these motions are put against each other,
he votes in accordance with his valuation.” Black (1948, p. 134 in Arrow and
Scitovsky (1969)).
When Arrow (1951) founded the formal theory of social choice by proving that there is
no “reasonable” voting method yielding to a non dictatorial social ranking of social alter-
natives which avoids intransitivity when no restriction is placed on individual preferences,
he also abstracted from the gaming issues and noticed:
9See Green and Laffont (1979, Chapter 14) for a more detailed analysis of this procedure.
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“The point here, broadly speaking, is that, once a machinery for making social
choices from individual tastes is established, individuals will find it profitable,
from a rational point of view, to misrepresent their tastes by their actions or,
more usually, because some other individual will be made so much better off
by the first individual’s misrepresentation that he could compensate the first
individual in such a way that both are better off than if everyone really acted
in direct accordance with his tastes.”10 p. 7
In a paper which provides a very lucid exposition of Arrow’s impossibility theorem,
Vickrey (1960) raised the question of strategic misrepresentation of preferences in a social
welfare function which associates a social ranking to individual preferences.
“There is another objection to such welfare functions, however, which is that
they are vulnerable to strategy. By this is meant that individuals may be
able to gain by reporting a preference differing from that which they actually
hold.” p. 517,
and:
“Such a strategy could, of course, lead to a counterstrategy, and the process of
arriving at a social decision could readily turn into a “game” in the technical
sense.” p. 518
Dummet and Farquharson (1961) will indeed pursue the analysis of such voting games
in terms of non-cooperative Nash equilibria. Vickrey (1960) further explained that the
social welfare functions which satisfy the assumptions of Arrow’s theorem, in particu-
lar the independence assumption, are immune to strategy. Then, comes his conjecture
acknowledged by Gibbard (1973):
“It can be plausibly conjectured that the converse is also true, that is, that if
a function is to be immune to strategy and to be defined over a comprehen-
sive range of admissible rankings, it must satisfy the independence criterion,
though it is not quite so easy to provide a formal proof of this.” p. 588.
Therefore, Vickrey is led, through Arrow’s theorem, to an impossibility result, namely
the strategic manipulability of any method of aggregating individual preferences or of
10Note that the last part of this quote refers to incentives for groups.
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any voting mechanism. The route toward the impossibility of non-manipulable and non-
dictatorial mechanisms via Arrow’s theorem was suggested. A complete proof, the great-
est achievement of social choice theory since Arrow’s theorem, came thirteen years later
in Gibbard (1973).11 The importance of Gibbard’s theorem for incentive theory lies in
showing that with no prior knowledge of preferences, non-dictatorial collective decision
methods cannot be found where truthful behavior is a dominant strategy. The positive
results of incentive methods in practice will have to be looked for in restrictions on pref-
erences, as in the principal-agent theory, or in the relaxation of the required strength of
incentives by giving up dominant strategy implementation.
1.6 Le´on Walras and the Regulation of Natural Mo-
nopolies
Walras (1897) defined a natural monopoly as an industry where monopoly is the efficient
market structure and suggested, following A. Smith (1776), to price the product of the
firm by balancing its budget. This led to the Ramsey (1927) and Boiteux (1956) theory
of optimal pricing under a budget constraint.
After some price cap regulation attempts in the 19th century, the practice of regulation
was rate of return regulation which ensures prices covering costs inclusive of a (higher than
the market) cost of capital. This led to the Averch and Johnson (1962) over-capitalization
result largely overemphasized.
In 1979, Loeb and Magat finally put the regulation literature in the framework of the
principal-agent literature with adverse selection by stressing the lack of information of the
regulator. They proposed to use a Groves dominant strategy mechanism which solves the
problem of asymmetric information at no cost when there is no social cost in transfers
from the regulator to the firm.
Baron and Myerson (1982) transformed the problem into a second-best problem by
weighting the firm’s profit with a smaller weight than consumers’ surplus in the social
welfare function maximized by the regulator. Then, optimal regulation entails a distortion
from the first-best (pricing higher than marginal cost) to decrease the information rent of
the regulated firm. Laffont and Tirole (1986) used a utilitarian social welfare function with
the same weight for profit and consumers’ surplus, but introduced a social cost for public
funds (due to distortive taxation) which creates also a rent-efficiency trade-off. Their
model features both adverse selection and moral hazard, but the ex post observability
of cost (commonly used in regulation) makes it technically an adverse selection model.12
11See also Satterthwaite (1975).
12See Chapter 7 below.
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This model is developed in Laffont and Tirole (1993) along many dimensions (dynamics,
renegotiation, auctions, political economy...).
1.7 Knight, Arrow, Pauly: Incentives in Insurance
The notion of moral hazard, i.e., the ability of insured agents to affect the probabilities
of insured events was well known in the insurance profession.13 However, the insurance
writers tended to look upon this phenomenon as a moral or ethical problem affecting their
business.
In 1963, Arrow introduced this concept in the economics literature 14 and argued that
it led to a market failure as some insurance markets would not emerge due to moral
hazard. Arrow was quite influenced by the moral connotation of the concept and looked
for solutions involving changes of ethical attitudes. Pauly (1968) rejected this approach,
by arguing that it was quite natural for agents to react to zero price —like demanding more
health consumption if health was free— and that the non-insurability of some risks did not
imply a market failure as no proof of the superiority of public intervention faced with the
same informational problems was given. Pauly (1974) and Helpman and Laffont (1975)
showed that indeed competitive insurance markets (with linear prices) were inefficient in
the sense that an uninformed government could improve upon the free market outcome.
Spence and Zeckhauser (1971) looked for more sophisticated contracts (non-linear
prices) by solving the maximization of the welfare of a representative agent with a break-
even constraint for the insurance company and the moral hazard constraint that each
agent chooses its level of self-protection optimally. When the self-protection variable is
chosen before nature selects the states of nature (i.e., who has an accident, who does
not), they obtained the moral hazard variable model with a continuum of agents and a
break-even constraint. When the self-protection variable is chosen after nature selects the
13See for example Faulkner (1960) and Dickerson (1957).
14Leroy and Singell (1987) make the claim we share that, by uncertainty, Knight (1921) meant situations
in which insurance markets collapse because of moral hazard or adverse selection.
“The classification or grouping (necessary for insurance) can only to a limited extent be
carried out by any agency outside the person himself who makes the decisions, because of
the peculiarly obstinate connection of a moral hazard with this sort of risks.” p. 251
“We have assumed . . . that each man in society knows his own powers as entrepreneur, but
that men know nothing about each other in this capacity... The presence of true profit,
therefore, depends... on the absence of the requisite organization for combining a sufficient
number of instances to secure certainty through consolidation. With men in complete
ignorance of the powers of judgement of other men it is hard to see how such organization
can be effected.” p. 284
However, Knight did not recognize that problems of moral hazard and adverse selection can be attenuated
or eliminated with properly structured contracts.
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states of nature, they have both moral hazard and adverse selection, making the problem
quite close to the Mirrlees optimal income tax problem 15 (as already noted by Zeckhauser
(1970)).
Ross (1973) expressed the pure principal-one agent model with only moral hazard and
an individual rationality constraint for the agent, before it received its modern treatment
in Mirrlees (1975), Guesnerie and Laffont (1979), Holmstro¨m (1979), Shavell (1979) and
later in Grossman and Hart (1983).
The Pareto inefficiency of competitive insurance markets (with linear prices) with ad-
verse selection was shown in Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976)16 and their successors studied
various forms of competition in non-linear tariffs. As in the case of moral hazard, one
can also study the optimal non-linear tariff which maximizes the expected welfare of a
population of agents having private information about their own risk characteristics.17
However, this problem was encountered earlier in the literature on price discrimination
with quality replacing quantity.18
1.8 Sidgwick, Vickrey, Mirrlees: Redistribution and
Incentives
The separation of efficiency and redistribution in the second theorem of welfare economics
rests on the assumption that lump-sum transfers are feasible. As soon as the bases
for taxation can be affected by agents’ behavior, deadweight losses are created. Then,
raising money for redistributive purposes destroys efficiency. More redistribution requires
more inefficiency. A trade-off appears between redistribution and efficiency. When labor
income is taxed, the leisure-consumption choices are distorted and the incentives for work
are decreased. There exists a redistribution-incentives trade-off. Sidgwick (1883) in his
Method of Ethics was apparently the first writer to recognize the incentive problems of
redistribution policies.
“It is conceivable that a greater equality in the distribution of products would
lead ultimately to a reduction in the total amount to be distributed in conse-
quence of a general preference of leisure to the results of labor.” Chapter 7,
Section 2.
15They do not go much beyond writing first-order conditions for this problem, and refer to Mirrlees
(1971) when they use the Pontryagin principle.
16See also Akerlof (1970) and Spence (1973).
17See Stiglitz (1977).
18See Mussa and Rosen (1978) and Guesnerie and Laffont (1984) for modern treatments.
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The informational difficulty associated with income taxation is that the supply of
labor is not observable and therefore not controllable, hence the distortion. However, if
the wage was observable, as well as income, the supply of labor would be easily recovered.
The next stage in the modeling of the problem was to assume that wages which equate
innate abilities are private information of the agents.19 Income, the observable variable,
is the product of a moral hazard variable, the supply of labor, and of an adverse selection
variable, ability.
A major step was achieved by Vickrey, who had been senior economist of the tax
research division of the US Treasury Department and tax expert of the governor of Puerto
Rico. As early as 1945, he used the insights of Von Neumann and Morgenstern to model
the optimal income tax problem as a principal-agent problem where the principal is the
tax authority and the agents the tax payers. In Vickrey (1945) he defined the objective
function of the government:
“If utility is defined as that quantity the mathematical expression of which is
maximized by an individual making choices involving risk, then to maximize
the aggregate of such utility over the population is equivalent to choosing
that distribution of income which such an individual would select were he
asked which of various variants of the economy he would become a member
of, assuming that once he selects a given economy with a given distribution of
income he has an equal chance of landing in the shoes of each member of it.”
p. 329
Equipped with this utilitarian social welfare criterion, with, in passing, the Harsanyi
(1955) interpretation of expected utility as a justice criterion, he formulated the funda-
mental problem of optimal income taxation:20
“It is generally considered that if individual incomes were made substantially
independent of individual effort, production would suffer and there would be
less to divide among the population. Accordingly some degree of inequality
in needed in order to provide the required incentives and stimuli to efficient
cooperation of individuals in the production process.” p. 330
“The question of the ideal distribution of income, and hence of the proper pro-
gression of the tax system, becomes a matter of compromise between equality
and incentives.” p. 330
19Note here a difficulty. Wages are paid by employers who must know ability. Implicitly, collusion
between employers and workers is assumed. With a profit tax it is easy to fight this type of collusion.
20Vickrey viewed his work as a generalization of Edgeworth’s minimum-sacrifice principle (1897). Also,
Edgeworth’s optimal indirect taxes can be viewed also as an incentive problem.
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He then proceeded to a formalization of the problem which is still the current one.
The utility function of any individual is made a function of his consumption and of his
productive effort. There is a relationship between the amount of output on the one hand
and the amount of effort and unknown productive characteristics of the individual on the
other hand. This leads to an alternative form of the utility function which depends now on
consumption, output and the individual’s characteristics. Taxation creates a relationship
between output and consumption. Adjusting his effort or output optimally, the individual
obtains his supply of effort characterized by a first-order condition which is the first-
order condition of incentive compatibility for an adverse selection problem. He stated the
government’s optimization problem which is to maximize the sum of individuals’ utilities
under the incentive compatibility conditions and the budget equation of the government.
Recognizing a calculus of variation problem, he wrote the Euler equation and gave up:
“Thus even in this simplified form the problem resists any facile solution.”
p. 332
The Pontryagin principle was still far away and twenty six years will be needed to
reach Mirrlees (1971)’s neat formulation and solution of the problem.21
Note that the problem analyzed here is not stricto sensu a delegation problem as
we defined it above. The principal is actually delegated by the taxpayers the task of
redistributing income, i.e., a particular public good problem. The principal observes
neither the effort level of a given agent, nor his productive characteristics. However,
by observing output which is a function of both, it can reduce the problem to a one
dimensional adverse selection problem. The principal is not facing a single agent over the
characteristics of which he has an asymmetry of information, but a continuum of them
for which he knows only the distribution of characteristics. Nevertheless, the problem is
mathematically identical to a delegation problem with a budget balance equation instead
of a participation constraint.22
1.9 Dupuit, Edgeworth, Pigou: Price Discrimination
When a monopolist or a government wants to extract consumers’ surpluses in the pricing
of a commodity, it faces in general the problem of the heterogeneity of consumers’ tastes.
Even if it knows the distribution of tastes, it does not know the type of any given consumer.
By offering different menus of price-quality or price-quantity pairs, i.e., by using second-
degree price discrimination, the government can increase its objective function. Such an
21Zeckhauser (1970) and Wesson (1972) formulated special cases of the optimal incentives-redistribution
problem that they solved approximately without being aware of the Vickrey model.
22At least when the types of the agents are independently distributed.
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anonymous menu is an incentive mechanism which leads consumers to reveal their type
by their self-selection in the menu.
Dupuit (1844) developed the concept of consumer surplus and used it to discuss price
discrimination. Dupuit was well aware of the incentive problems faced by the pricing of
infrastructures.
“The best of all tariffs would be the one which would make pay those which
use a way of communication a price proportional to the utility they derive
from using this service... I do not have to say that I do not believe in the
possible application of this voluntary tariff; it would meet an insurmountable
obstacle in the universal dishonesty of passants, but it is the kind of tariff one
must try to approach by a compulsory tariff,” Dupuit (1849), p. 223.
Edgeworth (1913) extended the theory for price discrimination for the railways in-
dustry. Pigou (1920) characterized the different types of price discrimination. Gabor
(1955) discussed block tariffs or two-part tariffs which had been recently introduced in
the electricity industry in England and showed that with one type of consumers two part
tariffs are equivalent to first degree price discrimination. Oi (1971) derived an optimal
two-part tariff. Mussa and Rosen (1978), Spence (1977), Goldman, Leland and Sibley
(1984) provided the general framework to derive for a monopolist an optimal tariff which
is non-linear in prices or qualities, substantially later than similar work in the income tax
or insurance literature.
1.10 Incentives in Planned Economies
We must distinguish between the Soviet practice and the Theory of Planning developed
in the western countries. As explained by Berliner (1976, p. 401) “In the early years of the
Soviet period there was some hope that socialist society could count on the spirit of public
service as a sufficient motivation for economic activity. With the intense industrialization
drive of the thirties, however, that hope was gradually abandoned. In a historic decla-
ration in 1931, Stalin renounced the equalitarian wage ethic that had obliterated “any
difference between skilled and unskilled work, between heavy and light work”.” Following
his biting denunciation of “equality mongering”, there evolved a new policy in which per-
sonal “material incentives” —primarily money incomes— became the major instrument
for motivating economic activity.
In the Soviet Union, a general set of managerial incentive structures developed dur-
ing the thirties and lasted for three decades. In this classical period, the manager’s
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incomes were decomposed in a salary, a basic bonus and the Enterprise Fund. This incen-
tive structure had many defects (problems with new products, no proper incentives for
cost minimization, ratchet effect...). It was critized and under constant evolution. With
the passing of Stalin, the discussion became more intense and quite open with the 1962
Liberman paper in the Pravda and culminated in the 1965 Reform. A literature study-
ing in detail the new incentive structure developed in the Western world among Soviet
specialists.23 In the famous socialist controversy of the thirties, incentives were largely
overlooked. Lange (1936) perceived no problem with imposing rules to managers.
“The decisions of the managers of production are no longer guided by the aim
to maximize profit. Instead, there are certain rules imposed on them by the
Central Planning Bureau which aim at satisfying consumers’ preferences in
the best way possible.
One rule must impose on each production plant the choice of the combination
of factors of production and the scale of output which minimizes the average
cost of production.
The second rule replaces the free entry of firms into an industry or their exodus
from it. This leads to an equality of average cost and the price of the product.”
Lerner (1934) pointed out the difficulty arising with a small number of firms having
increasing returns to scale and reformulated the rules as: Every producer must produce
whatever he is producing at the least total cost, and a producer shall produce any output
or any increment of output that can be sold for an amount equal to or greater than the
marginal cost of that output or increment of output.24 Even in 1967, Lange did not see
any problem of incentives in the working of the socialist economy. “Were I rewrite my
essay today my task would be much simpler. My answer to Hayek and Robbins would be:
so what’s the trouble? Let us put the simultaneous equations on an electronic computer
and we shall obtain the solution in less than a second. The market process with its
cumbersome taˆtonnements appears old fashioned.”25
It is therefore not surprising that the voluminous mathematical theory of iterative
23Leeman (1970), Keren (1972), Weitzman (1976),...
24Note that Lerner is here simply rediscovering Laundhart (1885)’s marginal cost pricing principle that
the last author associated with government ownership. This principle will be most clearly articulated by
Hotelling (1939).
25When, at the end of his life around 1964, Lange recognizes more fully the role of incentives, it is
about the innovation process and not the every day life of the planning system.
“What is called optimal allocation is a second-rate matter, what is really of prime impor-
tance is that of incentives for the growth of productive forces (accumulation and progress
in technology)”.
See Kowalik (1976).
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planning developed in the sixties did not pay any attention to incentives.26 Such a concern
appeared only marginally in Dre`ze and Valle´e Poussin (1971), where truthful reporting
of private characteristics was shown to be a maximum strategy in a planning procedure
for public goods. In 1974, Weitzman, who had participated to the development of the
iterative planning literature, made a direct criticism of the implicit idea that the planning
with prices was good for incentives.
“It seems to me that a careful examination of the mechanisms of successive
approximation planning shows that there is no principal informational dif-
ference between iteratively finding an optimum by having the center name
prices while the firm responds with quantities, or by having the center assign
quantities while the firm reveals costs or marginal costs.”
Considering then an explicit planning problem with asymmetric information, he com-
pares price mechanisms and quantity mechanisms. This will be the point of departure
of the more general approach in terms of nonlinear prices by Spence (1976). From then
on, planning procedures were more systematically studied from the point of incentives.27
However, by then, the lack of interest for iterative planning was fairly general.
1.11 Leonid Hurwicz and Mechanism Design
When general equilibrium theorists attempted to extend the resource allocation mecha-
nisms to non convex environments they realized that new issues of communication and
incentives arose.
“In a broader perspective, these findings suggest the possibility of a more sys-
tematic study of resource allocation mechanisms. In such a study, unlike in
the more traditional approach, the mechanism becomes the unknown of the
problem rather than a datum...
The members of such a domain (of mechanisms) can then be appraised in
terms of their various “performance characteristics” and, in particular, of their
(static and dynamic) optimality properties, their informational efficiency, and
the compatibility of their postulated behavior with self-interest (or other mo-
tivational variables).” Hurwicz (1960, p. 62) in Arrow and Scitovsky (1969)
26See Heal (1973) for a synthesis.
27See Laffont (1985) for a survey.
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Hurwicz (1960) dedicated his paper to Jacob Marschak. Indeed Marschak was the
only major economist aware of incentive problems in the fifties, problems that he chose
not to study.
“This raises the problem of incentives. Organization rules can be devised
in such a way that, if every member pursues his own goal, the goal of the
organization is served. This is exemplified in practice by bonuses to executives
and the promises to loot to besieging soldiers; and in theory, by the (idealized)
model of the laisser faire economy. And there exist, of course, also negative
incentive (punishments).
I shall have to leave the problem of incentives aside,” Marschak (1955).
Marschak was familiar with the literature of statisticians who became aware of in-
centive problems quite early. The problem of moral hazard arose in sampling theory
for quality control. Whittle (1954) and Hill (1960) understood that the distributions
of quality were endogenous and dependent on the care taken in the production process.
They studied how to take into account this non controllable effort level in their analysis
of quality from a sample. Adverse selection appeared when forecasting probabilities of
some events. Good (1952), McCarthy (1956) and later Savage (1971) looked for payment
formulas leading forecasters to announce their true estimated probabilities and discovered
the incentive constraints for the revelation of information.
Economists around Hurwicz developed a general framework, the mechanism design
approach, which treated the competitive markets as just one particular institution in a
much more general family of mechanisms run by benevolent planners. During the sixties
the emphasis of the research was on the communication costs required by non conventional
environments until Groves (1973), influenced by Schultze (1969);28 called for considering
incentives in public policy and constructed incentive compatible mechanisms in a team
problem.
The next major step was the understanding of the Revelation Principle29 which shows
that, with adverse selection and moral hazard, any mechanism of organizing society is
equivalent to an incentive compatible mechanism by which all informed agents reveal
their private information to a planner who recommends actions.30 The Revelation Prin-
ciple provides the appropriate framework for the normative analysis of economies with
28Schultze wrote, p. 151. “public action need not be simply the provision of public facilities... to offset
the economic losses caused by private actions. Rather the objectives of public policy, in such cases, should
include a modification of the “signals” given and incentives provided by the market place so as to induce
private actions consistent with public policy.”
29See Gibbard (1973), Green and Laffont (1977), Dasgupta, Hammond and Maskin (1978) and Myerson
(1979).
30Maskin (1977)’s Nash implementation theorem is the major result when a principal designs a mech-
anism to be played by agents who know their respective characteristics.
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asymmetric information and contracts which can be written on all observable variables.
It delivers a neat methodology to study incentive theory that we will use in most of the
book.
1.12 Auctions
Auctions are mechanisms by which principals attempt to use the competition among
agents to decrease the information rents they have to give up to the agent they are
contracting with. It requires a modeling of the relationship between bidders (the agents)
who bid under incomplete information about the other agents’ valuations for the auctioned
good or contract.
Even though auctions have been used at least as far back as 500 BC in Babylon, the
first academic work on auctions seems to date from 1944 with a thesis on competitive
bidding for securities in which Friedman (1956) presented a method to determine optimal
bids in a first-price, sealed-bib auction. In this operation research approach he assumed
that there was a single strategic bidder. Vickrey (1961) in a monumental paper provided
the first equilibrium theoretic analysis of the first price auction that he compared to the
second price auction, often called the Vickrey auction.
It is only after the clarification of the Bayesian Nash equilibrium concept by Harsanyi
(1967, 1968) that the theory of auctions was massively developed. Three major models
were particularly developed. The independent value model due to Vickrey (1961), the
symmetric common value model due to Rothkopf (1969) and Wilson (1969, 1977) and the
symmetric common value model due to Wilson (1967, 1969). In a major synthetic paper
Milgrom and Weber (1982) showed that most of these models are special cases of the
affiliated value paradigm and they clarified the winner’s curse developed at the occasion
of empirical work about auctions for oil drilling rights in the Gulf of Mexico (Capen et
alii (1971)). Myerson (1981) used the general mechanism approach to characterize the
optimal auctions in models with private values.
Chapter 2
The Rent Extraction-Efficiency
Trade-Off
2.1 Introduction
Incentive problems arise when a principal wants to delegate a task to an agent. Delegation
can be motivated either by the possibility of benefitting from some increasing returns
associated with the division of tasks which is at the root of economic progress, by the
principal’s lack of time or lack of any ability to perform the task himself, and, finally,
by any other form of the principal’s bounded rationality when facing complex problems.
However, by the mere fact of this delegation, the agent may get access to information
which is not available to the principal. The exact opportunity cost of this task, the precise
technology used, or how good is the matching between the agent’s intrinsic ability and this
technology are all examples of pieces of information which may remain private knowledge
of the agent. In such cases, we will say that there is adverse selection.1
Even if the agency model analyzed in this chapter, as well as in most of the book, will
be cast in terms of a manager-worker relationship, examples of such agency relationships
under adverse selection abound both in terms of their scope and their economic signifi-
cance. Both private and public transactions provide examples of contracting situations
plagued with informational problems of the adverse selection type. The landlord dele-
gates the cultivation of his land to a tenant who will be the only one to observe the exact
weather conditions. A client delegates his defense to an advocate who will be the only one
to know the difficulty of the case. An investor delegates the management of his portfolio
1It is sometimes said that there is hidden knowledge, probably a better expression for describing
this situation of asymmetric information. Adverse selection is rather a possible consequence of this
asymmetric information. However, we will keep the by now classic expression of adverse selection to
describe a principal-agent problem in which the agent has private information about a parameter of his
optimization problem.
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to a broker who will be the only one to know the prospects of the possible investments. A
stockholder delegates the firm’s day-to-day decisions to a manager who will be the only
one to know the business conditions. An insurance company provides insurance to agents
who privately know how good a driver they are. The Department of Defense procures a
good from the military industry without knowing its exact cost structure. A regulatory
agency contracts for service with a Public Utility without having complete information
about its technology.
The key common aspect of all those contracting settings is that the information gap
between the principal and the agent has some fundamental implications for the design of
the bilateral contract they sign. In order to reach an efficient use of economic resources,
this contract must elicit the agent’s private information. This can only be done by giving
up some information rent to the privately informed agent. Generally, this rent is costly
to the principal. This information cost just adds up to the standard technological cost of
performing the task and justifies distortions in the volume of trade achieved under asym-
metric information. The allocative and the informational roles of the contract generally
interfere. At the optimal second-best contract, the principal trades-off his desire to reach
allocative efficiency against the costly information rent given up to the agent to induce
information revelation. Under adverse selection, the characterization of the volume of
trade cannot be disentangled from the distribution of the gains from trade.
This chapter analyzes the contractual difficulties which appear more generally, when
this delegation of task takes place in a one-shot relationship. The fact that the relationship
is one-shot imposes that the principal and the agent cannot rely on the repetition of their
relationship to achieve efficient trades.2 In this case, the bilateral short-term relationship
between the principal and the agent can only be regulated by a contract. Implicit here is
the idea that there exists a legal framework for this contractual relationship. The contract
can be enforced by a benevolent Court of Justice and the agents are bound by the terms
of the contract. This implicit assumption on the legal framework of trades is not peculiar
to contract theory but prevails in most traditional studies of market economies.
The main objective of this chapter is to characterize the optimal rent extraction-
efficiency trade-off faced by the principal when designing his contractual offer to the agent.
This characterization proceeds through two different steps. First, we describe the set of
allocations that the principal can achieve despite the information gap he suffers from.
An allocation is an output to be produced and a distribution of the gains from trade.
Even under adverse selection, those allocations can be easily characterized once one has
2See Fudenberg and Tirole (1991), Myerson (1991) and Osborne and Rubinstein (1993) for textbook
analysis of these repeated relationships and applications of the so-called Folk Theorem which guarantees
that almost Pareto optimal trades can be achieved through repeated relationships when agents have a
common discount factor close enough to one.
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described a set of incentive compatibility constraints which are only due to asymmetric
information. In addition to those constraints, the conditions for voluntary trade require
that some participation constraints must also be satisfied to ensure that the agent wants
to participate in a contract giving all bargaining power to the principal. Incentive and
participation constraints define the set of incentive feasible allocations. Second, once this
characterization is achieved, we can proceed to a normative analysis and optimize the
principal’s objective function within the set of incentive feasible allocations. In general,
incentive constraints are binding at the optimum, showing that adverse selection clearly
impedes the efficiency of trade. The main lessons of this optimization is that the optimal
second-best contract calls for a distortion in the volume of trade away from the first-best
and for giving up some strictly positive information rents to the most efficient agents.
Implicit in this optimization are a number of assumptions worth stressing. First, we
assume that the principal and the agent both adopt an optimizing behavior and maximize
their individual utility. In other words, they are both fully rational individualistic agents.
Given the contract he receives from the principal, the agent maximizes his utility and
chooses output accordingly. Second, the principal does not know the agent’s private
information, but the probability distribution of this information is common knowledge.
There exists an objective distribution of the possible types of the agent which is known by
both the agent and the principal, and this fact itself is known by the two players.3 Third,
the principal is a Bayesian expected utility maximizer. He moves first as a Stackelberg
leader under asymmetric information anticipating the agent’s subsequent behavior and
optimizes accordingly within the set of available contracts.
Section 2.2 describes the adverse selection canonical model that we use in most of this
book. For the sake of simplicity, we assume that the agent’s type, i.e., his cost parameter,
can only take two possible values. In Section 2.3, we provide the benchmark solution
corresponding to the case where the principal knows perfectly the agent’s cost function.
Section 2.4 describes the set of allocations that the principal can achieve despite the
information gap he suffers from. Section 2.5 explains why the principal is generally obliged
to give up an information rent to the agent because of the latter’s informational advantage.
The optimization program of the principal who wants to maximize his expected utility
under the constraints of incentive compatibility and voluntary trade is described in Section
2.6. The optimal contract of the principal is obtained and discussed in Section 2.7. Two
major illustrations offered by the results are given in Sections 2.8 and 2.9. Section 2.10
proves the Revelation Principle in the principal-agent set up. This principle guarantees
that there is no loss of generality in restricting the analysis to menus of two contrats when
the agent’s private cost information takes only two possible values. The analysis of the
previous sections is then extended to more general cost and revenue functions in Section
3More generally, they both know that they know that...
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2.11. This allows us to illustrate new features of the rent extraction-efficiency trade-off.
Appendix 2.1 to this section generalizes the results to the more technical case, often
found in the literature, where the agent’s type is drawn from a continuous distribution on
a compact and convex set of possible types. So far, the analysis assumed risk neutrality
of the agent and an interim timing of contracting, i.e., the principal offers a contract to
an agent once the latter has already learned his type. Section 2.12 considers the more
symmetric case where the contract can be offered at the ex ante stage, i.e., before the
agent learns his type. We perform this analysis under various assumptions on the degrees
of risk aversion of the principal and the agent. Implicit in our whole analysis of this
chapter is the assumption that the agent and the principal can commit to the terms of
the contract. This assumption is discussed in Section 2.13. Section 2.14 gives a closer
look at the set of incentive feasible allocations and in particular at the convexity of this
set. We show there the conditions under which stochastic mechanisms can be useful for
the principal. Given that the principal wants to reduce an information gap with the
agent, informative signals can be useful to improve contracting and the terms of the rent
extraction-efficiency trade-off. Section 2.15 studies the added value of these informative
signals. Finally, in Section 2.16, we present many examples of contracting relationships
highlighting the generality of the framework provided in this chapter.
2.2 The Basic Model
2.2.1 Technology, Preferences and Information
Consider a consumer or a firm (the principal) who wants to delegate to an agent the
production of q units of a good. The value for the principal of these q units is S(q) where
S ′ > 0, S ′′ < 0 and S(0) = 0. The marginal value of the good is thus positive and strictly
decreasing with the number of units bought by the principal.
The production cost of the agent is unobservable to the principal, but it is common
knowledge that the fixed cost is F and that the marginal cost θ belongs to the set Θ =
{θ, θ¯}. The agent can be either efficient (θ) or inefficient (θ¯) with respective probabilities
ν and 1− ν. In other words, he has the cost function:
C(q, θ) = θq + F with probability ν (2.1)
C(q, θ¯) = θ¯q + F with probability 1− ν. (2.2)
We denote by ∆θ = θ¯ − θ > 0 the spread of uncertainty on the agent’s marginal cost.
When taking his production decision the agent is informed about his type θ. We stress
that this information structure is exogenously given to the players.4
4We will come back to the endogeneity of the information structure in Chapter 9.
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2.2.2 Contracting Variables
The economic variables of the problem we consider thereafter are the quantity produced q
and the transfer t received by the agent. Let A be the set of feasible allocations. Formally,
we have:
A = {(q, t) : q ∈ IR+, t ∈ IR}. (2.3)
These variables are both observable and verifiable by a third party such as a benevolent
Court of Justice. They can thus be included in a contract which can be enforced with
appropriate out-of-equilibrium penalties if either the principal or the agent deviates from
the requested output and transfer.
2.2.3 Timing
For most of the book, unless explicitly stated, we will maintain the timing defined in
Figure 2.1 below where A denotes the agent and P the principal.
-
time
? ? ??
t = 0 t = 1 t = 2 t = 3
A
discovers
his type θ
P
offers a
contract
A
accepts
or refuses
the contract
The contract
is executed
Figure 2.1: Timing of the Contracting Game.
Note that contracts are offered at the interim stage, i.e., when there is already asymmetric
information between the contracting parties when the principal makes his offers.5
2.3 The Complete Information Optimal Contract
2.3.1 First-Best Production Levels
Suppose first that there is no asymmetry of information between the principal and the
agent. The efficient production levels are obtained by equating the principal’s marginal
5For reasons that we do not discuss now, the principal did not have the opportunity to offer a contract
to the agent before t = 0. We return to this issue in Section 2.12 below where we analyze also the case
of ex ante contracting.
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value and the agent’s marginal cost. Hence, first-best outputs are given by the following
first-order conditions:
S ′(q∗) = θ (2.4)
and
S ′(q¯∗) = θ¯. (2.5)
The complete information efficient production levels q∗ and q¯∗ should be both carried out
if their social values, respectively W ∗ = S(q∗)− θq∗ − F and W¯ ∗ = S(q¯∗)− θ¯q¯∗ − F , are
non-negative. The social value of production when the agent is efficient, W ∗, is greater
than when he is inefficient, namely W¯ ∗. Indeed, we have S(q∗) − θq∗ ≥ S(q¯∗) − θq¯∗ by
definition of q∗ and S(q¯∗)− θq¯∗ ≥ S(q¯∗)− θ¯q¯∗ since θ¯ > θ. For trade to be always carried
out, it is enough that production be socially valuable for the least efficient type, i.e., the
following condition must be satisfied:
W¯ ∗ = S(q¯∗)− θ¯q¯∗ − F ≥ 0, (2.6)
an hypothesis that we will maintain throughout this chapter. As the fixed cost F plays
no other role than justifying the existence of a single agent, it is set to zero from now on
in order to simplify notations.6
Note that, since the principal’s marginal value of output is decreasing, the optimal
production levels defined by (2.4) and (2.5) are such that q∗ > q¯∗, i.e., the optimal
production of an efficient agent is greater than that of an inefficient agent.
2.3.2 Implementation of the First-Best
For a successful delegation of the task, the principal must offer to the agent a utility
level which is at least as high as the utility level that the latter obtains outside the
relationship (for each value of the cost parameter). We refer to these constraints as the
agent’s participation constraints. If we normalize to zero the agent’s outside opportunity
utility level7 (sometimes called his status quo utility level), these participation constraints
write as:
t− θq ≥ 0 (2.7)
t¯− θ¯q¯ ≥ 0. (2.8)
To implement the first-best production levels, the principal can make the following
take-it-or-leave-it-offers to the agent: If θ = θ¯ (resp. θ), the principal offers the transfer
6We come back to the role of the fixed cost in Section 2.7.3 below.
7This debatable assumption is relaxed in Section 3.4.
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t¯∗ (resp. t∗) for the production level q¯∗ (resp. q∗) with t¯∗ = θ¯q¯∗ (resp. t∗ = θq∗). Whatever
his type, the agent accepts the offer and makes then zero profit. The complete information
optimal contracts are thus (t∗, q∗) if θ = θ and (t¯∗, q¯∗) if θ = θ¯.
Importantly, under complete information, delegation is costless for the principal who
achieves the same utility level as what he would get if he was carrying the task himself
(of course with the same cost function as the agent).
2.3.3 A Graphical Representation of the Complete Information
Optimal Contract
In Figure 2.2, we draw the indifference curves of a θ-agent (solid curves) and of a θ¯-agent
(dotted curves) in the (q, t) space.
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Figure 2.2: Indifference Curves of Both Types.
The iso-utility curves of both types of agent correspond to increasing levels of utility when
one moves in the north-west direction. Since θ¯ > θ, the iso-utility curves of the inefficient
agent θ¯ have a greater slope than those of the efficient agent. Thus, the iso-utility curves
for different types cross only once. All along this chapter and the next one, we will come
back several times to this important property called the single-crossing or Spence-Mirrlees
property.
The complete information optimal contract is finally represented in Figure 2.3 by the
pair of points (A∗, B∗). For each those two points, the strictly concave indifference curve
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of the principal is tangent to the zero rent iso-utility curve of the corresponding type.
Note that the iso-utility curves of the principal correspond to increasing levels of utility
when one moves in the south-east direction. The principal reaches thus a higher profit
when dealing with the efficient type. We denote by V¯ ∗ (resp. V ∗) the principal’s level of
utility when he faces the θ¯− (resp. θ−) type. The principal having all bargaining power,
we have V¯ ∗ = W¯ ∗ (resp. V ∗ = W ∗).
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Figure 2.3: First-Best Contracts.
Remark: In Figure 2.3, the payment t∗ is greater than t¯∗, but we note that t∗ can be
greater or smaller than t¯∗ depending on the curvature of the function S(·) as it can be
easily seen graphically.
2.4 Incentive Feasible Menu of Contracts
2.4.1 Incentive Compatibility and Participation
Suppose now that the marginal cost θ is the agent’s private information and let us consider
the case where the principal offers the menu of contracts {(t∗, q∗); (t¯∗, q¯∗)} hoping that an
agent with type θ will select (t∗, q∗) and an agent with type θ¯ will select instead (t¯∗, q¯∗).
From Figure 2.3, we see that B∗ is preferred to A∗ by both types of agents. Indeed, the
θ-agent’s iso-utility curve which passes through B∗ corresponds to a positive utility level,
instead of a zero utility level at A∗. The θ¯-agent’s iso-utility curve which passes through
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A∗ corresponds to a negative utility level, less than the zero utility level this type gets by
choosing B∗. Offering the menu (A∗, B∗) fails to have the agents self-selecting properly
within this menu. The efficient type mimics the inefficient one and selects also contract
B∗. The complete information optimal contracts can no longer be implemented under
asymmetric information. We will thus say that the menu of contracts {(t∗, q∗); (t¯∗, q¯∗)} is
not incentive compatible. This leads us to the following definition:
Definition 2.1 : A menu of contracts {(t, q), (t¯, q¯)} is incentive compatible when (t, q) is
weakly8 preferred to (t¯, q¯) by agent θ and (t¯, q¯) is weakly preferred to (t, q) by agent θ¯.
Mathematically, these requirements amount to the fact that the allocations must satisfy
the following incentive compatibility constraints:
t− θq ≥ t¯− θq¯ (2.9)
and
t¯− θ¯q¯ ≥ t− θ¯q. (2.10)
Remark: Importantly, note that we do not presume a priori the existence of any com-
munication between the principal and the agent. We will address more fully the issue
of communication in Section 2.10. Incentive compatibility constraints should be mainly
understood as constraints on final allocations, i.e., on the agent’s choices. At a general
level, those constraints are thus similar to the simple revealed preference arguments used
in standard consumption theory.9
Furthermore, for a menu to be accepted, it must yield to each type at least its outside
opportunity level. The following two participation constraints must thus be satisfied:
t− θq ≥ 0, (2.11)
t¯− θ¯q¯ ≥ 0. (2.12)
Altogether, incentive and participation constraints define a set of incentive feasible allo-
cations achievable through a menu of contracts. This leads us to the following definition.
Definition 2.2 : A menu of contracts is incentive feasible if it satisfies both incentive
and participation constraints (2.9) to (2.12).
8In order to define incentive compatibility, it is common to impose weak rather than strong preference.
At an ε cost for the principal, strict preference is easily obtained.
9See Varian (1989).
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The inequalities (2.9) to (2.12) fully characterize the set of incentive feasible menus of
contracts. The restrictions embodied in this set express, in addition to the usual condition
of voluntary trade, the constraints imposed on the allocation of resources by asymmetric
information between the principal and the agent.
2.4.2 Special Cases
• Bunching or Pooling Contracts: A first special case of incentive feasible menu
of contracts is obtained when the contracts targeted for each type coincide, i.e., when
t = t¯ = tp, q = q¯ = qp and both types of agents accept this contract. For those contracts,
we say that there is bunching or pooling of types.
The incentive constraints are all trivially satisfied by these contracts. Incentive com-
patibility is thus easy to satisfy, but at the cost of an obvious loss of flexibility in al-
locations which are no longer dependent on the state of nature. Only the participation
constraints matter now. However, the hardest participation constraint to satisfy is that
of the inefficient agent since (2.12) implies then (2.11) for a pooling contract.
• Shut-Down of the Least Efficient Type: Another particular case occurs when
one of the contracts is the null contract (0, 0) and the non-zero contract (ts, qs) is only
accepted by the efficient type. Then, (2.9) and (2.11) reduce both to:
ts − θqs ≥ 0. (2.13)
The incentive constraint of the bad type reduces also to:
0 ≥ ts − θ¯qs. (2.14)
With such a contract, the principal gives up production if the agent is a θ¯-type. We will
say that it is a contract with shut-down.
As with the pooling contract just seen above, the benefit of the (0, 0) option is that it
somewhat reduces the number of constraints since the incentive (2.9) and the participation
(2.11) constraint take indeed the same form. Of course, the cost of such a contract may
be an excessive screening of types. Here, the screening of types takes the rather extreme
form of excluding the least efficient type.
2.4.3 Monotonicity Constraints
Incentive compatibility constraints reduce the set of feasible allocations. Moreover, in
well-behaved incentive problems, these constraints put lots of structure on the set of
feasible profiles of quantities. These quantities must generally satisfy a monotonicity
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constraint which does not exist under complete information. Indeed, in our simple model
adding (2.9) and (2.10) yields immediately:
q ≥ q¯. (2.15)
Independently of the principal’s preferences, incentive compatibility alone implies that the
production level requested from a θ¯-agent cannot be higher than the one requested from a
θ-agent. We will call condition (2.15) obtained by adding the two incentive constraints an
implementability condition. Any pair of outputs (q, q¯) which is implementable, i.e., which
can be reached by an incentive compatible contract, must satisfy this condition which is
here necessary and sufficient for implementability.
Remark: In our two-type model, the conditions for implementability take a simple form.
More generally, with more than two types or with a continuum, things might get harder
as we demonstrate in Appendix 2.1 and in Section 3.2.
2.5 Information Rents
To understand the structure of the optimal contract it is useful to introduce the concept
of information rent.
We saw in Section 2.2 that, under complete information, the principal (who has all
the bargaining power by assumption) is able to maintain all types of agents at their zero
status quo utility level. Their respective utility levels U∗ and U¯∗ at the first-best satisfy:
U∗ = t∗ − θq∗ = 0 (2.16)
and
U¯∗ = t¯∗ − θ¯q¯∗ = 0. (2.17)
This will not be possible anymore in general under incomplete information, at least when
the principal wants both types of agents to be active.
Indeed, take any menu {(t¯, q¯); (t, q)} of incentive feasible contracts and consider the
utility level that a θ-agent would get by mimicking a θ¯-agent. By doing so, he would get
t¯− θq¯ = t¯− θ¯q¯ +∆θq¯ = U¯ +∆θq¯. (2.18)
Even if the θ¯-agent utility level is reduced to its lowest utility level fixed at zero, i.e.,
U¯ = t¯− θ¯q¯ = 0, the θ-agent benefits from an information rent which is worth ∆θq¯ coming
from his ability to possibly mimic the less efficient type. So, as long as the principal
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insists on a positive output, q¯ > 0, the principal must give up a positive rent to a θ-agent.
This information rent is generated by the informational advantage of the agent over the
principal. The principal’s problem is to determine the smartest way to give up such a
rent provided by any given incentive feasible contract.
In what follows, we use the notations U = t − θq and U¯ = t¯ − θ¯q¯ to denote the
respective information rent of each type.
2.6 The Optimization Program of the Principal
According to our timing of the contractual game, the principal must offer a menu of
contracts before knowing which type of agent he is facing. Therefore, he will compute the
benefit of any menu of contracts {(t, q); (t¯, q¯)} in expected terms. The principal’s problem
writes thus as:
(P ) : max
{(t¯,q¯);(t,q)}
ν
(
S(q)− t)+ (1− ν) (S(q¯)− t¯)
subject to (2.9) to (2.12).
Using the definition of the information rents U = t− θq and U¯ = t¯− θ¯q¯, we can replace
transfers in the principal’s objective function as functions of information rents and outputs
so that the new optimization variables are now {(U, q); (U¯ , q¯)}. This change of variables
will sharpen our economic interpretations all along the book. The focus on information
rents allows us to assess the distributive impact of asymmetric information. The focus on
outputs allows us to analyze also its impact on allocative efficiency and the overall gains
from trade.
With this change of variables, the principal’s objective function can then be rewritten
as:
ν
(
S(q)− θq)+ (1− ν) (S(q¯)− θ¯q¯)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Expected Allocative Efficiency
− (νU + (1− ν)U¯) .︸ ︷︷ ︸
Expected Information Rent
(2.19)
This new expression shows clearly that the principal wishes to maximize the expected
social value of trade minus the expected rent of the agent.10 The principal is ready to
accept some distortions away from efficiency to decrease the agent’s information rent. We
see below precisely how.
10Note that a social utility maximizer putting an equal weight on the principal and the agent’s expected
utility in his objective function would be interested in maximizing expected allocative efficiency only,
without any concern for the distribution of information rents between the principal and the agent.
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The incentive constraints (2.9) and (2.10) written in terms of information rents and
outputs are respectively:
U ≥ U¯ +∆θq¯, (2.20)
U¯ ≥ U −∆θq. (2.21)
The participation constraints (2.11) and (2.12) become respectively:
U ≥ 0, (2.22)
U¯ ≥ 0. (2.23)
The principal wishes to solve problem (P ) below:
(P ) : max
{(U,q);(U¯ ,q¯)}
ν(S(q)− θq) + (1− ν)(S(q¯)− θ¯q¯)− (νU + (1− ν)U¯)
subject to (2.20) to (2.23).
We index with a superscript SB meaning “second-best” the solution to this problem.
2.7 The Rent Extraction-Efficiency Trade-Off
2.7.1 The Asymmetric Information Optimal Contract
The major difficulty of problem (P ), and more generally of incentive theory, is to deter-
mine which of the many constraints imposed by incentive compatibility and participation
are the relevant ones, i.e., the binding ones at the optimum of the principal’s problem.
A first route could be to apply Lagrangean techniques to problem (P ), once one has
checked that the problem is concave. The number of constraints calls nevertheless for a
more practical route where the modeler first guesses which are the binding constraints and
checks ex post that the omitted constraints are indeed strictly satisfied. In a well-behaved
incentive problem, this route is certainly more fruitful. In our very simple model, such
a strategy provides a quick solution to the optimization problem. Moreover, this route
turns out to be more fruitful to build the economic intuition behind this model.
Let us first consider contracts with q¯ > 0. The ability of the θ-agent to mimic the θ¯-
agent implies that the θ-agent’s participation constraint (2.22) is always strictly satisfied.
Indeed, (2.23) and (2.20) imply immediately (2.22). If a menu of contracts enables an
inefficient agent to reach his status quo utility level, it will be also the case for an efficient
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agent who can produce at a lower cost. Second, (2.21) seems also irrelevant since, as
guessed from Section 2.4, the difficulty comes from a θ-agent willing to claim that he is
inefficient rather than the reverse.
This simplification in the number of relevant constraints leaves us with only two re-
maining constraints, the θ-agent’s incentive constraint (2.20) and the θ¯-agent’s participa-
tion constraint (2.23). Of course, both constraints must be binding at the optimum of
the principal’s problem (P ). Indeed, suppose it is not so; then the principal could either
reduce U or (and) U¯ by a small amount ², still keeping all outputs the same. This would
increase the principal’s payoff leading to a contradiction. Hence, we must have:
U = ∆θq¯, (2.24)
and
U¯ = 0. (2.25)
Substituting (2.24) and (2.25) into (2.19), we obtain a reduced program (P ′) with outputs
as the only choice variables:
(P ′) : max
{(q,q¯)}
ν
(
S(q)− θq)+ (1− ν) (S(q¯)− θ¯q¯)− ν∆θq¯.
Compared with the full information setting, asymmetric information alters the principal’s
optimization simply by the subtraction of the expected rent which has to be given up to
the efficient type. The inefficient type gets no rent, but the efficient type θ gets the
information rent that he could obtain anyway by mimicking the inefficient type θ¯. This
rent depends only on the level of production requested from this inefficient type.
Since the expected rent given up does not depend on the production level q of the
efficient type, the maximization of (P ′) calls for no distortion away from the first-best for
the efficient type’s output, namely:
S ′(qSB) = θ or qSB = q∗. (2.26)
However, maximization with respect to q¯ yields now:
(1− ν) (S ′(q¯SB)− θ¯) = ν∆θ. (2.27)
Increasing the inefficient agent’s output by an infinitesimal amount dq increases allocative
efficiency in this state of nature. The principal’s expected payoff is improved by a term
equal to the left-hand side of (2.27) times dq. At the same time, this infinitesimal change
in output also increases the efficient agent’s information rent and the principal’s expected
payoff is diminished by a term equal to the right-hand side above times dq.
At the second-best optimum, the principal is neither willing to increase nor to de-
crease the inefficient agent’s output and (2.27) expresses the important trade-off between
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efficiency and rent extraction which arises under asymmetric information. The expected
marginal efficiency cost and the expected marginal cost of the rent brought about by an
infinitesimal change of the inefficient type’s output are equated.
For further references, it is useful to summarize the main features of the optimal
contract.
Proposition 2.1 : Under asymmetric information, the optimal menu of contracts en-
tails:
• No output distortion for the efficient type with respect to the first-best, qSB = q∗. A
downward output distortion for the inefficient type, q¯SB < q¯∗ with
S ′(q¯SB) = θ¯ +
ν
1− ν∆θ. (2.28)
• Only the efficient type gets a strictly positive information rent given by
USB = ∆θq¯SB. (2.29)
• The second-best transfers are given by tSB = θq∗ +∆θq¯SB and t¯SB = θ¯q¯SB.
To validate our approach based on the sole consideration of the efficient type’s incentive
constraint, it remains to check that the omitted incentive constraint of an inefficient agent
is satisfied, i.e., 0 ≥ ∆θq¯SB−∆θqSB. This latter inequality follows from the monotonicity
of the second-best schedule of outputs since we have indeed qSB = q∗ > q¯∗ > q¯SB.
2.7.2 A Graphical Representation of the Second-Best Outcome
Starting from the complete information optimal contract (A∗, B∗) which is not incentive
compatible, we can construct an incentive compatible contract (B∗, C) with the same
production levels by giving a higher transfer to the agent producing q∗. (See Figure 2.4).
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Figure 2.4: Necessary Rent to Implement the First-Best Outputs.
The contract C is on the θ-agent’s indifference curve passing through B∗. Henceforth, the
θ-agent is now indifferent between B∗ and C and (B∗, C) becomes an incentive compatible
menu of contracts. The rent which is given up to the θ-firm is now ∆θq¯∗.
Rather than insisting on the first-best production level for an inefficient type, the
principal prefers actually to slightly decrease q¯ by an amount dq. By doing so, expected
efficiency is just diminished by a second-order term, since q¯∗ is the first-best output which
maximizes efficiency when the agent is inefficient. Instead, the information rent left to
the efficient type diminishes to the first-order. Of course, the principal stops reducing the
inefficient type’s output until a further decrease would have a greater efficiency cost than
the gain in reducing the information rent it would bring about. The optimal trade-off
finally occurs at (ASB, BSB) as shown on Figure 2.5.
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Figure 2.5: Optimal Second-Best Contracts ASB and BSB.
2.7.3 Shut-Down Policy
If the first-order condition (2.28) has no positive solution, q¯SB should be set at zero. We
are in the special case of a contract with shut-down. BSB coincides with 0 and ASB with
A∗ in Figure 2.5. Then, no rent is given up to the θ-firm by the unique non null contract
(t∗, q∗) offered and only selected by agent θ. The shut-down of the agent occurs when
θ = θ¯. With such a policy, a significant inefficiency emerges since the inefficient type does
not produce. The benefit of such a policy is that no rent is given up to the efficient type.
More generally, such a shut-down policy is optimal when
ν
(
S(q∗)− θq∗) ≥ ν (S(qSB)− θqSB −∆θq¯SB)+ (1− ν) (S(q¯SB)− θ¯q¯SB) (2.30)
or, noting that q∗ = qSB, when
ν∆θq¯SB ≥ (1− ν) (S(q¯SB)− θ¯q¯SB) . (2.31)
The left-hand side of (2.31) represents the expected cost of the efficient type’s rent due to
the presence of the inefficient one when the latter produces a positive amount q¯SB. The
right-hand side of (2.31) represents instead the expected benefit from transacting with
the inefficient type at the second-best level of output. Shut-down of the inefficient type
is optimal when this expected benefit is lower than the expected cost.
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Remark: Looking again at condition (2.28), we see that shut-down is never desirable
when the Inada condition S ′(0) = +∞ is satisfied. Indeed, q¯SB defined by (2.28) is
necessarily strictly positive. Then, note that we can rewrite S(q¯SB)− (θ¯ + ν
1−ν∆θ
)
q¯SB as
S(q¯SB)−S ′(q¯SB)q¯SB which is strictly positive since S(q)−S ′(q)q is strictly increasing with
q when S ′′(·) < 0 and is equal to zero for q = 0. Hence, S(q¯SB) − (θ¯ + ν
1−ν )∆θ
)
q¯SB > 0
and shut-down of the least efficient type does not occur.
The shut-down policy is also dependent of the status quo utility levels. Suppose that,
for both types, the status quo utility level is U0 > 0. Then (2.31) becomes (dividing by
1− ν)
ν
1− ν∆θq¯
SB + U0 ≥ S(q¯SB)− θ¯q¯SB. (2.32)
Therefore, for ν large enough, shut-down occurs11 even if the Inada condition S ′(0) =
+∞ is satisfied. Note that this case also occurs when the agent has a strictly positive
fixed cost F > 0.
Coming back to the principal’s problem (P ), the occurrence of shut-down can also be
interpreted as saying that the principal has, on top of the agent’s production, another
choice variable to solve the screening problem. This extra variable is the subset of types
which are induced to produce a positive amount. Reducing the subset of producing agents
obviously reduces the rent of the most efficient type. In our two-type model exclusion of
the least efficient type may thus be optimal.
2.8 The Theory of the Firm under Asymmetric In-
formation
When the delegation of task occurs within the firm, a major conclusion of the above
analysis is that, because of asymmetric information, the firm does not maximize the social
value of trade, or more precisely its profit, a maintained assumption of most economic
theory. This lack of allocative efficiency should not be considered as a failure in the
rational use of resources within the firm. Indeed, the point is that allocative efficiency
is only one part of the principal’s objective. The allocation of resources within the firm
remains constrained optimal once informational constraints are fully taken into account.
This systematic deviation away from profit maximization can be interpreted as an “X-
inefficiency” a` la Leibenstein (1966). This author has indeed stressed the management
failures which take place within the largest firms, i.e., those which are the most likely to
suffer from significant internal informational problems.
11Suppose the contrary. Then q¯SB goes to zero as ν goes to one and S(q¯SB)−θ¯q¯SB as well as ν1−ν∆θq¯SB
go to zero. But then (2.32) must hold strictly for ν close enough to one.
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Williamson (1975) has also pushed forward the view that various transaction costs may
impede the achievement of economic transactions. Among the many origins of these costs,
Williamson stresses “informational impactedness” as an important source of inefficiency.
Clearly, even in a world with a costless enforcement of contracts, a major source of
allocative inefficiency is the existence of asymmetric information between trading partners.
Of course, another important insight of Williamson’s analysis is that transaction costs
may be mitigated by the choice of convenient organizational forms. This point does not
contradict our interpretation of transaction costs as coming from informational problems
if one is ready to accept the view that various organizational forms generate different
degrees and costs of asymmetric information between partners, an issue which is clearly
high on the current research agenda of organization theory.12
The idea that various organizational forms are associated with different information
structures has been used by some authors to provide a theory of vertical integration.
Arrow (1975) suggests that an upstream firm may want to integrate backward and ac-
quire a downstream supplier to reduce the extent of asymmetric information between
those two units. An obvious limitation of this approach is that it takes as exogenous the
fact that vertical integration improves information. This exogeneity has led to an impor-
tant debate over the last fifteen years between proponents of this idea (like for instance
Williamson (1985)) and opponents (like Grossman and Hart (1986)) who would prefer to
see information structures being derived from the property rights associated with different
organizational forms.
A last point is worth stressing. Even though asymmetric information generates al-
locative inefficiencies, those inefficiencies do not call for any public policy motivated by
efficiency. Indeed, any benevolent policy maker in charge of correcting these inefficiencies
would face the same informational constraints as the principal. The allocation obtained
above is Pareto optimal in the set of incentive feasible allocations or incentive Pareto
optimal. Nevertheless, the policy-maker might want to implement different trade-offs be-
tween efficiency and rent extraction as we will see in Section 2.16.1 in the archetypical
case of regulatory intervention. Redistribution would be then the motivation for public
policy.
2.9 Asymmetric Information andMarginal Cost Pric-
ing
Let us view the principal as acting for a set of consumers and the agent as a firm producing
a consumption good. The first-best rules defined by (2.4) and (2.5) can be interpreted
12Aghion and Tirole (1997) for instance.
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as price equal to marginal cost since consumers on the market will equate their marginal
utility of consumption to price.
Under asymmetric information, price equates marginal cost only when the producing
firm is efficient (θ = θ). Using (2.28), we immediately get the expression of the price p(θ¯)
for the inefficient type’s output:
p(θ¯) = θ¯ +
ν
1− ν∆θ. (2.33)
Price is higher than marginal cost to decrease the quantity q¯ produced by the inefficient
firm, and reduce the efficient firm’s information rent. Alternatively, we can say that price
is equal to a generalized (or virtual13) marginal cost which includes, in addition to the
traditional marginal cost of the inefficient type θ¯, an information cost which is worth
here ν
1−ν∆θ. What is simply required is to generalize the concept of cost to include the
information cost imposed by asymmetric information.
2.10 The Revelation Principle
In the above analysis, we have restricted the principal to offer a menu of contracts, one for
each possible type. First, one may wonder if a better outcome could be achieved with a
more complex contract allowing the agent to possibly choose among more options. Second,
one may also wonder whether some sort of communication device between the agent and
the principal could be used to transmit information to the principal so that the latter
can recommend outputs and payments as a function of transmitted information. This is
not the case. Indeed, the Revelation Principle ensures that there is no loss of generality
in restricting the principal to offer simple menus having at most as many options as
the cardinality of the type space. Those simple menus are actually examples of direct
revelation mechanisms for whom we give now a couple of definitions.
Definition 2.3 : A direct revelation mechanism is a mapping g(·) from Θ to A which
writes as g(θ) = (q(θ), t(θ)) for all θ belonging to Θ. The principal commits to offer the
transfer t(θ˜) and the production level q(θ˜) if the agent announces the value θ˜ for all θ˜ in
Θ.
Definition 2.4 : A direct revelation mechanism g(·) is truthful if it is incentive com-
patible for the agent to announce his true type, for any type, i.e., if the direct revelation
mechanism satisfies the following incentive compatibility constraints:
t(θ)− θq(θ) ≥ t(θ¯)− θq(θ¯) (2.34)
t(θ¯)− θ¯q(θ¯) ≥ t(θ)− θ¯q(θ). (2.35)
13To use the expression coined by Myerson (1979).
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Denoting transfer and output for each possible report respectively as t(θ) = t, q(θ) = q,
t(θ¯) = t¯ and q(θ¯) = q¯, we get back to the notations of the previous sections and in
particular to the incentive constraints (2.9) and (2.10).
A more generalmechanism can be obtained when communication between the principal
and the agent is more complex than having simply the agent report his type to the
principal. LetM be the message space offered to the agent by a more general mechanism.
This message space can be as complex as one can imagine. Conditionally on a given
message m received from the agent, the principal requests a production level q˜(m) and
provides a corresponding payment t˜(m).
Definition 2.5 : A mechanism is a message space M and a mapping g˜(·) from M to A
which writes as g˜(m) = (q˜(m), t˜(m)) for all m belonging to M.
When facing such a mechanism, the agent with type θ chooses a best message m∗(θ)
which14 is implicitly defined as
t˜(m∗(θ))− θq˜(m∗(θ)) ≥ t˜(m˜)− θq˜(m˜) for all m˜ inM. (2.36)
The mechanism (M, g˜(·)) induces therefore an allocation rule a(θ) = (q˜(m∗(θ)), t˜(m∗(θ))
mapping the set of types Θ into the set of allocations A. Then, we are ready to state the
Revelation Principle in the one agent case.
Proposition 2.2 : Any allocation rule a(θ) obtained with a mechanism (M, g˜(·)) can
also be implemented with a direct and truthful revelation mechanism.
Proof: The indirect mechanism (M, g˜(·)) induces an allocation rule a(θ) = (q˜(m∗(θ)), t˜(m∗(θ))
from Θ into A. By composition of g˜(·) and m∗(·), we can construct a direct revela-
tion mechanism g(·) mapping Θ into A, namely g = g˜ ◦ m∗, or more precisely g(θ) =
(q(θ), t(θ)) ≡ g˜(m∗(θ)) = (q˜(m∗(θ)), t˜(m∗(θ))) for all θ in Θ.
Figure 2.6 illustrates this construction which is at the core of the Revelation Principle:
- -Θ M A
m∗(·) g˜(·)
6
g(·) = g˜ ◦m∗(·)
14Possibly, the agent’s best response can be a correspondence without changing anything below; just
pick one of the possible maximizers and call it m∗(θ).
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Figure 2.6: The Revelation Principle.
We check now that the direct revelation mechanism g(·) is truthful. Indeed, since
(2.36) is true for all m˜, it holds in particular for m˜ = m∗(θ′) for any θ′ in Θ. We have
thus:
t˜(m∗(θ))− θq˜(m∗(θ)) ≥ t˜(m∗(θ′))− θq˜(m∗(θ′)) for all (θ, θ′) in Θ2. (2.37)
Finally, using the definition of g(·), we get:
t(θ)− θq(θ) ≥ t(θ′)− θq(θ′) for all (θ, θ′) in Θ2. (2.38)
Hence, the direct revelation mechanism g(·) is truthful.
Importantly, the Revelation Principle provides a considerable simplification of contract
theory since it enables us to restrict the analysis to a simple and well defined family of
functions, the truthful direct revelation mechanisms.
Gibbard (1973) characterized the dominant strategy (non random) mechanisms
(mappings from arbitrary strategy spaces into allocations) when feasible allocations be-
long to a finite set and when there is no a priori information on the players’ preferences
(which are strict orderings). Actually he showed that such mechanisms had to be dicta-
torial, i.e., they had to correspond to the optimal choice of single agent. As a corollary he
showed that any voting mechanism (i.e., direct revelation mechanism) for which the truth
was a dominant strategy was also dictatorial. In this environment anything achievable by
a dominant strategy mechanism can be achieved by a truthful direct revelation mecha-
nism. So, Gibbard proved one version of the Revelation Principle indirectly. For the case
of quasi-linear preferences, Green and Laffont (1977) defined dominant strategy truthful
direct revelation mechanisms and proved directly that for any other dominant strategy
mechanism there is an equivalent truthful direct revelation mechanism (and they char-
acterized the class of truthful direct revelation mechanisms). Dasgupta, Hammond and
Maskin (1979) extended this direct proof to any family of preferences. Myerson (1979)
extended this proof to Bayesian implementation. Those notions of implementation must
be analyzed in multi-agent environments which are out of the scope of the present book.
They will be studied in Volume II. The expression “The Revelation Principle” finally
appeared in Baron and Myerson (1982).
2.11 A More General Utility Function for the Agent
Still keeping quasi-linear utility functions, let U = t−C(q, θ) be now the agent’s objective
function with Cq(·) > 0, Cθ(·) > 0, Cqq(·) > 0 and Cqqθ(·) > 0. The generalization of
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the Spence-Mirrlees property used so far is now Cqθ(·) > 0. This latter condition still
ensures that the different types of the agent have indifference curves which cross each
other at most once. It is obviously satisfied in the case C(q, θ) = θq analyzed before.
Economically, this Spence-Mirrlees condition is quite clear; it simply says that a more
efficient type is also more efficient at the margin.
The analysis of the set of implementable allocations proceeds closely as we did before.
Incentive feasible allocations satisfy the following incentive and participation constraints:
U = t− C(q, θ) ≥ t¯− C(q¯, θ), (2.39)
U¯ = t¯− C(q¯, θ¯) ≥ t− C(q, θ¯), (2.40)
U = t− C(q, θ) ≥ 0, (2.41)
U¯ = t¯− C(q¯, θ¯) ≥ 0. (2.42)
2.11.1 The Optimal Contract
Following the same steps as in Section 2.6, the incentive constraint of an efficient type
(2.39) and the participation constraint for the inefficient type (2.42) are the two relevant
constraints for optimization. These constraints rewrite respectively as:
U ≥ U¯ + Φ(q¯) (2.43)
where Φ(q¯) = C(q¯, θ¯)−C(q¯, θ) (with Φ′(·) > 0 and Φ′′(·) > 0 from the assumptions made
on C(·)) and
U¯ ≥ 0. (2.44)
Those constraints being both binding at the second-best optimum, this leads to the fol-
lowing expression of the efficient type’s rent:
U = Φ(q¯) (2.45)
Since Φ′(·) > 0, reducing the inefficient agent’s output reduces also, as in Section 2.6, the
efficient agent’s information rent.
With the assumptions made on C(·), one can also check that the principal’s objec-
tive function is strictly concave with respect to outputs. The solution of the principal’s
program can finally be summarized as follows:
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Proposition 2.3 : With general preferences satisfying the Spence-Mirrlees property, Cθq >
0, the optimal menu of contracts entails:
• No output distortion with respect to the first-best outcome for the efficient type,
qSB = q∗ with
S ′(q∗) = Cq(q∗, θ). (2.46)
A downward output distortion for the inefficient type, q¯SB < q¯∗ with
S ′(q¯∗) = Cq(q¯∗, θ¯) (2.47)
and
S ′(q¯SB) = Cq(q¯SB, θ¯) +
ν
1− νΦ
′(q¯SB). (2.48)
• Only the efficient type gets a strictly positive information rent given by USB =
Φ(q¯SB).
• The second-best transfers are respectively given by tSB = C(q∗, θ) + Φ(q¯SB) and
t¯SB = C(q¯SB, θ¯).
The first-order conditions (2.46), (2.48) characterize the optimal solution if the ne-
glected incentive constraint (2.40) is satisfied. For this to be true, we need to have:
t¯SB − C(q¯SB, θ¯) ≥ tSB − C(qSB, θ) + C(qSB, θ)− C(qSB, θ¯), (2.49)
which amounts to
0 ≥ Φ(q¯SB)− Φ(qSB). (2.50)
We have Φ′(·) > 0 from the Spence-Mirrlees condition, hence (2.50) yields q¯SB ≤ qSB.
But, from our assumptions: qSB = q∗ > q¯∗ > q¯SB.15 So the Spence-Mirrlees condition
guarantees that only the efficient type’s incentive constraint has to be taken into account.
The critical role of the Spence-Mirrlees condition to simplify the problem will appear
even more clearly in models with more than two types.16
15Indeed, by definition of q∗, S′(q∗) = Cq(q∗, θ) < Cq(q∗, θ¯) since Cqθ > 0. Hence, using the fact that
S(q) − C(q, θ¯) is concave in q and maximum for q¯∗, we have q∗ > q¯∗. Moreover, Φ′(·) > 0 implies that
S′(q¯SB) > Cq(q¯SB , θ¯). Hence, we have also q¯SB < q¯∗.
16See Section 3.2 and Appendix 2.1 below.
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Remark: The Spence-Mirrlees property is more generally a constant sign condition17 on
Cθq. If Cθq < 0, Proposition 2.3 is unchanged except that now the inefficient type’s output
is distorted upwards q¯SB > q¯∗ > q∗. Indeed, in such a model, the first-best production
level of the inefficient type is higher than for the efficient type. Moreover, the information
rent of the efficient type is still Φ(q¯) = C(q¯, θ¯) − C(q¯, θ), but now to decrease this rent
requires an increase of q¯ since Cθq < 0.
2.11.2 Non-Responsiveness
Let us come back to our linear specification of the agent’s cost function, but let us also
assume that the principal’s return from contracting depends directly on θ and writes as
S(q, θ). This is an instance of a common value model where the agent’s type directly
affects the principal’s utility function. On top of the usual assumptions of a positive
and decreasing marginal value of trade, we also assume that Sqθ(q, θ) > 1. This latter
assumption simply means that the marginal gross value of trade for the principal increases
sharply with the agent’s type. For instance, the efficient agent produces a lower quality
good than the inefficient one and the principal prefers a high quality good.
The first-best productions are now defined by Sq(q
∗, θ) = θ and Sq(q¯∗, θ¯) = θ¯. With
our assumption on Sqθ, the first-best production schedule is such that q
∗ < q¯∗, i.e., it does
not satisfy the monotonicity condition (2.15) implied by incentive compatibility.
In this case, there exists a strong conflict between the principal’s desire to have the
θ¯-type produce more than the θ-agent for pure efficiency reasons and the monotonicity
condition due to asymmetric information. This is what Guesnerie and Laffont (1984) call a
phenomenon of non-responsiveness in their general analysis of the principal-agent’s model
with a continuum of types. This phenomenon makes screening of types quite difficult.
Indeed, the second-best optimum induces screening only when qSB = q∗ and q¯SB defined
by:
Sq(q¯
SB, θ¯) = θ¯ +
ν
1− ν∆θ (2.51)
satisfy the monotonicity condition qSB ≥ q¯SB. However, when ν is small enough, q¯SB
defined on (2.51) is close to the first-best outcome q¯∗ and thus q¯SB > qSB which violates
the monotonicity condition (2.15). Hence, non-responsiveness forces the principal to use
a pooling allocation. Figure 2.7 illustrates this non-responsiveness.
17In Guesnerie and Laffont (1984), the Spence-Mirrlees condition is called the constant sign (CS+ or
CS−) assumption.
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Figure 2.7: Non-Responsiveness.
As in Figure 2.4, the pair of first-best contracts (A∗, B∗) is not incentive compatible.
But, contrary to the case of Section 2.7.2, the contract C which makes the θ-type being
indifferent between telling the truth and taking contract A∗ is not incentive compatible
for the θ¯-type who also strictly prefers C to A∗.
One possibility to restore incentive compatibility would be to distort q¯∗ down to q∗
to decrease the θ-type’s information rent to contract D while still preserving incentive
compatibility for both types. We would obtain then a pooling allocation at D. The
principal can do better by choosing another pooling allocation which is obtained by moving
along the zero iso-utility line of a θ¯-type. Indeed, the best pooling allocation solves
problem (P ) below:
(P ) : max
{(qp,tp)}
νS(qp, θ) + (1− ν)S(qp, θ¯)− tp
subject to
tp − θqp ≥ 0 (2.52)
tp − θ¯qp ≥ 0. (2.53)
The harder participation constraint is obviously that of the least efficient type, namely
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(2.53). Hence, the optimal solution is characterized by
νSq(q
p, θ) + (1− ν)Sq(qp, θ¯) = θ¯, (2.54)
and
tp = θ¯qp (2.55)
with qp < q¯∗ since Sqθ > 0.
This pooling contract is represented by point E in Figure 2.6 (which can be to the left
or to the right of D) where the heavy line indifference curve of the principal corresponds
to the “average” utility function Sˆ(q)− t = νS(q, θ) + (1− ν)S(q, θ¯)− t.
Importantly, when non-responsiveness occurs, the sharp conflict between the prin-
cipal’s preferences and the incentive constraints (which reflect the agent’s preferences)
makes impossible the use of any information transmitted by the agent about his type.
2.11.3 More Than Two Goods
Let us now assume that the agent is producing a whole vector of goods q = (q1, . . . , qn) for
the principal. The agent’s cost function becomes C(q, θ) with C(·) being strictly convex
in q. The value for the principal of consuming this whole bundle is now S(q) with also
S(·) being strictly concave in q.
In this “multi-output” incentive problem, the principal is interested by a whole set of
activities carried out simultaneously by the agent. It is straightforward to check that the
efficient agent’s information rent writes now as U = Φ(q) with Φ(q) = C(q, θ¯)− C(q, θ).
This leads to the following second-best optimal outputs. The efficient type produces
the first-best vector of outputs qSB = q∗ with
Sqi(q
∗) = Cqi(q
∗, θ) for all i in {1, . . . , n}. (2.56)
The inefficient type’s vector of outputs q¯SB is instead characterized by:
Sqi(q¯
SB) = Cqi(q¯
SB, θ¯) +
ν
1− νΦqi(q¯
SB), for all i in {1, . . . , n}, (2.57)
which generalizes the distortion of unidimensional models.
Without specifying further the value and cost functions, it is a priori hard to compare
these second-best outputs above with the first-best outputs defined by the n first-order
conditions:
Sqi(q¯
∗) = Cqi(q¯
∗, θ¯). (2.58)
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Indeed, it may well be the case that the n first-order conditions (2.57) define altogether
a vector of outputs with some components q¯SBi above q¯
∗
i for a subset of indices i.
Turning now to incentive compatibility, and summing the incentive constraints U ≥
U¯ + Φ(q¯) and U¯ ≥ U − Φ(q) for any incentive feasible contract yields:
C(q, θ¯)− C(q¯, θ¯) ≥ C(q, θ)− C(q¯, θ) (2.59)
for all implementable pairs (q¯, q).
Obviously, this condition is satisfied if the Spence-Mirrlees conditions Cqiθ(·) > 0 holds
for each output i and if the monotonicity conditions q¯i < qi for all i are all satisfied. In
this case, the neglected incentive constraint of a θ¯-agent is automatically satisfied when
qSBi < q¯
∗
i = q
SB
i
for all i. However, the reverse is not true; it might well be the case that
q¯SBi > q
SB
i
= q∗
i
for some output i and the condition (2.59) nevertheless holds for the
second-best vector of outputs q∗ and q¯SB.
2.12 Ex Ante Versus Ex Post Participation Constraints
As we have already mentioned, for most of the book dealing with the case of adverse
selection, we consider the case of contracts offered at the interim stage. Sometimes, the
principal and the agent can nevertheless contract also at the ex ante stage, i.e., before
the agent discovers his type. For instance, the contours of the firm may be designed
before the agent receives any piece of information on his productivity. In this section, we
characterize for this alternative timing the optimal contract under various assumptions
about the risk aversion of the two players.
2.12.1 Risk Neutrality
Suppose that, instead of contracting after the agent has discovered θ, the principal and
the agent meet and contract ex ante, i.e., before the agent’s learning of information. If
the agent is risk neutral, his ex ante participation constraint writes now as:
νU + (1− ν)U¯ ≥ 0. (2.60)
This ex ante participation constraint replaces the two ex post participation constraints
(2.22) and (2.23) in problem (P ). What matters now to insure participation is that the
agent’s expected information rent remains non-negative.
From (2.19), we see that the principal’s objective function is decreasing in the agent’s
expected information rent. Ideally, the principal wants to impose a zero expected rent to
the agent and have (2.60) being binding.
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Moreover, the principal must structure the ex post rents U and U¯ to ensure that the
wedge between those two levels is such that the incentive constraints (2.20) and (2.21)
remain satisfied. An example of such a rent allocation which is both incentive compatible
and satisfies the ex ante participation constraint with an equality is:
U∗ = (1− ν)∆θq¯∗ > 0 and U¯∗ = −ν∆θq¯∗ < 0. (2.61)
With such a rent distribution, the optimal contract implements the first-best outputs
costlessly from the principal’s point of view. Note however that the first-best may not be
monotonic as requested by the implementability condition. This is for instance the case
when the non-responsiveness property holds as in Section 2.11.2. In that case, even under
ex ante contracting and risk neutrality, some inefficiency still arises.18
In the contract defined by (2.61), the agent is rewarded when he is efficient and
punished when he turns out to be inefficient. There must be some risk on the distribution
of information rents to induce information revelation, but this risk is costless for the
principal because of the agent’s risk neutrality. However, to be feasible, such an ex ante
contract requires a strong ability of the Court of Justice to enforce contracts leading
possibly to a negative payoff when a bad state of nature realizes.19
Remark: The principal has much more leeway in structuring the rents U and U¯ so that
the incentive constraints (2.20) and (2.21) hold and the ex ante participation constraint
(2.60) is an equality. Consider the following contracts {(t∗, q∗); (t¯∗, q¯∗)} where t∗ = S(q∗)−
T and t¯∗ = S(q¯∗)−T with T being a lump-sum payment to be defined below. This contract
is incentive compatible since:
t∗ − θq∗ = S(q∗)− θq∗ − T > t¯∗ − θq¯∗ = S(q¯∗)− θq¯∗ − T (2.62)
by definition of q∗ and
t¯∗ − θ¯q¯∗ = S(q¯∗)− θ¯q¯∗ − T > t∗ − θ¯q∗ = S(q∗)− θ¯q∗ − T, (2.63)
by definition of q¯∗.
Note that the incentive compatibility constraints are now strict inequalities. Moreover,
T can be used to satisfy the agent’s ex ante participation constraint with an equality
T = ν(S(q∗)− θq∗) + (1− ν)(S(q¯∗)− θ¯q¯∗).
This implementation of the first-best outcome amounts to have the principal selling
the benefit of the relationship to the risk neutral agent for a fixed up-front payment T .
Then, the agent will benefit from the full value of the good and will trade-off the value
18So, one cannot say that the distortions imposed by incentive compatibility are only due in Section 2.2
to the inability to contract before θ is revealed to the agent, i.e., to some sort of contractual incompleteness.
19See Section 9.1 for a weakening of this enforceability condition.
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of any production against its cost just as if he was an efficiency maximizer. We will say
that the agent is residual claimant for the firm’s profit.20
Harris and Raviv (1979) propose a theory of the firm as a mechanism allocating
resources at the ex ante stage. The first best allocation remains implementable when the
firm has a strong ability to enforce contracts. Loeb and Magat (1979) model regulation
as a principal-agent problem with adverse selection. They show that asymmetric infor-
mation is not an obstacle to the implementation of marginal cost pricing provided that
the regulated firm accepts the regulatory contract at the ex ante stage.
2.12.2 Risk Aversion
A Risk Averse Agent
The previous section has shown us that the implementation of the first-best is feasible
with risk neutrality. The counterpart of this implementation is that the agent is subject
to a significant amount of risk. Such a risk is obviously costly if the agent is risk averse.
Consider now a risk averse agent with a Von Neuman-Morgenstern utility function
u(·) defined on his monetary gains t− θq such that u′(·) > 0, u′′(·) < 0 and u(0) = 0. We
suppose, as in the previous Section 2.12.1, that the contract between the principal and
the agent is signed before the agent discovers his type.21 The incentive constraints are
unchanged but the agent’s ex ante participation constraint writes now as:
νu(U) + (1− ν)u(U¯) ≥ 0. (2.64)
As usual, we guess a solution such that (2.21) is slack at the optimum and we let the
reader check this ex post. The principal’s program reduces now to:
(P ) : max
{(U¯ ,q¯);(U,q)}
ν(S(q)− θq − U) + (1− ν)(S(q¯)− θ¯q¯ − U¯),
subject to (2.20) and now (2.64).
We summarize the solution in the next proposition (see Appendix 2.2 for the proof).
Proposition 2.4 : When the agent is risk averse and contracting takes place ex ante,
the optimal menu of contracts entails:
20We will come back to a similar first-best implementation under moral hazard in Chapter 4.
21If the contract is signed after the risk averse agent discovers his type, the solution is the same as with
risk neutrality (Proposition 2.1) since ex post participation and incentive constraints take the same form.
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• No output distortion for the efficient type, qSB = q∗. A downward output distortion
for the inefficient type, q¯SB < q¯∗ with
S ′(q¯SB) = θ¯ +
ν(u′(U¯SB)− u′(USB))
νu′(USB) + (1− ν)u′(U¯SB)∆θ. (2.65)
• Both (2.20) and (2.64) are the only binding constraints. The efficient (resp. in-
efficient) type gets a strictly positive (resp. negative) ex post information rent,
USB > 0 > U¯SB.
With risk aversion, the principal can no longer costlessly structure the agent’s infor-
mation rents to insure the efficient type’s incentive compatibility constraint, contrary to
Section 2.12.1. Creating a wedge between U and U¯ to satisfy (2.20) makes the risk averse
agent bear some risk. To insure the participation of the risk averse agent, the principal
must also pay a risk premium. Reducing this premium calls for a downward reduction in
the inefficient type’s output so that the risk borne by the agent is lower. As expected,
the agent’s risk aversion leads the principal to weaken the incentives.
For the constant absolute risk aversion utility function u(x) = 1−exp(−rx)
r
, (2.65) leads
to a closed-form expression for output:
S ′(q¯SB) = θ¯ +
ν
1− ν∆θ
(
1− 1
ν + (1− ν) exp(−r∆θq¯SB)
)
. (2.66)
Also, the efficient agent’s ex post utility writes as
USB = ∆θq¯SB +
1
r
ln
(
1− ν + ν exp(−r∆θq¯SB)) > 0, (2.67)
and the inefficient agent’s ex post utility is
U¯SB =
1
r
ln
(
1− ν + ν exp(−r∆θq¯SB)) < 0. (2.68)
Incentives (and outputs) decrease with risk aversion. If risk aversion goes to zero (r → 0),
q¯SB converges towards the first-best value q¯∗. Indeed we know from Section 2.12.1 that,
with risk neutrality and an ex ante participation constraint, the optimal contract induces
an efficient outcome. Moreover, the utility levels of both types converge also towards
those described in (2.61).
When the agent becomes infinitely risk averse, it is as if he had an ex post individual
rationality constraint for the worst state of the world given by (2.23). In the limit, q¯SB and
the utility levels, USB and U¯SB, converge towards the same solution as in Proposition 2.1.
So, the model of Section 2.2 can also be interpreted as a model with ex ante contracting
but with an infinitely risk averse agent at the zero utility level.
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Salanie´ (1990) analyzed the case of a continuum of types. Pooling for the least
efficient types occurs when risk aversion is large enough. Laffont and Rochet (1998)
showed a similar phenomenon with ex post participation constraints when a regulator
(the principal) maximizes ex ante social welfare with a risk averse firm.
A Risk Averse Principal
Consider now a risk averse principal with utility function v(·) defined on his gains from
trade S(q) − t such that v′(·) > 0, v′′(·) < 0 and v(0) = 0. Again, the contract between
the principal and the risk neutral agent is signed before the agent knows his type.
In this context, the first-best contract obviously calls for the first-best output q∗ and
q¯∗ being produced. It also calls for the principal being fully insured between both states
of nature and for the agent’s ex ante participation constraint being binding. This leads
us to the following two conditions which must be satisfied by the agent’s rents U∗ and
U¯∗:
S(q∗)− θq∗ − U∗ = S(q¯∗)− θ¯q¯∗ − U¯∗, (2.69)
and
νU∗ + (1− ν)U¯∗ = 0. (2.70)
Solving, this system of two equations with two unknowns (U∗, U¯∗) yields:
U∗ = (1− ν) (S(q∗)− θq∗ − (S(q¯∗)− θ¯q¯∗)) , (2.71)
and
U¯∗ = −ν (S(q∗)− θq∗ − (S(q¯∗)− θ¯q¯∗)) . (2.72)
Note that the first-best profile of information rents satisfies both types’ incentive
compatibility constraints since:
U∗ − U¯∗ = S(q∗)− θq∗ − (S(q¯∗)− θ¯q¯∗) > ∆θq¯∗ (2.73)
(from the definition of q∗) and
U¯∗ − U∗ = S(q¯∗)− θ¯q¯∗ − (S(q∗)− θq∗) > −∆θq∗, (2.74)
(from the definition of q¯∗). Henceforth, the profile of rents (U∗, U¯∗) is incentive compatible
and the first-best allocation is easily implemented in this framework.
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Proposition 2.5 : When the principal is risk averse over the monetary gains S(q) − t
and contracting takes place ex ante, the optimal incentive feasible contract implements the
first-best outcome.
It is interesting to note that U∗ and U¯∗ obtained in (2.71) and (2.72) are also the levels
of rent obtained in (2.62) and (2.63). Indeed, the lump-sum payment T = ν(S(q∗)−θq∗)+
(1− ν)(S(q¯∗)− θ¯q¯∗) which allows the principal to make the risk neutral agent’s residual
claimant for the hierarchy’s profit provides also full insurance to the principal.
By making the risk neutral agent residual claimant for the value of trade, ex ante
contracting allows the risk averse principal to implement the first-best outcome despite
the informational problem.
Of course this result does not hold anymore if the agent’s ex post participation con-
straint must be satisfied. In this case, we still guess a solution such that (2.21) is slack at
the optimum. The principal’s program reduces now to:
(P ) : max
{(U¯ ,q¯),(U,q)}
νv
(
S(q)− θq − U)+ (1− ν)v (S(q¯)− θ¯q¯ − U¯)
subject to (2.20) and (2.23).
Inserting the values of U and U¯ obtained from the binding constraints (2.20) and
(2.23) into the principal’s objective function and optimizing with respect to outputs leads
to qSB = q∗, i.e., no distortion for the efficient type just as in the case of risk neutrality
and a downward distortion of the inefficient type’s output q¯SB < q¯∗ given by
S ′(q¯SB) = θ¯ +
νv′(V SB)
(1− ν)v′(V¯ SB)∆θ, (2.75)
where V SB = S(q∗)−θq∗−∆θq¯SB and V¯ SB = S(q¯SB)− θ¯q¯SB are the principal’s payoffs in
both states of nature. We can check that V¯ SB < V SB since S(q¯SB)− θq¯SB < S(q∗)− θq∗
from the definition of q∗. In particular, we observe that the distortion in the right-hand
side of (2.75) is always lower than ν
1−ν∆θ, its value with a risk neutral principal. The
intuition is straightforward. By increasing q¯ above its value with risk neutrality, the
risk averse principal reduces the difference between V SB and V¯ SB. This gives him some
insurance and increases his ex ante payoff.
Risk aversion on the side of the principal is quite natural in some contexts. A local
regulator with a limited budget or a specialized bank dealing with relatively correlated
projects may be insufficiently diversified to become completely risk neutral. See Lewis
and Sappington (1995) for some application to the regulation of public utilities.
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2.13 Commitment
To solve our incentive problem, we have implicitly assumed that the principal has a
strong ability to commit himself to a distribution of rents inducing information revelation,
but also to some allocative inefficiency designed at reducing the cost of this revelation.
Alternatively, this assumption also means that the Court of Justice can perfectly enforce
the contract and that neither renegotiating nor reneging on the contract is a feasible
alternative for the agent or (and) the principal. What could happen when any of those
two assumptions is relaxed?
2.13.1 Renegotiating a Contract
A first source of limited commitment occurs when the principal can renegotiate the con-
tract offer to the agent along the course of actions. Renegotiation is a voluntary act which
should benefit both the principal and the agent. It should be contrasted with a breach of
contract which can hurt one of the contracting parties. On the contrary, one should view
a renegotiation procedure as the ability of the contracting partners to achieve a Pareto
improvement trade if any becomes incentive feasible along the course of actions.
Indeed, once the different types have revealed themselves to the principal by selecting
respectively the contracts (tSB, qSB) for the efficient type and (t¯SB, q¯SB) for the inefficient
type, the principal may propose a renegotiation to get around the allocative inefficiency
he has imposed on the inefficient agent’s output. The gain from this renegotiation comes
from raising allocative efficiency for the inefficient type and moving output from q¯SB to
q¯∗. To share these new gains from trade with the inefficient agent, the principal must at
least offer him the same utility level as before renegotiation. The participation constraint
of the inefficient agent can still be kept at zero when the transfer of this type is raised
from t¯SB = θ¯q¯SB to t¯∗ = θ¯q¯∗. However, raising this transfer also hardens the incentive
compatibility constraint of the efficient type. Indeed, it becomes more valuable for an
efficient type to hide his type to obtain this larger transfer, and truthful revelation by
the efficient type is no longer obtained in equilibrium. There is a fundamental trade-off
between raising efficiency ex post and hardening ex ante incentives when renegotiation is
an issue.
The ability to commit to a menu of contracts may not be too problematic in some
instances. Producing a quantity q may require to build a capacity up to that level.22
Raising production as requested by the renegotiation procedure asks for increasing the
productive capacity and this can be excessively costly compared to the allocative gains
coming from a larger volume of trade. Moreover, this commitment issue seems highly
22See Beaudry and Poitevin (1994) for a model along these lines.
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dependent on the use of a direct revelation mechanism since renegotiation takes place
after the agent has revealed his type, but before the principal imposes an output target.
Let us thus consider the simple and equivalent indirect mechanism where the principal
offers the same menu to the agent, but let the agent choose the output himself (as we have
done in the beginning of this chapter). This alternative mechanism does not require any
communication from the agent to the principal before production takes place. The agent
is delegated the choice of an output and, once this choice is made, there is no scope for
renegotiation since the one-shot relationship ends. The commitment issue becomes much
more problematic in truly dynamic contexts where different actions take place at various
dates. We will return to the difficult issues raised by the renegotiation of contracts in
Chapter 9 and Volume III.
2.13.2 Reneging on a Contract
A second source of imperfection arises when either the principal or the agent may breach
the contract and thus renege on his previous contractual obligation. Let us take the
case of the principal reneging the contract.23 Indeed, once the agent has revealed himself
to the principal by selecting the contract within the menu offered by the principal, the
latter, having learned the agent’s type, may propose the complete information contract
which extracts all rents without inducing any allocative efficiency. Of course, this breach
of contract should be anticipated by the agent and these anticipations will interfer with
truthful revelation in the first place. Also, the agent may want to renege on a contract
which gives him a negative ex post utility level as we mentioned in Section 2.12.1. In
this case, the threat of the agent reneging a contract signed at the ex ante stage forces
the agent’s participation to be written in ex post terms. Such a setting justifies also the
focus of this chapter on the case of interim contracting. In Chapter 9, we will also discuss
further the issue of enforcement.
2.14 Stochastic Mechanisms
We consider here the framework of Section 2.11 with a general cost function C(q, θ). Let
us rewrite the principal’s problem as:
(P ) : max
{(q,U);(q¯,U¯)}
ν
(
S(q)− C(q, θ))+ (1− ν) (S(q¯)− C(q¯, θ¯))− νU − (1− ν)U¯ ,
subject to
23See Section 8.4.3 and Section 9.2 for other models where the agent may renege on the contract.
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U − U¯ − Φ(q¯) ≥ 0 (2.76)
U¯ − U + Φ(q) ≥ 0 (2.77)
U ≥ 0 (2.78)
U¯ ≥ 0. (2.79)
When S(·) is concave and C(·) is convex, the principal’s objective function is concave
in (q, q¯, U, U¯). Neglecting constraints (2.77) and (2.78) as usual, the remaining constraints
define a convex set in (q, q¯, U, U¯) if Φ(·) is convex in q. Then, the optimal mechanism
cannot be stochastic. To see that suppose not. A random direct mechanism is then a
probability measure on the set of possible transfers and outputs which is conditional on
the agent’s report of his type. Let {(q˜, U˜); (˜¯q, ˜¯U)} be such a random stochastic mechanism.
We can replace this stochastic mechanism by the deterministic mechanism constructed
with the expectations of those variables namely, E(˜¯q), E(q˜), E(U˜) and E( ˜¯U) where E(·)
denotes the expectation operator.
Since the principal’s objective function is strictly concave in q, this new mechanism
gives a higher expected utility to the principal by Jensen’s inequality. Similarly, when
Φ(·) is convex, Jensen’s inequality also imply that, −Φ(E˜¯q) ≥ −E(Φ(˜¯q)) so that the new
deterministic mechanism expands the feasible set defined by the constraints (2.76) and
(2.79). The principal could thus achieve a higher utility level with the new deterministic
mechanism, a contradiction. Therefore, a sufficient condition to ensure the deterministic
nature of the optimal contract is Φ(·) convex or, equivalently, Cqqθ(·) > 0.
Let us explore briefly what could happen if the assumption Cqqθ(·) > 0 is no longer
satisfied. Substituting (2.76) and (2.79) into the principal’s objective function, and taking
into account that qSB = q∗ (where S ′(q∗) = Cq(q∗, θ)), the principal’s problem amounts
to maximizing an objective function
(1− ν) (S(q¯)− C(q¯, θ¯))− νΦ(q¯) (2.80)
which may fail to be strictly concave in q¯.
When this strict concavity is not satisfied, (2.80) may have several maximizers among
which the principal can randomize.24 Note that the randomness of contracts only affects
outputs. Indeed, from risk neutrality, the principal and the agent’s objective functions
being linear in transfers, the randomness on transfers is useless since any lottery of trans-
fers can be replaced by its expected value without changing the principal and the agent’s
payoffs.
The lack of concavity of (2.80) captures in fact a deeper property: the possible lack of
convexity of the set of incentive feasible allocations. To illustrate this phenomenon, note
24This randomization is then not uniquely defined.
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that, for contracts such that (2.79) is binding and such that q = q∗, (2.76) can then be
written as:
U ≥ Φ(q¯). (2.81)
Figure 2.8 below represents the set of implementable allocations in the (U, q¯) space and
shows that this set may not be convex when Φ(·) is non-convex. Points A and B are then
two possible deterministic maximizers of the principal’s (reduced) objective function:
(1− ν)(S(q¯)− C(q¯, θ¯))− νU. (2.82)
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Figure 2.8: Multiple Maximizers and Ex Ante Randomization.
In this case, the principal can randomize among A and B but the realization of this
randomization is known by the agent before he makes any report to the principal. The
randomization takes place ex ante, i.e., before the agent chooses his report. By doing
so, the principal can now achieve a payoff corresponding to point C in Figure 2.8 which
yields a higher expected utility level than what he gets at A or B.
However, the principal can even obtain a greater payoff by committing to randomize
among incentive feasible allocations ex post. Using such random direct mechanisms leads
indeed to a convexification of the set of these allocations as shown in Figure 2.9 below. The
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objective function (2.82) being strictly convex in (U, q¯), there exists a unique maximizer
to the principal’s problem and it is now described by point D.
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Figure 2.9: Unique Maximizer and Ex Post Randomization.
By being able to commit to an ex post randomization through a stochastic mechanism,
the principal can achieve a payoff which is strictly greater than what he obtains with
deterministic mechanisms or with an ex ante randomization. Of course, the difficulty
may come from the fact that this randomization has to be verifiable by a Court of Justice
to be contracted upon. Ensuring this verifiability is a slightly more difficult problem than
ensuring that a deterministic mechanism is enforced since any deviation away from a given
randomization can only be statistically detected once sufficiently many realizations of the
contracts have been observed. This suggests that such a deviation can only be detected
in a repeated relationship framework or when the principal is involved in many bilateral
one-shot principal-agent relationships. The enforcement of such stochastic mechanisms is
thus particularly problematic. This has led scholars to give up those random mechanisms
or, at least, to focus on economic settings where they are not optimal.
Stochastic mechanisms have been sometimes suggested in the insurance, the
nonlinear pricing and optimal taxation literatures (see Stiglitz (1987), Arnott and Stiglitz
(1988)) as well as in the price discrimination literature (see Maskin and Riley (1984) and
Moore (1985)).
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2.15 Informative Signals to Improve Contracting
In this section, we investigate the impacts of various improvements of the principal’s infor-
mation system on the optimal contract. The idea here is to see how pieces of information
exogenous to the relationship can help the principal to design the contract with the agent.
The simple observation of performances in similar principal-agent relationships and the
setting up of monitoring and auditing structures which are specific to the relationship
are all informational devices used to improve the agent’s control by somewhat filling the
information gap between the principal and his agent.
2.15.1 Ex Post Verifiable Signal
Suppose that the principal, the agent and the Court of Justice observe ex post a verifiable
signal σ which is correlated with θ. This signal is observed after the agent’s choice of
production (or alternatively after the agent’s report to the principal in a direct revelation
mechanism). The contract can then be conditioned on both the agent’s report and the
observed signal which provides useful information on the underlying state of nature.
For simplicity, we assume that this signal may take only two values σ1 and σ2. Let
the conditional probabilities of these respective realizations of the signal be µ1 = Pr(σ =
σ1/θ = θ) ≥ 1/2 and µ2 = Pr(σ = σ2/θ = θ¯) ≥ 1/2. Note that, if µ1 = µ2 = 1/2, the
signal σ is uninformative. Otherwise, σ1 brings “good news” on the fact that the agent
is efficient and σ2 brings “bad news” since it is more likely that the agent is inefficient in
this case.
Let us adopt the following notations for the information rents u11 = t(θ, σ1)−θq(θ, σ1),
u12 = t(θ, σ2)− θq(θ, σ2), u21 = t(θ¯, σ1)− θ¯q(θ¯, σ1) and u22 = t(θ¯, σ2)− θ¯q(θ¯, σ2). Similar
notations are used for the outputs qij. The agent knows his type before the signal σ
realizes. Then, the incentive and participation constraints must be written in expectation
over the realization of σ. Incentive constraints for both types write respectively as:
µ1u11 + (1− µ1)u12 ≥ µ1(u21 +∆θq21) + (1− µ1)(u22 +∆θq22), (2.83)
(1− µ2)u21 + µ2u22 ≥ (1− µ2)(u11 −∆θq11) + µ2(u12 −∆θq12). (2.84)
The contract being accepted by each type after learning his type but before the realization
of the signal, participation constraints for both types write as:
µ1u11 + (1− µ1)u12 ≥ 0, (2.85)
(1− µ2)u21 + µ2u22 ≥ 0. (2.86)
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Note that, for a given schedule of output qij, the system (2.83) to (2.86) has as many
equations as unknowns uij. When the determinant of the system (2.83) to (2.86) is non-
zero, it is possible to find ex post rents uij (or equivalently transfers) such that all these
constraints are binding.25 In this case, the agent receives no rent whatever his type.
Moreover, any choice of production levels, in particular the complete information optimal
ones, can be implemented this way. The determinant of the system is non-zero when:
1− µ1 − µ2 6= 0. (2.87)
Importantly, condition (2.87) holds generically. It fails only if µ1 + µ2 = 1 which corre-
sponds to the case of a uninformative signal.
Riordan and Sappington (1988) were the first to introduce the condition (2.87).
Cre´mer and McLean (1988) generalized this use of correlated information in their analysis
of multi-agent models. These authors use another mathematical tool to ensure that
incentive constraints are slack: Farkas’ Lemma. We will cover this important topic for
incentive theory with multiple agents in Volume II.
2.15.2 Ex Ante Nonverifiable Signal
We keep the same informational structure as in Section 2.15.1, but we suppose now that
a nonverifiable binary signal σ about θ is available to the principal at the ex ante stage.
Before offering an incentive contract, the principal computes for each value of this signal
his posterior belief that the agent is efficient, namely:
νˆ1 = Pr(θ = θ/σ = σ1) =
νµ1
νµ1 + (1− ν)(1− µ2) (2.88)
νˆ2 = Pr(θ = θ/σ = σ2) =
ν(1− µ1)
ν(1− µ1) + (1− ν)µ2 . (2.89)
Then, the optimal contract entails a downward distortion of the inefficient agent’s pro-
duction q¯SB(σi) which is, for signals σ1 and σ2 respectively:
S ′(q¯SB(σ1)) = θ¯ +
νˆ1
1− νˆ1∆θ = θ¯ +
νµ1
(1− ν)(1− µ2)∆θ, (2.90)
S ′(q¯SB(σ2)) = θ¯ +
νˆ2
1− νˆ2∆θ = θ¯ +
ν(1− µ1)
(1− ν)µ2∆θ. (2.91)
In the case where µ1 = µ2 = µ >
1
2
, we can interpret µ as an index of the informativeness
of the signal. Observing σ1, the principal thinks that it is more likely that the agent is
25In fact, using Farkas’ lemma, one can even ensure that incentive constraints are strict inequalities.
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efficient. A stronger reduction in the efficient type’s information rent is called for after
σ1. (2.90) shows that incentives decrease with respect to the case without informative
signal since ( µ1
1−µ2 > 1). In particular, if µ2 is large enough, the principal shuts down
the inefficient firm after having observed σ1. He offers a high powered incentive contract
to the efficient agent only which leaves him no rent. On the contrary, because it is less
likely to face an efficient type after having observed σ2, the principal reduces less the
information rent than in the case without informative signal since (1−µ1
µ2
< 1). Incentives
are stronger.
See Boyer and Laffont (2000) for a comparative statics analysis of the effect of
a more competitive environment on the optimal contract. In their analysis, the competi-
tiveness of the environment is linked to the informativeness of the signal σ.
2.15.3 More or Less Favorable Distribution of Types
In the last two Sections 2.15.1 and 2.15.2, the principal benefits from improvements in
the information structure. More generally, even in the basic model of this chapter, one
may wonder how information structures can be ranked by the principal and the agent.
We will say that a distribution (ν˜, 1− ν˜) is more favorable than a distribution (ν, 1−ν)
if and only if ν˜ > ν. Then, the expected utility of the principal is higher with a more
favorable distribution. Indeed, we can define this expected utility as:
V (ν) = ν(S(q∗)− θq∗ −∆θq¯SB(ν)) + (1− ν)(S(q¯SB(ν))− θ¯q¯SB), (2.92)
where we make explicit the dependence of V and q¯SB on ν.
Using the Envelope Theorem, we obtain:
dV (ν)
dν
= (S(q∗)− θq∗ −∆θq¯SB)− (S(q¯SB)− θ¯q¯SB)
= (S(q∗)− θq∗)− (S(q¯SB)− θq¯SB), (2.93)
which is strictly positive by definition of q∗.
The rent of the efficient type, ∆θq¯SB, is clearly lower when the distribution is more
favorable. Indeed, as it can be seen on (2.28), q¯SB(ν) is a decreasing function of ν. So,
incentives decrease as the distribution becomes more favorable. Indeed, the perspective
of a more likely efficient type leads the principal to a trade-off which is tilted against
information rents, i.e., a trade-off which is less favorable to allocative efficiency. For the
ex ante rent of the agent, U(ν) = ν∆θq¯SB(ν), we have instead:
dU(ν)
dν
= ∆θq¯SB(ν) + ν∆θ
dq¯SB(ν)
dν
(2.94)
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or, using (2.28),
dU(ν)
dν
= ∆θq¯SB(ν)︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0
+
ν(∆θ)2
(1− ν)2S ′′(q¯SB)︸ ︷︷ ︸
<0
(ν)
. (2.95)
Therefore, for ∆θ small enough the expected rent increases when the distribution is
more favorable but it decreases when ∆θ is rather large. Note that, if there is shut-down
when ν becomes larger, the expected rent decreases necessarily. The most interesting
result is thus that, for ∆θ small, both the principal and the agent gain from a more
favorable distribution. There is no conflict of interests on the choice of the information
structure.
See Laffont and Tirole (1993, Chapter 1) for a similar analysis in the case of a
continuum of types.
2.16 Contract Theory at Work
This section proposes several classical settings where the basic model of this chapter is
useful. Introducing adverse selection in each of these contexts has proved to be a quite
significative improvement of standard microeconomic analysis.
2.16.1 Regulation
In the Baron and Myerson (1982) regulation model, the principal is a regulator who max-
imizes a weighted average of the consumers’ surplus S(q)− t and a regulated monopoly’s
profit U = t − θq with a weight α less than one for the firm’s profit. The principal’s
objective function writes now as V = S(q)− θq− (1−α)U . Because α is less than one, it
is again socially costly to give up a rent to the firm. Maximizing expected social welfare
under incentive and participation constraints leads to qSB = q∗ for the efficient type and
to a downward distortion for the inefficient type which is given by:
S ′(q¯SB) = θ¯ +
ν
1− ν (1− α)∆θ. (2.96)
Note that a higher value of α reduces the output distortion since the regulator is less
concerned by the distribution of rents within society as α increases.
The regulation literature of the last fifteen years has improved greatly our under-
standing of government intervention under asymmetric information. We refer to Laffont
and Tirole (1993) for a comprehensive view of this theory and its various implications for
the design of real world regulatory institutions.
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2.16.2 Nonlinear Pricing of a Monopoly
In Maskin and Riley (1984), the principal is the seller of a private good with production
cost cq who faces a continuum of buyers. The principal has thus a utility function V =
t − cq. The tastes of a buyer for the private good are such that his utility function is
U = θu(q) − t where q is the quantity consumed and t his payment to the principal. As
in our analysis of Section 2.6, one can view the parameter θ of each buyer as being drawn
independently from the same distribution26 on Θ = {θ, θ¯} with respective probabilities
1− ν and ν.
Incentive and participation constraints can, as usual, be written directly in terms of
the information rents U = θu(q)− t and U¯ = θ¯u(q¯)− t¯ as:
U ≥ U¯ −∆θu(q¯), (2.97)
U¯ ≥ U +∆θu(q), (2.98)
U ≥ 0, (2.99)
U¯ ≥ 0. (2.100)
The principal’s program takes now the following form:
(P ) : max
{(U¯ ,q¯),(U,q)}
ν
(
θ¯u(q¯)− cq¯)+ (1− ν) (θu(q)− cq)− (νU¯ + (1− ν)U)
subject to (2.97) to (2.100).
The analysis is the mirror image of that of Section 2.6 since now the “efficient type” is
the one with the highest valuation for the good θ¯. Hence, (2.98) and (2.99) are the two
binding constraints. As a result, there is no output distortion with respect to the first-best
outcome for the high valuation type and q¯SB = q¯∗ where
θ¯u′(q¯∗) = c. (2.101)
However, there exists a downward distortion of the low valuation agent’s output with
respect to the first-best outcome. We have qSB < q∗ where(
θ − ν
1− ν∆θ
)
u′(qSB) = c. (2.102)
26Note that this distribution is now the actual distribution of types (i.e., ν is the frequency of type θ
by the Law of Large Numbers), and not a probability distribution. This interpretation also applies to
the basic model of this chapter and enlarges considerably its relevance.
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and θu′(q∗) = c.
The literature on nonlinear pricing is huge. The interested reader will find in
Tirole (1988), Varian (1988) and Wilson (1993) excellent reviews of this topic. In Chapter
9, we discuss the link between direct revelation mechanisms and nonlinear prices, and in
particular how and when the optimal direct mechanism can be implemented with a menu
of linear prices.
2.16.3 Quality and Price Discrimination
Mussa and Rosen (1978) have studied a very similar problem as in Section 2.16.2 where
agents buy one unit of a commodity with quality q but are vertically differentiated with
respect to their preferences for the good. The marginal cost (and average cost) of produc-
ing one unit of quality q is C(q) and the principal has the utility function V = t− C(q).
The utility function of an agent is now U = θq − t with θ in Θ = {θ, θ¯} with respective
probabilities 1− ν and ν.
Incentive and participation constraints can still be written directly in terms of the
information rents U = θq − t and U¯ = θ¯q¯ − t¯ as:
U ≥ U¯ −∆θq¯, (2.103)
U¯ ≥ U +∆θq, (2.104)
U ≥ 0, (2.105)
U¯ ≥ 0. (2.106)
The principal solves now:
(P ) : max
{(U,q),(U¯ ,q¯)}
ν
(
θ¯q¯ − C(q¯))+ (1− ν) (θq − C(q))− (νU¯ + (1− ν)U)
subject to (2.103) to (2.106).
Following similar procedures to what we have done so far, only (2.104) to (2.105) are
binding constraints. Finally, we find that the high valuation agent receives the first-best
quality q¯SB = q¯∗ where θ¯ = C ′(q¯∗). However, quality is now reduced below the first-best
for the low valuation agent. We have qSB < q∗ where:
θ = C ′(qSB) +
ν
1− ν∆θ. (2.107)
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Interestingly, the spectrum of qualities (defined as the difference of qualities between what
is obtained respectively by the high valuation and by the low valuation agent) is larger
under asymmetric information than under complete information. This incentive of the
seller to put a low quality good on the market is a well documented phenomenon in the
industrial organization literature. Some authors have even argued that damaging its own
goods may be part of the firm’s optimal selling strategy when screening of the consumers’
willingness to pay for quality is an important issue.27
2.16.4 Financial Contracts
Asymmetric information affects significantly the financial markets. For instance, in Freixas
and Laffont (1990), the principal is a lender who provides a loan with size k to a bor-
rower. Capital costs Rk to the lender since it could be invested elsewhere in the economy
to earn the risk free interest rate R. The lender has thus a utility function V = t − Rk.
The borrower makes a profit V = θf(k) − t where f(k) is the return on capital and t is
the borrower’s repayment to the lender. We assume that f ′(·) > 0 and f ′′(·) < 0. The
parameter θ is a productivity shock drawn from Θ = {θ, θ¯} with respective probabilities
1− ν and ν.
Incentive and participation constraints can again be written directly in terms of the
information rents U = θf(k)− t and U¯ = θ¯f(k¯)− t¯ as
U ≥ U¯ −∆θf(k¯), (2.108)
U¯ ≥ U +∆θf(k), (2.109)
U ≥ 0, (2.110)
U¯ ≥ 0. (2.111)
The principal’s program takes now the following form:
(P ) : max
{(U,k);(U¯ ,k¯)}
ν
(
θ¯f(k¯)−Rk¯)+ (1− ν) (θf(k)−Rk)− (νU¯ + (1− ν)U)
subject to (2.108) to (2.111).
We let the reader check that (2.109) and (2.110) are now the two binding constraints. As
a result, there is no capital distortion with respect to the first-best outcome for the high
productivity type and k¯SB = k¯∗ where θ¯f ′(k¯∗) = R. In this case, the return on capital
27Edgeworth (1857).
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is equal to the risk free interest rate. However, there exists also a downward distortion
of the low productivity borrower’s loan with respect to the first-best outcome. We have
kSB < k∗ where (
θ − ν
1− ν∆θ
)
f ′(kSB) = R. (2.112)
and θf ′(k∗) = R.
Screening borrowers according to the size of their loans amounts to some kind of ra-
tioning for the low productivity firms. This phenomenon is well documented in the finance
literature and we refer to Freixas and Rochet (1999, Chapter 5) for further references.
We will see in Section 3.7 that the lender may also rely on other screening devices,
like auditing or the threat of termination, to get valuable information on the firm.
2.16.5 Labor Contracts
Asymmetric information undermines also the relationship between a worker and the firm
for which he works. In Green and Khan (1983) and Hart (1983) among others, the
principal is a union (or a set of workers) who provides its labor force l to a firm. To
simplify the analysis, we assume that it has full bargaining power in determining the
labor contract with the firm and the latter has a zero reservation utility.
The firm makes a profit θf(l)−t where f(l) is the return on labor and t is the worker’s
payment. We assume that f ′(·) > 0 and f ′′(·) < 0. The parameter θ is a productivity
shock drawn from Θ = {θ, θ¯} with respective probabilities 1 − ν and ν. In the labor
contracting literature, the firm knows the realization of the shock and the union ignores
its value. The firm is objective is to maximize its profit U = θf(`) − t. Workers have a
utility function defined on consumption and labor. If their disutility of labor is counted in
monetary terms and all payments from the firm are consumed, they get V = v(t− ψ(l))
where ψ(·) is their disutility of labor which is increasing and convex (ψ′(·) > 0, ψ′′(·) > 0)
and v(·) is increasing and concave (v′(·) > 0, v′′(·) < 0).
In this context, the firm’s boundaries are determined before the realization of the
shock and contracting takes place ex ante. The firm’s ex ante participation constraint
writes thus as (2.70). It should thus be also clear that the model is completely isomorphic
to that of Section 2.13.2 with a risk averse principal and a risk neutral agent.
Using the results above, we know that the risk averse union will propose a contract to
the risk neutral firm which provides full insurance and implements the first-best levels of
employments ¯`∗ and `∗ defined respectively by θ¯f ′(¯`∗) = ψ′(¯`∗) and θf ′(`∗) = ψ′(`∗).
Let us now turn to the more difficult case where workers have a utility function ex-
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hibiting an income effect and let us assume, to simplify, that V = v(t)− ψ(`).
The first-best optimal contract would still require efficient employment in both states
of nature. Moreover, it would also call for equating the worker’s marginal utility of income
across states:
t∗ = t¯∗, (2.113)
and making the firm’s expected utility equal to zero
ν(θ¯f(¯`∗)− t¯∗) + (1− ν)(θf(`∗)− t∗) = 0. (2.114)
Solving those latter two equations for the pair of transfers (t¯∗, t∗) immediately yields
t¯∗ = t∗ = νθ¯f(¯`∗) + (1 − ν)θf(`∗) = E(θf(`∗)), where E(·) denotes the expectation
operator with respect to θ.
Inserting this value of the transfer into the union’s objective function, the principal
chooses levels of employment which are obtained as solutions to:
(P ) : max
{(¯`,`)}
v
(
νθ¯f(¯`) + (1− ν)θf(`))− νψ(¯`)− (1− ν)ψ(`).
We immediately find the first-best levels of labor:
θ¯f ′(¯`∗) =
ψ′(¯`∗)
v′(E(θf(`∗)))
, (2.115)
and
θf ′(`∗) =
ψ′(`∗)
v′(E(θf(`∗)))
. (2.116)
It follows that θ¯ f
′(¯`∗)
ψ′(¯`) = θ
f ′(`∗)
ψ′(`∗) and thus, using the fact that
f ′
ψ′ is decreasing, we obtain
that ¯`∗ > `∗.
Let us now consider the case of asymmetric information. The firm’s incentive com-
patibility constraints in both states of nature write as:
U¯ − U ≥ ∆θf(`) (2.117)
in the good state θ¯, and
U − U¯ ≥ −∆θf(¯`) (2.118)
in the bad state θ.
Note that the first-best levels of information rents U∗ = θf(`∗)−t∗ and U¯∗ = θ¯f(¯`∗)−t¯∗
satisfy (2.117) but violate (2.118). Henceforth, let us look for an optimal incentive feasible
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contract where the binding incentive constraint prevents the firm from claiming that a
high shock θ¯ has realized when, in fact, a low shock θ has realized. The union’s problem
writes thus as:
(P ) : max
{(U¯ ,¯`);(U,`)}
ν
(
v(θ¯f(¯`)− U¯)− ψ(¯`))+ (1− ν) (v(θf(`)− U)− ψ(`))
subject to (2.118) and
νU¯ + (1− ν)U ≥ 0. (2.119)
We let the reader check that both constraints above are binding at the optimum. In
this case, we have U¯ = (1 − ν)∆θf(¯`) and U = −ν∆θf(¯`). Inserting those expressions
of the firm’s information rents into the union’s objective function and optimizing with
respect to ¯` and ` yields:
θf ′(`SB) =
ψ′(`SB)
v′(V SB)
(2.120)
and (
θ¯ − (1− ν)∆θ(v
′(V¯ SB)− v′(V SB))
v′(V¯ SB)
)
f ′(¯`SB) =
ψ′(¯`SB)
v′(V¯ SB)
, (2.121)
where V¯ SB = θ¯f(¯`SB)− (1− ν)∆θf(¯`SB) and V SB = θf(`SB) + ν∆θf(¯`SB).
Note that V¯ SB > V SB as long as the implementability condition ¯`SB > `SB is satisfied.
The virtual shock ˜¯θ and the true shock θ¯ in the good state of nature are such that
˜¯θ = θ¯ − (1− ν)∆θ(v
′(V¯ SB)− v′(V SB))
v′(V¯ SB)
> θ¯. (2.122)
Therefore, as it can seen by comparing (2.115) and (2.121), asymmetric information
creates an incentive for the union to expand output over the first-best level ¯`∗.
This optimal overemployment has often been critized in the labor literature as
coming from the fact that the worker’s utility function used in our example is such that
labor is a normal good. For more general preferences, underemployment can instead be
obtained as an optimal solution to the asymmetric information problem. For further
references on this topic, the interested reader can look at Hart and Holmstro¨m (1987)
and Blanchard and Fisher (1989, Chapter 9) and references therein.
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APPENDIX 2.1: The Continuum of Types
Despite the fact that few new economic insights can be obtained in the continuum
case, we give in this appendix a brief account of this case because most of the literature
is written within this framework.
Reconsider the model of Section 2.2 with θ in Θ = [θ, θ¯], with a cumulative distribution
function F (θ) and a density function f(θ) > 0 on [θ, θ¯]. The Revelation Principle is still
valid in this context and we can restrict our analysis to direct revelation mechanisms
{(q(θ˜), t(θ˜))} which are truthful, i.e., here such that:
t(θ)− θq(θ) ≥ t(θ˜)− θq(θ˜) for any (θ, θ˜) in Θ2. (2.123)
In particular (2.123) implies:
t(θ)− θq(θ) ≥ t(θ′)− θq(θ′), (2.124)
t(θ′)− θ′q(θ′) ≥ t(θ)− θ′q(θ) for all pairs (θ, θ′) in Θ2. (2.125)
Adding (2.124) and (2.125) we obtain:
(θ − θ′)(q(θ′)− q(θ)) ≥ 0. (2.126)
Incentive compatibility alone requires that the schedule of output q(·) has to be non
increasing. This implies that q(·) is differentiable almost everywhere (a.e.), from which
we can derive that t(·) is also differentiable with the same points of non-differentiability.
The most general class of direct revelation mechanisms to consider is therefore the class
of a.e. differentiable functions. In practice, we use piecewise differentiable functions and
in most cases differentiable functions. Here, we will restrict the analysis to differentiable
functions, but it can be immediately extended to piecewise differentiable functions28
(2.123) implies the following first-order condition for the optimal response θ˜ chosen by
type θ is satisfied:
dt
dθ
(θ˜)− θdq
dθ
(θ˜) = 0. (2.127)
For the truth to be an optimal response for all θ, it must be the case that
dt
dθ
(θ)− θdq(θ)
dθ
= 0, (2.128)
and (2.128) must hold for all θ in Θ since θ is unknown to the principal.
28See Laffont and Tirole (1993, Chapter 6) for an example of an optimal discontinuous direct revelation
mechanism. See also Guesnerie and Laffont (1984).
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It is also necessary to satisfy the local second-order condition:
d2t(θ˜)
dθ2
∣∣∣
θ˜=θ
− θd
2q(θ˜)
dθ2
∣∣∣
θ˜=θ
≤ 0 (2.129)
or
d2t
dθ2
(θ)− θd
2q
dθ2
(θ) ≤ 0. (2.130)
But differentiating (2.128), (2.130) can be written more simply as:
−dq
dθ
(θ) ≥ 0. (2.131)
(2.128) and (2.131) constitute the local incentive constraints which ensure that the
agent does not want to lie locally. We need to check now that he does not want to lie
globally either, i.e.:
t(θ)− θq(θ) ≥ t(θ˜)− θq(θ˜) for any (θ, θ˜) in Θ2. (2.132)
From (2.128) we have:
t(θ)− t(θ˜) =
∫ θ
θ˜
τ
dq(τ)
dτ
du = θq(θ)− θ˜q(θ˜)−
∫ θ
θ˜
q(τ)dτ (2.133)
or
t(θ)− θq(θ) = t(θ˜)− θq(θ˜) + (θ − θ˜)q(θ˜)−
∫ θ
θ˜
q(τ)dτ, (2.134)
where (θ − θ˜)q(θ˜)− ∫ θ
θ˜
q(τ)dτ ≥ 0 since q(·) is non-increasing.
So, it turns out that the local incentive constraints imply also the global incentive
constraints. This is due to the fact that the Spence-Mirrlees condition holds.
In such circumstances the double infinity of incentive constraints (2.132) reduces to
a differential equation and to a monotonicity constraint. Local analysis of incentives is
enough. Truthful revelation mechanisms are then characterized by the two conditions
(2.128) and (2.131).
Let us use the rent variable U(θ) = t(θ) − θq(θ) instead of the transfer as we did in
the text of Chapter 2. The local incentive constraint writes then29 (by using (2.128)):
U˙(θ) = −q(θ). (2.135)
29U˙(θ) = −q(θ) + ( dtdθ − θ dqdθ ) but the term in parenthesis is zero from the first-order condition (2.128).
By the Envelope Theorem, the incentive constraint reduces therefore to (2.135).
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The optimization program of the principal can then be written:
(P ) : max
{(U(·),q(·))}
∫ θ¯
θ
(S(q(θ))− θq(θ)− U(θ)) f(θ)dθ,
subject to
U˙(θ) = −q(θ) (2.136)
q˙(θ) ≤ 0 (2.137)
U(θ) ≥ 0. (2.138)
Using (2.135), the participation constraint (2.138) simplifies to U(θ¯) ≥ 0. As in the
discrete case, incentive compatibility implies that only the participation constraint of the
most inefficient type can be binding. Furthermore, it is clear from the above program
that it will be binding, i.e., U(θ¯) = 0.
Ignoring momentarily (2.137), we can solve (2.136):
U(θ¯)− U(θ) = −
∫ θ¯
θ
q(τ)dτ (2.139)
or, since U(θ¯) = 0,
U(θ) =
∫ θ¯
θ
q(τ)dτ. (2.140)
The principal’s maximand becomes∫ θ¯
θ
(
S(q(θ))− θq(θ)−
∫ θ¯
θ
q(τ)dτ
)
f(θ)dθ), (2.141)
which, by an integration by parts, gives:∫ θ¯
θ
(
S(q(θ))−
(
θ +
F (θ)
f(θ)
)
q(θ)
)
f(θ)dθ. (2.142)
Maximizing pointwise (2.142) we get the second-best optimal outputs:
S ′(qSB(θ)) = θ +
F (θ)
f(θ)
, (2.143)
which generalizes (2.26) and (2.28) to the case of a continuum of types.
If the monotone hazard rate property d
dθ
(F (θ)
f(θ)
) ≥ 0 holds, then30 the solution qSB(θ) of
(2.143) is clearly decreasing and the neglected constraint (2.137) is satisfied.31 All types
choose therefore different allocations and there is no bunching in the optimal contract.
30This sufficient condition is satisfied by most parametric single peaked densities (see Bagnoli and
Bergstrom (1989)).
31If qSB(θ) is not non-increasing, it is not the solution. The solution which involves bunching in some
intervals (i.e., qSB constant on some intervals) can be easily obtained by the Pontrygin principle (see
Appendix 3.1 and Guesnerie and Laffont (1984)).
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From (2.143), we note that there is no distortion for the most efficient type (F (θ) = 0),
and a downward distortion for all the other types.
All types, except the least efficient type, obtain a positive information rent at the
optimal contract
USB(θ) =
∫ θ¯
θ
qSB(τ)dτ. (2.144)
Finally, one could allow for some shut-down of types. The virtual surplus S(q) −(
θ + F (θ)
f(θ)
)
q being decreasing with θ when the monotone hazard rate property holds,
shut-down (if any) occurs on an intervall [θ∗, θ¯]. θ∗ is obtained as a solution to
max
{θ∗}
∫ θ∗
θ
(
S(qSB(θ))−
(
θ +
F (θ)
f(θ)
)
qSB(θ)
)
f(θ)dθ.
For an interior optimum, we find that
S(qSB(θ∗)) =
(
θ∗ +
F (θ∗)
f(θ∗)
)
qSB(θ∗).
As in the discrete case, we let the reader check that the Inada condition S ′(0) = +∞
ensures that θ∗ = θ¯.
Remark: The optimal solution above can be also derived by using the Pontryagin prin-
ciple. The Hamiltonian is then:
H(q, U, θ) = (S(q)− θq − U) f(θ)− µq, (2.145)
where µ is the co-state variable, U the state variable and q the control variable.
From the Pontryagin principle
µ˙(θ) = −∂H
∂U
= f(θ). (2.146)
From the transversality condition (since there is no constraint on U(·) at θ)
µ(θ) = 0. (2.147)
Integrating (2.146), using (2.147), we get:
µ(θ) = F (θ). (2.148)
Optimizing with respect to q(·) yields also
S ′(qSB(θ)) = θ +
µ(θ)
f(θ)
, (2.149)
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and inserting the value of µ(θ) obtained from (2.148) yields again (2.143).
We have derived in three steps (use of the Revelation Principle, characterization of
truthful direct revelation mechanisms, and optimization of the principal’ expected welfare
in the class of truthful direct revelation mechanisms) the optimal truthful direct revelation
mechanism {(qSB(θ), USB(θ))} or {(qSB(θ), tSB(θ))}.
It remains to inquire if there is a simple implementation of this mechanism. Since
qSB(·) is decreasing,32 we can invert this function and obtain θSB(q). Then,
tSB(θ) = USB(θ) + θqSB(θ), (2.150)
becomes
T (q) = tSB(θSB(q)) =
∫ θ¯
θ(q)
qSB(τ)dτ + θ(q)q. (2.151)
To the optimal truthful direct revelation mechanism, we have associated a nonlinear
transfer T (q). We can check that the agent confronted with this non linear transfer chooses
the same allocation as when he is faced with the optimal revelation mechanism. Indeed,
we have d
dq
(T (q)− θq) = T ′(q)− θ = dtSB
dθ
· dθSB
dq
− θ = 0, since dtSB
dθ
− θ dqSB
dθ
= 0.
Remark: In Chapter 9, we will give one more result which is specific to the continuum
case, namely the possibility (sometimes) to implement the optimal contract by a menu of
linear contracts.
To conclude, the economic insights obtained in the continuum case are not different
from those obtained in the two-state case studied in this chapter. The case of partial
bunching where a whole set of types with non-zero measure choose the same allocation
has been omitted above, but will be illustrated in the next chapter with an example of a
three state adverse selection problem and discussed in Appendix 3.1..
The differentiable method was used in Mirrlees (1971) and Mussa and Rosen
(1978), but the systematic approach of differentiable direct revelation mechanisms was
provided in Laffont and Maskin (1980) in the more general case of dominant strategy
mechanisms for multi-agent frameworks. Baron and Myerson (1982) and Guesnerie and
Laffont (1984) extended the analysis to cases where the monotonicity condition may be
binding.
32When qSB(·) is not strictly decreasing some care must be exerted in the writing below. A “flat” in
q(·) is associated with a non-differentiability of T (·).
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APPENDIX 2.2: Proof of Proposition 2.4
Let us form the following Lagrangean for the principal’s problem:
L(q, q¯, U, U¯ , λ, µ) = ν(S(q)− θq − U) + (1− ν)(S(q¯)− θ¯q¯ − U¯)
+ λ(U − U¯ −∆θq¯) + µ(νu(U) + (1− ν)u(U¯)) (2.152)
where λ is the multiplier of (2.20) and µ is the multiplier of (2.64).
Optimizing w.r.t. U and U¯ yields respectively:
−ν + λ+ µνu′(USB) = 0, (2.153)
−(1− ν)− λ+ µ(1− ν)u′(U¯SB) = 0. (2.154)
Summing (2.153) and (2.154), we obtain:
µ(νu′(USB) + (1− ν)u′(U¯SB)) = 1, (2.155)
and thus µ > 0. Using (2.155) and inserting into (2.153) yields:
λ =
ν(1− ν)(u′(U¯SB)− u′(USB))
νu′(USB) + (1− ν)u′(U¯SB) . (2.156)
Moreover, (2.20) implies that USB ≥ U¯SB and thus λ ≥ 0.
Optimizing with respect to outputs yields respectively:
S ′(qSB) = θ, (2.157)
and
S ′(q¯SB) = θ¯ +
λ
µ(1− ν)∆θ. (2.158)
Simplifying by using (2.155) and (2.156) yields (2.65).
Chapter 3
Incentive and Participation
Constraints with Adverse Selection
3.1 Introduction
The main theme of Chapter 2 was to determine how the conflict between rent extraction
and efficiency can be solved in a principal-agent relationship with adverse selection. In
the models of this latter chapter, this conflict was relatively easy to understand because it
resulted from the simple interaction of a single incentive constraint with a single partici-
pation constraint. A major difficulty of Incentive Theory in general and adverse selection
models in particular lies in the numerous constraints imposed by incentive compatibility
when one moves away from the simple models of Chapter 2.1
In this chapter, we consider more complex contractual environments which all have in
common the fact that they raise further difficulties for the determination of the binding
incentive and participation constraints. Those difficulties are not only purely technical
difficulties associated with the increased mathematical complexity of the models. They are
also deeply rooted into the economics of the problems under scrutiny and they lead often
to a quite novel analysis of the rent extraction-efficiency trade-off, sometimes challenge
its main insights and always offer quite sharp and interesting economic conclusions.
We can roughly classify into three broad categories the features of the new contractual
settings analyzed in this chapter. Each of those categories yields a particular perturbation
of the standard rent extraction-efficiency trade-off. Let us now describe briefly those three
categories.
• Models with a hardening of the agent’s incentive constraints: In more complex envi-
1Even in those simple models, the optimal solution is only derived by guessing which are the binding
incentive and participation constraints and, then, by checking ex post that the remaining constraints are
really satisfied by the solution of the relaxed problem.
91
92 CHAPTER 3. INCENTIVE AND PARTICIPATION CONSTRAINTS
ronments than the bareboned model of Chapter 2, the agent may have more than two
possible types. Those models include the relatively straightforward three-type extensions
of the basic set up of Chapter 2, but also the less easy-to-handle multidimensional model-
ing of adverse selection. In both cases, new conflicts arise between the various incentive
constraints of the agent.
In a single dimensional model with three types, the Spence-Mirrlees condition enables
us to simplify considerably the analysis, as only local incentive constraints need to be
taken into account. However, the sole consideration of upward incentive compatibility
constraints may be misleading, and the optimal contract may call for some downward
incentive compatibility constraints being also binding. Bunching of different types on the
same contract arises then quite naturally when the distribution of types does not satisfy
the monotone hazard rate property.
In practice, the agent’s type is often multi-dimensional. A regulator is ignorant of
both the marginal cost and the fixed cost of a regulated firm. A bank is ignorant of both
the quality of an investment and the risk aversion of the investor. A monopolistic seller
knows neither the willingness to pay nor the risk aversion of the buyer... Even though,
by the mere multi-dimensionality of the type space, different types of agents cannot be
unambiguously ordered, multi-dimensional models are still characterized by some conflicts
between various incentive constraints. Nothing like the monotone hazard rate property
guarantees now the full separation of types on different allocations. However, at least in
two by two discrete models, some analogies with the uni-dimensional model can still be
drawn.
• Models with a hardening of the agent’s participation constraints: Another significant
simplification made in Chapter 2 was to assume that the status quo utility level of the
agent was independent of his type (and normalized to zero). Quite often, an efficient agent
has better opportunities outside his relationship with the principal than an inefficient
agent. To model those valuable opportunities, we assume that the agent gets a type
dependent utility level when he is not trading with the principal. When the efficient
type’s status quo utility level becomes high enough, the principal finds no longer as useful
to distort allocative efficiency to decrease the agent’s information rent which is bounded
below by this outside opportunity. Keeping the efficient agent within the relationship
may even lead to offer him such a great deal that the inefficient agent is also willing to
take this offer, i.e., to mimic the efficient type. The inefficient agent’s incentive constraint
is then binding, a case of so-called countervailing incentives.
Instead of being deterministic, the agent’s outside opportunities may also be random.
The agent’s true willingness to participate in a trade with the principal may also be a
stochastic variable which is revealed to the agent before his acceptance of the contract.
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This leads to random participation constraints and thus to a probabilistic participation of
some types. In a two-type model where only the inefficient type’s participation is random,
the contract must not only induce information revelation by the efficient type but must
also arbitrate between the benefit of trading more often with an inefficient one and the
cost of providing the latter type enough incentives to participate.
•Models with constraints on transfers: So far we have assumed that the monetary transfers
between the principal and the agent were unlimited. Several kinds of constraints can be
imposed on these transfers.
Under ex ante contracting and with a risk neutral agent, we showed in Section 2.12.1
that the first-best was implementable provided that the agent receives a negative pay-
off in the bad state of nature. However, agents are often financially constrained and
have limited liability. When such penalties are restricted by different kinds of limited
liability constraints, it becomes harder to induce information revelation. The conflict be-
tween incentive compatibility and ex ante participation constraints is no longer costless
to solve. second-best volumes of trade are then distorted away from the first-best values.
The direction of the distortion depends nevertheless of the nature of the limited liability
constraints.
In Section 2.15.1 we have already seen how informative signals on the agent’s type
enabled the principal to improve the terms of the rent extraction-efficiency trade-off.
Auditing is an endogenous way to obtain such signals. It is akin to a costly enlargement
of the principal’s tools available to screen the agent’s type. At some cost, the principal
may be able to verify with some probability the agent’s message on his type. In cases
where a lie is detected, the agent is punished and has to pay a penalty which, again, can
be limited in different ways by either the agent’s assets or his gains from trade with the
principal. Of course, this threat of an audit relaxes the incentive compatibility constraint.
But the trade-off between incentive compatibility and participation constraints is again
dependent on the particular constraints imposed on punishments.
Most of the book is concerned with principal-agent relationships where the conflict
between the principal and the agent is quite obvious and leads to binding participation
constraints. However, when the principal is a benevolent government willing to redis-
tribute income between heterogenous agents, the conflict comes from the interaction be-
tween the principal’s budget balance constraint and the agent’s incentive constraint. The
resolution of such problems does not use exactly the same methods as those we have used
so far. Indeed, for such models, one cannot determine sequentially, first, the distribution
of information rents which implement at a minimal cost a given output profile and, sec-
ond, the second-best outputs. Instead, the technical difficulties of such models come from
the simultaneous characterization of the second-best outputs and profiles of information
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rents.
Section 3.2 presents the straightforward three-type extension of the standard model of
Chapter 2. We discuss there the Spence-Mirrlees and the monotone hazard rate property
which altogether ensure monotonicity of the optimal schedule of outputs and the absence
of any bunching of types. Section 3.3 deals with a bi-dimensional adverse selection model,
solving for the optimal outputs and comparing it with a standard uni-dimensional model.
Several economic applications are discussed. Section 3.4 offers a careful analysis of a
two-type model with reservation utilities, discussing all possible regimes of the solution.
We provide there various instances where this modeling has turned out to be useful to
understand various economic phenomena. Section 3.5 introduces random participation
constraints. In Section 3.6, we look at the impacts that different limited liability con-
straints, either on transfers or on rents, may have on the allocation of resources under ex
ante contracting. The first constraints increase the volume of trade as the second ones
reduce it. In Section 3.7, we analyze audit models and derive optimal audit policies under
various constraints for punishments. We draw there some analogy between audit models
and models where incentives for truthful revelation are based on the threat of terminat-
ing with some probability the relationship between the principal and the agent. Finally,
Section 3.8 analyzes the trade-off between efficiency and redistribution. It shows how to
optimize such efficiency-equity trade-offs.
3.2 More than Two Types
Suppose that θ may take three possible values, i.e., Θ = {θ, θˆ, θ¯} with θ¯− θˆ = θˆ− θ = ∆θ
for simplicity, and with respective probabilities ν, νˆ and ν¯ such that ν + νˆ + ν¯ = 1.
We denote by {(t, q), (tˆ, qˆ), (t¯, q¯)} a direct truthful revelation mechanism in this three-
type environment. Using similar notations, information rents write respectively as U =
t− θq, Uˆ = tˆ− θˆqˆ and U¯ = t¯− θ¯q¯. As a benchmark, note that the first-best outputs
are respectively given by S ′(q∗) = θ, S ′(qˆ∗) = θˆ and S ′(q¯∗) = θ¯.
3.2.1 Incentive Feasible Contracts
For each of the three possible types, we have now the following incentive constraints: For
the most efficient type θ,
U ≥ Uˆ +∆θqˆ, (3.1)
U ≥ U¯ + 2∆θq¯; (3.2)
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for the intermediate type θˆ,
Uˆ ≥ U¯ +∆θq¯, (3.3)
Uˆ ≥ U −∆θq; (3.4)
for the least efficient type θ¯,
U¯ ≥ Uˆ −∆θqˆ, (3.5)
U¯ ≥ U − 2∆θq. (3.6)
Les us show for example how (3.1) and (3.2) are obtained. We want that a θ-agent
does not announce θˆ. This requires:
U = t− θq ≥ tˆ− θqˆ = tˆ− θˆqˆ + (θˆ − θ)qˆ (3.7)
or
U ≥ Uˆ +∆θqˆ. (3.8)
Also, we want that a θ-agent does not pretend to be θ¯. This requires:
U = t− θq ≥ t¯− θq¯ = t¯− θ¯q¯ + (θ¯ − θ)q¯ (3.9)
or
U ≥ U¯ + 2∆θq¯. (3.10)
Those six incentive constraints (3.1) to (3.6) can be classified into two categories: local
and global incentive constraints. Local incentive constraints involve adjacent types like
the upward incentive constraints (3.1) and (3.3) or the downward incentive constraints
(3.5) and (3.4). Global incentive constraints involve non-adjacent types like the upward
(3.2) or the downward (3.4) incentive constraint.
To simplify the analysis and find the relevant binding constraints, we proceed in two
steps. First, as in Chapter 2, intuition suggests that the most efficient types want to
lie upward and claim they are less efficient. Therefore, we can ignore momentarily the
downward constraints as we did in Chapter 2. We are left with the remaining upward
incentive constraints (3.1), (3.2) and (3.3).
Second, the incentive constraints (3.1) to (3.6) imply also some monotonicity condi-
tions on the schedule of outputs. Indeed, adding the incentive constraints for two adjacent
types yields q ≥ qˆ (use (3.1) and (3.4)) and qˆ ≥ q¯ (use (3.3) and (3.5)). Finally, we get:
q ≥ qˆ ≥ q¯. (3.11)
96 CHAPTER 3. INCENTIVE AND PARTICIPATION CONSTRAINTS
This monotonicity helps to further simplify the set of relevant incentive constraints by
getting rid of the global incentive constraint (3.2). Indeed, adding (3.1) and (3.3) yields:
U ≥ U¯ +∆θ(qˆ + q¯). (3.12)
But using that qˆ ≥ q¯, the second term right-hand side above is greater than 2∆θq¯.
Therefore, the global incentive constraint (3.2) is implied by the two local incentive con-
straints (3.1) and (3.3).
Finally, to obtain the optimal contract we will only consider the two upward local
incentive constraints with the monotonicity constraint on outputs (implying the global
upward constraint) and we will check ex post that the downward IC are also satisfied.
3.2.2 The Optimal Contract
This huge simplification in the set of incentive constraints being made, all relevant con-
straints for the principal reduce to the incentive constraints (3.1), (3.3), (3.11) and to the
least efficient type’s participation constraint:
U¯ ≥ 0. (3.13)
The optimal contract solves thus the program (P ) below:
(P ) : max
{(U,q);(Uˆ ,qˆ);(U¯ ,q¯)}
ν(S(q)− θq − U) + νˆ(S(qˆ)− θˆqˆ − Uˆ) + ν¯(S(q¯)− θ¯q¯ − U¯)
subject to (3.1), (3.3), (3.11) and (3.13).
It should be clear that constraints (3.1), (3.3), (3.13) are all binding at the optimum.
This leads to the following expressions of the information rents, U = ∆θ(qˆ+ q¯), Uˆ = ∆θq¯
and U¯ = 0. Substituting into the objective function of problem (P ), we obtain that the
principal must solve program (P ′) below:
(P ′) : max
{(q,qˆ,q¯)}
ν
(
S(q)− θq −∆θ(qˆ + q¯))+ νˆ(S(qˆ)− θˆq¯ −∆θq¯) + ν¯(S(q¯)− θ¯q¯).
The next proposition summarizes the solution of the principal’s problem:
Proposition 3.1 : In a three type adverse selection model, the optimal contract entails:
• Constraints (3.1), (3.3) and (3.13) are all binding.
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• When νˆ > ν¯ν, the monotonicity conditions (3.11) are strictly satisfied. Optimal
outputs are given by qSB = q∗, qˆSB < qˆ∗ and q¯SB < q¯∗ with:
S ′(qˆSB) = θˆ +
ν
νˆ
∆θ, (3.14)
S ′(q¯SB) = θ¯ +
ν + νˆ
ν¯
∆θ. (3.15)
• When νˆ < ν¯ν, some bunching emerges.We still have qSB = q∗ but now qˆSB = q¯SB =
qP < q∗ with:
S ′(qP ) = θ¯ +
2ν
νˆ + ν¯
∆θ. (3.16)
When νˆ > ν¯ν, we have a straightforward extension of Proposition 2.1. The most
efficient type’s production level is not distorted. Since his information rent, namely U =
∆θ(qˆ+ q¯), depends now on the production levels of all the types who are less efficient than
him, those production levels are distorted downward to reach the optimal rent extraction-
efficiency trade-off. The reason for this expression of the θ-agent’s rent is that all the
local upward incentive constraints are binding (and only those). The θˆ-agent has also an
information rent, Uˆ = ∆θq¯, as he can pretend to be a θ¯-agent. This justifies a second
downward distortion of q¯. Only the least efficient agent gets a zero rent U¯ = 0. All these
features of the optimal contract are general and hold for any number of types.
If the profile of production levels obtained satisfies the monotonicity conditions (3.11),
all the other incentive constraints also hold strictly. If not, some bunching emerges as
described in the second part of Proposition 3.1. We have already seen in Chapter 2 how
bunching may arise at the optimal contract when the principal’s and the agent’s objectives
are strongly conflicting (see Section 2.11.2). Here, the origin of bunching is that the
principal would like to implement an increasing second-best schedule of output over some
range of types (namely q¯ > qˆ), but this monotonicity conflicts with the monotonicity
condition imposed by incentive compatibility. This can be viewed, again, as an instance
of non-responsiveness.2 Such phenomenon appears only when there are more than two
types or with a continuum. Remember, indeed, that it never holds in the standard two
type model of Section 2.4. To avoid it, modelers have often chosen to impose a sufficient
condition on the distribution of types, the “monotonicity of the hazard rate”.
Definition 3.1 : A distribution of types satisfies the monotone hazard rate property if
and only if:
Pr(θ < θˆ)
Pr(θ = θˆ)
=
ν
νˆ
<
Pr(θ < θ¯)
Pr(θ = θ¯)
=
ν + νˆ
ν¯
. (3.17)
2See Appendix 3.1 for an analysis of bunching in the case of a continuum of types.
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This sufficient condition ensures that the incentive distortions on the right-hand sides
of (3.14) and (3.15) are increasing with the agent’s type. The virtual costs of the different
types, namely θ, θˆ + ν
νˆ
∆θ and θ¯ + ν+νˆ
ν¯
∆θ, are thus ranked exactly as the true physical
costs. Asymmetric information does not perturb the ranking of types.
Remark: With n types, i.e., Θ = {θ1, . . . , θn} and a distribution of types such that
Pr(θi) = νi > 0 for all i, the monotonicity of the hazard rate property says that
Pr(θ<θi)
Pr(θ=θi)
=∑i−1
k=1 νk
νi
is increasing in i.
3.2.3 The Spence-Mirrlees Condition with more than Two Types
When the local incentive constraints imply the global ones, it is sufficient to check that
the agent does not want to lie locally to be sure that he does not want to lie globally. The
incentive problem is then well behaved since there is a huge simplification in the number
of relevant constraints. This is precisely this simplification which yields the clear analysis
in the last section. This huge simplification holds for any number of types or even for a
continuum if the agent’s utility function satisfies the so-called Spence-Mirrlees condition,
i.e., if the agent’s objective function U(q, t, θ), which is defined over allocations (q, t) in
A and types θ in Θ, is such that the marginal rates of substitution between output and
money can be ranked in a monotonic way. The following property must thus be satisfied:
∂
∂θ
(
Uq
Ut
)
> 0
(or < 0)
for any (t, q, θ) in A×Θ. (3.18)
Economically, this property means that the indifference curves move always in the
same direction as θ changes. In Figure 3.1 below, we have drawn the case where the
marginal rates of substitution Uq
Ut
, which is also the slope of the agent’s indifference curve,
are increasing with the agent’s type. At point A where the indifference curves of a θ-and
a θˆ-type cross each other, the indifference curve of the θˆ-type has a greater slope.
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Figure 3.1: The Spence-Mirrlees Property.
Of course, the particular objective function used in Chapter 2 and in Section 3.2.1,
namely U = t− θq, satisfies the Spence-Mirrlees condition since ∂
∂θ
(
Uq
Ut
)
= −1.
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Figure 3.2: Indifference Curves with Three Types and U = t− θq.
Figure 3.2 illustrates why the Spence-Mirrlees condition ensures that, when upward
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local incentive constraints are binding, global ones and downward ones are strictly satis-
fied. As it can be easily seen from the figure, the efficient type is just indifferent between
telling the truth and lying upward to θˆ, i.e., he is indifferent between contracts A and B.
However, lying upward up to θ¯ would reduce significantly his utility level, since contract C
is on an indifference curve with a lower level of utility than what a θ-type get by choosing
A. Hence, the θ-type’s global incentive constraint is satisfied. Similarly, consider an agent
with type θˆ. This agent is indifferent between telling the truth and lying upward up to θ¯.
He is indifferent between choosing B and C. However, by lying downward, type θˆ could
get contract A which yields him a strictly lower utility level. The downward incentive
constraint is strictly satisfied.
The Spence-Mirrlees conditions make the incentive problem well-behaved in the sense
that only local constraints need to be considered. It is similar to a concavity condition
in usual maximization problems. As for a concavity condition, the optimization of the
agent’s problem is obtained by looking at the benefits of “local” changes away from his
truthful report strategy, as “global” changes are certainly dominated. The analysis of
such situations is then very similar to that developed in Chapter 2.
When the Spence-Mirrlees condition is satisfied, the above analysis can also be easily
extended3 to the case of a continuum of types [θ, θ¯] already considered in Appendix 2.1. If
it is not satisfied, the analysis of the continuum case becomes quickly untractable, and the
study of the finite type case requires to consider all combinations of binding constraints
and calls very quickly for numerical methods.
Spence (1973) introduced the single-crossing assumption in his theory of sig-
naling. Similarly, Mirrlees (1971) used also such an assumption in his theory of opti-
mal income tax. It was called the constant sign assumption in Guesnerie and Laffont
(1984). Araujo and Moreira (2000) provides an analysis of optimal contracts when the
Spence-Mirrlees assumption may not be satisfied and types are distributed continuously.
Matthews and Moore (1987) provides an extensive study of the set of incentive constraints.
3.3 Multi-dimensional Asymmetric Information
3.3.1 A Discrete Model
Another important limitation of our analysis of adverse selection in Chapter 2 is that
the adverse selection parameter θ was modeled as a uni-dimensional parameter. In many
3See Appendix 3.2.
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instances, the agent knows several pieces of information which are payoff relevant and
affect the optimal trade. For instance, a tax authority would like to know both the
elasticity of an agent’s labor supply and his productivity before fixing his tax liability.
Similarly, an insurance company would like to know both the probability of accident of an
agent and his degree of risk aversion before fixing the risk premium that this agent should
pay. The producer of a good knows not only his marginal cost of producing this good,
but also the associated fixed cost. In all these situations, the uni-dimensional paradigm
must be given up to assess the true consequences of asymmetric information on the rent
extraction-efficiency trade-off.
We extend now the analysis of Chapter 2 to the case of multi-dimensional asymmetric
information. The simplest way to do so is to have the agent accomplish two activities
for the principal. Let us thus assume that the agent produces two goods in respective
quantities q1 and q2 with a utility function U = t − (θ1q1 + θ2q2) with θi in {θ, θ¯}, for
i = 1, 2. We also assume that there is no externality between the two tasks for the
principal so that the surpluses associated with both tasks just add up in the latter’s
objective function which becomes V = S(q1) + S(q2)− t.
The probability distribution of the adverse selection vector θ = (θ1, θ2) (which is again
common knowledge) is now defined by ν = Pr(θ1 = θ, θ2 = θ),
νˆ
2
= Pr(θ1 = θ, θ2 = θ¯) =
Pr(θ1 = θ¯, θ2 = θ), ν¯ = Pr(θ1 = θ¯, θ2 = θ¯) with a positive correlation among types being
defined as ρ = νν¯ − νˆ2
4
> 0.
The components of the direct revelation mechanism are denoted as (t11, q11, q11) if
(θ1 = θ, θ2 = θ), (t12, q12, q21) if (θ1 = θ, θ2 = θ¯), (t12, q21, q12) if (θ1 = θ¯, θ2 = θ),
(t22, q22, q22) if (θ1 = θ¯, θ2 = θ¯), where we impose (without loss of generality) a symmetry
restriction or transfers. Similar notations are used for the information rents Uij. Because
of the symmetry of the model, there are only three relevant levels of information rents
U = U11, Uˆ = U12 = U21 and U¯ = U22. Similarly, we denote outputs by q11 = q, q12 = qˆ2,
q21 = qˆ1 and q22 = q¯, and transfers by t11 = t, t21 = t12 = tˆ, t22 = t¯. These notations,
even though they look quite cumbersome, unify the present multi-dimensional modeling
with that of Section 3.2.1 above.
Again, following the logic of the uni-dimensional model we may guess that only the
upward incentive constraints matter. The three following incentive constraints become
then relevant:
U = t− 2θq ≥ tˆ− θ(qˆ1 + qˆ2) = Uˆ +∆θqˆ1, (3.19)
U ≥ t¯− 2θq¯ = U¯ + 2∆θq¯, (3.20)
Uˆ = tˆ− (θ + θ¯)qˆ ≥ t¯− (θ + θ¯)q¯ = U¯ +∆θq¯. (3.21)
We can expect also the participation constraint of an agent who is inefficient on both
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dimensions (θ1 = θ¯ and θ2 = θ¯) to be binding, i.e.:
U¯ = 0. (3.22)
Moreover, we let the reader check that adding incentive constraints for types taken
two by two yields the following monotonicity conditions on outputs:
q ≥ max(qˆ1, q¯), (3.23)
and
qˆ2 ≥ max(qˆ1, q¯). (3.24)
3.3.2 The Optimal Contract
We can expect (3.21) to be binding at the optimum. Then (3.19) and (3.20) can be
summarized as:
U ≥ ∆θmax(2q¯, q¯ + qˆ1), (3.25)
which should also be binding at the optimum.
After substitution of the information rents as functions of outputs, the principal’s
optimization program becomes:
(P ′) : max
{(q,qˆ,q¯)}
ν(2S(q)− 2θq −∆θmax(2q¯, qˆ1 + q¯))
+νˆ(S(qˆ1) + S(qˆ2)− θqˆ2 − θ¯qˆ1 −∆θq¯) + ν¯(2S(q¯)− 2θ¯q¯).
We must distinguish two cases depending on the level of correlation ρ between both
dimensions of adverse selection.
Case 1: Weak Correlation
Let us first assume that the solution is such that q¯ ≤ qˆ1. In this case, max(2q¯, qˆ1+ q¯) =
qˆ1 + q¯ and optimizing (P
′) yields the following second-best outputs:
S ′(qSB) = S ′(qˆSB2 ) = θ, (3.26)
S ′(qˆSB1 ) = θ¯ +
ν
νˆ
∆θ, (3.27)
S ′(q¯SB) = θ¯ +
ν + νˆ
ν¯
∆θ, (3.28)
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This latter schedule of outputs is really the solution when the monotonicity condition
q¯SB ≤ qˆSB1 holds, i.e., when:
ν
νˆ
≤ ν + νˆ
ν¯
, (3.29)
or to put differently when ρ ≤ νˆ(ν+ 3
4
νˆ). This condition obviously holds in the case where
θ1 and θ2 are independently drawn since then the correlation is zero, i.e., ρ = 0. We let
the reader check that all neglected incentive and participation constraints are satisfied
when (3.29) is satisfied.
The binding constraints in the case of weak correlation are only the local ones. In
Figure 3.3 below, an arrow from a point in the type space, say A, to another one, say B,
means that A is “attracted” by B, i.e., the corresponding incentive constraint is binding
at the optimum.
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Figure 3.3: Binding Incentive Constraints with a Weak Correlation.
Case 2: Strong Correlation
If we had perfect correlation νˆ = 0, the binding constraint would obviously be from (θ, θ)
to (θ¯, θ¯) (see Figure 3.4).
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Figure 3.4: Binding Incentive Constraint with Perfect Correlation.
More generally, for a strong positive correlation, we may expect an intermediary case
with the binding constraints as in Figure 3.5.
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Figure 3.5: Binding Incentive Constraints with Strong Correlation.
Indeed, consider the case where the condition (3.29) does not hold. Then, the outputs
defined by (3.27) and (3.28) are such that max(2q¯, qˆ1 + q¯) = 2q¯, a contradiction with our
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starting assumption q¯ ≤ qˆ1. Let us thus assume that we have instead q¯ > qˆ1. In this case
optimizing (P ′) leads to the substitution of (3.27) and (3.28) by respectively:
S ′(qˆ1) = θ¯, (3.30)
and
S ′(q¯) = θ¯ +
2ν + νˆ
ν¯
∆θ. (3.31)
But, we immediately observe that q¯ < qˆ1; again this is a contradiction with our starting
assumption q¯ > qˆ1.
When (3.29) does not hold, we have thus necessarily qˆ1 = q¯ = q
P and bunching
arises at the optimal contract. To understand the origin of this bunching, first note that,
because of a strong correlation, the probability that mixed states (θ, θ¯) occur is small.
Hence, because he fears mostly the global deviation where a (θ, θ)-type claims he is (θ¯, θ¯),
the principal would like to implement a high output qˆ1 without much distortion. But by
doing so, the allocation of a (θ, θ¯)-agent becomes very attractive to the most efficient type
on both dimensions (θ, θ). This pushes now the principal to distort output qˆ1 downward.
Torned between those two opposite incentives, the principal chooses to bunch the outputs
qˆ1 and q¯.
Optimizing (P ′) with this added constraint still yields (3.26) but also
S ′(qP ) = θ¯ +
ν + νˆ
νˆ + ν¯
∆θ. (3.32)
We can note the strong analogy between the multi-dimensional case and what we have
seen for a uni-dimensional parameter both in Chapter 2 and in Section 3.2 above. First,
note that, for a weak correlation between types, the asymmetric information distortions
on the right-hand sides of (3.27) and (3.28) are the same as those on the right-hand sides
of (3.14) and (3.15). In this case, the 4-type bi-dimensional model almost boils down to a
3-type one dimensional model. Everything happens as if there were only three fictitious
types which could be denoted by θ, θˆ and θ¯ with respective probabilities ν, νˆ and ν¯ and
a single dimension of output. Second, for a strong correlation, the 4-type bi-dimensional
model is almost like a 2-type uni-dimensional model with distortions similar to those of
Proposition 2.1. Everything happens now as if there were only two fictitious types θ and
θ¯ with respective probabilities ν + νˆ
2
and νˆ
2
+ ν¯ and, again, a single dimension of output.
These two results yield an important insight. In a multi-dimensional world, it is easy to
construct examples where, at the optimum, everything happens as if the principal was
using a message space with the agent which has a much lower dimensionality than the
type space itself. The detour of modeling a more complex environment also brings some
“simplicity” into the optimal contract.
106 CHAPTER 3. INCENTIVE AND PARTICIPATION CONSTRAINTS
We summarize our findings in the next proposition:
Proposition 3.2 : In a symmetric bi-dimensional adverse selection setting, the optimal
contract with a weak correlation of types keeps many features of the uni-dimensional case.
With a strong correlation, the optimal contract may instead entail some bunching.
Finally, note that more complex situations arise when the correlation is negative,
asymmetric distributions are postulated, or when the dimensionality of actions is not the
same as the dimensionality of the asymmetry of information.
We now describe a number of settings where modeling adverse selection with multi-
dimensional types has proved to be useful.
Example 1: Unknown Fixed Cost
Let us suppose that the agent has a cost function C(θ, q) = θ1q + θ2 where both the
marginal cost θ1 and the fixed cost θ2 are now unknown. As shown in Baron and Myerson
(1982) and Rochet (1984), stochastic mechanisms where the decision to produce or not
is used as a screening device are useful in this context. To see why, let us introduce x in
{0, 1} as a dummy variable which is equal to 1 when a positive production is requested
and 0 otherwise. As a function of the contracting variable q and x, the agent’s utility
function writes now as U = t − (θ1qx + θ2x) and this expression almost takes the same
form as what we have analyzed above. It is easy to show that the shut-down of some
types is also a valuable screening device to learn the value of the fixed cost θ2.
Example 2: Unknown Cost and Demand
Let us assume that the agent is a retailer who serves a market with a linear inverse
demand P (q) = a− θ1 − q, where θ1 is an intercept parameter which is the first piece of
private information of the agent. This agent has also a cost function C(q) = θ2q where the
marginal cost θ2 is the second piece of private information of the agent. The latter’s utility
function writes finally as U = t˜+(a− θ1− q)q− θ2q, where t˜ is the transfer received from
the principal, here a manufacturer. To simplify, we also assume that the manufacturer
incurs no production cost for the intermediate good he provides to the agent. Introducing
a new variable t = t˜+aq−q2, the agent’s utility function rewrites as U = t−(θ1q1+θ2q2).
On the other hand, the principal’s objective becomes V = aq − q2 − t.
We can then apply the previous analysis to compute the characteristics of the optimal
contract. Interestingly, a strong correlation between cost and demand parameters calls for
a relatively inflexible contract with an “almost” fixed quantity being sold on the market.
This may explain the relative simplicity of some vertical restraint arrangements between
manufacturers and retailers.
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3.3.3 Continuum of Types
In Chapter 2 and in its Appendix 2.1 we have argued that the discrete model and the
model with a continuum of types were economically quite similar. Things are a little
bit different with multi-dimensional asymmetric information. The dimensionality of the
type space plays indeed a crucial role. To see this point, recall that, in a one dimensional
case, the least efficient type’s participation constraint is the only binding participation
constraint (at least as long as shut-down is not optimal). Now imagine that the same
holds with a continuum of bi-dimensional types, i.e., only the “least” efficient type on
both dimensions θ1 and θ2, i.e., (θ¯, θ¯), is put at its reservation utility. Let us imagine that
the principal slightly decreases uniformly by ε the whole transfer schedule he offers to the
agent. Of course, a whole subset of types around (θ¯, θ¯) prefers to stop producing. The
efficiency loss for the principal is roughly of order ε2. However, by reducing uniformly
the whole transfer schedule, the principal reduces all information rents of the remaining
types by ε, hence he makes a gain worth ε(1 − ε2) ≈ ε. Therefore, the shut-down of a
subset of types with non-zero measure is always optimal.4
Armstrong and Rochet (1999) provided a complete analysis of the two type
model. The case of a continuum of types has first been analyzed by McAfee and McMil-
lan (1988) who attempted to generalize the Spence-Mirrlees assumption to a multi-
dimensional case and Laffont, Maskin and Rochet (1987) who solved explicitly an example.
The result that shut-down of types is always optimal is due to Armstrong (1996) who also
offers some closed-form solutions when the set of types includes the origin. These tech-
niques are difficult and outside the scope of the present volume. See also Wilson (1993)
on this point. Rochet and Chone´ (1998)’s analysis is the most general. They showed that
bunching of types is always found in these multi-dimensional models and they provide
also the so-called “ironing and sweeping” techniques designed at analyzing this bunching
issue. Finally, Armstrong (1999) pushed the idea that multi-dimensional adverse selec-
tion problems may introduce a significant simplification in the optimal contract between
a seller and a buyer privately informed on his type. Instead of explicitly computing this
contract, he provides a lower bound on what can be achieved with simple two part tariffs
and, using the Law of Large Numbers, shows that those contracts can approximate the
first-best when the number of products sold to this buyer is large enough.
4Note that this dimensionality argument fails for a discrete n2−type model since the loss of efficiency
and the saving on information rent have the same dimensionality.
108 CHAPTER 3. INCENTIVE AND PARTICIPATION CONSTRAINTS
3.4 State Dependent Status Quo Utility Level and
Countervailing Incentives
The models of Sections 3.2 and 3.3 have already illustrated the difficulties that the modeler
faces when there may be no obvious order between the various incentive constraints. The
same kind of difficulties arise when the agent’s participation constraint is type dependent.
Indeed, those participation constraints may perturb the natural ordering of the incentive
and participation constraints studied in Chapter 2. To analyze those issues, we now
come back to our two type model. In Chapter 2 we made a simplifying and debatable
assumption by postulating that the outside opportunities of the two types of agents were
identical (and without loss of generality normalized to zero). Then, we know that the
binding incentive constraint is always the efficient type’s one. However, in many cases
there is a correlation (in general a positive one) between the agent’s productivity in a
given principal-agent relationship and his outside opportunity. We assume now that the
efficient agent’s outside utility level is U0 > 0 and we still normalize to zero the inefficient
agent’s one.
The efficient and inefficient type participation constraints write now respectively as:
U ≥ U0 (3.33)
U¯ ≥ 0. (3.34)
3.4.1 The Optimal Contract
The principal’s problem writes thus as optimizing (2.19) subject to the relevant downward
incentive compatibility constraint (2.22) to (2.23) and the new type-dependent partici-
pation constraints (3.33) and (3.34). The solution to this problem exhibits five different
regimes depending on the value of U0.
Case 1- Irrelevance of Outside Opportunity: U0 < ∆θq¯
SB
Then, the optimal second-best solution (2.22), (2.24), (2.26) obtained in Section 2.7 re-
mains valid since the neglected participation constraint (3.33) is satisfied by the solution
discussed in Proposition 2.1. When the outside option does not provide too much rent to
the efficient agent, it does not affect the second-best contract.
Case 2- Binding Outside Opportunity and Incentive Constraints: ∆θq¯∗ > U0 >
∆θq¯SB
The former solution is now no longer valid. To induce his participation more rent must be
given up to the efficient type than the information rent obtained in the optimal second-best
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contract corresponding to U0 = 0. Then, one can afford less distorsion in the inefficient
type’s production level and choose q¯ such that U0 = ∆θq¯. As long as U0 belongs to
[∆θq¯SB,∆θq¯∗], the incentive constraint of the efficient type and both participation con-
straints are simultaneously binding. (See for example the pair of contracts (A0, B0) in
Figure 3.6).
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Figure 3.6: Type-Dependent Participation Constraint: Case 2.
Case 3- Both Outside Opportunities Constraints Are Binding: ∆θq∗ > U0 >
∆θq¯∗
Still raising U0, the principal finds now no longer optimal to use the inefficient type’s
output to raise the efficient agent’s information rent and induce his participation. This
output being already efficient, the only remaining tool available to the principal to raise
the efficient agent’s rent is the transfer t and we have now t = θq∗ + U0. This solution is
obviously valid as long as the inefficient agent’s incentive constraint is not binding, i.e.,
as long as 0 = U¯ > U0 − ∆θq∗. (See the pair of contracts (A0, B0) in Figure 3.7. This
case remains valid as long as A0 is below D). In that region, both production levels are
the efficient ones.
Case 4- The Inefficient Agent’s Incentive Constraint is Binding: U0 ≥ ∆θq∗
When U0 still increases (A0 would be above D), the inefficient type is now attracted by
the allocation given to the efficient type but both constraints (3.33) and (3.34) remain
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binding. As a result, the efficient agent’s output is upward distorted to reach a value q
defined by U0 = ∆θq
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Figure 3.7: Type-Dependent Participation Constraint: Case 4.
Case 5- The Efficient Type’s Participation Constraint and the Inefficient Type’s
Incentive Constraint Are Both Binding: U0 > ∆θq
CI
Let us maximize (2.19) under the constraints (3.33) and (2.23). Assuming that those two
constraints are binding, we obtain U = U0 and U¯ = U0−∆θq. Inserting, those expressions
into the principal’s objective function, we get a reduced form program given by:
(P ) : max
{(q,q¯)}
ν(S(q)− θq) + (1− ν)(S(q¯)− θ¯q¯) + (1− ν)∆θq − U0.
Optimizing with respect to outputs yields no distortion for the inefficient type who
produces q¯CI = q¯∗ and now an upward distortion for the efficient type qCI > q∗ such that:
S ′(qCI) = θ − 1− ν
ν
∆θ, (3.35)
where the superscript CI means countervailing incentives. As U0 becomes greater than
∆θqCI , a rent U¯CI = U0 −∆θqCI is now given up to the inefficient type (see the pair of
contracts (ACI , BCI) in Figure 3.8).
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Figure 3.9 summarizes the profiles of production levels as functions of the efficient
type’s outside opportunity utility level U0. For U0 higher than ∆θq
∗, we are in the case
of countervailing incentives. To attract the efficient type who has such profitable outside
opportunities it is necessary to offer him a very high transfer. But then this contract
becomes attractive for the inefficient type who now captures a strictly positive rent. To
decrease this costly rent the production level of the efficient type is now distorted. But it
is distorted upwards rather than downwards because the inefficient type’s rent, U0−∆θq,
is decreasing with q.
Type dependent utilities with interesting economic implications have successively
appeared in Moore (1985) for a model of labor contracts, Lewis and Sappington (1989) for
an extension of the Baron and Myerson (1982) regulation model with fixed costs, Laffont
and Tirole (1990) for the regulation of bypass, Feenstra and Lewis (1991) and Brainard
and Martimort (1996) for models of international trade and, finally, Jeon and Laffont
(1999) for a model of downsizing the public sector. Jullien (2000) provides a general
theory of type-dependent reservation utility with a continuum of types.
3.4.2 Countervailing Incentives: Examples
State Dependent Fixed Costs
Lewis and Sappington (1989) (who have coined the expression countervailing incentives)
reconsidered the Baron-Myerson model with a firm having a fixed cost negatively corre-
lated with its marginal cost. The firm’s cost function is C(θ, q) = θq + F (θ), where θ
belongs to {θ, θ¯} with respective probabilities ν and 1− ν. The fixed costs are such that
F (θ) > F (θ¯), i.e., high marginal costs are associated with low fixed costs and vice versa.
In this model, incentive constraints are still unchanged and expressed as (2.20) and
(2.21). The participation constraints become instead
U ≥ F (θ) = F (θ¯) + (F (θ)− F (θ¯)) (3.36)
and
U¯ ≥ F (θ¯). (3.37)
It should be clear, that, up to a constant term F (θ¯), the model is identical to that of
Section 3.4.1. F (θ)−F (θ¯) > 0 plays exactly the role of U0 and may lead to countervailing
incentives if it is large enough.
3.4. STATE DEPENDENT 113
Lewis and Sappington (1989) studied a model with a continuum of types and
emphasized the bunching region they obtain in the transition from upward to downward
binding incentive constraints. Maggi and Rodriguez-Clare (1995a) showed that bunching
is due to the concavity that Lewis and Sappington assume for the F (·) function. If F (·)
is convex, countervailing incentives are compatible with fully separating contracts. To
investigate these issues in a discrete example requires a three type model.
With more than two types, let us say three as in Section 3.2, or with a continuum,
it may be that a given type θˆ attracts both types θ which are immediately above and
below it. The fact that θˆ attracts more efficient types calls for distorting downwards
output for the types close but below θˆ. The fact that θˆ attracts also less efficient types
calls for distorting upwards output for the types close to θˆ from above. These two distor-
tions conflict with the monotonicity requirement that output should remain decreasing
everywhere. Countervailing incentives create thus some pooling for intermediate types.
In a related context, the optimal contract has been interpreted by Lewis and Sappington
(1991) as an inflexible rule coming from the existence of countervailing incentives.
Bypass
Laffont and Tirole (1990) considered consumers of a network technology such as electricity.
They are of two possible types θ and θ¯ having utility function U¯ = θv(q) − t. Those
consumers can either consume the good produced by the network technology which offers
a menu of contracts,
{
(t, q), (t¯, q¯)
}
, or they can use an alternative bypass technology
which has a fixed cost σ and a marginal cost d. By choosing this latter option, consumers
obtain the utility levels S = maxq{θv(q)− σ − dq} and S¯ = maxq{θ¯v(q)− σ − dq}. The
consumers’ participation constraints become then:
U = θv(q)− t ≥ S (3.38)
U¯ = θ¯v(q¯)− t¯ ≥ S¯ = S + S¯ − S. (3.39)
Up to a change in the definition of the “efficient” and the “inefficient” type, S¯−S plays
here the role of U0 in Section 3.4.1 and can again give rise to countervailing incentives.
When the network industry is very efficient, a regulated or profit maximizing network
attracts all consumers with a discriminating menu of contracts. As its efficiency deterio-
rates, it must distort the pricing scheme to maintain the high valuation consumers in the
network and the good deal made to these consumers may attract low valuation consumers
and create countervailing incentives. Finally, as efficiency deteriorates further, the profit
maximizing network lets the high valuation consumers leave the network.
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Downsizing the Public Sector
An inefficient public sector exhibits sometimes a considerable labor redundancy. Hence,
downsizing constitutes a natural step for every public sector reform. However, downsizing
is subject to adverse selection. To model this issue, Jeon and Laffont (1999) assumed that
a worker of the public firm has a private cost θ in {θ, θ¯} when working in that firm. Let
Up(θ) be the rent obtained by a θ-worker in the public firm and Um(θ) be the rent he
would obtain in the private sector with the normalization Um(θ¯) = 0.
A (voluntary) downsizing mechanism for a continuum [0, 1] of workers is a pair of
transfers and probabilities5 of being maintained in the firm, {(t, q), (t¯, p¯)}, which must
satisfy the participation constraints
U = t− pθ + (1− p)Um(θ) ≥ Up(θ) (3.40)
U¯ = t¯− p¯θ¯ ≥ Up(θ¯), (3.41)
and the incentive constraints
U = t− pθ + (1− p)Um(θ) ≥ t¯− pθ¯ + (1− p¯)Um(θ) = U¯ + p∆θ + (1− p)Um(θ) (3.42)
U¯ = t¯− p¯θ¯ ≥ t− pθ¯ = U¯ − q∆θ. (3.43)
If we define the worker’s full costs θf as the sum of the production cost and his rent in
the private sector, θf = θ + Um(θ), these equations can be rewritten as:
U = t− pθf ≥ Up(θ)− Um(θ) (3.44)
U¯ = t¯− p¯θ¯f ≥ Up(θ¯) (3.45)
U = t− pθf ≥ t¯− p¯θf = U¯ + p¯∆θ (3.46)
U¯ = t¯− p¯θ¯f ≥ t− pθ¯f = U − p∆θ. (3.47)
We can reduce the problem to the one treated in Section 3.4, if we rewrite the partic-
ipation constraints in the following manner:
U¯ ≥ Up(θ¯) (3.48)
U ≥ Up(θ¯) + Up(θ)− Up(θ¯)− Um(θ). (3.49)
Defining U0 = U
p(θ)− Up(θ¯)− Um(θ) we could proceed as in Section 3.4.
If θ¯f > θf , i.e., ∆θ > Um(θ), the worker with production cost θ remains the low full
cost worker. If furthermore, Up(θ) − Up(θ¯) = ∆θ, i.e., the discrimination in the public
5These probabilities can also be interpreted as part time work in the public firm.
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firm fits the productivity difference, then U0 = ∆θ
f and we have necessarily countervailing
incentives. The rent of the high full cost is then Up(θ)−Um(θ)−p¯∆θ¯f and to decrease this
information rent p¯ is increased. This means that downsizing decreases under asymmetric
information. This situation is illustrated in Figure 3.10.
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Consider a case where downsizing is large and the complete information downsizing
entails excluding all the inefficient workers (contract A) and a proportion p∗ of efficient
ones (contract B). Under incomplete information this requires giving up a rent AA′ to the
inefficient type and creates countervailing incentives. To decrease this rent p is increased
to pSB (contracts (A′′, B′′)).
If θ¯f < θf the high full cost is then the worker with low production cost. But we have
again countervailing incentives and the rent of the high full cost is p¯∆θf + Up(θ¯). Now
∆θf < 0 and p¯ is decreased. Downsizing decreases also under incomplete information,
but now the workers with low production costs are excluded first.
International Trade and Protection
Private industries subject to international competition often call for some protection from
their national government to avoid delocalisation. The goal of public intervention in such
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a context is first to provide domestic firms with at least their profits in the international
arena and, second, as in domestic regulation, to correct any market power.
To model such issues, let us consider a variation of the Baron-Myerson model discussed
in Section 2.17.1. The domestic regulator maximizes S(q + qf ) − pwqf − θq − (1 − α)U
where qf is foreign production imported at the world price pw. The domestic firm’s utility
function is U = t − θC(q) with C(q) = q2
2
. Decreasing returns are here necessary to
have the national consumption being split in a non trivial way between national and
foreign productions. Again, the efficiency parameter θ can take values in Θ = {θ, θ¯} with
respective probabilities ν and 1− ν.
It is clear that the first-best outcome is such that the domestic firm produces at the
world price, the residual domestic demand being imported at this price. This leads to
pw = θq
∗ and pw = θ¯q¯∗.
Under asymmetric information and if regulation applies to a national public enterprise
having no outside option, the second best policy becomes qSB = q∗ and q¯SB given by:
pw =
(
θ¯ +
ν
1− ν (1− α)∆θ
)
q¯SB. (3.50)
Consider now a private enterprise which could take all its assets away from the national
country and behave competitively in the world market. Participation constraints become
for type θ and θ¯ respectively:
U ≥ U0 = max
q
pwq − θC(q) = p
2
w
2θ
, (3.51)
and
U¯ ≥ U¯0 = max
q
pwq − θ¯C(q) = p
2
w
2θ¯
. (3.52)
In this model, we can redefine U0 as U0 = U0 − U¯0 = p
2
w∆θ
2θ¯θ
. The information rents
corresponding to the first-best outputs q∗ and q¯∗ are now
∆θq∗2
2
and ∆θq¯
∗2
2
. Hence
∆θq∗2
2
>
U0 >
∆θq¯∗2
2
and we are (up to a change in the cost function) in Case 3 above, leading to
no countervailing incentives.
Insurance Contracts
Standard microeconomics analysis shows that, under complete information, all agents
subject to some risk should receive complete insurance against this risk. This conclusion
fails under asymmetric information. Let us consider a risk averse agent with utility
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function u(·) which is increasing and concave (u′(·) > 0, u′′(·) < 0 with u(0) = 0). The
agent’s initial wealth is w, but with probability θ the agent suffers from a damage which
has value d. The agent is a low risk θ < 1 (resp. high risk θ < θ¯ < 1) with probability
1 − ν (resp. ν). The agent knows his probability of accident which remains unknown
from an insurance company. The agent’s wealth level is common knowledge. The agent’s
expected utility writes thus as U = θu(w − d + ta) + (1 − θ)u(w − tn) where ta is the
agent’s reimbursement in case of a damage and tn is what he pays to the insurance
company when there is no accident. Much of the technical difficulties encountered with
this model will come from the nonlinearity of the agent’s utility function with respect
to transfers. Note nevertheless that the Spence-Mirrlees property (3.18) is satisfied since
Utn
Uta
= − ( θ
1−θ
)
u′(w−d+ta)
u′(w−tn) is a monotonically decreasing function of θ.
To make things simpler, we assume that the risk neutral insurance company is a
monopoly and maximizes its expected profit V = −θta + (1− θ)tn. In this model where
the quasi-linearity of the agent’s objective function is lost, it is useful to keep for the
moment incentive and participation constraints as functions of transfers. This leads to
the following expressions:
U = θu(w − d+ ta) + (1− θ)u(w − tn) ≥ θu(w − d+ t¯a) + (1− θ)u(w − t¯n), (3.53)
U¯ = θ¯u(w − d+ t¯a) + (1− θ¯)u(w − t¯n) ≥ θ¯u(w − d+ ta) + (1− θ¯)u(w − tn). (3.54)
U ≥ U0, (3.55)
U¯ ≥ U¯0, (3.56)
where U0 (resp. U¯0) is the participation constraint of the low (resp. high) probability
of accident agent. These reservation utilities are given by the expected utility that the
agent gets in the absence of any insurance, i.e., U0 = θu(w−d)+ (1− θ)u(w) = u(w) and
U¯0 = θ¯u(w − d) + (1 − θ¯)u(w) = u(w¯), where w and w¯ denote the certainty equivalents
of wealth for types θ and θ¯ respectively. Note that θ¯ > θ implies that U¯0 < U0 and thus
that w¯ < w. The agent with a low probability of accident has thus a higher reservation
utility than the agent with a high probability of accident.
Under complete information, the insurance company would provide full insurance
against the damage for both types. In that case, we would have −d+ t∗a = −t∗n = w, and
−d+ t¯∗a = −t¯∗n = w¯. Note that this pair of insurance contracts is not incentive-compatible.
Indeed, since w¯ < w, the agent with a high probability of accident is willing to take the
insurance contract of the agent with a low probability of accident. By doing so, the θ¯-
agent gets u(w) instead of u(w¯) for sure. This situation has been represented in Figure
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3.11 below. A∗ (resp. B∗) is the complete information contract of the agent with a high
(resp. low) probability of accident. A∗ and B∗ both provide full insurance. The θ¯-agent
prefers contract B∗ to contract A∗, as it can be easily seen in the figure.
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Figure 3.11: Full Insurance Contracts.
Under asymmetric information, the principal’s program takes now the following form:
(P ) : max
{(t¯1,t¯2);(t1,t2)}
(1− ν) (−θta + (1− θ)tn) + ν
(−θ¯t¯a + (1− θ¯)t¯n)
subject to (3.53) to (3.56).
We first assume that (3.56) and (3.53) are the two binding constraints of the pro-
gram above. We will check ex post that this conjecture is in fact true. Because of the
nonlinearity of the model, this will be a harder task than usually.
It is now useful to rewrite the program using the following change of variables u(w −
d + ta) = ua and u(w − tn) = un. These new variables are thus the agent’s utility levels
whenever an accident occurs or not. Denoting by h = u−1 the inverse function of u(·) and
observing that this is an increasing and strictly convex function (h′(·) > 0, h′′(·) > 0 with
h(0) = 0), one can check that the principal’s program is in fact strictly convex with a set
of linear constraints and rewrites as:
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(P ) : max
{(u¯1,u¯2);(u1,u2)}
(1− ν) (−θd+ w − θh(ua)− (1− θ)h(un))
+ν
(−θ¯d+ w − θ¯h(u¯a)− (1− θ¯)h(u¯n))
subject to
θ¯u¯a + (1− θ¯)u¯n ≥ θ¯ua + (1− θ¯)un, (3.57)
and
θua + (1− θ)un ≥ u(w). (3.58)
Let us denote by λ and µ the respective multipliers of (3.57) and (3.58). Optimizing
the Lagrangean of the principal’s problem with respect to ua and un yields respectively:
−θ(1− ν)h′(ua)− θ¯λ+ µ = 0, (3.59)
−(1− θ)(1− ν)h′(un)− (1− θ¯)λ+ µ = 0. (3.60)
Optimizing with respect to u¯a and u¯n yields also:
−θ¯νh′(u¯a) + θ¯λ = 0, (3.61)
−(1− θ¯)νh′(u¯n) + (1− θ¯)λ = 0. (3.62)
Using (3.61) and (3.62), it is immediate to see that the high risk agent receives full
insurance at the optimum:
u¯a = u¯n = u¯. (3.63)
From (3.61), we immediately get λ = νh′(u¯) > 0 and therefore (3.57) is binding.
Moreover, summing (3.59) to (3.62), we get µ = νh′(u¯)+(1−ν)(θh′(ua)+(1−θ)h′(un)) > 0
and thus (3.58) is also binding. Using that (3.57) and (3.58) are both binding, we also
obtain
u¯ = −∆θ∆u+ u(w) (3.64)
where un − ua = ∆u is the difference of utilities of a low risk agent between not having
and having an accident. The fact that (3.58) is binding also implies that one can write
ua = u(w)− (1−θ)∆u and un = u(w)+θ∆u. Inserting those expressions of ua, u¯a, un and
u¯n into the principal’s objective function and optimizing with respect to ∆u, we obtain
that the second-best value ∆uSB is defined implicitly as a solution to:
ν∆θ
(1− ν)θ(1− θ)h
′(−∆θ∆uSB + u(w)) = h′(u(w) + θ∆uSB)− h′(u(w)− (1− θ)∆uSB).
(3.65)
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The left-hand side of (3.65) is positive and we have thus h′(u(w)+θ∆uSB) > h′(u(w)−
(1− θ)∆uSB). Since h′(·) is increasing, we finally get that:
uSBn − uSBa = ∆uSB > 0. (3.66)
To reduce the incentives of the high risk agent to pretend being a low risk one, the
insurance company let this latter agent bear some risk. Imperfect insurance arises as a
second-best optimum.
Remark: When ∆θ is small enough, a simple Taylor expansion shows that the right-hand
side of (3.65) is close to h′′(u(w))∆uSB and we get the following approximation:
∆uSB =
ν
1− ν∆θ
h′(u(w))
h′′(u(w))
> 0. (3.67)
The neglected participation constraint of the high risk agent amounts to U¯SB = u¯SB =
−∆θ∆uSB + u(w) > u(w¯) which is now automatically satisfied since, when ∆θ is small
enough, u(w)− u(w¯) is positive and of order ∆θ and ∆θ∆uSB is instead of order ∆θ2.
More generally, the high risk agent’s participation constraint is not binding as long
as ∆θ∆uSB < u(w)− u(w¯) = ∆θ(u(w − d)− u(w)), or ∆uSB < u(w − d)− u(w), where
∆uSB is defined implicitly by (3.65). Using the strict concavity of the principal’s objective
function with respect to ∆u, this latter condition rewrites as:
ν∆θ
(1− ν)θ(1− θ)h
′(θ¯u(w − d) + (1− θ¯)u(w)) < h′(u(w))− h′(u(w − d)). (3.68)
When this latter condition does not hold, the high risk agent’s participation constraint
is also binding. We are then in a case where the participation constraints of both types
are binding. This is the equivalent of Case 3 in Section 3.4.1 with the specific features
imposed by the nonlinearity of the agent’s utility function. As long as both participation
constraints (3.55) and (3.56) are the only binding ones, we have then ∆uSB = u(w− d)−
u(w).
Figure 3.12 illustrates the optimal second-best solution in the (u1, u2) plane when only
the low probability agent’s participation constraint is binding.
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Figure 3.12: The Optimal Insurance Contract under Asymmetric Information.
The contracts A∗ and B∗ are respectively offered to a θ¯-and a θ-agent under complete
information. Instead, ASB and BSB are now offered to those agents under asymmetric
information. The θ¯-agent is indifferent between ASB and BSB and thus weakly prefers
the full insurance contract ASB. The θ-type strictly prefers BSB to ASB but gets no
information rent.
3.5 Random Participation Constraint
The previous section has shown how a deterministic but type-dependent participation
constraint could perturb the standard results on the optimal rent extraction-efficiency
trade-off. We now perturb the agent’s participation constraint in another direction, by
allowing some randomness in the decision to participate. Instead of the agent’s reser-
vation utility being perfectly known, let us consider a risk neutral agent with a random
participation constraint:6
U ≥ ε˜, (3.69)
6It is assumed implicitly that the principal does not attempt to elicit the value taken by the random
variable ε˜ with a stochastic mechanism.
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and
U¯ ≥ ε˜. (3.70)
We assume that ε˜ is drawn on the interval [−ε¯, ε¯] centered at zero with a cumulative
distribution function G(ε). We denote by g(ε) = G′(ε) the density of this random variable.
The motivation for such a stochastic specification of the reservation utility levels is that
the agent may have some random opportunity cost of accepting the contract proposed by
the principal and that this cost is already revealed to the agent at the time of contracting
even if the principal has no ability to screen this information. Alternatively, the agent may
be facing a whole set of possible trading opportunities outside of the relationship with a
given principal. Those trading opportunities yield a random profit ε˜ to the agent. Implicit
here is thus the idea that the principal competes with other principals having unknown
characteristics. However, this competition remains under the form of an exogenous black-
box.
In this model, the incentive constraints for both types remain as usual
U ≥ U¯ +∆θq¯, (3.71)
and
U¯ ≥ U −∆θq. (3.72)
A deterministic incentive-feasible contract {(U, q); (U¯ , q¯)} will be accepted if and only
if (3.69) and (3.70) both hold. Acceptance is thus now a random event. A priori, both
types only accept the contract with some probability, respectively G(U) for the θ-type and
G(U¯) for the θ¯-type. To simplify the analysis, we will assume that ε¯ is small with respect
to ∆θq¯. This assumption will imply that G(U) = 1 and only the inefficient agent may
not participate with some strictly positive probability 1 − G(U¯). The optimal contract
must solve the program below:
(P ) : max
{(U¯ ,q¯);(U,q)}
ν(S(q)− θq − U) + (1− ν)G(U¯)(S(q¯)− θ¯q¯ − U¯),
subject to (3.71) and (3.72).
Assuming the quasi-concavity of this program, its solution is described in the next
proposition. It is indexed by a superscript “R” meaning “random participation”.
Proposition 3.3 : Assume random participation constraints but ε¯ small enough. Then
the optimal contract entails:
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• The incentive constraint (3.71) is binding.
• The rent U¯R and the output q¯R of an inefficient agent are determined altogether as
the solutions to:
S ′(q¯R) = θ¯ +
ν∆θ
(1− ν)G(U¯R) (3.73)
and
S(q¯R)− θ¯q¯R = U¯R + ν + (1− ν)G(U¯
R)
(1− ν)g(U¯R) . (3.74)
Two important remarks should be made at this point. First, since an inefficient agent
trades with the principal with a probability less than one (i.e., G(U¯SBR) < 1), the principal
finds relatively less likely that he faces an efficient agent conditionally on trade being
carried on. Hence, the principal is more willing to distort downward the inefficient agent’s
output to reduce the relatively high expected cost of the efficient agent’s information rent.
q¯R defined on (3.73) is more distorted than the usual second-best distortion q¯SB obtained
with an exogenously given zero participation constraint.
Simultaneously, the principal chooses a level of the inefficient agent’s rent U¯R which
trades-off the marginal gain of inducing slightly more participation by this type against
the marginal cost of this extra participation. The marginal gain of increasing the rent by
dU¯R is precisely the net total surplus (S(q¯R)− θ¯q¯R− U¯R) times the increase in probability
that the inefficient agent chooses to participate, namely (1 − ν)g(U¯R)dU¯ . The marginal
cost takes into account the fact that this rent U¯R has to be given to all participating
agents, i.e., both the efficient one who trades with probability one and the inefficient one
also who comes only with a probability G(U¯R) less than one.
It is interesting to note that the output q¯R converges towards q¯SB defined in (2.28) as
ε¯ goes to zero. Indeed, in this case the random participation constraint becomes almost
as the usual deterministic participation constraint with zero reservation value.
Finally, assuming that the “generalized” monotone hazard rate property ν+(1−ν)G(ε)
(1−ν)g(ε)
increasing in ε guarantees that U¯R solution to (3.74) is strictly positive when S(q¯R)−θ¯q¯R >
0.7 To induce a relatively more likely participation, the principal must a priori give to the
inefficient agent a strictly positive rent. Lastly, the probability that the inefficient type
shows up is strictly lower than one when S(q¯SB)− θ¯q¯SB > ε¯+ 1
(1−ν)g(ε¯) , where q¯
SB is the
second-best optimal output with a deterministic participation constraint.
Rochet and Stole (2000) provided a complete analysis of a model with random
participation constraints and a continuum of types. They looked also at the interesting
case of competition between principals that we will analyze in Volume III.
7This latter condition always holds when S(·) satisfies the Inada condition S′(0) = +∞.
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3.6 Limited Liability
Sometimes the set of incentive-feasible contracts is constrained by some exogenous limits
on the feasible transfers between the principal and the agent. These exogenous financial
constraints often capture implicitly the existence of previous financial contracts that the
agent may have already signed.
A first possible limit on those transfers is that the transfer received by the agent should
not be lower than his liabilities which are fixed at some exogenous value −`. This leads
to the following limited liability constraints on transfers :
t ≥ −`, (3.75)
and
t¯ ≥ −`. (3.76)
A possible motivation for these constraints is that the agent already owns assets which
have value ` and can use them to cover any negative transfer received from the principal.
The production cost θq being already sunk, it does not enter into the left-hand sides of
(3.75) and (3.76).
A second limit on transfers arises when the agent’s information rent itself must be
greater than this exogenous value `. This leads to the following limited liability constraints
on rents :
U ≥ −`, (3.77)
U¯ ≥ −`. (3.78)
Now, the production cost θq is incurred before the transfer t takes place. Again, the
interpretation is that contracting with the principal may involve negative rents U or U¯ as
long as those losses can be covered by the agent’s own liabilities `.
To assess the impact of these limited liability constraints, let us go back to the frame-
work of Section 2.12. When contracting takes place ex ante, we have seen that the
first-best outcome can still be obtained provided that the inefficient agent receives a neg-
ative payoff, U¯∗ < 0. Obviously this negative payoff may conflict with the constraints
(3.76) or (3.78).
With ex ante contracting, we have already seen that the relevant incentive and par-
ticipation constraints are respectively:8
U ≥ U¯ +∆θq¯, (3.79)
8We let the reader check that the inefficient agent’s incentive constraint is slack at the optimum.
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and
νU + (1− ν)U¯ ≥ 0. (3.80)
Adding the limited liability constraints, the principal’s program writes thus as:
(P ) : max
{(U¯ ,q¯),(U,q)}
ν(S(q)− θq − U) + (1− ν)(S(q¯)− θ¯q¯ − U¯),
subject to (3.79), (3.80) and (3.75), (3.76) or (3.77), (3.78).
where limited liability constraints are either on transfers or on rents.
The next two propositions summarize the features of the optimal contract with a
limited liability constraint on either rents or transfers respectively.9 We index with a
superscript “L” meaning “limited liability” the second-best optimal contracts in these
cases.
Proposition 3.4 : Assume ex ante contracting and limited liability on rents. Then the
optimal contract entails:
• For ` > ν∆θq¯∗, only (3.79) and (3.80) are binding and the first-best outcome of
Section 2.12.1 remains optimal.
• For ν∆θq¯SB ≤ ` ≤ ν∆θq¯∗, (3.79), (3.80) and (3.78) are all binding. The efficient
agent produces efficiently qL = q∗ and the inefficient agent’s production is downwards
distorted away from the first-best q¯L < q¯∗ with:
` = ν∆θq¯L. (3.81)
• For ` < ν∆θq¯SB, only (3.79) and (3.78) are binding. The efficient agent produces
efficiently qL = q∗ and the inefficient agent’s production is equal to the second-best
output with ex post participation constraints q¯L = q¯SB defined in (2.28).
A limited liability constraint on ex post rents may reduce the efficiency of ex ante
contracting. If the limited liability constraint on the inefficient type is stringent enough,
the principal must reduce the inefficient agent’s output to keep the limited liability con-
straint satisfied. The agent is then subject to less risk on the allocation of ex post rents.
When the limited liability constraint is even harder, the principal must give up his desire
to let the ex ante participation constraint be binding. The limited liability constraint
9The proofs of these propositions are in Appendix 3.3.
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then implies also an ex ante information rent. Indeed, when ` is small enough, the agent’s
expected utility becomes U = −`+ ν∆θq¯SB which is then strictly positive.
Remark: Finally, note the similarity of the solution obtained in Proposition 3.4 with that
obtained when the agent is risk averse in Section 2.12.2 (Proposition 2.4). The limited
liability constraint on rents plays a similar role as the agent’s risk aversion. Indeed,
in both cases, the risk neutral principal finds costly to create a wedge between U and
U¯ and reducing this cost calls for lower powered incentives than with risk neutrality and
unlimited transfers. More precisely, with a limited liability constraint on rents, everything
happens as if the agent has an infinite risk aversion below a wealth of −`.
Let us now turn to the case of limited liability constraints on transfers. Restricting the
analysis to a few particular cases we have the following characterization of the optimal
contract.
Proposition 3.5 : Assume ex ante contracting and limited liability on transfers. Then
the optimal contract entails:
• For ` ≥ −(νθq∗ + (1 − ν)θ¯q¯∗), only (3.80) is binding and the first-best outcome of
Section 2.12.1 remains optimal.
• For −(νθ+ (1− ν)θ¯)q∗ ≤ ` ≤ −(νθq∗+ (1− ν)θ¯q¯∗), then, (3.79), (3.80) and (3.76)
are all binding. The efficient agent produces efficiently qL = q∗ and the inefficient
agent’s production is upwards distorted away from the first-best, with q∗ > q¯L > q¯∗
and:
` = −(νθ + (1− ν)θ¯)q¯L. (3.82)
• For ` < −(νθ+(1− ν)θ¯)q∗, there is bunching for which both types produce the same
output qL and (3.75), (3.76), (3.79) and (3.80) are all binding. The constant output
target qL is given by:
` = −(νθ + (1− ν)θ¯)qL. (3.83)
The limited liability constraints on transfers give rise to allocative distortions which
are rather different from those highlighted in Proposition 3.4. As the limited liability
constraint (3.76) is more stringent, it becomes again quite difficult to create the wedge
between U and U¯ which is necessary to ensure incentive compatibility. However, to relax
the limited liability constraint (3.76), the principal increases now the inefficient type’s
output. Indeed, using the information rent to rewrite (3.76), we obtain:
U¯ ≥ −`− θ¯q¯. (3.84)
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Hence, distorting the inefficient type’s output upwards relaxes this limited liability
constraint. A limited liability constraint on transfers implies thus higher powered incen-
tives for the agent. It is therefore almost the same as what we would obtain by assuming
that the agent is a risk lover. The limited liability constraint on transfers somewhat
convexifies the agent’s utility function.
Of course, the principal cannot raise indefinitively the inefficient agent’s output with-
out introducing some bunching in the allocation. In this case, the agent receives a fixed
payment which covers in expectation his cost. This transfer also satisfies the limited
liability constraints (3.75) and (3.76) which both take the same form.
Sappington (1983) and Lewis and Sappington (2000) derived optimal contracts
under adverse selection and limited liability constraints.
3.7 Audit Mechanisms and Costly State Verification
Sometimes the principal would like to relax the efficient type’s incentive constraint by
making somewhat costly for the efficient agent to lie and claim that he is inefficient.
One important way to do so is by using an audit technology which may detect the agent’s
nontruthful report and allows some punishment when such a false report is detected. This
audit technology allows, at a cost, to verify the state of nature announced by the agent.
Of course, the mere fact that this technology is costly may prevent its systematic use by
the principal.
Let us thus assume that the principal owns such an audit technology and that the
agent’s true type can be observed with probability p if the principal incurs a cost c(p)
with c′(·) > 0 and c′′(·) > 0. To always insure interior solutions, we assume that the
following Inada conditions c′(0) = 0 and c′(1) = +∞ both hold.
3.7.1 Incentive-Feasible Audit Mechanisms
The possibility of an audit significantly enlarges the set of incentive feasible mechanisms.
An incentive mechanism includes not only the transfer t(θˆ) and output targets q(θˆ), but
also a probability of audit p(θˆ) and a punishment P (θ, θˆ) if the agent’s announcement θˆ dif-
fers from its observed true type θ. We denote thereafter by
{
(U, q, p, P ); (U¯ , q¯, p¯, P¯ )
}
this
audit mechanism with the obvious notations P = P (θ, θ¯) and P¯ = P (θ¯, θ). In equilibrium,
the Revelation Principle applies and reports are truthful. Therefore, those punishments
are never used. They will nevertheless significantly affect the incentive constraints.
128 CHAPTER 3. INCENTIVE AND PARTICIPATION CONSTRAINTS
Remark: We stress that the principal has the ability to commit to this mechanism. We
will comment on the importance of this assumption later on.
The Revelation Principle still applies in this context and there is no loss of generality
in focusing on truthful direct mechanisms satisfying the following incentive constraints:
U = t− θq ≥ t¯− θq¯ − p¯P , (3.85)
U¯ = t¯− θ¯q¯ ≥ t− θ¯q − pP¯ . (3.86)
Note that the positive punishments P and P¯ relax those incentive constraints if audit
is performed with a strictly positive probability.
Let us now turn to a description of those punishments. Punishments used in the
literature can be classified into two subsets:
• Exogenous Punishments: P (resp. P¯ ) cannot be greater than some exogenous
threshold `
P ≤ `, (3.87)
P¯ ≤ `. (3.88)
These exogenous punishments can be viewed as the maximal amount of the agents’
assets which can be seized in case of a detected lie.
• Endogenous Punishments: P (resp. P¯ ) cannot be greater than the lying agent’s
benefit from his false announcement:
P ≤ t¯− θq¯, (3.89)
P¯ ≤ t− θ¯q. (3.90)
In this case, the agent may have no asset to be seized by the principal. Only his
profit from the relationship can now be taken back.
Of course, those two sets of constraints on punishments are mutually exclusive.
On top of the constraints (3.85) to (3.90), the usual participation constraints:
U ≥ 0, (3.91)
U¯ ≥ 0, (3.92)
must still be satisfied by any incentive-feasible audit mechanism.
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3.7.2 Optimal Audit Mechanism
The principal’s problem writes now as:
(P ) : max
{(U¯ ,q¯,p¯,R¯);(U,q,p,R)}
ν(S(q)− θq − U − c(p)) + (1− ν)(S(q¯)− θ¯q¯ − U¯ − c(p¯))
subject to (3.85), (3.86), {(3.87), (3.88)} or {(3.89), (3.90)}, (3.91), (3.92).
A preliminary remark should be made. Although punishments help to relax incentive
constraints, they do not enter directly into the principal’s objective function since, in
equilibrium, the Revelation Principle tells us that the agent’s report are truthful and lies
never occur.
As usual, we conjecture (and let the reader check ex post) that only the upward
incentive constraint (3.85) and the least efficient type’s participation constraint (3.92) are
relevant.
Let us now turn to the value of the punishments. In both cases of endogenous and
exogenous punishments, constraint (3.87) or constraint (3.89) should be respectively bind-
ing. Indeed, by raising as much as possible the punishment in case of a detected lie by
the efficient type, the principal can reduce as much as possible the right-hand side of
the efficient agent’s incentive constraint, making it easier to satisfy. This is the so-called
“Maximal Punishment Principle”.
Another important remark should be made at this point: there is no need to audit an
agent claiming that he is efficient since the inefficient type’s incentive constraint (3.86)
is slack anyway and since audit is costly. Henceforth, we have necessarily p = 0 at the
optimum. Similarly, the value of P¯ is irrelevant when (3.86) holds strictly.
Once (3.85) and (3.92) are both binding, we can also rewrite (3.89) as:
P ≤ ∆θq¯. (3.93)
We are thus led to optimize a reduced-form problem which writes as:
(P ′) : max
{(q¯,q,p¯,P )}
ν(S(q)− θq −∆θq¯ + p¯P ) + (1− ν)(S(q¯)− θ¯q¯ − c(p¯))
subject to either (3.87) or (3.89).
The next proposition summarizes the solution. The superscript “A” means “audit”.
Proposition 3.6 : With audit, the optimal contract entails:
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• Maximal punishments and either (3.87) (with exogenous punishments) or (3.89)
(with endogenous punishments) is binding.
• No output distortion with respect to the first-best outcome for the efficient type,
qA = q∗, and a downward distortion for the less efficient type
S ′(q¯A) = θ¯ +
ν
1− ν∆θ, (3.94)
with exogenous punishment; and
S ′(q¯A) = θ¯ +
ν
1− ν (1− p¯
A)∆θ, (3.95)
with endogenous punishment.
• Only the inefficient type is audited with a strictly positive probability p¯A such that
c′(p¯A) =
ν
1− νP, (3.96)
with exogenous punishment;
c′(p¯A) =
ν
1− ν∆θq¯
A, (3.97)
with endogenous punishment.
A comparison of the results obtained respectively with endogenous and with exogenous
punishments shows that, in both cases, a strictly positive probability of auditing the least
efficient type is obtained. This probability trades-off the physical cost of audit against its
benefit in diminishing the efficient type’s information rent. In the case of an exogenous
punishment, increasing by a small amount dp¯ the probability of audit of the inefficient
agent allows the principal to reduce the transfer t of the efficient type by an amount
Pdp where P is the exogenous maximal punishment. There is no output distortion of
production which is still equal to the second-best optimal output without audit. We have
q¯A = q¯SB where q¯SB is defined in (2.28). Audit is only useful in reducing the incentive
transfer, but has no impact on allocative efficiency.
With an endogenous punishment, the small increase dp in the probability of auditing
allows the principal to reduce the transfer t to the efficient type by an amount ∆θq¯dp.
Output distortions become less valuable to reduce the efficient type’s information rent
and the audit becomes a substitute for higher-powered incentives shifting output upwards
towards the first-best. We have q¯A > q¯SB. Audit has now an allocative impact.
Finally, note that the solution exhibited in Proposition 3.6 in the case of an exogenous
punishment is really the solution as long as the efficient type’s participation constraint
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(3.91) is slack, i.e., when `p¯A < ∆θq¯A. Otherwise, the constraint ∆θq¯ − `p¯ ≥ 0 must
be taken into account in the principal’s organization. The production distortion is then
smaller, and the probability of audit p¯ lower.
Remark: Let us briefly comment now on the commitment assumption. The key lesson of
these audit models is that the principal must commit to audit an inefficient firm with some
probability to relax the efficient type’s incentive constraint. Of course, such commitment
is ex post inefficient. Indeed, once the principal knows that only the inefficient firm claims,
in equilibrium, that it is inefficient, he has no longer any incentive to incur the audit cost.
However, if he does not audit, the efficient agent anticipates this. This latter agent will
not tell the truth anymore. Quite naturally, the lack of commitment to an audit strategy
generates a mixed strategy equilibrium where the efficient agent mixes between telling
the truth or not and the principal mixes between auditing or not an inefficient report.
The study of such a game is left to Volume III, where we will more generally analyze the
issues associated to the lack of commitment.
The Maximal Punishment Principle is due to Baron and Besanko (1984a). The
Revelation Principle has been first stated and proved in this context by Border and Sobel
(1989). Those authors also provide a careful analysis of the set of binding incentive
constraints with a finite number of types. The fundamental difficulty here is that those
models lose the Spence-Mirrlees condition and thus the incentive problem with more than
two types is badly behaved and becomes quickly untractable as the number of types
grows. Finally, Mookherjee and P’ng (1989) analyze an audit problem in an insurance
setting. The specificity of their model comes from the fact that the agent is no longer
risk-neutral. A random audit significantly helps in relaxing the incentive constraint. This
gives another reason for using a stochastic audit mechanism, namely, increasing the risk
exposure of an efficient agent if he lies and mimics an inefficient one. Khalil (1997) offers
a nice treatment of the case without commitment.
3.7.3 Financial Contracting
Audit models have been mainly developed in the financial and taxation contracting lit-
erature10. Those models are different from our model above because of their focus on a
continuum of types for the agent (let us think of him as a borrower to fix ideas), but
also because the only screening instrument for the principal (a lender) is the probability
of audit. In our model of Section 3.7.2, the screening instruments are less crude since
the principal could use the agent’s production even in the absence of an audit. Let us
sketch such a financial contracting model. If the profit θ can take two possible values θ
10See Townsend (1978), Gale and Hellwig (1985), and Williamson (1987).
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in {θ, θ¯} with respective probabilities 1 − ν and ν, the incentive contract writes thus as
{(t, p); (t¯, p¯)}. Note that again there is no point in auditing the high profit agent and
p¯ = 1 at the optimum. The high-profit agent’s incentive constraint becomes thus:
θ¯ − t¯ ≥ θ¯ − t− pP ; (3.98)
and the low profit agent’s participation constraint writes as:
θ − t ≥ 0. (3.99)
In general the financial contracting literature assumes endogenous punishment so that:
P ≤ θ¯ − t. (3.100)
The justification of this assumption comes from the interpretation of the audit model
made by the financial contracting literature. The audit is indeed often viewed as a costly
bankruptcy procedure following a strategic announcement of default by the manager of
the indebted firm. In this case, the debtholders reap all possible profits from the firm
following a default. The lender’s problem becomes then:
(P ) : max
{(t¯,t,p)}
νt¯+ (1− ν)(t− c(p)),
subject to (3.98) to (3.100).
All those constraints are binding at the optimum as it can be easily seen. This leads
to the transfers tA = θ, t¯A = θ¯ − (1 − pA)∆θ, PA = ∆θ and an optimal probability of
auditing an inefficient firm which is now given by c′(pA) = ν
1−ν∆θ where ∆θ is in fact the
efficient firm’s information rent when it is not audited by the principal.
In a model with a continuum of types, Gale and Hellwig (1985) showed that
the optimal contract with a deterministic audit involves two different regions. In the first
one, there is verification of low profits below a threshold R and a full repayment over this
region. In the second region, there is no verification and a fixed repayment R. This is
akin to a debt contract.
3.7.4 The Threat of Termination
In a model with two levels of profit, Bolton and Sharfstein (1990) argue that the threat
of termination of a long term relationship between a lender and his borrower may play
the same role as an audit and relaxes also the efficient agent’s incentive constraint. They
interpret their model as a debt contract where the probability of refinancing is contingent
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on past performance. To understand the analogy between the Bolton and Sharfstein
(1990) model and the costly state verification literature discussed above, let us consider
the following model stressing the threat of termination as an incentive device.
A cashless agent requires an amount of funds F to finance a project. With probability
ν (resp. 1 − ν) this project yields profit θ¯ (resp. θ). We will assume that the project
is socially valuable, νθ¯ + (1 − ν)θ > F. Moreover, the worst profit is already enough to
finance the project, θ > F . As in the costly state verification literature, the level of profit
is non-observable by the lender. The lender will have to rely on the agent’s announcement
of the realized profit to fix a repayment. Moreover, we assume that the agent is protected
by limited liability and can never get a negative payoff.
Suppose now that the contractual relationship lasts for two periods with independently
and identically distributed profits at each date and without any discounting. Then, the
lender can use the threat of terminating the financing to induce information revelation.
In the second period, it is still true that the maximal repayment that can be obtained by
the lender is θ. Note that such a repayment yields an expected information rent ν∆θ to
the borrower if the relationship continues for the second period.
We denote a first period direct mechanism by {(t¯, p¯); (t, p)}. p¯ (resp. t¯) is the proba-
bility of not refinancing the firm (resp. the borrower’s payment) when the agent reports
having a high profit θ¯ in the first period. A similar definition applies to p (resp. t).
The first period incentive compatibility constraints for both types write therefore as:
θ¯ − t¯+ (1− p¯)ν∆θ ≥ θ¯ − t+ (1− p)ν∆θ, (3.101)
and
θ − t+ (1− p)ν∆θ ≥ θ − t¯+ (1− p¯)ν∆θ. (3.102)
The intertemporal participation constraints for both types write also as:
θ¯ − t¯+ (1− p¯)ν∆θ ≥ 0, (3.103)
and
θ − t+ (1− p)ν∆θ ≥ 0. (3.104)
Finally, the agent being cashless to start with, the following first period limited liability
constraints must be satisfied:
θ¯ − t¯ ≥ 0, (3.105)
134 CHAPTER 3. INCENTIVE AND PARTICIPATION CONSTRAINTS
and
θ − t ≥ 0. (3.106)
Knowing that the repayment he gets in the second period is always θ, the principal’s
program is thus:
(P ) : max
{(t¯,p¯);(t,p)}
ν (t¯+ (1− p¯)(θ − F )) + (1− ν) (t+ (1− p)(θ − F ))− F
subject to (3.101) to (3.106).
We let the reader check that (3.101) and (3.106) are the only two constraints which
are binding at the optimum. Henceforth, we obtain the following values of the first
period payments: t = θ and t¯ = θ + (p − p¯)ν∆θ. Inserting those expressions into the
principal’s objective function yields a reduced program depending only on the probabilities
of refinancing p¯ and p:
(P ′) : max
{(p¯,p)}
ν
(
θ + (1− p¯)(νθ¯ + (1− ν)θ − F )− (1− p)ν∆θ)
+(1− ν)(θ + (1− p)(θ − F ))− F.
We index with a “R” meaning “refinancing” this optimal contract. Since the project
is valuable in expectation, it would be costly for the principal not to refinance the project
following a high first period profit and therefore we have p¯R = 0. Following a first high
period profit, the project is therefore always refinanced with probability one.
Even if θ > F , it may well be that the fixed investment F is such that
θ − ν
2
1− ν∆θ − F < 0. (3.107)
In this case, it is never optimal to refinance a project following a low first period
profit and pR = 1. There exists a whole set of values for the cost of the project F , F
in [θ − ν2
1−ν∆θ, θ], which are such that it is efficient to finance the project, but asym-
metric information implies that those projects are nevertheless not renewed following the
announcement of a low first period profit.
It is interesting to note that the probability of not refinancing the project plays the
same role as the probability of audit in a Townsend-Gale-Hellwig model. First, it relaxes
the high profit agent’s incentive constraint. Second, not renewing finance is also costly
for the principal since projects are always socially valuable.
Finally, note that the lender’s intertemporal profit under asymmetric information be-
comes V SB = νθ¯ + (1− ν)θ − F + θ − F .
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It is obviously lower than the intertemporal profit when profit is verifiable V FB =
2(νθ¯ + (1− ν)θ − F ), but greater than realizing the project each period and asking for a
payment θ which yields 2(θ − F ).
3.8 Redistributive Concerns and the Efficiency-Equity
Trade-Off
In the rent extraction-efficiency trade-off analyzed so far, the principal wants to minimize
the information rent left to the agent for a given level of output. The principal has no
redistributive concerns vis-a`-vis the agent. In the optimal taxation literature, starting
with the seminal paper of Mirrlees (1971) that we will cover more extensively in Chapter
7, the principal (generally a government or a tax authority) wants to redistribute wealth
among members of society according to a particular social objective function G(·) that
we will assume increasing and concave (G′(·) > 0 and G′′(·) < 0). Of course, for the
redistribution problem to be non trivial, agents have to be heterogenous. We will thus
assume that with probability ν (resp. 1− ν) an agent is a high (resp. low) productivity
one having a cost of production θ (resp. θ¯). An agent’s utility function writes thus as
usual as U = t−θq. The principal’s objective is instead V = νG(U)+(1−ν)G(U¯), where
U = t− θq and U¯ = t¯− θ¯q¯.
This redistributive objective of the government is constrained by the State’s budget
constraint. Typically, if the return from production of each type is S(q), the budget
constraint requires that the government cannot redistribute more than what is actually
produced, i.e.:
νS(q) + (1− ν)S(q¯) ≥ νt+ (1− ν)t¯. (3.108)
Using the definition of the information rents U and U¯ , the budget constraint can be
rewritten as:
ν
(
S(q)− θq)+ (1− ν) (S(q¯)− θ¯q¯) ≥ νU + (1− ν)U¯ .11 (3.109)
Under complete information, i.e., when the principal can distinguish between high
and low productivity agents, the optimal redistributive scheme must solve the following
problem:
11If the government must also cover a fixed spending B out of the society production, B should be
added on the right-hand side above.
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(P ) : max
{(U,q);(U¯ ,q¯)}
νG(U) + (1− ν)G(U¯)
subject to (3.109).
The problem is concave and the first-order Kuhn and Tucker are necessary and suffi-
cient conditions for optimality. Optimizing with respect to U and U¯ respectively yields:
µ = G′(UFB) = G′(U¯FB), (3.110)
where µ is the positive multiplier of (3.109).
When G(·) is strictly concave, the full information policy calls for complete redistribu-
tion so that: UFB = U¯FB = U∗.
Optimizing with respect to outputs yields the usual first-best productions q∗ and q¯∗.
Henceforth, any agent, whatever his type, gets:
U∗ = E(S(q∗)− θq∗), (3.111)
where E(·) denotes the expectation operator with respect to θ.
Under complete information, the government chooses to maximize the “size of the
cake” before redistributing equal shares of it to everybody. There is no conflict between
efficiency and equity.
Let us now turn to the more realistic case where the agent’s productivity is non-
observable. An incentive-feasible redistribution policy must now satisfy not only the
budget constraint (3.109), but also the following incentive constraints:
U − U¯ ≥ ∆θq¯, (3.112)
and
U¯ − U ≥ −∆θq. (3.113)
First, note that the optimal first-best policy is such that: UFB − U¯FB = 0 < ∆θq¯FB,
i.e., the high productivity agent’s incentive constraint is violated. Hence, we suspect
(3.112) to be binding under asymmetric information and we look for an optimal second-
best policy as a solution to the following program:
(P ) : max
{(U,q);(U¯ ,q¯)}
νG(U) + (1− ν)G(U¯),
subject to (3.109) and (3.112).12
12We let the reader check that the inefficient agent’s incentive constraint is slack at the optimum.
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Denoting by µ and λ the respective multipliers of (3.109) and (3.112), the first-order
Kuhn and Tucker conditions for optimality with respect to U and U¯ yield respectively:
νG′(USB) = µν − λ, (3.114)
and
(1− ν)G′(U¯SB) = µ(1− ν) + λ. (3.115)
Summing those last two equations, we obtain:
µ = νG′(USB) + (1− ν)G′(U¯SB) > 0, (3.116)
and the budget constraint is again binding. Also, we compute:
λ = ν(1− ν) (G′(U¯SB)−G′(USB)) . (3.117)
Since G(·) is concave and U¯SB > USB is necessary to satisfy the incentive constraint
(3.112), we have λ > 0 and the incentive compatibility constraint is also binding.
Optimizing with respect to outputs yields immediately qSB = q∗, i.e., “no distortion
at the top” and a downward distortion of the low productivity agent’s output. We have
indeed q¯SB < q¯∗ where
S ′(q¯SB) = θ¯ +
λ
(1− ν)µ∆θ. (3.118)
Using the definitions of λ and µ given above, we finally obtain:
S ′(q¯SB) = θ¯ + ν
(
G′(U¯SB)−G′(USB)
νG′(USB) + (1− ν)G′(U¯SB)
)
∆θ. (3.119)
We summarize all those results as a proposition.
Proposition 3.7 : Under asymmetric information, the optimal redistributive policy calls
for a downward distortion of the low productivity agent’s output, q¯SB < q¯∗, and a positive
wedge between the low and the high productivity agents’ utilities, USB > U¯SB.
To induce information revelation by the high productivity type, the principal raises
his after tax utility level and reduces that of the low productivity type. Introducing this
unequal distribution of utilities is costly for the principal who maximizes a strictly concave
social objective. To reduce this cost, and thereby to reduce inequality, the principal
decreases the low productivity agent’s output. Under asymmetric information, there
exists a true trade-off between equity and efficiency.
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Remark: It is interesting to give an approximation of the distortion described on (3.117)
when ∆θ is small enough. Using simple Taylor expansions, we get G′(U¯SB)−G′(USB) ≈
−G′′(U∗)(USB − U¯SB) = −G′′(U∗)∆θq¯SB, and νG′(USB) + (1 − ν)G′(U¯SB) ≈ G′(U∗).
Hence, we finally obtain
S ′(q¯SB) = θ¯ − νG
′′(U∗)
G′(U∗)
(∆θ)2q¯SB. (3.120)
As the degree of government’s inequality aversion −G′′(U∗)
G′(U∗) increases, the principal
becomes more averse to inequality and he must reduce more significantly the low produc-
tivity agent’s output.
The taxation literature has been mostly developed, following Mirrlees (1971), in
the case of a continuum of productivity shocks. The technical difficulties of such models
come from the fact that one can no longer proceed in two steps as usual, i.e., first, find
the distribution of utilities and, second, optimize with respect to output. Those two steps
must indeed be performed simultaneously by relying on complex optimization techniques
(calculus of variations or Pontryagin Principle). This makes the analysis quite difficult
and explicit solutions are generally not available (see Atkinson and Stiglitz (1981), Stiglitz
(Chapter 15) and Myles (1998) for the techniques needed to solve this problem). A second
peculiarity of the optimal solution with a continuum of types is that both the lowest and
the highest productivity agents produce the first-best output (provided that second-order
conditions are satisfied, see Lollivier and Rochet (1983); otherwise, it may be sometimes
optimal to have the least productive agents producing zero output). For all other types,
the production is downwards distorted as in our two type example. The clear advantage
of the continuum model is that it gives realistic predictions on the taxation schedule.
This allows to discuss the progressivity or regressivity of this schedule. In fact, the “no
distortion at the top” result also implies that the marginal tax rate faced by the highest
productivity agents should be zero in the optimal taxation literature. This seems to
contradict some empirical observations (see Saez (1999) and Chapter 7 for more on this
issue).
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APPENDIX 3.1: Bunching in the case of a continuum of types
We analyze in this appendix the bunching problem in the case of a continuum of types.
The framework is thus that of Appendix 2.1.
In the case of a continuum of types, the principal’s optimization program writes (see
Appendix 2.1):
(P ) : max
{(U(θ),q(θ))}
∫ θ¯
θ
(S(q(θ))− θq(θ)− U(θ)) f(θ)dθ
subject to
U˙(θ) = −q(θ) (3.121)
q˙(θ ≥ 0 (3.122)
U(θ) ≥ 0 for all θ in Θ, (3.123)
where (3.122) is the local second-order condition of the agent’s problem.
We can solve (3.121) for U(θ) and using U(θ¯) = 0, substitute in the principal’s objec-
tive program. Then, we can define q(θ) as the new state variable and y(θ) = q˙(θ) as the
control variable. (P ) reduces to:
(P ′) : max
{(q(θ),y(θ))}
∫ θ¯
θ
(
S(q(θ))− θq(θ)− F (θ)
f(θ)
q(θ)
)
f(θ)dθ
q˙(θ) = y(θ) (3.124)
y(θ) ≤ 0. (3.125)
We denote by µ(θ) the multiplier of (3.124).
The Hamiltonian is then:
H(q, y, µ, θ) =
(
S(q)−
(
θ +
F (θ)
f(θ)
)
q
)
f(θ) + µy. (3.126)
From the Pontryagin principle, we have:
µ˙(θ) = −∂H
∂q
=
(
S ′(q(θ))−
(
θ +
F (θ)
f(θ)
))
f(θ). (3.127)
Maximizing with respect to y(·) with the constraint (3.125) yields µ(θ) ≥ 0, with
y(θ) = 0 if µ(θ) > 0.
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Consider an interval where the monotonicity constraint (3.125) is not binding. Then,
µ(θ) is zero on this interval (and therefore µ˙(θ) = 0 also on this interval). Maximizing
with respect to q(·) we find then the second-best solution characterized by:
S ′(qSB(θ)) = θ +
F (θ)
f(θ)
. (3.128)
So, when the monotonicity constraint is not binding, the optimal solution coincide
with the second-best solution.
Consider now an interval [θ0, θ1] where the monotonicity constraint is binding. Then
q(·) is constant in the interval. Denote by q¯ this value. Since (3.125) is not binding to
the left of θ0 and to the right of θ1, and, from the continuity of the Pontryagin multiplier
µ(θ), we have µ(θ0) = µ(θ1) = 0. Integrating (3.127) between θ0 and θ1, we obtain:
∫ θ1
θ0
(
S ′(q¯)−
(
u+
F (u)
f(u)
))
f(u)du = 0, (3.129)
or putting it differently:
S ′(q¯) =
∫ θ1
θ0
(uf(u) + F (u))du∫ θ1
θ0
f(u)du
. (3.130)
Integrating by parts the numerator of (3.130), we get:
S ′(q¯) =
θ1F (θ1)− θ0F (θ0)
F (θ1)− F (θ0) . (3.131)
To determine the three unknowns θ0, θ1, and q¯, we have three equations, namely
(3.128) and q¯ = qSB(θ0) = q
SB(θ1) (see Figure 3.13).
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Figure 3.13: Bunching.
There is bunching in the interval [θ0, θ1].
See Guesnerie and Laffont (1984) for more general solutions.
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APPENDIX 3.2: The Spence-Mirrlees Conditions
The goal of this appendix is to see the importance of the Spence-Mirrlees condition in
a general incentive problem.
Consider the general utility function U(q, t, θ) for the agent with Ut > 0. Local
incentive compatibility for the direct revelation mechanism {(q(θ˜), t(θ˜))} writes:
Uq(q(θ), t(θ), θ)q˙(θ) + Ut(q(θ), t(θ), θ)t˙(θ) = 0. (3.132)
The local second-order condition writes:
Uqθ(q(θ), t(θ), θ)q˙(θ) + Utθ(q(θ), t(θ), θ)t˙(θ) ≥ 0, (3.133)
or, using the first-order condition:
q˙(θ)
(
Uqθ(q(θ), t(θ), θ) + Utθ(q(θ), t(θ), θ) · Uq(q(θ), t(θ), θ)
Ut(q(θ), t(θ), θ)
)
≥ 0,
or, finally
q˙(θ) · Ut(q(θ), t(θ), θ) · ∂
∂θ˜
(
Uq(q(θ), t(θ), θ˜)
Ut(q(θ), t(θ), θ˜)
)∣∣∣∣∣
θ˜=θ
≥ 0. (3.134)
Using the Spence-Mirrlees condition at θ˜ = θ
∂
∂θ
(
Uq
Ut
)
> 0, (3.135)
and Ut > 0, we conclude that q˙(θ) ≥ 0.
Global incentive compatibility requires:
U(q(θ), t(θ), θ) ≥ U(q(θ˜), t(θ˜), θ) for all (θ, θ˜) in Θ2, (3.136)
(3.136) can be rewritten:
∫ θ
θ˜
(
Uq(q(τ), t(τ), θ)q˙(τ) + Ut(q(τ), t(τ), θ)t˙(τ)
)
dτ ≥ 0, (3.137)
or, using again the first-order condition to express t˙(u)
∫ θ
θ˜
q˙(τ)Ut(q(τ), t(τ), θ)
(
Uq(q(τ), t(τ), θ)
Ut(q(τ), t(τ), θ)
− Uq(q(τ), t(τ), τ)
Ut(q(τ), t(τ), τ)
)
dτ ≥ 0. (3.138)
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Since q˙(τ) ≥ 0, Ut > 0, and using the Spence-Mirrlees condition with τ < θ, we can
conclude that∫ θ
θ˜
q˙(τ)Ut(q(τ), t(τ), θ)
(
Uq(q(τ), t(τ), θ)
Ut(q(τ), t(τ), θ)
− Uq(q(τ), t(τ), τ)
Ut(q(τ), t(τ), τ)
)
dτ
≥
∫ θ
θ˜
q˙(τ)Ut(q(τ), t(τ), θ)
(
Uq(q(τ), t(τ), τ)
Ut(q(τ), t(τ), τ)
− Uq(q(τ), t(τ), τ)
Ut(q(τ), t(τ), τ)
)
dτ = 0(3.139)
Hence, the local second-order condition q˙(τ) ≥ 0 also implies global optimality of the
truthtelling strategy when the Spence-Mirrlees condition (3.136) holds.
Remark: It is important to notice that, for reducing the second-order condition to
q˙(θ) ≥ 0, we need only to use the Spence-Mirrlees condition at (q(θ), t(θ), θ), but to reach
global incentive compatibility, we need this condition at (q(τ), t(τ), θ) for any (τ, θ), i.e.,
for any (q, t, θ), which is a much stronger requirement.
For models linear in θ, such as θu(q) + t, the “local Spence-Mirrlees condition”.
∂
∂θ
(θUq(q(θ˜)))θ˜=θ > 0 for all θ which is equivalent to Uq(q(θ)) > 0 for all θ implies the
“global Spence-Mirrlees condition” ∂
∂θ
(θUq(q(τ))) > 0 for all (θ, τ), which is equivalent to
Uq(q(τ)) > 0 for all τ .
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APPENDIX 3.3: Proofs of Propositions 3.4 and 3.5
We start with Proposition 3.4. Suppose first that ` < ν∆θq¯SB; we conjecture that
the relevant constraints are (3.79) and (3.78). Those constraints are obviously binding to
minimize the expected rent νU + (1− ν)U¯ left to the agent. Hence, U¯L = −` and UL =
−` + ∆θq¯. Inserting those values into the principal’s objective function and optimizing
with respect to q∗ and q¯SB yields qL = q∗ and q¯L = q¯SB.
This solution is valid as long as the agent’s ex ante participation constraint is strictly
satisfied, i.e., νUL + (1− ν)U¯L = −`+ ν∆θq¯SB > 0.
Note that the θ¯-agent’s incentive constraint and the limited liability constraint (3.77)
are both slack. Suppose now that ν∆θq¯SB ≤ ` ≤ ν∆θq¯∗, then we conjecture that (3.80)
is also binding. In this case we obtain that νUL + (1− ν)U¯L = −`+ ν∆θq¯L = 0 and thus
the output distortion is explicitly defined by (3.81). This distortion continues to hold as
long as q¯ ≥ q¯∗. For ` > ν∆θq¯∗, the principal implements the first-best outcome by fixing
UL = (1 − ν)∆θq¯∗ and U¯L = −ν∆θq¯∗. These rents satisfy (3.79) and (3.80) with an
equality. Moreover the limited liability constraints (3.77) and (3.78) also hold.
We now turn to the proof of Proposition 3.5. Note first that we can rewrite (3.75) and
(3.76) respectively as:
U ≥ −`− θq, (3.140)
U¯ ≥ −`− θ¯q¯. (3.141)
The best way to solve the problem is graphically. In Figure 3.14, we have drawn the set
of pairs (U, U¯) which are implementable and satisfy the ex ante participation constraint
(3.80) and the limited liability constraints (3.140) and (3.141).
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Figure 3.14: First-Best Implementation with Limited Liability.
In Figure 3.14 we note that the limited liability constraints (3.140) and (3.141) define a
north-east quadrant with a basis A which lies strictly below the θ-type incentive constraint
since q ≥ q¯ is requested from standard monotonicity condition. In the figure, ` is large
enough so that the first-best can be implemented by choosing U∗ = (1 − ν)∆θq¯∗ and
U¯∗ = −ν∆θq¯∗. This case occurs as long as ν(−` − θq∗) + (1 − ν)(−` − θ¯q¯∗) < 0 or
equivalently as long as ` > − (νθq∗ + (1− ν)θ¯q¯∗). Graphically, we see that all omitted
constraints are then strictly satisfied. When ` diminishes, one moves upwards along the
450 line D to reach point B Figure 3.15.
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Figure 3.15: Distortion with Limited Liability.
In Figure 3.15, we see that (3.76), (3.79) and (3.80) are all binding. In this case, we
obtain UL = ∆θq¯L−`− θ¯q¯L, U¯L = −`− θ¯q¯L and ` = −θ¯q¯L+ν∆θq¯L = −(νθ+(1−ν)θ¯)q¯L.
This solution entails a distortion of a θ¯-agent’s output. It is valid as long as q¯L ≤ q∗ to
keep the usual monotonicity condition satisfied. Finally, when ` < −(νθ + (1 − ν)θ¯)q∗,
both types are bunched together and produce q such that ` = −(νθ + (1− ν)θ¯)q.
Chapter 4
Moral Hazard: The Basic Trade-Offs
4.1 Introduction
In the introduction to Chapter 2, we have stressed that the delegation of task creates an
information gap between the principal and his agent when the latter may have learned
some piece of information relevant for determining the efficient volume of trade. Adverse
selection is not the only informational problem one can imagine. Agents to whom a task
has been delegated by a principal may also choose actions which affect the value of trade
or, more generally, the agent’s performance. By the mere fact of delegation, the principal
loses any ability to control those actions when those actions are no longer observable,
either by the principal who offers the contract, or by the Court of Justice which enforces
it. Those actions cannot be contracted upon because no one can verify the value of the
agent’s actions. We will then say that there is moral hazard.1
The leading candidates for such moral hazard actions are effort variables which influ-
ence positively the agent’s level of production but also create a disutility for the agent.
For instance, the yield of a field depends on the amount of time that the tenant has spent
selecting the good crops, or the quality of the harvesting he has made. Similarly, the
probability that a driver gets a car crash depends on how safely he drives and this affects
his demand for insurance. Also, a regulated firm may have to perform a costly and non
observable investment to reduce its cost of producing a socially valuable good. However,
the agent’s action can also be a more complex array of decisions which defines the agent’s
task or his job attributes. The agent can sometimes choose among various projects to be
carried out on behalf of the principal with each project being associated with a particular
non-transferable private benefit that he may get if this project is selected. As an example,
the manager of a large corporation may divert the firm’s resources in perquisites rather
1This situation is sometimes also referred to as hidden action. See Section 1.7 for the origin of the
expression moral hazard.
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than in hiring new engineers for the firm’s research lab.
It is important to stress that, as adverse selection, moral hazard would not be an issue
if the principal and the agent had the same objective function. Crucial to the agency cost
arising under moral hazard is the conflict between the principal and the agent over which
action should be carried out. The non-observability of the agent’s action may then prevent
an efficient resolution of this conflict of interest since a contract can never stipulate which
action should be taken by the agent.
As under adverse selection, asymmetric information plays here also a crucial role in
the design of the incentive contract under moral hazard. However, instead of being an
exogenous uncertainty for the principal, uncertainty is now endogenous. The probabilities
of the different states of nature and thus the expected volume of trade depend now
explicitly on the agent’s effort. In other words, the realized production level is only a noisy
signal of the agent’s action. This uncertainty is key to understand the contractual problem
under moral hazard. Had the mapping between effort and performance been completely
deterministic, the principal and the Court of Justice would have no difficulties in inferring
the agent’s effort from the observed output. Even if effort is non-observable directly,
it could be indirectly contracted upon since output is itself observable and verifiable.
The non-observability of the effort would not put any real constraint on the principal’s
ability to contract with the agent and their conflict of interest would be costless to solve.
Contrary to what occurs in the adverse selection paradigm, the resolution of uncertainty
is now common knowledge ex post and contracting takes place before output realizes, i.e.,
at the ex ante stage.
In a moral hazard context, the random output aggregates the agent’s effort and the
realization of pure luck. However, the principal can only design a contract based on the
agent’s observable performance. Through this contract, the principal wants to induce,
at a reasonable cost, a good action of the agent despite the impossibility to condition
directly the agent’s reward on his action. In general, the non-observability of the agent’s
effort affects the cost of implementing a given action. To illustrate this point, we present
a model where a risk averse agent can choose a binary effort, and the production level
can be either high or low. A first step of the analysis made in this chapter is to study
the properties of incentive schemes which induce a positive and costly effort. Such a
scheme must thus satisfy an incentive constraint. Also, inducing the agent’s voluntary
participation imposes a standard participation constraint. Incentive feasible contracts are
those satisfying those two constraints. Among such schemes, the principal prefers the one
which implements the positive level of effort at minimal cost. This cost minimization yields
the characterization of the second-best cost of implementing this effort. In general, this
second-best cost is greater than the first-best cost which would be obtained by assuming
that effort is verifiable. The reason is that an incentive constraint is generally binding for
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the incentive scheme implementing a positive effort at minimal cost.
Once this first step of the analysis is performed, we can characterize the second-
best effort chosen by the principal. This second-best effort trades-off the benefit for the
principal of inducing a given effort against the second-best cost of implementing this
effort. The main lesson of this second step of the analysis is that the second-best effort
may differ from the first-best one. An allocative inefficiency emerges as the result of the
conflict of interest between the principal and the agent.
Let us now see in more detail the terms of the moral hazard trade-offs. When the
agent is risk neutral, the non-observability of effort has no bite on the efficiency of trade.
Moral hazard does not create any transaction cost. The principal can achieve the same
utility level as if he could directly control the agent’s effort. This first-best outcome is
nevertheless obtained through a contract which is contingent on the level of production.
The agent is incentivized by being rewarded for good production levels and penalized
otherwise. Since the agent is risk neutral, he is ready to accept penalties and rewards
as long as the expected payment he receives satisfies his ex ante participation constraint.
Transfers can be structured to saturate the agent’s participation constraint while inducing
the desirable effort level. One way of doing so is to make the agent residual claimant for
the gains from trade and to grasp from him this gain through an ex ante lump-sum
transfer.
If the risk neutral agent has no wealth and cannot be punished, a new limited liability
constraint must be satisfied on top of the usual incentive and participation constraint.
There is then a conflict between the limited liability and the incentive constraints. Indeed,
punishment being infeasible, the principal is restricted to use only rewards to induce
effort. This restriction in the principal’s instruments implies that he must give up some
ex ante rent to the agent. This limited liability rent is costly for the principal who then
distorts the second-best effort level below its first-best value to reduce the cost of this
rent. As for adverse selection and ex post participation constraints, we have a quite similar
limited liability rent extraction-efficiency trade-off leading to a downward distortion in the
expected volume of trade.
If the agent is risk averse, a constant wage provides full insurance but induces no
effort provision. Inducing effort requires to let the agent bear some risk. To accept such
a risky contract, the agent must receive a risk premium. There is now a conflict between
the incentive and the participation constraints. This leads to an insurance-efficiency
trade-off. To solve this trade-off, the principal must distort the complete information risk
sharing agreement between him and the agent to induce effort provision. As we will see
in Chapter 5 below, there is no general lesson on how the second-best and the first-best
effort can be compared in a moral hazard environment. However, in a model with two
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effort levels, one can still easily show that a high effort is less often implemented by the
principal than under complete information.
In Section 4.2, we present the general moral hazard model highlighting the stochastic
nature of the production process in a two-effort-two-outcome setting. We also describe
there the set of incentive feasible contracts inducing a high level of effort and we derive
as a benchmark the first-best decision rule. In Section 4.3, we show that the agent’s
risk neutrality imposes no real transaction cost on the efficiency of contracting. Section
4.4 focuses on the trade-off between extraction of the limited liability rent and allocative
efficiency under risk neutrality. Section 4.5 deals with the trade-off between insurance
and efficiency under risk aversion. These latter two sections are the core of the chapter.
We then extend the basic framework to provide various comparative statics results on
the optimal contract. In Section 4.6, we briefly generalize our previous insights to the
case of more than two levels of performance. This extension is worth pursuing to analyze
the conditions on the information structure which ensure the monotonicity of the agent’s
compensation schedule. In Section 4.7, we investigate the properties of various information
systems from an agency point of view. We prove there an important property: any
signal which is informative on the agent’s effort should be included as an argument of his
compensation payment. Section 4.8 proposes a brief overview of the insights obtained from
the moral hazard paradigm to understand the theory of the firm. Section 4.9 develops
a number of bareboned examples where the moral hazard paradigm has proved to be
extremely useful.
4.2 The Model
4.2.1 Effort and Production
We consider an agent who can exert a costly effort e. e can take two possible values
that we normalize respectively as a zero effort level and a positive effort of one: e in
{0, 1}. Exerting effort e implies a disutility for the agent which is equal to ψ(e) with the
normalizations ψ(0) = ψ0 = 0 and ψ(1) = ψ1 = ψ.
The agent receives a transfer t from the principal and we assume that his utility func-
tion is separable between money and effort2, U = u(t)− ψ(e), with u(·) being increasing
and concave (u′(·) > 0, u′′(·) < 0). Sometimes, we will use the function h = u−1, the
inverse function of u(·), which is also increasing and convex (h′(·) > 0, h′′(·) > 0).
Production is stochastic and effort affects the production level as follows. The stochas-
2This assumption facilitates notations and is irrelevant in this chapter. See Chapter 5 for the case of
non-separability and its possible impact on the main features of the optimal contract.
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tic production level q˜ can only take two values {q, q¯}, with q¯ − q = ∆q > 0, and the
stochastic influence of effort on production is characterized by the probabilities Pr(q˜ =
q¯/e = 0) = pi0, and Pr(q˜ = q¯/e = 1) = pi1, with pi1 > pi0. We will denote by ∆pi = pi1 − pi0
the difference between these two probabilities.
Note that effort improves production in the first-order stochastic dominance sense,
i.e., Pr(q˜ ≤ q∗|e) is decreasing with e for any given production q∗. Indeed, we have:
Pr(q˜ ≤ q|e = 1) = 1− pi1 < 1− pi0 = Pr(q˜ ≤ q|e = 0) and Pr(q˜ ≤ q¯|e = 1) = 1 = Pr(q˜ ≤
q¯|e = 0). This property implies that any principal who has an utility function v(·) which
is increasing in production prefers the stochastic distribution of production induced by
the positive effort level e = 1 to that induced by the null effort e = 0. Indeed, we have:
pi1v(q¯)+(1−pi1)v(q) = pi0v(q¯)+(1−pi0)v(q)+(pi1−pi0)(v(q¯)−v(q)) which is greater than
pi0v(q¯)+ (1− pi0)v(q) if v(·) is increasing. So, an increase in effort improves production in
a strong sense in this model with two possible levels of performance.
4.2.2 Incentive Feasible Contracts
Mimicking what we did in Chapters 2 and 3, we now describe incentive feasible contracts
in a moral hazard environment. In such an environment, the agent’s action is not directly
observable by the principal. The principal can only offer a contract based on the observable
and verifiable production level, i.e., a function {t(q˜)} linking the agent’s compensation to
the random output q˜. With two possible outcomes q¯ and q, the contract can equivalently
be defined by a pair of transfers t¯ and t. t¯ (resp. t) is the payment received by the agent
if the production q¯ (resp. q) realizes. Keeping the same notations as in Chapter 2, the
risk neutral principal’s expected utility writes now as:
V1 = pi1(S(q¯)− t¯) + (1− pi1)(S(q)− t), (4.1)
if the agent makes a positive effort (e = 1), and
V0 = pi0(S(q¯)− t¯) + (1− pi0)(S(q)− t), (4.2)
if the agent makes no effort (e = 0). For notational simplicity, we will denote all along
this chapter the principal’s benefits in each state of nature respectively by S(q¯) = S¯ and
S(q) = S.
The problem of the principal is now to decide whether to induce the agent to exert
effort or not, and if he chooses to do so, which incentive contract should be used.
To each level of effort that the principal wishes to induce corresponds a set of contracts
ensuring participation and incentive compatibility. In our model with two possible levels
of effort, we will say that a contract is incentive feasible if it induces a positive effort and
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ensures the agent’s participation. The corresponding moral hazard incentive constraint
writes thus as:
pi1u(t¯) + (1− pi1)u(t)− ψ ≥ pi0u(t¯) + (1− pi0)u(t). (4.3)
(4.3) is the incentive constraint which imposes that the agent prefers to exert a positive
effort. If he exerts effort, the agent faces the lottery which gives t¯ (resp. t) with probability
pi1 (resp. 1 − pi1) and not the lottery which yields t¯ (resp. t) with probability pi0 (resp.
1 − pi0). However, when he does not exert effort, the agent incurs no disutility of effort
and saves an amount ψ.
Still normalizing at zero the agent’s reservation utility, the agent’s participation con-
straint writes now as:
pi1u(t¯) + (1− pi1)u(t)− ψ ≥ 0. (4.4)
(4.4) is the agent’s participation constraint requiring that exerting effort yields to the
agent at least his outside opportunity utility level. Note that this participation constraint
is ensured at the ex ante stage, i.e., before the realization of the production shock.3
Definition 4.1 : An incentive feasible contract satisfies the incentive and participation
constraints (4.3) and (4.4).
Finally, the timing of the contracting game under moral hazard can be summarized
as follows:
-? ??? ?
t = 0 t = 1 t = 2 t = 3 t = 4
P
offers a contract
{(t¯, t)}.
A
accepts
or refuses
the contract
A
exerts an
effort or not
The outcome q˜
is realized
The contract
is executed
time
Figure 4.1: Timing of Contracting under Moral Hazard.
3See Section 2.12 for the case of ex ante contracting under adverse selection.
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4.2.3 The Complete Information Optimal Contract
As a benchmark, let us first assume that the principal and a benevolent Court of Justice
can observe effort and that this variable is now observable and verifiable and can thus be
included into a contract enforced by this Court. Then, if he wants to induce effort, the
principal’s problem becomes:
(P ) : max
{(t¯,t)}
pi1(S¯ − t¯) + (1− pi1)(S − t)
subject to (4.4).
Indeed, only the agent’s participation constraint matters for the principal since the
agent can be forced to exert the positive level of effort. If the agent were not choosing this
level of effort, the agent’s deviation could be perfectly detected by both the principal and
the Court of Justice. The agent could be heavily punished and the Court could enforce
such a punishment.
Denoting by λ the multiplier of this participation constraint and optimizing with
respect to t¯ and t yields respectively the following first-order conditions:
−pi1 + λpi1u′(t¯∗) = 0, (4.5)
−(1− pi1) + λ(1− pi1)u′(t∗) = 0, (4.6)
where t¯∗ and t∗ are the first-best transfers.
From (4.5) and (4.6) we immediately derive that λ = 1
u′(t∗) =
1
u′(t¯∗) > 0, and finally
that t∗ = t¯∗ = t∗.
With a verifiable effort, the agent obtains therefore full insurance from the risk neutral
principal and the transfer t∗ he receives is the same whatever the state of nature. Since
the participation constraint is binding, we also obtain the value of this transfer which is
just enough to cover the disutility of effort, namely t∗ = h(ψ). This is also the expected
payment made by the principal to the agent or the first-best cost CFB of implementing
the positive effort level. For the principal, inducing effort yields therefore an expected
payoff equal to:
V1 = pi1S¯ + (1− pi1)S − h(ψ). (4.7)
Had the principal decided to let the agent exert no effort, e = 0, he would make a zero
payment to the agent whatever the realization of output. Thereby, the principal would
obtain instead a payoff:
V0 = pi0S¯ + (1− pi0)S. (4.8)
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Inducing effort is thus optimal from the principal’s point of view when V1 ≥ V0, i.e.:
pi1S¯ + (1− pi1)S − h(ψ) ≥ pi0S¯ + (1− pi0)S, or to put it differently when:
∆pi∆S︸ ︷︷ ︸
Expected
gain
of effort
≥ h(ψ)︸︷︷︸
first-best cost
of inducing
effort
, (4.9)
where ∆S = S¯ − S > 0.
The left-hand side of (4.9) captures the gain of increasing effort from e = 0 to e = 1.
This gain comes from the fact that the return S¯, which is greater than S, arises more
often when a positive effort is exerted. The right-hand side of (4.9) is instead the first-best
cost of inducing the agent’s acceptance when he exerts a positive effort.
Denoting by B = ∆pi∆S the benefit of inducing a strictly positive effort level, the
first-best outcome calls for e∗ = 1 if and only if B ≥ h(ψ) as shown in Figure 4.2.
ff-ff
e∗ = 0 e∗ = 1
CFB = h(ψ)
-
-
First-Best Effort
Benefit
e
B
Figure 4.2: First-Best Level of Effort.
4.3 Risk Neutrality and First-Best Implementation
If the agent is risk neutral, we have (up to an affine transformation) u(t) = t for all t
and h(u) = u for all u. The principal who wants to induce effort must thus choose the
contract which solves the following problem:
(P ) : max
{(t¯,t)}
pi1(S¯ − t¯) + (1− pi1)(S − t)
pi1t¯+ (1− pi1)t− ψ ≥ pi0t¯+ (1− pi0)t (4.10)
pi1t¯+ (1− pi1)t− ψ ≥ 0. (4.11)
With risk neutrality, the principal can for instance choose incentive compatible trans-
fers t¯ and t which saturate the agent’s participation constraint and leave no rent to the
agent. Indeed, solving (4.10) and (4.11) with equalities, we obtain immediately:
t∗ = − pi0
∆pi
ψ, (4.12)
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and
t¯∗ =
1− pi0
∆pi
ψ. (4.13)
The agent is rewarded if production is high. His net utility in this state of nature
U¯∗ = t¯∗ − ψ is then U¯∗ = 1−pi1
∆pi
ψ > 0. The agent is instead punished if production is low.
His corresponding net utility U∗ = t∗ − ψ is thus U∗ = − pi1
∆pi
ψ < 0.
The principal (who is risk neutral with respect to transfers) makes an expected pay-
ment pi1t¯
∗ + (1 − pi1)t∗ = ψ which is equal to the disutility of effort he would incur if he
could perfectly control the effort level or if he was carrying the agent’s task himself. The
principal can costlessly structure the agent’s payment so that the latter has the right in-
centives to exert effort. Indeed, by increasing effort from e = 0 to e = 1, the agent receives
more often the transfer t¯∗ than the transfer t∗. Using (4.12) and (4.13), his expected gain
from exerting effort is thus ∆pi(t¯∗− t∗) = ψ, i.e., it exactly compensates the agent for the
extra disutility of effort that the agent incurs when increasing his effort from e = 0 to
e = 1.
Delegation is here costless to the principal. Therefore, if effort is socially valuable in
the first-best world, it will also be implemented by the principal with the incentive scheme
{(t¯∗, t∗)} when effort is no longer observed by the principal and the agent is risk neutral.
Summarizing, we have:
Proposition 4.1 : Moral hazard is not an issue with a risk neutral agent despite the
non-observability of effort. The first-best level of effort is still implemented.
Remark 1: The reader will have recognized the similarity of those results with those
described in Section 2.12. In both cases, when contracting takes place ex ante, i.e.,
before the realization of the state of nature, the incentive constraint, either under adverse
selection, or now under moral hazard, does not conflict with the ex ante participation
constraint with a risk neutral agent and the first-best outcome is still implemented.
Remark 2: The transfers (t¯∗, t∗) defined in (4.12) and (4.13) yield only one possible
implementation of the first-best outcome, an implementation such that the incentive con-
straint (4.10) is exactly binding. Other pairs of transfers can be used which may induce
a strict preference of the agent for exerting effort.
Let us for instance consider the following transfers t¯∗
′
= S¯ − T ∗, and t∗′ = S − T ∗,
where T ∗ is an upfront payment made by the agent before output realizes. Those transfers
satisfy the agent’s incentive constraint since:
∆pi(t¯∗
′ − t∗′) = ∆pi∆S > h(ψ) = ψ (4.14)
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where the right-hand side inequality comes from the fact that effort is socially optimal in
a first-best world. Moreover, the upfront payment T ∗ can be adjusted by the principal to
have the agent’s participation constraint binding. The corresponding value of this transfer
is T ∗ = pi1S¯ + (1 − pi1)S − ψ. With the transfers t¯∗′ and t∗′ above, the agent becomes
residual claimant for the profit of the firm. T ∗ is thus precisely equal to this expected
profit. The principal requires this ex ante payment to reap all gains from delegation.
Making the risk neutral agent residual claimant for the hierarchy’s profit is an optimal
response to the moral hazard problem. In other words the principal must sell the property
rights over the firm to the agent. Indeed a proper allocation of property rights is sufficient
to induce efficiency.4
On the contrary, inefficiencies in effort provision due to moral hazard will arise when
the agent is no longer risk neutral. There are two alternative ways to model these trans-
action costs. One is to maintain risk neutrality for positive income levels, but impose
a limited liability constraint, which requires transfers not to be too negative. The other
is to let the agent be strictly risk averse. We analyze in turn those two contractual
environments and the different trade-offs they respectively imply.
4.4 The Trade-Off between Limited Liability Rent
Extraction and Efficiency
Let us thus consider a risk neutral agent. As we have already seen, (4.3) and (4.4) take
now the following forms:
pi1t¯+ (1− pi1)t− ψ ≥ pi0t¯+ (1− pi0)t, (4.15)
and
pi1t¯+ (1− pi1)t− ψ ≥ 0. (4.16)
Let us also assume that the agent’s transfer must always be greater than some ex-
ogenous level −` with ` ≥ 0. The framework is thus quite similar to that of Section 3.6,
and we refer to that section for some motivations and discussions of the origins of such
limited liability constraints on transfers. Limited liability constraints in both states of
nature write thus as:
t¯ ≥ −`, (4.17)
4See Tirole (1999) for a more general discussion of when a proper allocation of property rights imple-
ments the optimal contract. See also Section 5.3.5.
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and
t ≥ −`. (4.18)
Those constraints obviously reduce the set of incentive feasible allocations and may
prevent the principal from still willing to implement the first-best level of effort even if
the agent is risk neutral. Indeed, when he wants to induce a high effort, the principal’s
program writes now as:
(P ) : max
{(t¯,t)}
pi1(S¯ − t¯) + (1− pi1)(S − t),
subject to (4.15) to (4.18).
A first observation is that the transfers (4.12) and (4.13) allowing the first-best im-
plementation may not satisfy the newly added limited liability constraints. The next
proposition summarizes the solution to (P ).5
Proposition 4.2 : With limited liability, the optimal contract inducing effort from the
agent entails:
• For ` > pi0
∆pi
ψ, only (4.15) and (4.16) are binding. Optimal transfers are given by
(4.12) and (4.13). The agent has no expected limited liability rent; EUSB = 0.
• For 0 ≤ ` ≤ pi0
∆pi
ψ, (4.15) and (4.18) are binding. Optimal transfers are then given
by:
tSB = −`, (4.19)
t¯SB = −`+ ψ
∆pi
. (4.20)
Moreover, the agent’s expected ex ante limited liability rent EUSB is strictly positive:
EUSB = pi1t¯
SB + (1− pi1)tSB − ψ = −`+ pi0
∆pi
ψ > 0. (4.21)
First, we note that only the limited liability constraint in the bad state of nature may
be binding. Indeed, since inducing effort requires to create a positive wedge between t¯
and t, (4.18) implies necessarily (4.17). When the limited liability constraint (4.18) is
binding, the principal is limited in his punishments to induce effort. The risk neutral
agent has not enough assets to cover the punishment requested by the principal to induce
effort provision if q realizes. The principal uses rewards when a good state of nature q¯
5The proof is in Appendix 4.1.
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realizes. As a result, the agent receives a strictly positive ex ante limited liability rent
described by (4.21). Comparing with the case without limited liability this rent is actually
the additional payment that the principal must incur because of the conjunction of moral
hazard and limited liability.
As the agent is endowed with more assets, i.e., as ` gets larger, the conflict between
moral hazard and limited liability diminishes and disappears whenever ` is large enough.
In this case, the agent avoids bankruptcy even when he has to pay the principal in the
bad state of nature.
Let us now assume that ` = 0 so that only positive transfers are feasible. We model
therefore a contractual environment where the agent owns no asset at the time of starting
the relationship with the principal. When he induces effort from the agent, the principal’s
expected utility can be computed as:
V SB1 = pi1S¯ + (1− pi1)S −
pi1ψ
∆pi
. (4.22)
If the principal gives up the goal of inducing effort from the agent, he can choose
t = t¯ = 0 and obtain instead the expected utility level (4.8). It is worth inducing effort if
V SB1 is greater than V0, i.e., when:
∆pi∆S ≥ pi1ψ
∆pi
. (4.23)
The left-hand side of (4.23) is the gain of inducing effort, i.e., the gain of increasing the
probability of a high production level. The right-hand side is instead the second-best cost
CSB of inducing effort which is the disutility of effort ψ plus now the limited liability rent
pi0ψ
∆pi
. This second-best cost of implementing effort obviously exceeds the first best cost. As
it can easily been seen by comparing (4.23) and the right-hand side of (4.9) (taken for the
case of risk neutrality, i.e., for h(ψ) = ψ), limited liability and moral hazard altogether
make costlier to induce effort.
Figure 4.3 below describes the reduced subset of values of B justifying a high effort
from the agent when limited liability and moral hazard interact.
-
ff-
ff-
eSB = 1eSB = 0
e∗ = 0 e∗ = 1
CFB = ψ CSB = pi1ψ∆pi
First-Best Effort
Second-Best Effort
Benefit
-
-
Figure 4.3: First- and Second-Best Efforts with Moral Hazard and Limited Liability.
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Moral hazard justifies an underprovision of effort when the benefit B of a strictly
positive effort lies between ψ and pi1
∆pi
ψ. Summarizing our analysis, we have:
Proposition 4.3 : With moral hazard and limited liability, there is a trade-off between
inducing effort and giving up an ex ante limited liability rent to the agent. The principal
chooses less often to induce a high effort from the agent.
4.5 The Trade-Off Between Insurance and Efficiency
Let us now turn to the second source of inefficiency in a moral hazard context: the agent’s
risk aversion. When the agent is risk averse, the principal’s program writes now as:
(P ) : max
{(t¯,t)}
pi1(S¯ − t¯) + (1− pi1)(S − t),
subject to (4.3) and (4.4).
It is not obvious that (P ) is a concave program for which the first-order Kuhn and
Tucker conditions are necessary and sufficient. The reason for this possible lack of concav-
ity is that the concave function u(·) appears on both sides of the incentive compatibility
constraint (4.3). However, the following change of variables shows that concavity of the
program is ensured. Let us define u¯ = u(t¯) and u = u(t) or equivalently let t¯ = h(u¯) and
t = h(u). These new variables are the levels of ex post utility obtained by the agent in
both states of nature. The set of incentive feasible contracts can now be described by two
linear constraints:
pi1u¯+ (1− pi1)u− ψ ≥ pi0u¯+ (1− pi0)u, (4.24)
which replaces the incentive constraint (4.3) and also
pi1u¯+ (1− pi1)u− ψ ≥ 0, (4.25)
which replaces the participation constraint (4.4).
Program (P ) can now be replaced by a new program (P ′) which writes as:
(P ′) : max
{(u¯,u)}
pi1(S¯ − h(u¯)) + (1− pi1)(S − h(u))
subject to (4.24) and (4.25).
Note that the principal’s objective function is now strictly concave in (u¯, u) since h(·)
is strictly convex. The constraints being linear, (P ′) is thus a concave problem with
the Kuhn and Tucker conditions being both sufficient and necessary for characterizing
optimality.
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4.5.1 Optimal Transfers
Letting λ and µ be the non-negative multipliers associated respectively with constraints
(4.24) and (4.25), the first-order conditions of this program can be expressed respectively
as:
−pi1h′(u¯SB) + λ∆pi + µpi1 = − pi1
u′(t¯SB)
+ λ∆pi + µpi1 = 0, (4.26)
−(1− pi1)h′(uSB)− λ∆pi + µpi1 = −(1− pi1)
u′(tSB)
− λ∆pi + µ(1− pi1) = 0, (4.27)
where t¯SB and tSB are the second-best optimal transfers. Rearranging terms, we get:
1
u′(t¯SB)
= µ+ λ
∆pi
pi1
, (4.28)
1
u′(tSB)
= µ− λ ∆pi
1− pi1 . (4.29)
The four variables (tSB, t¯SB, λ, µ) are simultaneously obtained as the solution to the
system of four equations (4.24), (4.25), (4.28) and (4.29). Multiplying (4.28) by pi1 and
(4.29) by 1− pi1 and adding those two modified equations, we obtain:
µ =
pi1
u′(t¯SB)
+
1− pi1
u′(tSB)
> 0. (4.30)
Hence, the participation constraint (4.25) is necessarily binding.
Using (4.30) and (4.28), we obtain also:
λ =
pi1(1− pi1)
∆pi
(
1
u′(t¯SB)
− 1
u′(tSB)
)
. (4.31)
λ must also be strictly positive. Indeed, from (4.24), we have u¯SB − uSB ≥ ψ
∆pi
> 0,
and thus t¯SB > tSB implying that the right-hand side of (4.31) is strictly positive since
u′′ < 0.
Henceforth, the risk averse agent does not receive full insurance anymore. This result
must be contrasted with what we have seen under complete information in Section 4.2.3.
Indeed, with full insurance, the incentive compatibility constraint (4.3) can no longer be
satisfied. Inducing effort requires to let the agent bear some risk. Summarizing, we can
state:
Proposition 4.4 : When the agent is strictly risk averse, the optimal contract which
induces effort saturates both the agent’s participation and incentive constraints. This
contract does not provide full insurance. Moreover, second-best transfers are obtained as:
t¯SB = h
(
ψ + (1− pi1) ψ
∆pi
)
, (4.32)
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and
tSB = h
(
ψ − pi1 ψ
∆pi
)
. (4.33)
It is also worth noting that the agent receives more than the complete information
transfer when a high output realizes, t¯SB > h(ψ). When a low output realizes, the agent
receives instead less than the complete information transfer, tSB < h(ψ). A risk premium
must be paid to the risk averse agent to induce his participation since he incurs now a
risk coming from the fact that tSB < t¯SB. Indeed, when (4.4) is binding, we have:
ψ = pi1u(t¯
SB) + (1− pi1)u(tSB) < u(pi1t¯SB + (1− pi1)tSB), (4.34)
where the right-hand side inequality in (4.34) follows from Jensen’s inequality. The ex-
pected payment pi1t¯
SB+(1−pi)tSB given by the principal is thus larger than the first-best
cost CFB1 = h(ψ) which is incurred by the principal when effort is observable as we have
seen in Section 4.2.3.
4.5.2 Optimal Second-Best Effort
Let us now turn to the question of the second-best optimality of inducing a high effort
from the principal’s point of view. The second-best cost CSB of inducing effort under
moral hazard is the expected payment made to the agent CSB = pi1t¯
SB + (1 − pi1)tSB.
Using (4.32) and (4.33), this cost rewrites as:
CSB = pi1h
(
ψ + (1− pi1) ψ
∆pi
)
+ (1− pi1)h
(
ψ − pi1ψ
∆pi
)
. (4.35)
The benefit of inducing effort is still B = ∆pi∆S and a positive effort e∗ = 1 is the
optimal choice of the principal whenever:
∆pi∆S ≥ CSB = pi1h
(
ψ + (1− pi1) ψ
∆pi
)
+ (1− pi1)h
(
ψ − pi1ψ
∆pi
)
. (4.36)
h(·) being strictly convex, Jensen’s inequality implies that the right-hand side of (4.36)
is strictly greater than the first-best cost of implementing effort CFB = h(ψ). Therefore,
inducing a high effort occurs less often with moral hazard than when effort is observable.
Figure 4.4 represents this phenomenon graphically.
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Figure 4.4: Second-Best Level of Effort with Moral Hazard and Risk Aversion.
For B belonging to the interval [CFB, CSB], the second-best level of effort is zero and
is thus strictly below its first-best value. There is now under-provision of effort because
of moral hazard and risk aversion.
Proposition 4.5 : With moral hazard and risk aversion, there is a trade-off between
inducing effort and providing insurance to the agent. The principal induces less often a
positive effort from the agent than with risk neutrality.
To get further insights on the dependency of the second-best cost of implementation
on various parameters, let us thus specialize the model and assume that h(u) = u + ru
2
2
where r > 0.6 Equivalently, this means that u(x) = −1+
√
1+2rx
r
. From (4.35), we have now
the following expression of CSB:
CSB = ψ +
rψ2
2
+
rψ2pi1(1− pi1)
2(∆pi2)
. (4.37)
The first-best cost of implementing effort with such a utility function would instead
be:
CFB = ψ +
rψ2
2
. (4.38)
Henceforth, the agency cost AC, which is also the principal’s loss between his first-best
and his second-best expected profit when he implements a positive effort in both cases
can be defined as:
AC = CSB − CFB = rψ
2pi1(1− pi1)
2(∆pi)2
. (4.39)
This agency cost increases with r, a measure of the agent’s degree of risk aversion, with
ψ the cost of one unit of effort, and with η = pi1(1−pi1)
∆pi
. η is a measure of the informational
6This quadratic specification can be viewed as a reasonable approximation of any inverse function
h(u) whenever u is small enough. Note that r can then be considered as the agent’s degree of absolute
risk aversion around zero.
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problem for the principal. Everything else being kept equal, it becomes harder, and less
often optimal for the principal, to induce a high effort as η increases. η is larger when pi1 is
close to 1
2
. In this case, the variance of the measured performance q˜ is the greatest possible
one: the observable output is a rather poor indicator of the agent’s effort. Therefore, more
noisy measures of the agent’s effort will more often call for inducing a low effort at the
optimum and for a fixed wage without any incentives being provided. Finally, note that
η is also larger when ∆pi is small, i.e., when the difference in utilities u(t¯SB) − u(tSB)
necessary to incentivize the agent gets larger. More generally, this dependence of the
agency cost on η shows that the informational content of the observable output plays a
crucial role in the design of the optimal contract. This is a general theme of agency theory
that we will cover more extensively in Section 4.7 below.
4.6 More Than Two Levels of Performance
We now extend our previous models to allow for more than two levels of performance.7
We consider a production process where n possible outcomes can be realized. Those
performances can be ordered so that q1 < q2 . . . < qi < . . . < qn. We denote also
by Si = S(qi) the principal’s return in each of those states of nature. In this context,
a contract is a n-uple of payments {(t1, . . . , tn)}. Let also piik be the probability that
production qi takes place when the effort level is ek. We assume that piik > 0 for all pairs
8
(i, k) with
∑n
i=1 piik = 1. Finally, we keep the assumption that only two possible levels of
effort are feasible, i.e., ek in {0, 1}. We still denote ∆pii = pii1 − pii0.
4.6.1 Limited Liability
Consider first the limited liability model of Section 4.4. The optimal contract inducing a
positive effort must now solve the following program:
(P ) : max
{(t1,... ,tn)}
n∑
i=1
pii1(Si − ti)
subject to
n∑
i=1
pii1ti − ψ ≥ 0, (4.40)
7See Appendix 4.2 for the case of a continuum of performances.
8Mirrlees (1999) has shown that if the support of probabilities varies with the level of effort, then the
first-best can be achieved. This is because there is then a non zero probability that the agent reveals
that he has not taken the postulated effort level and he can be punished strongly in that case.
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n∑
i=1
(pii1 − pii0)ti ≥ ψ, (4.41)
ti ≥ 0, for all i in {1, . . . , n}. (4.42)
(4.40) is the agent’s participation constraint. (4.41) is his incentive constraint. (4.42)
are all the limited liability constraints that we simplify, with respect to Section 4.4, by
assuming that the agent cannot be inflicted a negative payment, i.e., the agent has no
asset of his own before starting the relationship with the principal.
First, note that the participation constraint (4.40) is implied by the incentive (4.41)
and the limited liability constraints (4.42). Indeed, we have:
n∑
i=1
pii1ti − ψ ≥
n∑
i=1
(pii1 − pii0)ti − ψ︸ ︷︷ ︸
≥ 0 from (4.41)
+
n∑
i=1
pii0ti︸ ︷︷ ︸
≥ 0 from (4.42)
Hence, we can neglect (4.40) in the optimization of problem (P ).
Denoting by λ the multiplier of (4.41) and by ξi the respective multipliers of (4.42),
the first-order conditions of program (P ) lead to
−pii1 + λ∆pii + ξi = 0, (4.43)
with the slackness conditions ξiti = 0 for each i in {1, . . . , n}.
For i such that the second-best transfer tSBi is strictly positive, ξi = 0 and we must
have λ = pii1
pii1−pii0 for any such i. If the ratios
pii1−pii0
pii1
are all different, there exists an
index j such that
pij1−pij0
pij1
is the highest possible such ratio. Then, the structure of the
optimal payments is “bang-bang”. The agent receives a strictly positive transfer only in
this particular state of nature j and this payment is such that the incentive constraint
(4.41) is binding, i.e., tSBj =
ψ
pij1−pij0 . In all other states, the agent receives no transfer and
tSBi = 0 for all i 6= j. Finally, the agent gets a strictly positive ex ante limited liability
rent which is worth EUSB =
pij0ψ
pij1−pij0 .
The important point here is that the agent is rewarded in the state nature which is the
most informative one about the fact that he has exerted a positive effort. Indeed, pii1−pii0
pii1
can be interpreted as a likelihood ratio. The principal uses therefore a maximum likelihood
ratio criterion to reward the agent. The agent is only rewarded when this likelihood ratio
is maximum. Like an econometrician, the principal tries thus to infer from the distribution
of observed outputs what has been the “parameter” (effort) underlying this distribution.
But here the “parameter” is endogenous and affected by the incentive contract.
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Definition 4.2 : The probabilities of success satisfy the monotone likelihood ratio prop-
erty9 (MLRP ) if pii1−pii0
pii1
is non-decreasing in i.
When this monotonicity property holds, the structure of the agent’s rewards is quite
intuitive and described in the next proposition.10
Proposition 4.6 : If the probability of success satisfies MLRP, the second-best payment
tSBi received by the agent increases with the level of production qi.
The benefit of offering to the agent a schedule of rewards which is increasing in the
level of production is that such a scheme does not create any incentive for the agent to
sabotage or destroy production to increase his payment.11 However, only the rather strong
assumption of a monotone likelihood ratio ensures this quite intuitive property. To show
why, consider a simple example where MLRP does not hold. Let the probabilities in the
different states of nature be pi10 = pi30 =
1
6
, pi20 =
2
3
when the agent exerts no effort and
pi11 = pi21 = pi31 =
1
3
when he exerts an effort. Then, we have
pi11 − pi10
pi11
=
pi31 − pi30
pi31
=
1
2
>
pi21 − pi20
pi21
= −1,
and thus MLRP fails. Of course, when the principal’s benefits are such that S3 is much
larger than S2 and S1, the principal would like to implement a positive effort in order
to increase the probability that the state of nature 3 realizes. However, since outputs
q1 and q3 are equally informative on the fact the agent has exerted a positive effort, the
agent must receive the same transfer in both states. Since output q2 is also particularly
informative on the fact that the agent has exerted no effort, the second-best payment
should be null in this state of nature. Hence, the non-monotonic schedule reduces the
agent’s incentives to shirk and reduces therefore the probability that state 2, which is bad
from the principal’s point of view, realizes.
Milgrom (1981) proposed an extensive discussion of the MLRP assumption.
4.6.2 Risk Aversion
Suppose now that the agent is strictly risk averse. The optimal contract inducing effort
must solve the program below:
9If i = 2, this property reduces to the assumption made in Section 4.2, pi1 > pi0.
10See Appendix 4.2 for the proof.
11Implicit here is the idea that the principal does not observe the production q but that the agent can
show hard evidence that he has produced some amount q. This evidence can always be hidden to the
principal by destroying production. “Lying upwards” and pretending having produced more than what
has really been done is instead impossible.
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(P ) : max
{(t1,... ,tn)}
n∑
i=1
pii1(Si − ti)
subject to
n∑
i=1
pii1u(ti)− ψ ≥
n∑
i=1
pii0u(ti) (4.44)
and
n∑
i=1
pii1u(ti)− ψ ≥ 0, (4.45)
where the latter constraint is the agent’s participation constraint.
Using the same change of variables as in Section 4.5, it should be clear that (P ) is
again a concave problem with respect to the new variables ui = u(ti). Using also the
same notations as in Section 4.5, the first-order conditions of program (P ) write thus
respectively as:
1
u′(tSBi )
= µ+ λ
(
pii1 − pii0
pii1
)
for all i in {1, . . . , n}. (4.46)
Multiplying each of these equations by pii1 and summing over i yields µ = E
q˜
(
1
u′(t˜SBi )
)
>
0, where E
q˜
(·) denotes the expectation operator with respect to the distribution of output
induced by effort e = 1.
Multiplying (4.46) by pii1u(t
SB
i ), summing all these equations over i and taking into
account the expression of µ obtained above yields:
λ
(
n∑
i=1
(pii1 − pii0)u(t˜SBi )
)
= E
q˜
(
u(t˜SBi )
(
1
u′(t˜SBi )
− E
(
1
u′(t˜SBi )
)))
. (4.47)
Using the slackness condition λ
(∑n
i=1(pii1 − pii0)u(tSBi )− ψ
)
= 0 to simplify the left-
hand side of (4.47), we finally get:
λψ = cov
(
u(t˜SBi ),
1
u′(t˜SBi )
)
. (4.48)
We know that u(·) and u′(·) covary in opposite directions. Moreover, a constant wage
tSBi = t
SB for all i does not satisfy the incentive constraint and thus tSBi cannot be
constant everywhere. Hence, the right-hand side of (4.48) is necessarily strictly positive.
We have thus λ > 0 and the incentive constraint (4.41) is binding.
Coming back to (4.46), we observe that the left-hand side is increasing in tSBi since
u(·) is concave. For tSBi to be non-decreasing with i, MLRP must again hold. Higher
outputs are then also those which are the more informative ones about the realization of
a high effort. Henceforth, the agent should be more rewarded as output increases.
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4.7 Informative Signals to Improve Contracting
As in the case of adverse selection analyzed in Section 2.15, various verifiable signals can
be used by the principal to improve the provision of incentives to the agent in a moral
hazard framework. These pieces of information can be gathered by different kinds of
information systems which can be internal to the organization or which can be market
information obtained by comparing the agent’s performances with those of other related
agents in the market place. Those practices are known as “benchmarking” or “yardstick
competition”.
4.7.1 Informativeness of Signals
The framework of Section 4.6 with multiple levels of performance is extremely useful
to assess the principal’s benefit from other sources of information than the agent’s sole
performance. To assess the role of improved information structures let us still assume
that there are only two levels of production q¯ and q, and that the principal learns also a
binary signal σ˜ belonging to the set Σ = {σ0, σ1}, which depends directly on the agent’s
effort. More precisely, the following matrix gives the probabilities of each signal σi for i
in {0, 1} as a function of the agent’s effort:
@
@
@
@
@
@
Effort
Signal
e = 0 e = 1
σ1 ν0
1− ν0
ν1
1− ν1σ0
<
>
Note that the signal σ1 (resp. σ0) is “good news” (resp. “bad news”) about the fact
that the agent has exerted a high level of effort. The signal is uninformative on the agent’s
effort when ν0 = ν1.
The signal σ being verifiable, the principal has now the ability to condition the agent’s
performance on four possible different states of nature, yi, for i in {1, . . . , 4}, where each
of these states is defined as follows:
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State of nature Probability Probability
when e0 when e1
y1 = {q¯, σ1} pi0ν0 pi1ν1
y2 = {q¯, σ0} pi0(1− ν0) pi1(1− ν1)
y3 = {q, σ1} (1− pi0)ν0 (1− pi1)ν1
y4 = {q, σ0} (1− pi0)(1− ν0) (1− pi1)(1− ν1)
The signal σ˜ being not related to output, but only to effort, we assume that it does
not affect the principal’s return from the relationship and we have of course S1 = S2 = S¯
and S3 = S4 = S.12
Denoting by λ and µ the respective multipliers of the agent’s incentive and participa-
tion constraints, the first-order conditions (4.46) become now:
1
u′(tSB1 )
= µ+ λ
(
pi1ν1 − pi0ν0
pi1ν1
)
, (4.49)
1
u′(tSB2 )
= µ+ λ
(
pi1(1− ν1)− pi0(1− ν0)
pi1(1− ν1)
)
, (4.50)
1
u′(tSB3 )
= µ+ λ
(
(1− pi1)ν1 − (1− pi0)ν0
(1− pi1)ν1
)
, (4.51)
1
u′(tSB4 )
= µ+ λ
(
(1− pi1)(1− ν1)− (1− pi0)(1− ν0)
(1− pi1)(1− ν1)
)
. (4.52)
Note that tSB1 = t
SB
2 and t
SB
3 = t
SB
4 only when ν1 = ν0, i.e., when σ˜ is not informative
on the agent’s effort. In this case, conditioning the agent’s contribution on an extra risk
σ˜ unrelated to the agent’s effort is of no value for the principal. This can only increase
risk without any incentive benefit. Any compensation t(σ˜, q˜) yielding utility u(t(σ˜, q˜)) to
the agent can indeed be replaced by a new scheme tˆ(q˜) which is independent of σ˜ and
such that u(tˆ(q˜)) = E
σ˜
(u(t(σ˜, q˜))) for any q˜ without changing the agent’s incentive and
participation constraints. Furthermore, this new scheme is also less costly to the principal
since E
q˜
(tˆ(q˜)) < E
(σ˜,q˜)
t(σ˜, q˜). To prove that, note that using the definition of tˆ(q), we have
tˆ(q) = h
(
E
σ˜
(u(t(σ˜, q)))
)
, and thus
E
q˜
(tˆ(q˜)) = E
q˜
(
h(E
σ˜
(u(t(σ˜, q˜))))
)
< E
q˜
(
E
σ˜
(h ◦ u(t(σ˜, q˜)))
)
= E
(σ˜,q˜)
(t(σ˜, q˜)), (4.53)
12In fact, we could allow for some differences in the values of those surpluses in a more general model
where the principal’s surplus would write as S(q˜, σ˜).
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where the first inequality comes from using Jensen’s inequality for h(·) convex, and the
second equality is the Law of Iterated Expectations.
Instead, when σ is informative on the agent’s effort, conditioning the agent’s contri-
bution on the realization of σ has some positive incentive value as shown on equations
(4.49) to (4.52). We state this as a proposition:
Proposition 4.7 : Any signal σ which is informative on the agent’s effort should be used
to condition the agent’s reward.
This result is known as Holmstro¨m (1979)’s “Sufficient Statistics” Theorem. It
was initially proved in a model wich a continuum of outcomes and a continuum of effort
levels but its logic is the same as above.
4.7.2 More Comparisons among Information Structures
The previous section has shown how the principal can strictly prefer a given information
structure {q˜, σ˜} to another structure {q˜} as soon as the signal σ˜ is informative on the
agent’s effort. More generally, the choice between various information structures will
trade-off the direct cost of these systems, which may increase as the principal uses signals
on the agent’s performance which are more informative, and the possible benefits provided
by these structures in reducing the agency costs.
Let us thus define an information structure pi(e) as a n-uple {pii(e)}i∈{1,... ,n} such that
pii(e) ≥ 0 for all i and
∑n
i=1 pii(e) = 1. Again, we assume that e can be either 0 or 1 and
to simplify, we denote pi(1) = pi.
A natural ordering of information systems is provided by Blackwell’s condition stated
below.
Definition 4.3 : The information structure pi(e) is sufficient in the sense of Blackwell
for the information structure pˆi(e) if and only there exists a transition matrix13 P =
(pij), (i, j) ∈ {1, . . . , n}2, which is independent of e and which is such that pˆij(e) =∑n
i=1 pjipii(e), for all e in {0, 1}.
An intuitive example of this ordering is given by the garbling of an information struc-
ture. Then, each signal of information structure 1 is transformed by a purely random
mechanism (independent of the signal considered) into a vector of signals. The new in-
formation, say structure 2, is such that the information structure 1 is sufficient for the
13A transition matrix is such that pij ≥ 0 for all i, and
∑n
i=1 pij = 1 for all j.
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information structure 2. The ordering implied by the Blackwell conditions is an inter-
esting expression of dominance since it is a necessary and sufficient condition for any
decision maker to prefer the information structure 1 to information structure 2. We
want to understand whether this natural statistical ordering among information struc-
tures allows us to rank the agency costs in the incentive problems associated with the
information structures pi and pˆi.14 To see that, let us define CSB(pi) as the second-best
cost of implementing a positive effort when the information structure is pi. By definition,
we have CSB(pi) =
∑n
i=1 pii1t
SB
i (pi) =
∑n
i=1 pii1h(u
SB
i (pi)), where t
SB
i (pi) is given by (4.46).
Note that we make explicit the dependence of these transfers on the information system
since different informations systems may not yield the same second-best transfers and
implementation costs.
We are interested in comparing information structures according to their agency costs.
Let us state first the following definition.
Definition 4.4 : The information structure pi is weakly more efficient than the informa-
tion structure pˆi if and only if CSB(pi) ≤ CSB(pˆi).
We can then obtain the following comparison:
Proposition 4.8 : If the information structure pi is sufficient for the information struc-
ture pˆi in the sense of Blackwell, then pi is weakly more efficient than pˆi.
Proof: To prove this result, note first that the definition of the information system pˆi
implies that:
CSB(pˆi) =
n∑
i=1
pˆii1h(u
SB
i (pˆi)) =
n∑
i=1
(
n∑
k=1
pikpik1
)
h(uSBi (pˆi)) =
n∑
k=1
pik1
(
n∑
i=1
pikh(u
SB
i (pˆi))
)
≥
n∑
k=1
pik1h
(
n∑
i=1
piku
SB
i (pˆi)
)
, (4.54)
where the second equality uses the definition of pˆi and the last line is obtained from
Jensen’s inequality.
However, uSBi (pˆi) implements a positive effort at a minimal cost when the informa-
tion structure is pˆi so that the agent’s incentive compatibility constraint
∑n
i=1(pˆii1 −
pˆii0)u
SB
i (pˆi) = ψ, and his participation constraint
∑n
i=1 pˆii1u
SB
i (pˆi) = ψ are both binding.
Using again the definition of pˆi, those two last equations write respectively as:
n∑
i=1
(
n∑
k=1
pik(pik1 − pik0)
)
uSBi (pˆi) =
n∑
k=1
(
(pik1 − pik0)
(
n∑
i=1
piku
SB
i (pˆi)
))
= ψ (4.55)
14If the principal wants to induce zero effort, he does so by offering a wage which is identically nul
whatever the information system.
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and
n∑
i=1
(
n∑
k=1
pikpik1
)
uSBi (pˆi) =
n∑
k=1
pik1
(
n∑
i=1
piku
SB
i (pˆi)
)
= ψ. (4.56)
Let us now define the ex post utility levels u˜k =
∑n
i=1 piku
SB
i (pˆi). Those new utility
levels implement the high level of effort for the information structure pi (from (4.55))
and ensure the agent’s participation (from (4.56)). By definition of uSBi (pi) we have thus∑n
k=1 pik1h(u˜k) ≥ CSB(pi).
Finally, using (4.54) we obtain CSB(pˆi) ≥∑ni=1 pik1h(u˜k) ≥ CSB(pi).
Proposition 4.8 is due to Gjesdal (1982) and Grossman and Hart (1983). Black-
well’s dominance between two information structures implies a ranking between the agency
costs of the two agency problems associated with these information structures. However,
the reverse is not true. Indeed, Kim (1995) shows that an information structure pi is more
efficient than an information structure pˆi if the likelihood ratio of pˆi is a mean preserving
spread of that of pi, i.e., if pˆii1−pˆii0
pˆii1
= pii1−pii0
pii0
+ zi, for all i in {1, . . . , n} where
∑n
i=1 zi = 0.
It can be shown that this later property is not implied by Blackwell’s dominance. Jewitt
(2000) generalizes Kim (1995)’s results.
4.8 Moral Hazard and the Theory of the Firm
4.9 Contract Theory at Work
This section elaborates on the moral hazard paradigm discussed so far in a number of
settings which have been extensively discussed in the contracting literature.
4.9.1 Efficiency Wage
Let us consider a risk neutral agent working for a firm, the principal. By exerting effort
e in {0, 1}, the firm’s added value is V¯ (resp. V ) with probability pi(e) (resp. 1 − pi(e)).
The agent can only be rewarded for a good performance and cannot be punished for a
bad outcome since he is protected by limited liability.
To induce effort, the principal must find an optimal compensation scheme {(t, t¯)}
which is the solution to the program below:
(P ) : max
{(t,t¯)}
pi1(V¯ − t¯) + (1− pi1)(V − t)
subject to
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pi1t¯+ (1− pi1)t− ψ ≥ pi0t¯+ (1− pi0)t, (4.57)
pi1t¯+ (1− pi1)t− ψ ≥ 0, (4.58)
t ≥ 0. (4.59)
The problem is completely isomorphic to that analyzed in Section 4.4. The limited
liability constraint is binding at the optimum and the firm chooses to induce a high effort
when ∆pi∆V ≥ pi0ψ
∆pi
. At the optimum, tSB = 0 and t¯SB > 0. The positive wage t¯SB = ψ
∆pi
,
is often called an efficiency wage because it induces the agent to exert a high (efficient)
level of effort. To induce production, the principal must give up to the agent a share of
the firm’s return.
4.9.2 Sharecropping
The moral hazard paradigm has been one of the leading tools used by development
economists to analyze agrarian economies. In the sharecropping example, the princi-
pal is now a landlord and the agent is his tenant. By exerting an effort e in {0, 1}, the
tenant increases (resp. decreases) the probability pi(e) (resp. 1 − pi(e)) that a large q¯
(resp. small q) quantity of an agricultural product is produced. The price of this good
is normalized to one so that the principal’s stochastic return of the activity is also q¯ or q
depending on the state of nature.
It is often the case that peasants in developing countries are subject to strong financial
constraints. To model such a setting we assume that the agent is risk neutral and protected
by limited liability. When he wants to induce effort, the principal’s optimal contract must
solve:
(P ) : max
{(t,t¯)}
pi1(q¯ − t¯) + (1− pi1)(q − t)
subject to (4.57) to (4.59).
The optimal contract satisfies therefore tSB = 0 and t¯SB = ψ
∆pi
. This is again akin to
an efficiency wage. The expected utilities obtained respectively by the principal and the
agent are then given by:
EV SB = pi1q¯ + (1− pi1)q − pi1ψ
∆pi
, (4.60)
and
EUSB =
pi0ψ
∆pi
. (4.61)
The flexible second-best contract described above has sometimes been criticized as
not corresponding to the contractual arrangements observed in most agrarian economies.
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Contracts take often the form of simple linear schedules linking the tenant’s production
to his compensation. Let us now analyze such a simple linear sharing rule between the
landlord and his tenant, with the landlord offering to the agent a fixed share α of the
realized production. Such a sharing rule satisfies automatically the agent’s limited liability
constraint which can therefore be omitted in what follows. Formally, the optimal linear
rule inducing effort must solve:
(P ) : max
α
(1− α)(pi1q¯ + (1− pi1)q)
subject to
α(pi1q¯ + (1− pi1)q)− ψ ≥ α(pi0q¯ + (1− pi0)q), (4.62)
α(pi1q¯ + (1− pi1)q)− ψ ≥ 0. (4.63)
Obviously, only (4.62) is binding at the optimum and one finds the optimal linear
sharing rule:
αSB =
ψ
∆pi∆q
. (4.64)
Note that αSB < 1 since, for the agricultural activity to be a valuable venture in
the first-best world, we must have ∆pi∆q > ψ. Henceforth, the return of the agricultural
activity is shared between the principal and the agent, with high powered incentives (α
close to one) being provided when the disutility of effort ψ is large or when the principal’s
gain from an increase in effort ∆pi∆q is small.
This sharing rule yields also the following expected utilities respectively to the principal
and the agent:
EVα = pi1q¯ + (1− pi1)q −
(
pi1q¯ + (1− pi1)q
∆q
)
ψ
∆pi
, (4.65)
and
EUα =
(
pi0q¯ + (1− pi0)q
∆q
)
ψ
∆pi
. (4.66)
Comparing respectively (4.60) and (4.65) on the one hand and (4.61) and (4.66) on
the other hand, we observe that the constant sharing rule benefits the agent but not the
principal. A linear contract is less powerful than the optimal second-best contract since
the former is an inefficient way to extract rent from the agent even if it still provides
sufficient incentives to exert effort. Indeed, with a linear sharing rule, the agent always
benefits from a positive return on his production even in the worst state of nature. This
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positive return yields to the agent more than what is requested by the optimal second-
best contract in the worst state of nature, namely zero. Punishing the agent for a bad
performance is thus found to be rather difficult with a linear rule.
A linear sharing rule allows the agent to keep some strictly positive information rent
EUα. If the space of available contracts is extended to allow for fixed fees β, the principal
can nevertheless bring down the agent to the level of his outside opportunity by setting a
fixed fee βSB equal to
(
pi0q¯+(1−pi0)q
∆q
)
ψ
∆pi
.
4.9.3 Wholesale Contracts
Let us now consider a manufacturer-retailer relationship. The manufacturer supplies at
constant marginal cost c an intermediate good to the risk averse retailer who sells this
good on a final market. Demand on this market is high (resp. low) D¯(p) (resp. D(p))
with probability pi(e) where, again, e is in {0, 1} and p denotes the price for the final
good. Effort e is exerted by the retailer who can increase the probability that demand
is high if after-sales services are efficiently performed. The wholesale contract consists of
a retail price maintenance agreement specifying the prices p¯ and p on the final market
with a sharing of the profits, namely {(t, p); (t¯, p¯)}. When he wants to induce effort, the
optimal contract offered by the manufacturer solves therefore the following problem:
(P ) : max
{(t,p);(t¯,p¯)}
pi1((p¯− c)D¯(p¯)− t¯) + (1− pi1)((p− c)D(p)− t)
subject to (4.3) and (4.4).
The solution to this problem is obtained by appending to the transfers given in (4.32)
and (4.33) the following expressions of the retail prices p¯∗+ D(p¯
∗)
D′(p¯∗) = c, and p
∗+
D(p∗)
D′(p∗) = c.
4.9.4 Financial Contracts
Moral hazard is a quite important issue in financial markets. Let us now assume that
a risk averse entrepreneur wants to start a project which requires an initial investment
worth an amount I. The entrepreneur has no cash of his own and must raise money from
a bank or any other financial intermediary. The return on the project is random and
equal to p¯i (resp. pi) with probability pi(e) (resp. 1−pi(e)) where the effort exerted by the
entrepreneur e belongs to {0, 1}. We denote by ∆V = V¯ − V > 0 the spread of profits.
The financial contract consists of repayments {(z¯, z)} depending on whether the project
is successful or not.
To induce effort from the borrower, the risk neutral lender’s program writes as:
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(P ) : max
{(t,t¯)}
(pi1z¯ + (1− pi1)z − I)
subject to
pi1u(V¯ − z¯) + (1− pi1)u(V − z)− ψ ≥ pi0u(V¯ − z¯) + (1− pi0)u(V − z), (4.67)
pi1u(V¯ − z¯) + (1− pi1)u(V − z)− ψ ≥ 0, (4.68)
where (4.67) and (4.68) are respectively the agent’s incentive and participation constraints.
Note that the project is a valuable venture if it provides to the bank a positive expected
profit.
With the change of variables, t¯ = V¯ − z¯ and t = V − z, the principal’s program takes
its usual form. This change of variables also highlights that everything happens as if the
lender was benefitting himself directly from the return of the project paying then to the
agent only a fraction of the returns in these different states of nature.
Let us define the second-best cost of implementing a positive effort CSB as in Section
4.5 and let us assume that ∆pi∆V ≥ CSB, so that the lender wants to induce a positive
effort level even in a second best environment. The lender’s expected profit is worth:
V1 = pi1V¯ + (1− pi1)V − CSB − I. (4.69)
Let us now parameterize projects according to the size of the investment I. Only the
projects with positive value V1 > 0 will be financed. This requires that investment is low
enough and, typically, we must have:
I < ISB = pi1V¯ + (1− pi1)V − CSB. (4.70)
Under complete information and no moral hazard, the project would instead be fi-
nanced as soon as
I < I∗ = pi1V¯ + (1− pi1)V . (4.71)
For intermediary values of the investment, i.e., for I in [ISB, I∗], moral hazard implies
that some projects are financed under complete information, but no longer under moral
hazard. This is akin to some form of credit rationing.
Finally, note that the optimal financial contract offered to the risk averse and cashless
entrepreneur does not satisfy the limited liability constraint t ≥ 0. Indeed, we have
tSB = h
(
ψ − pi1∆ψ
∆pi
)
< 0. To induce effort, the agent must bear some risk which implies
a negative payoff in the bad state of nature. Adding the limited liability constraint,
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the optimal contract would instead entail tLL = 0 and t¯LL = h
(
ψ
∆pi
)
. Interestingly, this
contract has sometimes been interpreted in the finance literature as a debt contract, with
no money being left to the borrower in the bad state of nature and the residual being
pocketed by the lender in the good state of nature.
Finally, note that:
t¯LL − tLL = h
(
ψ
∆pi
)
< t¯SB − tSB = h
(
ψ + (1− pi) ψ
∆pi
)
− h
(
ψ − piψ
∆pi
)
, (4.72)
since h(·) is strictly convex and h(0) = 0. This inequality shows that the debt contract
has less incentive power than the optimal incentive contract. Indeed, it becomes harder
to spread the agent’s payments between both states of nature to induce effort if the agent
is protected by limited liability. The agent being interested only by his payoff in the high
state of nature, only rewards are attractive.
Remark: The finance literature starting with Jensen and Meckling (1976) has stressed
that moral hazard within the firm may not be due to the desire of the manager to avoid
costly effort but, instead, to his desire of choosing projects with private benefits. Those
private benefits arise, for instance, when the manager devotes the resources of the firm to
consume perquisities.
The modeling of these private benefits is very similar to that of the standard moral
hazard problem viewed so far.15 Let us consider that the risk-neutral manager can choose
between a “good” and a “bad” project. The shareholders’ return of the good project is V¯
with probability pi1 and 0 otherwise. However, by choosing the bad project, the manager
gets a private benefit B which is strictly positive. A contract is again a pair of transfers
{(t¯, t)} where, assuming limited liability, t = 0.
The manager chooses the good project when the following incentive constraint is sat-
isfied:
pi1t¯ ≥ pi0t¯+B, (4.73)
which amounts to:
t¯ ≥ B
∆pi
. (4.74)
This constraint being obviously binding at the optimum of the financier’s problem,
the latter gets an expected payoff V1 such that:
V1 = pi1
(
V¯ − B
∆pi
)
− I (4.75)
15The private benefit is an output which is not observed by the principal, while effort was an unobserved
input.
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where I is the investment cost that financiers have incurred. Obviously, compared with
complete information, the set of valuable investments is reduced under moral hazard
because of the agency cost incurred to avoid private benefits.
4.9.5 Insurance Contract
Moral hazard also undermines the functioning of insurance markets. We consider now a
risk averse agent with utility function u(·) and initial wealth w. With probability pi(e)
(resp. 1− pi(e)) the agent has no (resp. an) accident and pays an amount z¯ (resp. z) to
an insurance company. The damage incurred by the agent is worth d. Effort e in {0, 1}
can now be interpreted as a level of safety care.
Monopoly: To make things simpler, and as in Section 2.16.6, the insurance company
is first assumed to be a monopoly and has all the bargaining power when offering the
insurance contract to the insuree. To induce effort from the insuree, the optimal insurance
contract must solve:
(P ) : max
{(z¯,z)}
pi1z¯ + (1− pi1)z
subject to
pi1u(w − z¯) + (1− pi1)u(w − d− z)− ψ ≥ pi0u(w − z¯) + (1− pi0)u(w − d− z), (4.76)
pi1u(w − z¯) + (1− pi1)u(w − d− z)− ψ ≥ u(wˆ), (4.77)
where wˆ is the certainty equivalent of the agent’s wealth when he does not subscribe any
insurance and exerts no effort. wˆ is implicitly defined as u(wˆ) = pi1u(w) + (1− pi1)u(w−
d)− ψ.16
Note that the right-hand side of (4.77) is not zero. Except for this non zero reservation
value, the problem is very close to that of Section 4.5 after having replaced variables so
that the net transfers received by the agent are t¯ = w − z¯ and t = w − d− z and noticed
that S¯ = w and S = w −D.
Both constraints (4.76) and (4.77) are again binding at the optimum and the second-
best cost of inducing effort writes now as:
CSB(wˆ) = pi1h
(
ψ + u(wˆ) + (1− pi1) ψ
∆pi
)
+ (1− pi1)h
(
ψ + u(wˆ)− pi1ψ
∆pi
)
. (4.78)
16We assume that the agent wants to exert an effort in the absence of an insurance contract, i.e.
u(w) − u(w − d) > ψ∆pi . One could assume instead that he does not want to exert effort when he is not
insured. Then, his status quo utility level is pi0u(w) + (1− pi0)u(w − d) = u(wˆ′).
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Without moral hazard this cost of inducing effort would instead be:
CFB(wˆ) = h(ψ + u(wˆ)). (4.79)
Let us thus denote by AC(wˆ) = CSB(wˆ) − CFB(wˆ), the agency cost incurred by the
principal, i.e., the difference between the second-best and the first-best cost of inducing
effort. This difference is the agency cost from moral hazard. Differentiating with respect
to wˆ, we have:
AC ′(wˆ) = u′(wˆ)
(
pi1h
′ (ψ + u(wˆ) + (1− pi1) ψ∆pi)+ (1− pi1)h′ (ψ + u(wˆ)− pi1ψ∆pi )
−h′(ψ + u(wˆ))
)
> 0, (4.80)
if h′(·) is convex. In fact, we let the reader check that this latter concavity is insured when
pu(x) < 3ru(x) where pu(x) = −u′′′(x)u′′(x) is the agent’s degree of prudence and ru(x) = −u
′′(x)
u′(x)
is his degree of risk aversion.17
The fact that AC(·) is monotonically increasing with wˆ can be interpreted as saying
that, as the agent’s wealth increases, there is more distortion due to moral hazard in the
decision of the insurance company to induce effort or not. However, the sufficient condition
on h(·) needed to obtain this result is somewhat intricate. This highlights the important
difficulties that modelers often face when they want to derive simple comparative statics
results from even a simple agency problem.
Competitive Market: The insurance market is often viewed as an archetypical ex-
ample of a perfectly competitive market where insurers’ profits are driven to zero. Without
entering too much into the difficult issues of competitive markets plagued by agency prob-
lems, it is nevertheless useful to characterize the equilibrium contract inducing a positive
effort. Because of perfect competition among insurance companies, this contract should
maximize the agent’s expected utility subject to the standard incentive compatibility
constraint (written with our usual change of variables)
u¯− u ≥ ψ
∆pi
, (4.81)
and the non zero-profit constraint of the insurance company:
pi1(w − h(u¯)) + (1− pi1)(w − d− h(u)) ≥ 0. (4.82)
The equilibrium contract must therefore solve the following problem:
(P ) : max
{(u¯,u)}
pi1u¯+ (1− pi1)u− ψ
subject to (4.81) and (4.82).
17This latter property holds when u(·) is CARA. See also Wambach (2000) for such comparative statics.
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Denoting by λˆ and µˆ the respective multiplier of those two constraints, the necessary
and sufficient Kuhn and Tucker conditions for this concave problem write respectively as:
pi1 + λˆ = µˆpi1h
′(u¯M), (4.83)
and
1− pi1 − λˆ = µˆ(1− pi1)h′(uM). (4.84)
Summing those two equations immediately yields that:
µˆ =
1
pi1h′(u¯M) + (1− pi1)h′(uM) > 0. (4.85)
Henceforth, the zero profit constraint is automatically satisfied by this equilibrium
contract. Similarly, we also find that:
λˆ = pi1(1− pi1) (h
′(u¯M)− h′(uM))
pi1h′(u¯M) + (1− pi1)h′(uM) > 0, (4.86)
since h(·) is convex and u¯M > uM is necessary to guarantee that (4.81) holds. The
incentive compatibility constraint is also binding at the equilibrium contract.
Denoting by UM the agent’s expected utility when exerting a positive effort, the
binding insurer’s zero profit constraint can thus be rewritten as:
pi1h
(
UM + ψ + (1− pi1) ψ
∆pi
)
+ (1− pi1)h
(
UM + ψ − pi1 ψ
∆pi
)
= w − d(1− pi1). (4.87)
The market does not break down as long as (4.87) defines implicitly a value UM which
is greater than what the agent gets by not taking any insurance contract. Let denote by
Uˆ this utility level:
Uˆ = max
e∈{0,1}
pi(e)u(w) + (1− pi(e))u(w −D)− ψ(e).
Note that, under complete information, the agent would be perfectly insured and would
exert a positive effort. He would then get a positive expected utility U∗ such that h(U∗+
ψ) = w − d(1− pi1). Again, the market does not breakdown as long as U∗ > Uˆ .
Let us take a case where U∗ is greater than Uˆ under complete information, i.e., inducing
effort has a positive social value w− d(1− pi1)− h(ψ) > 0. Then, this condition certainly
does not guarantee that UM defined implicitly by (4.87) remains greater than Uˆ . Indeed,
from Jensen’s inequality and h(·) convex, the left-hand side of (4.87) is strictly greater
than h(UM+ψ). Moral hazard may then imply an inefficiency of the competitive insurance
market, in the sense that it cannot induce a positive effort level.
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4.10 Commitment under Moral Hazard
The assumption of full commitment to an incentive scheme was already discussed in
Section 2.11 in the case of adverse selection. This issue is also quite important under
moral hazard. Indeed to induce a positive effort level, the principal must let the risk
averse agent bear some risk. However, once this effort is sunk and before uncertainty is
resolved, the principal would like to offer more insurance to the agent to avoid paying an
excessive agency cost. For this reinsurance stage to have any impact, the principal must
be aware, maybe through a direct observation of the effort itself, or by indirectly getting
a signal correlated with this effort, that effort has already been performed. Of course,
the renegotiation stage would be perfectly anticipated by the rational agent at the time
of exerting effort. Renegotiation is then unlikely to lead to complete insurance ex post,
since the agent would then have no incentive to exert effort in the first place.18 We will
discuss the issues of moral hazard and renegotiation more fully in Volume III.
18See Fudenberg and Tirole (1990).
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APPENDIX 4.1: Proof of Proposition 4.2
• Suppose first that 0 ≤ ` ≤ pi0
∆pi
ψ. We conjecture that (4.15) and (4.16) are the only
relevant constraints. Of course, since the principal is willing to minimize the payments
made to the agent, both constraints must be binding. Hence, tSB = −` and t¯SB = −`+ ψ
∆pi
.
We check that (4.17) is satisfied since −`+ ψ
∆pi
> −`. We check also that (4.16) is strictly
satisfied since pi1t¯
SB + (1− pi1)tSB − ψ = −`+ pi0∆piψ > 0.
• For ` > − pi0
∆pi
ψ, note that the transfers t∗ = − pi0
∆pi
ψ and t¯∗ = −ψ + (1−pi1)
∆pi
ψ > t∗ are
such that both constraints (4.17) and (4.18) are strictly satisfied and such that (4.15) is
binding.
APPENDIX 4.2: A Continuum of Performances
Let us now assume that the level of performance q˜ is drawn from a continuous dis-
tribution with a cumulative function F (·|e) on the support [q, q¯]. This distribution is
conditional on the agent’s level of effort which still takes two possible values e in {0, 1}.
We denote by f(·|e) the density corresponding to the above distributions. A contract t(q)
inducing a positive effort in this context must satisfy the incentive constraint∫ q¯
q
u(t(q))f(q|1)dq − ψ ≥
∫ q¯
q
u(t(q))f(q|0)dq, (4.88)
and the participation constraint∫ q¯
q
u(t(q))f(q|1)dq − ψ ≥ 0. (4.89)
The risk neutral principal’s problem writes thus as:
(P ) : max
{t(q)}
∫ q¯
q
(S(q)− t(q))f(q|1)dq,
subject to (4.88) and (4.89).
Denoting by λ and µ the respective multipliers of (4.88) and (4.89), the Lagrangean of
(P ) writes as L(q, t) = (S(q)− t)f(q|1)+λ(u(t)(f(q|1)−f(q|0))−ψ)+µ(u(t)f(q|1)−ψ).
Optimizing pointwise with respect to t yields:
1
u′(tSB(q))
= µ+ λ
(
f(q|1)− f(q|0)
f(q|1)
)
. (4.90)
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Multiplying (4.90) by f1(q) and taking expectations,
19 we obtain as in the main text:
µ = E
(
1
u′(tSB(q))
)
> 0, (4.91)
where E
q˜
(·) is the expectation operator with respect to the probability distribution of
output induced by an effort eSB. Finally, using this expression of µ, inserting into (4.90)
and multiplying by f(q|1)u(tSB(q)), we obtain:
λ(f(q|1)− f(q|0))u(tSB(q)) = f(q|1)u(tSB(q))
(
1
u′(tSB(q))
− E
(
1
u′(tSB(q))
))
. (4.92)
Integrating over [q, q¯] and taking into account that λ
(∫ q¯
q
(f(q|1)− f(q|0))u(tSB(q))dq − ψ
)
=
0 yields λψ = cov
(
u(tSB(q˜)), 1
u′(tSB(q˜))
)
> 0.
Hence, λ ≥ 0 since u(·) and u′(·) vary in opposite directions. λ = 0 only if tSB(q)
is a constant but, then, the incentive constraint is necessarily violated. Hence, we have
necessarily λ > 0. Finally, tSB(pi) is monotonically increasing in pi when the monotone
likelihood property d
dq
(
f(q|1)−f(q|0)
f(q|1)
)
> 0 is satisfied.
APPENDIX 4.3: Proof of Proposition 4.6
Indeed, let J be the set of indices j such that
pij1−pij0
pij1
= maxi
{
pii1−pii0
pii1
}
. If J = {n},
then we have tn =
ψ
pin1−pin0 and ti = 0 for i < n. Otherwise ti = 0 if i 6∈ J and for i ∈ J ,
the transfer ti must satisfy the incentive constraint as an equality.
∑
i∈J(pii1− pii0)ti = ψ,
and the principal (and the agent) are indifferent to the profiles of positive transfers. They
can be chosen positive and increasing for example.
19Note that
∫ q¯
q
f(q|e)dq = 1 for e in {0, 1}.
Chapter 5
Incentive and Participation
Contraints with Moral Hazard
5.1 Introduction
In Chapter 4, we have already stressed the various conflicts which may appear in a moral
hazard environment. The analysis of these conflicts, either under limited liability or risk
aversion, was made easy because of our focus on a simple 2 by 2 environment with a binary
effort and two levels of performance. The simple interaction between a single incentive
constraint with either a limited liability constraint or a participation constraint was then
quite straightforward.
However, moral hazard models inherit also the major difficulties of Incentive Theory
already present in our investigation of complex adverse selection models made in Chapter
3. Indeed, when one moves away from the 2 by 2 (by far too simplistic) model of Chapter
4, numerous incentive constraints have also to be taken into account in complex moral
hazard environments. The analysis becomes much harder and characterizing the optimal
incentive contracts is a difficult task. Examples of such complex contracting environments
abound. Effort may no longer be binary but, instead, may be better characterized as a
continuous variable. A manager may no longer choose between working or not on a
project but may be able to fine tune the exact spend on this project. Even worse, the
agent’s actions may no longer be summarized by a one-dimensional parameter but may be
better described by a whole array of control variables which are technologically linked. For
instance, the manager of a firm has to choose how to allocate his effort between productive
activities and monitoring his peers or other workers. The manager’s performances, i.e., his
profit, may also be better approximated as a continuous variable, a less crude assumption
than that made in Chapter 4.1 Real world incentive schemes for the manager of the firm
1Appendix 4.1 already gives an example of such an analysis with a continuum of performances and
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are not based on a discrete number of performances but on the more continuous level of
profit of the firm. Lastly, the agent’s preferences over effort and consumption may no
longer be separable as we have assumed in Chapter 4.
Mirroring as much as possible the analysis made in Chapter 3 for the case of adverse
selection, we argue here that complex contractual environments with moral hazard raise
also many new difficulties for the characterization of the binding incentive and participa-
tion constraints. Again mimicking what was done in Chapter 3, we propose a classification
of the new contractual settings analyzed in the present chapter. Each of those categories
corresponds to a particular perturbation of the standard moral hazard trade-offs analyzed
in Chapter 2.
• Models with a hardening of the agent’s incentive constraints: Let us consider a first class
of models where the agent can exert more than two possible levels of effort. The agent may
choose his one-dimensional action within a finite set or may be able to fine tune continously
his effort supply. In both cases, the agent’s performance remains nevertheless a single
dimensional vector. Alternatively, the agent may be performing several tasks on the
principal’s behalf, controlling thus various dimensions of effort with each of those efforts
affecting a particular aspect of the agent’s performance. In those complex contracting
environments, a major difficulty is to ensure that local incentive constraints, which are
the easiest ones to handle, still drive the design of incentives.
When the agent’s performance has a single dimension, we first derive the second-best
cost of implementing any given level of effort. This cost is obtained by minimizing the
agent’s expected payment subject to his incentive and participation constraints. As in
Chapter 4, it is generally true that the second-best cost is greater than the first-best
cost as soon as one incentive contraint is binding. Second, we generalize the second-best
analysis of Chapter 4 to find the optimal effort level that the principal wants to induce
under moral hazard. This analysis already shows that there is no general lessons on the
nature of the distortion entailed by moral hazard. The second-best level of effort may
be either higher or lower than its first-best value, contrary to our findings in the binary
effort model of Chapter 4. We then develop the so-called “first-order approach” to moral
hazard problems where effort is a continuous variable. This approach replaces the set of
possible incentive constraints by a local incentive constraint, a legitimate step provided
that the agent’s problem is concave. This concavity is, in turn, obtained under rather
stringent assumptions, namely the cumulative distribution function of the performance
level should be a convex function of the agent’s effort (CCFD) and the monotone likeli-
hood property (MLRP ) should also be satisfied. As we have already seen in Chapter 4,
this latter property also implies that the agent’s compensation schedule is increasing with
two levels of effort.
5.1. INTRODUCTION 185
this performance.
In practice, the agent’s effort is often better characterized as a multi-dimensional
variable. For instance, a retailer selling goods on the manufacturer’s behalf must reduce
retailing costs but also improve after-sales services. A worker is not only involved in
productive tasks but must sometimes be also involved in monitoring his peers. A tenant
must simultaneously choose the quality of the crops he seeds and the level of physical
investment he should make. A teacher must allocate his time between doing research
and supervising students. All these examples belong to the class of multi-task incentive
problems. In those models, agency costs are significantly affected by the possible conflicts
in incentivizing the various tasks performed by the agent. The characterization of the
optimal contract depends on the complementarity or substitutability of the tasks. The
technological relationship between tasks has thus strong incentive consequences. Viewing
the relationship between the principal and his agent as a cluster of various transactions
significantly extends standard theory. New issues arise in such a framework. For instance,
one can study how the distribution of efforts along those different dimensions of the agent’s
activity or the degrees of informativeness of the different performances affect the power
of incentives, deriving from such analysis rich lessons for organizational design.
Even though the relevant literature2 has been mostly developed in a particular frame-
work,3 we have found useful to recast the lessons of this literature in a discrete framework
which extends quite naturally the standard model of Chapter 4. Doing so, we clearly
gain in consistency by offering an integrated framework all over the book. Moreover,
this discrete modeling allows us to discuss the conditions under which non-local incentive
constraints affect the design of incentives, giving us strong economic intuitions about the
economic phenomenon at stakes in this multi-task environment. Keeping this framework,
we also present a number of important examples of the multi-task principal-agent models.
These applications cover a broad range of issues like the interlinking of agrarian contracts,
the design of incentive schemes based on aggregate performances, and finally the choice of
vertically integrating or not a downstream unit and its consequences for the comparison
between the power of incentives in market environments and within firms.
• Models with a hardening of the agent’s participation constraint: One peculiarity of the
principal-agent models presented so far is that, even though various incentive constraints
might be taken into account by the principal, the separability of the agent’s utility function
between consumption and effort implies that giving up an ex ante rent to the agent is
never optimal from the principal’s point of view. Instead, with a non-separability between
2See Holmstro¨m and Milgrom (1991) and (1994).
3This framework considers the case of a continuum of possible performances, a continuum of possible
effort levels on each task and a disutility of effort being evaluated in monetary terms with CARA utility
functions.
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consumption and effort in the agent’s utility function, the conflict between incentive and
participation constraints may be better solved by leaving a positive ex ante rent to the
agent. Leaving such a rent allows the principal to benefit from wealth effects which may
reduce the cost of providing incentives.
• Models with constraints on transfers: Finally, we also replace the conflict between incen-
tive and participation constraints by the conflict between incentive and budget balance
constraints which appears in the optimal taxation literature. Again, in a model with a
binary level of effort, under-provision of effort appears with moral hazard.
Section 5.2 presents the straightforward extensions of the standard model of Chapter
4 to the cases where the agent can perform more than two and possibly a continuum of
levels of effort. We discuss there the two-step characterization of the second-best optimum
with, first, the derivation of the second-best cost of implementing a level of effort, and
second the analysis of the trade-off between the benefit and the cost of implementing
any given effort. We prove, by exhibiting an example, that the second-best level of effort
in an insurance-efficiency trade-off can be upwards distorted. This shows therefore that
complex moral hazard models may fail to perpetuate the simple lessons of Chapter 4.
Nevertheless, we also provide a limited liability rent-efficiency trade-off with a continuum
of levels of effort where the basic lessons of Section 4.6.1 carry over. The trade-off between
the extraction of the limited liability rent and allocative efficiency always calls for a
reduction in the expected volume of trade. Finally, this section ends with an exposition
of the “first-order approach” and the many technical problems it raises. When it applies,
the “first-order approach” allows the modeler to replace the infinitely many incentive
constraints arising when the agent controls a continuous effort variable by a simple first-
order condition. Section 5.3 deals with a multi-task model, solving first for the optimal
contracts inducing efforts on both dimensions of the agent’s activity and then deriving the
second-best level of effort on each of these dimensions. This analysis is first performed in
the simple framework of a risk neutral agent who is protected by limited liability. Then, we
turn to the somewhat more complex case of risk aversion. We show the possible origins
of diseconomies of scope in agency costs and we discuss their precise origins. Several
examples of multi-task agency models are then presented. Section 5.4 analyzes the case
where the agent’s utility function is no longer separable between consumption and effort.
We discuss there the conditions under which the agent’s participation constraint may
not be binding at the optimum. We also provide in that section a simple example of
preferences where the disutility of effort can be expressed in monetary terms. Despite the
non-separability between effort and consumption, the optimal contract keeps almost the
same features as in the case of separability.4 Finally, Section 5.5 analyzes the trade-off
4This example will be useful later on in Chapter 9, when we will investigate how optimal contrats
may be linear in moral hazard environments.
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between efficiency and redistribution in a moral hazard context.
5.2 More Than Two Levels of Effort
5.2.1 A Discrete Model
Let us first extend the basic model of Chapter 4 by now allowing more than two levels
of effort. Consider the more general case with n levels of production q1 < q2 < . . . < qn
and K levels of effort with 0 = e0 < e1 < . . . < eK−1 and the following disutilities of
effort ψ(ek) = ψk for all k in {0, . . . , K− 1}. We still make the normalization ψ0 = 0 and
assume that ψk is increasing in k. Let piik for i in {1, . . . , n} also denote the probability
of production qi when the effort level is ek. The agent has still a separable utility function
over monetary transfer and effort U = u(t) − ψ(e) where u(·) is increasing and concave
(u′(·) > 0 and u′′(·) ≤ 0). In such an environment, a contract is a set of transfers {t1, ...tn}
corresponding to each possible output levels.
As usual, we proceed in two steps. First, we compute the second-best cost of inducing
effort ek for the principal. We denote this cost by C
SB
k . Second, we find the optimal level
of effort from the principal’s point of view, taking into account both the costs and benefits
of each action ek.
Let us thus define (Pk) the cost minimization problem of a principal willing to imple-
ment effort ek. Using our, by now standard, change of variables, the important variables
are the utility levels in each state of nature, i.e., ui = u(ti) or alternatively ti = h(ui)
where h = u−1. (Pk) is a concave problem which writes as:
(Pk) : min{(u1,... ,un)}
n∑
i=1
piikh(ui)
subject to
n∑
i=1
(piik − piik′)ui ≥ ψk − ψk′ for all k′ 6= k, (5.1)
n∑
i=1
piikui − ψk ≥ 0. (5.2)
(5.1) is the incentive constraint preventing the agent from exerting effort ek′ , for k
′ 6= k,
when the principal wants to implement effort ek. There are K − 1 such constraints. (5.2)
is the agent’s participation constraint when he exerts effort ek. We denote by λ
k′
k the
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multiplier of (5.1) and still, as in Chapter 4, by µ the multiplier of (5.2). The value of
this problem is the second-best cost of implementation CSBk for effort ek.
It should be immediately clear that the second-best cost of implementing effort ek is
such that CSBk ≥ CFBk = h(ψk), where CFBk denotes the first-best cost of implementing
effort ek. This is so because the presence of incentive constraints in problem (Pk) implies
that the value of this problem is necessarily not greater than under complete information.
Note that the inequality above is strict whenever one of the incentive constraints (5.1) is
binding at the optimum of (Pk).
The necessary and sufficient first-order conditions for the optimization of program (Pk)
write thus as:
1
u′(tik)
= µ+
∑
k′ 6=k
λk
′
k
(
piik − piik′
piik
)
, i = 1, . . . , n, (5.3)
where tik is the transfer given to the agent in state i when the principal wants to implement
effort ek.
The new difficulty coming with more than two levels of effort is that there may be
several incentive constraints binding, i.e., several multipliers λk
′
k which may be different
from zero. Looking only at local incentive constraints may not be enough to characterize
the solution to (Pk) and the optimal payments are then the solutions of a complex system
of nonlinear equations. However, if the only binding incentive constraint is the local
downward incentive constraint, the first-order condition for problem (Pk) writes simply
as:
1
u′(tik)
= µ+ λk−1k
(
piik − pii(k−1)
piik
)
. (5.4)
When the cumulative distribution function of production is a convex function of the
level of effort, and when the monotone likelihood ratio assumption holds, the local ap-
proach described above can be validated as it has been shown by Grossman and Hart
(1983). We prove this proposition in Section 5.2.3. for the case of a continuum of effort
levels and a continuum of performances.
Even if describing the behavior of the second-best cost of implementation CSBk is in
general a difficult task, one may try to already get some insights on how the principal
chooses the second-best level of effort. The optimal second-best effort is indeed defined
as eSB = argmaxek
∑n
i=1 piikSi − CSBk .5
Finding this second-best effort eSB is a rather difficult problem and there is, a priori,
no reason to be sure that it is below its first-best value. Under- as well as over-provision
of effort may be obtained at the second-best.
5If there are several such maximizers, just pick any of them.
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Under-provision was already obtained in Chapter 4. To see that over-provision may
also arise, let us consider the following example with three possible levels of effort e0, e1
and e2, and two possible outcomes yielding respectively S¯ and S to the principal. The
probabilities that S¯ realizes are respectively pi0, pi1 and pi2 with pi0 < pi1 < pi2 and the
corresponding disutilities of effort are ψ0 = 0 < ψ1 < ψ2. Under complete information,
the intermediate effort is chosen when:
h(ψ1)
pi1 − pi0 < S¯ − S <
h(ψ2)− h(ψ1)
pi2 − pi1 . (5.5)
The first inequality means that effort e1 is preferred to e0. The second inequality
means that e1 is also preferred to e2.
Under moral hazard, let us first observe that the first-best effort e1 may no longer be
implementable. Indeed, let denote by u¯ and u the levels of utility offered to the agent
when S¯ and S realize. Incentive compatibility requires that:
u¯− u ≥ ψ1
pi1 − pi0 (5.6)
so that the agent prefers exerting effort e1 rather than e0. Similarly, we must also have
u¯− u ≤ ψ2 − ψ1
pi2 − pi1 (5.7)
to insure that the agent prefers exerting effort e1 than e2. However, when
ψ2−ψ1
pi2−pi1 <
ψ1
pi1−pi0 ,
the set of payoffs (u¯, u) such that (5.6) and (5.7) are both satisfied is empty. Hence, e1
can no longer be implemented.
Effort e0 remains obviously implementable with a null payment in each state of nature.
Finally, effort e2 is implementable when the incentive constraint
u¯− u ≥ max
{
ψ2 − ψ1
pi2 − pi1 ;
ψ2
pi2 − pi0
}
(5.8)
which ensures that effort e2 is preferred to both e1 and e0, and the participation constraint
pi2u¯+ (1− pi2)u− ψ2 ≥ 0, (5.9)
are both satisfied.
When ψ2−ψ1
pi2−pi1 <
ψ2
pi2−pi0 , the maximand on the right-hand side of (5.8) is
ψ2
pi2−pi0 . Hence,
the second-best cost of implementing effort e2 can be easily computed as:
CSB2 = pi2h
(
ψ2 +
(1− pi2)ψ2
pi2 − pi0
)
+ (1− pi2)h
(
ψ2 − pi2ψ2
pi2 − pi0
)
. (5.10)
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Therefore, effort e2 is second-best optimal when
S¯ − S > C
SB
2
pi2 − pi0 . (5.11)
It is easy to check that one can find values of S¯−S so that (5.5) and (5.11) both hold
simultaneously. We conclude from that:
Proposition 5.1 : With more than two levels of effort, the second-best effort level may
be greater than the first-best level.
5.2.2 Two Outcomes with a Continuum of Effort Levels
To reduce the cumbersome difficulty of the discrete case, modelers have often preferred to
allow for a continuum of effort levels. With more than two states of nature, one meets soon
important technical problems analyzed in Section 5.2.3 below. With only two possible
levels of performance, the analysis remains nevertheless quite tractable as we see in this
section.
To make some progress in this direction, we reparametrize the model by assuming
that pi(e) = e, for all e in [0, 1]. Henceforth, the agent’s effort level equals the probability
of a high performance. The disutility of effort function ψ(e) is increasing and convex in
e (ψ′ > 0 and ψ′′ ≥ 0). Moreover, to insure always interior solutions, we assume that
the Inada conditions ψ′(0) = 0 and ψ′(1) = +∞ both hold. Let us finally consider a risk
neutral agent with zero initial wealth who is protected by limited liability constraints:
t ≥ 0 (5.12)
and
t¯ ≥ 0. (5.13)
Faced with an incentive contract {(t, t¯)}, this agent chooses an effort e such that
e = arg max
e˜∈[0,1]
e˜t¯+ (1− e˜)t− ψ(e˜). (5.14)
By strict concavity of the agent’s objective function, the incentive constraint rewrites
with the following necessary and sufficient first-order condition:
t¯− t = ψ′(e). (5.15)
The principal’s program writes now as:
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(P ) : max
{(e,t¯,t)}
eS¯ + (1− e)S − et¯− (1− e)t
subject to (5.12), (5.13) and (5.15).
As in the model of Section 4.3, the limited liability constraint (5.12) (resp. (5.13)) is
again binding (resp. slack). Replacing t¯ by ψ′(e) into the principal’s objective function,
the principal’s reduced program (P ′) writes thus as:
(P ′) : max
e∈[0,1]
eS¯ + (1− e)S − eψ′(e).
When ψ′′′(·) > 0, the principal’s objective function is strictly concave in e and direct
optimization leads to the following expression for the second-best level of effort eSB:
∆S = ψ′(eSB) + eSBψ′′(eSB). (5.16)
This second-best effort is obviously lower than the first-best effort e∗ which is defined
by
∆S = ψ′(e∗). (5.17)
The first-best effort is such that the marginal benefit ∆S of increasing effort by a
small amount de is just equal to the marginal disutility of doing so ψ′(e∗)de. Under
moral hazard, the marginal benefit ∆Sde must equal the marginal cost ψ′(eSB)de plus
the marginal cost of the agent’s limited liability rent eSBψ′′(eSB)de.
Indeed, with moral hazard, the limited liability rent of the agent is strictly positive
since this rent rewrites also as EUSB = eSBψ′(eSB) − ψ(eSB) > 0 where the right-hand
side inequality is derived from the convexity of ψ(·) and the fact that eSB > 0. Reducing
this rent which is costly from the principal’s point of view calls for decreasing effort below
the first-best.
Remark: The model with a risk neutral agent protected by limited liability bears some
strong resemblance with the adverse selection model of Chapter 2. Indeed, in both models
the principal reduces the expected volume of trade with the agent to reduce the latter’s
information rent. Effort is now replacing output to reduce this information rent.
5.2.3 The “first-order Approach”
Let us now consider the case where the agent may exert a continuous level of effort e in
a compact interval [0, e¯] and incurs by doing so a disutility ψ(e) which is increasing and
convex (ψ′(·) > 0 and ψ′′(·) > 0). To avoid corner solutions, we will also assume that the
Inada conditions ψ′(0) = 0 and ψ′(e¯) = +∞ are satisfied.
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The agent’s performance q˜ may take any possible value in the compact interval Q =
[q, q¯] with the conditional distribution F (q|e) and the everywhere positive density function
f(q|e). We assume that F (·|e) is twice differentiable with respect to e and that those
distributions have all the same full support Q.
Formally a contract {t(q˜)} which implements a given level of effort e must now satisfy
the following incentive constraints:∫ q¯
q
u(t(q))f(q|e)dq − ψ(e) ≥
∫ q¯
q
u(t(q))f(q|e˜)dq − ψ(e˜), for all e˜ in [0, e¯]; (5.18)
and the participation constraint:∫ q¯
q
u(t(q))f(q|e)dq − ψ(e) ≥ 0. (5.19)
The principal’s problem is thus:
(P ) : max
{(t(·),e)}
∫ q¯
q
(S(q)− t(q))f(q|e)dq
subject to (5.18) and (5.19).
We denote by {(tSB(·), eSB)} the solution to (P ). The first difficulty with this problem
is to insure that such an optimum exists within the class of all admissible functions t(·).
For instance, Mirrlees (1999) has shown that the problem above may sometimes have
no optimal solution among the class of unbounded sharing rules. The difficulty comes
here from the lack of compacity of the set of incentive feasible contracts.6 We leave
aside these technicalities to focus on what we think is the main difficulty of problem (P ):
“simplifying” the infinite number of global incentive constraints (5.18) and replacing those
constraints by the simpler “local” incentive constraint:∫ q¯
q
u(t(q))fe(q|e)dq − ψ′(e) = 0. (5.20)
This constraint simply means that the agent is indifferent between choosing effort e
and increasing (or decreasing) slightly his effort by an amount de when he receives the
compensation schedule {t(q˜)}.
Let us thus define (PR) as the “relaxed” problem of the principal where the infinite
number of constraints (5.18) have now been replaced by (5.20):
6To solve this technical issue, some authors like Holmstro¨m (1979), Page (1987) and Bergeman (1993)
have put further restrictions on the class of incentive schemes like equicontinuity or bounded variations.
A set H of functions on IR, is equicontinuous if and only if, for all ε > 0, there exists σ > 0 such that
||x− x0|| ≤ σ implies ||f(x)− f(x0)|| ≤ ε for all f ∈ H. A function f(·) on IR is of bounded variations if
and only if it is the difference of two monotone functions.
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(PR) : max
{(t(q),e)
∫ q¯
q
(S(q)− t(q))f(q|e)dq
subject to (5.19) and (5.20).
We denote by {(tR(·), eR)} the solution to this relaxed problem. We will first charac-
terize this solution. Then, we will find sufficient conditions under which the solution of the
relaxed problem (PR) satisfies the constraints of the original problem (P ). Henceforth,
we will have obtained a characterization of the solution for problem (P ).
Let us first characterize the solution to the relaxed problem (PR). Denoting by λ the
multiplier of (5.20) and µ the multiplier of (5.19) we can form the Lagrangean L of this
problem:
L(t, e) = (S(q)− t)f(q|e) + λ (u(t)fe(q|e)− ψ′(e)) + µ (u(t)f(q|e)− ψ(e)) . (5.21)
Pointwise optimization with respect to t(q) yields:
1
u′(tR(q))
= µ+ λ
fe(q|eR)
f(q|eR) . (5.22)
The left-hand side of (5.22) is increasing with respect to tR(q) since u′′ < 0. Provided
that λ > 0, the “monotone likelihood ratio property” (thereafter MLRP)
∂
∂q
(
fe(q|e)
f(q|e)
)
> 0 for all q, (5.23)
guarantees that the right-hand side of (5.22) is also increasing in q. Hence, under MLRP,
tR(q) is strictly increasing with respect to q.
Remark: Note that the probability that the realized output is greater than a given q
when effort e is exerted is 1−F (q|e). Let us check that increasing e raises this probability
when MLRP holds. We have indeed:
Fe(q|e) =
∫ q
q
fe(q|e)
f(q|e) f(q|e)dq =
∫ q
q
v(q, e)f(q|e)dq, (5.24)
where v(q, e) = ∂
∂e
(log f(q|e)) = fe(q|e)
f(q|e) is the derivative of the log-likelihood of f(·).
But, by MLRP, v(q, e) is increasing in q. v(q, e) cannot be everywhere negative since,
by definition: Fe(q¯|e) = 0 =
∫ q¯
q
f(q|e)v(q, e)dq. Henceforth, there exists q∗ such that:
v(q, e) ≤ 0 if and only if q ≤ q∗. Fe(q|e) is decreasing in q (resp. increasing) on [q, q∗]
(resp. [q∗, q¯]). Since Fe(q|e) = Fe(q¯|e) = 0, we have necessarily Fe(q|e) ≤ 0 for any q in
[q, q¯]. Hence, when the agent exerts an effort e which is greater than e′, the distribution
of output with e dominates the distribution of output with e′ in the sense of first-order
stochastic dominance.
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We now show that indeed λ > 0. Let us first denote by eR the effort solution of (PR).
Multiplying (5.22) by f(q|eR) and integrating over [0, q¯] yields
µ =
∫ q¯
q
1
u′(tR(q))
f(q|eR)dq = E
q˜
(
1
u′(tR(q˜)
)
,
since
∫ q¯
q
fe(q|eR)dq = 0. E
q˜
(·) denotes the expectation operator with respect to the distri-
bution of output induced by effort eR. Since u′(·) > 0, we have µ > 0 and the participation
constraint (5.19) is binding.
Using (5.22) again, we also find
λfe(q|eR)
f(q|eR) =
1
u′(tR(q))
− E
q˜
(
1
u′(tR(q˜))
)
. (5.25)
Multiplying both sides of (5.25) by u(tR(q))f(q|eR) and integrating over [q, q¯] yields:
λ
∫ q¯
q
u(tR(q))fe(q|eR)dq = cov
(
u(tR(q˜)),
1
u′(tR(q˜))
)
, (5.26)
where cov (·) is the covariance operator.
Using the slackness condition associated with (5.20), namely λ
(∫ q¯
q
u(tR(q))fe(q|e)dq − ψ′(e)
)
=
0, we get:
λψ′(eR) = cov
(
u(tR(q˜)),
1
u′(tR(q˜))
)
. (5.27)
Since u(·) and u′(·) covary in opposite directions, we have necessarily λ ≥ 0. Moreover,
the only case where this covariance is exactly zero is when tR(q) is a constant for all q.
But then, the incentive constraint (5.22) can no longer be satisfied at a positive level of
effort. Having proved that λ > 0, we derive from above the following proposition.
Proposition 5.2 : Under MLRP, the solution tR(q) to the relaxed problem (PR) is in-
creasing in q.
We can rewrite the agent’s expected utility when he receives the scheme {tR(q)} and
exerts an effort e as:
U(e) =
∫ q¯
q
u(tR(q))f(q|e)dq − ψ(e),
=
[
u(tR(q))F (q|e)]q¯
q
−
∫ q¯
q
u′(tR(q))(tR(q))′F (q|e)dq − ψ(e)
= u(tR(q¯))−
∫ q¯
q
u′(tR(q))(tR(q))′F (q|e)dq − ψ(e), (5.28)
5.2. MORE THAN TWO LEVELS OF EFFORT 195
where the second line is obtained by simply integrating by parts and the second uses
F (q|e) and F (q¯|e) = 1 for all e.
Since ψ′′(·) > 0, u′(·) > 0 and tR(q) is increasing, U(e) is concave in e as soon as
Fee(q|e) > 0 for all (q, e). This last property is called the Convexity of the Cumulative
Distribution Function (CCDF).
Remark 1: Joined to MLRP, CCDF captures the idea that increasing the agent’s effort
increases the probability 1−F (q|e) that the realized output is greater than q but does so
at a decreasing rate.
Remark 2: Note finally that CCDF may not be very intuitive in some contexts. Let us
assume, for instance, that production is linked to effort as follows q = e + ε where ε is
distributed on ] − ∞,+∞[ with a cumulative distribution function G(·). Then, CCDF
implies that the distribution of ε has an increasing density, a stringent assumption which
may sometimes be hard to justify.
Remark 3: It may seem surprising that such stringent assumptions are needed to prove
the simple and intuitive result that the agent’s reward should be increasing in his perfor-
mance. But remember that the dependence of tR(·) on q (which is bad from the insurance
point of view) is interesting only to the extent that it creates incentives for effort. For
a higher q to be a signal of a high effort, it must be that an increase of effort increases
unambiguously production (this is insured by first-order stochastic dominance), but also
that the informativeness of q about e increases also with q (this is insured by MLRP).
Since U(e) is concave for a solution of the relaxed problem, the first-order condition
(5.20) is sufficient to characterize the incentive constraints. Accordingly, the first-order
conditions of problem (P ) are the same as those of problem (PR). Summarizing, we have:
Proposition 5.3 : Assume that both MLRP and CCDF hold. If the optimal effort level is
positive, it is characterized by the solution of a relaxed problem (PR) using the first-order
approach (5.20). We have {(tSB(·), eSB(·))} = {(tR(·), eR(·))}.
This solution {(tSB(·), eSB)} is then characterized by the binding participation con-
straint (5.18), the incentive constraint (5.20) and the two first-order conditions of the
principal’s problem, namely (5.22) and∫ q¯
q
(S(q)− tSB(q))fe(q|eSB)dq + µ
(∫ q¯
q
u(tSB(q))fee(q|eSB)dq − ψ′′(eSB)
)
= 0. (5.29)
Given the highly restrictive assumptions imposed to prove this proposition, the va-
lidity of the first-order approach is somewhat limited. Furthermore, when the first-order
approach is not valid, using it can be very misleading. The true solution may not even be
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one among the multiple solutions of the first-order conditions for the relaxed problem.7
As a consequence a lot of the applied moral hazard literature adopts the discrete {0, 1}
formalization of Chapter 4.
The “first-order approach” has been one of the most debated issues in contract
theory in the late seventies, early eighties. Mirrlees (1999) was the first to point out
the limits of this approach and argued that it is valid only when the agent’s problem
has a unique maximizer.8 He later (1979) offered a proof for the use of this approach
when the conditions MLRP and CCDF both hold. This proof was based on an invalid
and circular argument. It somewhat assumed that the “first-order approach” was true
to prove it. This proof was finally corrected by Rogerson (1985a). Finally, Jewitt (1988)
was the first to offer a direct proof that the multiplier of the incentive constraint was
positive.9 Second, he also showed that CCDF can be relaxed provided that the agent’s
utility function satisfies further fine properties. Sinclair-Desgagne´ (1994) generalized the
“first-order approach” to the case where the principal observes several dimensions of the
agent’s performance. Grossman and Hart (1983) gave an exhaustive characterization of
the agent’s incentive scheme. Their approach is based on a complete description of the
incentive and participation constraints when the performances take n ≥ 2 values and the
agent’s effort belongs to any compact and possibly finite set.
5.3 The Multi-Task Incentive Problem
It is often the case that the agent does not exert a single dimensional effort, in partic-
ular when he is involved in many related activities associated with the same job. Such
examples abound as we will see in Section 5.3.3 below. When the agent performs simulta-
neously several tasks for the principal, new issues are raised: How does the technological
interaction between those tasks affect incentives? What sort of optimal incentive contracts
should be provided to the agent? How do incentive considerations affect the optimal mix
of efforts along each dimension of the agent’s performance?
5.3.1 Technology
To answer these questions, we now extend the simple model of Chapter 4 and let the agent
perform for the principal two tasks with respective efforts e1 and e2. For simplicity, we
first assume that those two tasks are completely symmetric and have the same stochastic
7Grossman and Hart (1983) offer a graphical illustration of this phenomenon.
8See also Guesnerie and Laffont (1978).
9This is his proof that we have used in the text.
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returns Si = S¯ or S (for i = 1, 2) which are independently distributed with respective
probabilities pi(e1) and pi(e2). Since there are basically three possible outcomes yielding
respectively 2S¯, S¯ + S and 2S to the principal, a contract is in fact a triplet of corre-
sponding payments (t¯, tˆ, t). t¯ is given in case of success on both tasks, tˆ is given in case
of success on only one task and t is given when none of the task have been successful.10
Again, we normalize each effort to belong to {0, 1}. Note that the model has, by
symmetry, three possible levels of “aggregate” effort. The agent can exert a high effort
on both tasks, on only one or on no task at all. The reader will recognize that the
multi-task agency model should thus inherit many of the difficulties discussed in Section
5.2. However, the multi-task problem has also more structure thanks to the technological
assumption generally made on these tasks. We will denote respectively by ψ2, ψ1, and
ψ0 = 0, the agent’s disutilities of effort when he respectively exerts two high effort levels,
only one or none. Of course, we have ψ2 > ψ1 > 0. Moreover, we say that the two tasks
are substitutes when ψ2 > 2ψ1, and complements when instead ψ2 < 2ψ1. When tasks are
substitutes, it is at the margin harder to accomplish the second task when the first one
is already performs. The reverse holds when the two tasks are complements.
5.3.2 The Simple Case of Limited Liability and Substitutability
of Tasks
In this Section, we start by analyzing a simple example with a risk neutral agent protected
by limited liability.
First-best outcome: Let us first assume that the principal performs the tasks himself
or alternatively that he uses a risk neutral agent to do so and that effort is observable.
Because the performances on each task are independent variables, the principal’s net
benefit of choosing to let the agent exert a positive effort on both tasks is V FB2 = 2(pi1S¯+
(1 − pi1)S) − ψ2. Note also that CFB2 = ψ2 is the first-best cost of implementing both
efforts.
If he chooses to have the agent exerting only one positive level of effort, the principal
gets instead V FB1 = pi1S¯ + (1 − pi1)S + pi0S¯ + (1 − pi0)S − ψ1. CSB1 = ψ1 is the first-best
cost of implementing only one effort.
Finally, if he chooses to let the agent exert no effort at all the principal gets: V FB0 =
2(pi0S¯ + (1− pi0)S).
Hence, exerting both efforts is preferred to any other allocation when V FB2 ≥ max(V FB1 , V FB0 )
10It is a straightforward extension to allow the principal’s payoff to be a symmetric and a nonlinear
function S(q˜1, q˜2) of the random outputs q˜1 and q˜2. Various asymmetries can also be handled as we will
see in Section 5.3.3 below.
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or to put it differently when:
∆pi∆S ≥ max
{
ψ2
2
, ψ2 − ψ1
}
. (5.30)
When the two tasks are substitutes, we have ψ2 − ψ1 > ψ22 and the more stringent
constraint on the right-hand side of (5.30) is obtained when the principal let the agent
exert only one positive level of effort.11 Figure 5.1 below summarizes the first-best choices
of effort made by the principal as a function of the incremental benefit ∆pi∆S associated
with each task.
-
- First-Best Efforts
Benefit ∆pi∆S
ff
for i = 1, 2
e∗i = 0
e∗2 = 0
e∗1 = 1
for i = 1, 2
e∗i = 1
CFB1 = ψ1 C
FB
2 − CFB1 = ψ2 − ψ1
-ff -
Figure 5.1: First-Best Levels of Effort with Substitutes.
When tasks are substitutes, there exists also a whole range of intermediate values of
∆pi∆S which are simultaneously large enough to justify a positive effort on one task and
small enough to prevent the principal from willing to let the agent exert both efforts.
Moral hazard: Let us now turn to the case where efforts are non-observable and the
risk neutral agent is protected by limited liability.
Suppose first that the principal wants to induce a high effort on both tasks. We let
the reader check that the best way to do so for the principal is by rewarding the agent
only when q˜1 = q˜2 = q¯, i.e., when both tasks are successful. Differently stated, we have
t¯ > tˆ = t = 0.
The local incentive constraint preventing the agent to exert only one effort writes thus
as:
pi21 t¯− ψ2 ≥ pi1pi0t¯− ψ1. (5.31)
The global incentive constraint preventing the agent to exert no effort at all writes
instead as:
pi21 t¯− ψ2 ≥ pi20 t¯. (5.32)
11In this latter case, given the symmetry of the model, there is no loss of generality in assuming that
the only high effort is performed on task 1.
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Both incentive constraints (5.31) and (5.32) can finally be summarized as:
t¯ ≥ 1
∆pi
max
{
ψ2 − ψ1
pi1
,
ψ2
pi1 + pi0
}
.12 (5.33)
The principal’s problem (P ) writes thus as:
(P ) : max
{t¯}
pi21(2S¯ − t¯) + 2pi1(1− pi1)(S¯ + S) + 2(1− pi1)2S
subject to (5.33).
The latter constraint is obviously binding at the optimum of (P ). The second-best cost
of implementing both efforts is thus CSB2 =
pi1
∆pi
max
{
ψ2 − ψ1, pi1ψ2pi1+pi0
}
. For the principal,
the net benefits from inducing a positive effort on both activities writes finally as:
V SB2 = 2(pi1S¯ + (1− pi1)S)−
pi1
∆pi
max
{
ψ2 − ψ1, pi1ψ2
pi1 + pi0
}
. (5.34)
If the principal chooses to induce only one effort, say on task 1, he offers instead a
transfer tˆ = ψ1
∆pi
each time that q˜1 = q¯ and zero otherwise just as in Chapter 4. The second-
best cost of implementing effort on a single task is thus CSB1 =
pi1ψ1
∆pi
. The second-best net
benefit for the principal of inducing this single dimension of effort is thus:
V SB1 = pi1S¯ + (1− pi1)S + pi0S¯ + (1− pi0)S −
pi1ψ1
∆pi
. (5.35)
Finally, the second-best choices of effort made by the principal can be summarized in
Figure 5.2 below.
-
- Second-Best Efforts
Benefit ∆pi∆S
ffff-
CSB1 C
SB
2 − CSB1
for i = 1, 2
eSBi = 0
eSB2 = 0
eSB1 = 1
for i = 1, 2
eSBi = 1
-
CFB1 C
FB
2 − CFB1
Figure 5.2: Second-Best Levels of Effort with Substitutes (for pi0ψ2
pi1+pi0
≥ ψ1).
Again, there are three possible sets of parameters corresponding each to a different
combination of optimal efforts.
12Note that the right-hand side of (5.33) is strictly positive. Hence, the limited liability constraint
t¯ ≥ 0 is automatically satisfied.
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It is first easy to check that the principal chooses now to exert zero effort more often
than under complete information since:
CSB1 =
pi1ψ1
∆pi
> ψ1 = C
FB
1 . (5.36)
Let us turn to the determination of whether or not the principal induces less often
two positive efforts under moral hazard than under complete information.
We isolate two cases. First, when pi0ψ2
pi1+pi0
≥ ψ1, one can check that the local incentive
constraint is the more constraining one for a principal willing to induce both efforts from
the agent. This means that t¯ = ψ2−ψ1
pi1∆pi
. Then, when pi0ψ2
pi1+pi0
≥ ψ1, we have also:
CSB2 − CSB1 =
pi1
∆pi
(ψ2 − 2ψ1) ≥ CFB2 − CFB1 = ψ2 − ψ1. (5.37)
This inequality means that the principal induces less often those two efforts than under
complete information.
The intuition behind this result is the following. Under moral hazard, the cost of
implementing either two or one effort is of course greater than under complete information.
Because of the technological substitutability between tasks, what matters for evaluating
whether both tasks should be incentivized less often than under complete information
is how the second-best incremental cost CSB2 − CSB1 can be compared to the first-best
incremental cost CFB2 −CFB1 . When the local incentive constraint is binding, it is harder
to incentivize effort on a second task when a positive effort is already implemented on
the first one. The second-best cost of inducing effort increases more quickly than the
first-best cost as the number of tasks increases.
Remark: Note that pi0 < pi1 implies that the condition
pi0ψ2
pi1+pi0
> ψ1 is more stringent
than the condition for task substitutability, namely ψ2 > 2ψ1. For the second best cost of
implementation to satisfy (5.37), it must be true that efforts are in fact strong substitutes.
It is then at the margin much harder to accomplish the second task when the first one is
already done.
Let us now turn to the case where pi0ψ2
pi1+pi0
< ψ1. For such a weak substitutability,
the global incentive constraint is now the more constraining one for a principal willing to
induce both efforts from the agent. The transfer received by the agent is thus t¯ = ψ2
(pi1+pi0)∆pi
.
Then, pi0ψ2
pi1+pi0
< ψ1 implies that we have also:
CSB2 − CSB1 =
pi1(pi1ψ2 − (pi1 + pi0)ψ1)
∆pi(pi1 + pi0)
< CFB2 − CFB1 = ψ2 − ψ1. (5.38)
The principal prefers now to induce both efforts rather than only one more often than
under complete information. The second-best cost of inducing effort increases less quickly
than the first-best cost as the number of tasks increases. Intuitively, the complementarity
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of tasks which arises from incentives goes counter to the technological diseconomies of
scope.
We summarize these findings in the next proposition.
Proposition 5.4 : Under moral hazard and limited liability, the degree of diseconomies
of scope between substitute tasks increases or decreases depending on whether local or
global incentive constraints are binding in the principal’s problem.
The Case of Complements: Let us turn now quickly to the case where the two tasks are
complements. The principal finds now harder to induce both efforts than under complete
information as it can be seen in Figure 5.3 below:
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Figure 5.3: First-Best Levels of Effort with Complements.
Under moral hazard, the global incentive constraint is now always binding for a princi-
pal willing to induce both efforts. Indeed, the inequality ψ2
pi1+pi0
> ψ2−ψ1
pi1
always holds when
ψ2 < 2ψ1. Hence, we have also C
SB
2 =
pi21ψ2
(pi1+pi0)∆pi
. It is easy to check that the principal
finds again harder to induce both efforts rather than none as it can be seen in Figure 5.4
below.
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2
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2
Figure 5.4: Second-Best Levels of Effort with Complements.
Finally, we observe that CSB2 > ψ2. Hence, the principal induces less often a pair of
high efforts under moral hazard than under complete information. Intuitively, the case of
complementarity is very much like the case of a single activity analyzed in Chapter 4.
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5.3.3 The Optimal Contract for a Risk Averse Agent
We assume in this section and the following ones that the agent is strictly risk averse.
Because of the symmetry between tasks, there is again no loss of generality in assuming
that the principal offers a contract {(t¯, tˆ, t)} where t¯ is given in case of success on both
tasks, tˆ is given when only one task is successful and t is given when no task succeeds.
Let us now describe the set of incentive feasible contracts inducing effort on both
dimensions of the agent’s activity. We have to consider the possibility for the agent to
shirk not only on one dimension of effort but also on both dimensions. The first incentive
constraint is a local incentive constraint which writes as:
(pi1)
2u(t¯) + 2pi1(1− pi1)u(tˆ) + (1− pi1)2u(t)− ψ2 ≥
pi1pi0u(t¯) + (pi1(1− pi0) + pi0(1− pi1))u(tˆ) + (1− pi1)(1− pi0)u(t)− ψ1. (5.39)
The second incentive constraint is a global incentive constraint and writes as:
(pi1)
2u(t¯) + 2pi1(1− pi1)u(tˆ) + (1− pi21)u(t)− ψ2 ≥
(pi0)
2u(t¯) + 2pi0(1− pi0)u(tˆ) + (1− pi0)2u(t). (5.40)
Finally, the agent’s participation constraint is:
(pi1)
2u(t¯) + 2pi1(1− pi1)u(tˆ) + (1− pi1)2u(t)− ψ2 ≥ 0. (5.41)
As usual, it is useful to express these constraints with the agent’s utility levels in each
state of nature as the new variables. Let us thus define u¯ = u(t¯), uˆ = u(tˆ) and u = u(t).
(5.39) rewrites now as a linear constraint:
(pi1)
2u¯+ 2pi1(1− pi1)uˆ+ (1− pi1)2u− ψ2 ≥
pi1pi0u¯+ (pi1(1− pi0) + pi0(1− pi1)) uˆ+ (1− pi1)(1− pi0)u− ψ1. (5.42)
(5.40) becomes:
(pi1)
2u¯+ 2pi1(1− pi1)uˆ+ (1− pi1)2u− ψ2 ≥
(pi0)
2u¯+ 2pi0(1− pi0)uˆ+ (1− pi0)2u. (5.43)
Finally, (5.41) becomes:
(pi1)
2u¯+ 2pi1(1− pi1)uˆ+ (1− pi1)2u− ψ2 ≥ 0. (5.44)
If he wants to induce both efforts, the principal’s problem can be stated as:
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(P ) : max
{(u¯,uˆ,u)}
(pi1)
2(2S¯ − h(u¯)) + 2pi1(1− pi1)(S¯ + S − h(uˆ)) + (1− pi1)2(2S − h(u)),
subject to (5.42) to (5.44).
Structure of the Optimal Contract: A priori, the solution to problem (P ) may entail
either one or two incentive constraints being binding. Moreover, when there is only one
such binding constraint it might be either the local or the global incentive constraint. We
derive the full-fledged analysis when the inverse utility function h = u−1 is quadratic, i.e.,
h(u) = u + ru
2
2
for some r > 0 in Appendix 5.1 of this chapter. The next proposition
summarizes our findings.
Proposition 5.5 : In the multi-task incentive problem (P ), the optimal contract inducing
effort on both dimensions is such that the participation constraint (5.44) is always binding.
Moreover, the binding incentive constraints are:
• The local incentive constraint (5.42) in the case of substitute tasks such that ψ2 >
2ψ1.
• Both local and global incentive constraints (5.42) and (5.43) in the case of weak
complements tasks such that
(
∆pi2+2pi1(1−pi1)
∆pi2+pi1(1−pi1)
)
ψ1 ≤ ψ2 ≤ 2ψ1.
• The global incentive constraint (5.43) in the case of strong complements tasks such
that ψ2 ≤ ∆pi2+2pi1(1−pi1)∆pi2+pi1(1−pi1) ψ1.
The incentive problem in a multi-task environment with risk aversion has a quite in-
tuitive structure which is somewhat similar to the one obtained in Section 5.3.2. When
effort are substitutes, the principal finds harder to provide incentives for both tasks si-
multaneously rather than for only one. Indeed, the agent is more willing to reduce his
effort on task 1 if he exerts also a high effort on task 2. The local incentive constraint is
thus binding. On the contrary, with a strong complementarity between tasks, inducing
the agent to exert a positive effort on both tasks simultaneously rather than on none
becomes the most difficult constraint of the principal. The global incentive constraint is
now binding. For intermediary cases, i.e., with weak complements, the situation is less
clear. All incentive constraints, both local and global ones, are then binding.
Remark: The reader will have recognized the strong similarity between the structure
of the optimal contract in the moral hazard multi-task problem and the structure of the
optimal contract in the multi-dimensional adverse selection problem already discussed
in Section 3.3. In both cases, it may happen that either local or global incentive con-
straints bind. A strong complementarity of efforts plays almost the same role as a strong
correlation in the agent’s types under adverse selection.
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Optimal Effort: Let us turn now to the characterization of the optimal effort chosen
by the principal in this second-best environment. To better understand these choices
it is useful to start with the simple case where tasks are technologically unrelated, i.e.,
ψ2 = 2ψ1.
Suppose that the principal wants to induce effort on only one task. Under complete
information, the expected incremental benefit of doing so, ∆pi∆S, should exceed the
first-best cost CFB1 of implementing this effort:
∆pi∆S ≥ CFB1 = h(ψ1) = ψ1 +
rψ21
2
. (5.45)
With two tasks and still under complete information, the principal prefers to induce
effort on both tasks rather than on only one when the incremental expected benefit from
implementing one extra unit of effort, which is again ∆pi∆S, exceeds the increase in the
cost of doing so, i.e., CFB2 − CFB1 , where CFB2 = h(2ψ1) = 2ψ1 + r2(2ψ1)2 is the first-best
cost of implementing two efforts. This leads to the condition:
∆pi∆S ≥ CFB2 − CFB1 = ψ1 +
3rψ21
2
. (5.46)
It is easy to check that the right-hand side of (5.46) is greater than the right-hand side
of (5.45) since CFB2 > 2C
FB
1 as soon as r > 0. This means that it is less often valuable
for the principal to induce both efforts rather than at least one when effort is verifiable.
The latter inequality also means that the first-best cost of implementing efforts exhibits
some diseconomies of scope. Adding up tasks makes more costly to induce effort from the
agent even if those tasks are technologically unrelated and contracting takes place under
complete information. The point here is that inducing the agent to exert more tasks re-
quires to increase the certain wealth level necessary to satisfy his participation constraint.
Adding more task changes therefore the cost borne by the principal for implementing an
extra level of effort. The agent having now a decreasing marginal utility of consumption,
multiplying by two the cost of effort requires to multiply by more than two the transfer
needed to insure the agent’s participation. For that reason, the diseconomies of scope
isolated above can be viewed as pure participation diseconomies of scope.
Now, still with unrelated tasks, let us move to the case of moral hazard. Under moral
hazard, we already know from Section 4.5 that, with the specification made on the agent’s
utility function, the second-best cost of implementing a single effort writes as:
CSB1 = ψ1 +
rψ21
2
+
rψ21pi1(1− pi1)
2∆pi2
. (5.47)
The principal prefers now to induce one effort rather than none when:
∆pi∆S ≥ CSB1 = CFB1 +
rψ21pi(1− pi)
2∆pi2
. (5.48)
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In Appendix 5.2, we compute also CSB2 the second-best cost of implementing a positive
effort on both tasks. For unrelated tasks, this cost writes as:
CSB2 = 2ψ1 +
r
2
(2ψ1)
2 +
rψ21pi1(1− pi1)
∆pi2
,
= CFB2 +
rψ21pi1(1− pi1)
∆pi2
. (5.49)
This cost has again an intuitive meaning. Since tasks are technologically unrelated,
providing incentives on one of those tasks does not affect the cost of incentives on the
other. Just as in Chapter 4, the principal must incur an agency cost rψ
2pi1(1−pi1)
2∆pi2
per
task on top of the complete information cost CFB2 which is needed to insure the agent’s
participation.
Being given this agency cost, the principal prefers to induce two positive efforts rather
than only one when:
∆pi∆S ≥ CSB2 − CSB1 = CFB2 − CFB1 +
rψ21pi1(1− pi1)
2∆pi2
. (5.50)
(5.50) is more stringent than (5.48) since CFB2 > 2C
FB
1 . In fact, one can easily observe
that the second-best rules (5.50) and (5.48) are respectively “translated” from the first-
best rules (5.46) and (5.45) by adding the same term
rψ21pi1(1−pi1)
2∆pi2
which is precisely the
extra cost paid by the principal to induce a positive effort on a single dimension of the
agent’s activities when there is moral hazard.
We conclude from this analysis that, with technologically unrelated tasks, agency
problems do not reduce the set of parameters over which the principal induces only one
effort from the agent as it can be seen on Figure 5.5 below:13
13In this figure, we assume that this is task 1 which is performed when only incentivizing one effort is
optimal. This is without loss of generality by symmetry.
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Figure 5.5: First-Best and Second-Best Efforts with Unrelated Tasks.
Let us now turn to the more interesting case where efforts are substitutes, i.e., ψ2 > 2ψ1.
On top of the participation diseconomies of scope already seen above, our analysis will
highlight the existence of incentives diseconomies of scope. To see their origins, we proceed
as before and first analyze the complete information decision rule. The principal still
prefers to induce one effort rather than none when (5.46) holds. However, the principal
prefers now to induce two efforts rather than only one when
∆pi∆S ≥ CFB2 − CFB1 , (5.51)
where CFB2 = h(ψ2) = ψ2 +
rψ22
2
.
Again, we can check that the right-hand side of (5.51) is greater than the right-hand
side of (5.45) since
CFB2 − 2CFB1 = h(ψ2)− 2h(ψ1) > h(2ψ1)− 2h(ψ1) > 0, (5.52)
where the first inequality uses the facts that h(·) is increasing and that ψ2 > 2ψ1 and the
second inequality is simply Jensen’s inequality.
Moving now to the case of moral hazard, the principal still prefers to induce one effort
rather than none when (5.48) still holds. Moreover, the second-best cost of inducing two
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efforts is now:14
CSB2 = ψ2 +
rψ22
2
+
r(ψ2 − ψ1)2pi1(1− pi1)
∆pi2
,
= CFB2 +
r(ψ2 − ψ1)2pi1(1− pi1)
∆pi2
. (5.53)
Again, this expression has an intuitive meaning. To induce the agent to exert two
efforts which are substitutes, the principal must consider the more constraining local
incentive constraint which prevents the agent from exerting effort on only one dimension
of his activities. For each of those two local incentives constraints, the incentive cost
that should be added to the first-best cost of implementing both efforts is r(ψ2−ψ1)
2pi1(1−pi1)
2∆pi
where ψ2−ψ1 is the incremental disutility of effort when moving from one to two efforts.
Hence, the principal prefers to induce both efforts rather than only one when:
∆pi∆S ≥ CSB2 − CSB1 = CFB2 − CFB1 +
rpi1(1− pi1)
∆pi2
(
(ψ2 − ψ1)2 − ψ
2
1
2
)
. (5.54)
In a second-best environment, both efforts are incentivized less often than only one.
Indeed, the second-best decision rule to induce both efforts (5.54) is more stringent than
the second-best decision rule (5.48) to induce only one since:
CFB2 − CFB1 +
rpi1(1− pi1)
∆pi2
(
(ψ2 − ψ1)2 − ψ
2
2
)
> CFB1 +
rpi1(1− pi1)ψ21
2∆pi2
. (5.55)
We notice that there are again some diseconomies of scope in implementing both
efforts. However, those diseconomies of scope have now a double origin. First, there are
still the participation diseconomies of scope which ensures that (5.52) holds. Second, and
contrary to the case of technological unrelated tasks, incentives diseconomies of scope
now appear since:
rpi1(1− pi1)
∆pi2
(
(ψ2 − ψ1)2 − ψ
2
2
)
>
rpi1(1− pi1)ψ21
2∆pi2
(5.56)
if and only if ψ2 > 2ψ1.
Moving from a first-best world to moral hazard, it becomes even harder to induce
effort on both tasks rather than on only one when goods are substitutes because of those
incentives diseconomies of scope. Figure 5.6 below shows graphically the impact of those
new agency diseconomies of scope on the optimal decision rule followed by the principal.
14See Appendix 5.2 of this chapter for a derivation of this formula.
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Figure 5.6: First-Best and Second-Best Efforts with Substitute Tasks.
We also summarize our findings in the next proposition.
Proposition 5.6 : When tasks are substitutes and with moral hazard, the principal must
face some new incentives diseconomies of scope which reduce the set of parameters such
that inducing both efforts is second-best optimal.
This proposition highlights the new difficulty faced by the principal when incentivizing
the agent on two tasks under moral hazard. Incentives diseconomies of scope can become
so important than the principal will choose more often than under complete information to
induce effort on only one task. Task focus may be a response to these agency diseconomies
of scope.
Remark: The case of complements could be treated similarly. It would highlight that
there exist incentives economies of scope when an agent performs two tasks which are
complements.
5.3.4 Asymmetric Tasks
The analysis that we have performed in Section 5.3.2 was made significantly easier by
our assumption of symmetry between the two tasks. In a real world contracting envi-
ronment, those tasks are likely to differ along several dimensions like the noises in the
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agent’s performances, the expected benefits of those tasks or the sensitivity of the agent’s
performance on his effort. The typical example along these lines is that of a university
professor who must devote efforts both on research and teaching. Those two tasks are
substitutes: giving more time to teaching reduces the time spent on research. Moreover,
the performances on each of those tasks cannot be measured with the same accuracy.
Research records may be viewed as highly precise measures of the performance along this
dimension of the professor’s activity. Teaching quality is instead harder to assess.
To model such settings, we now generalize the multi-task framework to the case of
asymmetric tasks that we still index with a superscript i in {1, 2}. Task i yields a benefit S¯i
to the risk neutral principal with probability pii(eik) = pi
i
k and a benefit S
i with probability
1 − piik. Effort eik still belongs to {0, 1}. Benefits and probabilities distribution may now
differ across tasks.
A contract is now a four-uple {(t¯, tˆ1, tˆ2, t)} where tˆ1 is offered when the outcome is
(S¯1, S2) and tˆ2 is offered when (S
1, S¯2) realizes. Now, we must allow for the possibility
that tˆ1 is possibly different from tˆ2, contrary to our previous assumption in Section 5.3.2.
Indeed, to take avantage of the asymmetry between tasks, the principal may distinguish
these latter two payments.
Let us again use our usual change of variables so that transfers are replaced by utility
levels in each state of nature: u¯ = u(t¯), uˆ1 = u(tˆ1), uˆ2 = u(tˆ2), and u = u(t). An
incentive feasible contract inducing a positive effort on both tasks must satisfy two local
incentive constraints:
pi11pi
2
1u¯+ pi
1
1(1− pi21)uˆ1 + (1− pi11)pi21uˆ2 + (1− pi11)(1− pi21)u− ψ2
≥ pi10pi21u¯+ pi10(1− pi21)uˆ1 + (1− pi10)pi21uˆ2 + (1− pi10)(1− pi21)u− ψ1, (5.57)
pi11pi
2
1u¯+ pi
1
1(1− pi21)uˆ1 + (1− pi11)pi21uˆ2 + (1− pi11)(1− pi21)u− ψ2
≥ pi11pi20u¯+ pi11(1− pi20)uˆ1 + (1− pi11)pi20uˆ2 + (1− pi11)(1− pi20)u− ψ1; (5.58)
and a global incentive constraint,
pi11pi
2
1u¯+ pi
1
1(1− pi21)uˆ1 + (1− pi11)pi21uˆ2 + (1− pi11)(1− pi21)u− ψ2
≥ pi10pi20u¯+ pi10(1− pi20)uˆ1 + (1− pi10)pi20uˆ2 + (1− pi10)(1− pi20)u. (5.59)
Finally, a contract must also satisfy the usual participation constraint,
pi11pi
2
1u¯+ pi
1
1(1− pi21)uˆ1 + (1− pi11)pi21uˆ2 + (1− pi11)(1− pi21)u− ψ2 ≥ 0. (5.60)
The principal’s problem writes thus as:
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(P ) : max
{(u¯,uˆ1,uˆ2,u)}
pi11pi
2
1(S¯
1 + S¯2 − h(u¯))
+pi11(1− pi21)
(
S¯1 + S2 − h(uˆ1)
)
+ (1− pi11)pi21
(
S1 + S¯
2 − h(uˆ2)
)
+(1− pi11)(1− pi21)
(
S1 + S2 − h(u)) ,
subject to (5.57) to (5.60).
Again, to obtain an explicit solution to (P ) we specify the utility function so that
h(u) = u+ ru
2
2
for some r > 0.
The intuition built in Section 5.3.2 suggests that local incentive constraints are the
most difficult ones to satisfy in the case where tasks are substitutes, i.e., when ψ2 >
2ψ1. This is indeed the case as it is confirmed in the next proposition which generalizes
Proposition 5.5 to the case of asymmetric tasks.
Proposition 5.7 : When tasks are substitutes, the solution to (P ) is such that the local
incentive constraints (5.57) and (5.58) and the participation constraint (5.60) are all
binding. The global incentive constraint (5.59) is always slack.
Using the second-best values of u¯SB, uˆ1u
SB, uˆSB2 and u
SB derived in Appendix 5.2, we
can compute the second-best cost of implementing two positive levels of effort CSB2 . After
easy computations, we find:
CSB2 = ψ2 +
rψ22
2︸ ︷︷ ︸
CFB2
+
r(∆ψ)2
2
(
pi11(1− pi11)
(∆pi1)2
+
pi21(1− pi21)
(∆pi2)2
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Incentive cost.
, (5.61)
where ∆ψ = ψ2 − ψ1, ∆pi1 = pi11 − pi10 and ∆pi2 = pi21 − pi20.
This second-best cost can be given an intuitive interpretation. Under complete infor-
mation, insuring the agent’s participation costs CFB2 = ψ2 +
rψ22
2
to the principal. This is
the first term of the right-hand side of (5.61). Under moral hazard and with substitute
tasks, each tasks i can be incentivized by giving a bonus ∆ψ
∆pi
when S˜i = S¯, i.e., with
probability pii1, and imposing a similar punishment
∆ψ
∆pi
when S˜i = S, i.e., with probability
1 − pii1. Success and failure on each task being independent events, the incentive costs
of inducing those two independent risks in the agent’s payoff just add up. These costs
represent the second bracketed term on (5.61). The above expression of CSB2 will be used
throughout the next subsection.
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5.3.5 Applications of the Multi-Task Framework
Aggregate Measures of Performances
Let us suppose that S¯1+S2 = S1+S¯2, i.e., the principal, by simply observing the aggregate
benefit of his relationship with the agent, cannot distinguish the successful task from the
unsuccessful one. In this case, the only contracts which can be written are conditional on
the agent’s aggregate performance. They are thus of the form {(t¯, tˆ, t)} with the added
constraint tˆ = tˆ1 = tˆ2. This restriction in the space of available contracts is akin to an
incomplete contract assumption. To show the consequences of such an incompleteness,
it is useful to use the expressions for uˆSB1 and uˆ
SB
2 found in Appendix 5.2 in order to
compute the difference of payoffs uˆSB1 − uˆSB2 = ∆ψ
(
1
∆pi1
− 1
∆pi2
)
. Given this value, the
only case where the measure of aggregate performance does as well as the measure of
individual performances on both tasks is when ∆pi1 = ∆pi2, i.e., in the case of symmetric
tasks analyzed in Section 5.3.3. Otherwise, there is a welfare loss incurred by the principal
from not being able to distinguish between the two intermediate states of nature.
Let us assume now that ∆pi1 < ∆pi2. This condition means that task 1 is harder
to incentivize than task 2 since an increase of effort has less impact on performances.
In this case, uˆSB1 should thus be greater than uˆ
SB
2 . With only an aggregate measure of
performances, the principal is forced to set uˆ1 = uˆ2 and it becomes more difficult to
provide incentives on task 1 which is the more costly from the incentive point of view and
easier to give incentives on task 2 which is the least costly. Consequently, there may be a
misallocation of the agent’s efforts who prefers to shift his effort towards task 2. Even if
task 1 is as valuable as task 2 for the principal, the latter will find less often optimal to
incentivize this first task.
To illustrate this point with a simple example, consider a retailer who must allocate
his efforts between improving cost and raising demand for the product he sells on behalf of
a manufacturer. If the only aggregate observable is profit, the optimal franchise contract
is a sharing rule which may nevertheless induce the manager to exert effort only on one
task, for instance the one which consists of enhancing demand if the latter task is easier
to incentivize for the principal.
More or Less Informative Performances
Let us thus assume that the principal can still observe the whole vector of performances
(S˜1, S˜2) and offers a fully contingent contract {(t¯, tˆ1, tˆ2, t)}. We now turn to the rather
difficult question of finding the second-best choice of efforts that the principal would like
to implement when tasks are asymmetric.
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We have already derived the second-best cost CSB2 of implementing two positive efforts
in Section 5.3.4. Had the principal chosen to implement only a positive effort on task 1,
the second-best cost of implementing this effort would instead be:
C1 = ψ1 +
rψ21
2
+
rψ21pi
1
1(1− pi11)
2(∆pi1)2
. (5.62)
Similarly, the second-best cost of implementing a positive effort on task 2 only writes
also as:
C2 = ψ1 +
rψ21
2
+
rψ21pi
2
1(1− pi21)
2(∆pi2)2
. (5.63)
Let us denote respectively by B1 = ∆pi1∆S1 and B2 = ∆pi2∆S2 the benefits obtained
by the principal on each activity when he induces a high level of effort. The principal
prefers inducing e1 = e2 = 1 rather than e1 = e2 = 0, when B1 + B2 − CSB2 ≥ 0.
The principal prefers also inducing e1 = e2 = 1 rather than (e1 = 1, e2 = 0) when
B1 + B2 − CSB2 ≥ B1 − C1. Similarly e1 = e2 = 1 is preferred to (e1 = 0, e2 = 1) when
B1 +B2 − CSB2 ≥ B2 − C2.
Proceeding similarly, we could determine the set of values of the parameters where
inducing the pairs of efforts (e1 = 1, e2 = 0) and (e1 = 0, e2 = 1) are respectively optimal.
Figure 5.7 below offers a complete characterization of all these areas of dominance where it
has been taken into account that there exist some diseconomies of scope in implementing
both tasks (i.e., CSB2 > C
1 + C2) when those tasks are substitutes.
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Figure 5.7: Areas of Dominance with Asymmetric Tasks.
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of output q˜2 is pi
2′
1 (1− pi2′1 )(q¯2 − q2)2 > pi21(1− pi21)(q¯2 − q2)2.
All pairs of parameters (B1, B2) lying on the north-east quadrant of point B justify
the implementation of two positive efforts. On the south-west quadrant of point A, no
effort is implemented. On the south-east (resp. north-west) of the line joining A and B,
only task 1 (resp. task 2) is incentivized.
When the performance on task 2 becomes more noisy, the variance of output q˜2 which
is pi21(1−pi21)(q¯2− q2)2 increases to pi2′1 (1−pi2′1 )(q¯2− q2)2. Comparing (5.61) and (5.63) we
observe that the cost CSB2 increases more quickly than C
2 with this variance. This effect
increases the area of parameters (B1, B2) where the principal wants to induce e1 = 1 and
e2 = 0 since point A is shifted to A′ and point B to B′ as it can be seen in Figure 5.7.
The intuition behind this phenomenon is clear. When the performance on task 2
becomes a more noisy signal of the corresponding effort, inducing effort along this dimen-
sion becomes harder for the principal. By rewarding only the more informative task 1,
the principal reduces the agent’s incentives to substitute effort e2 against effort e1. This
relaxes the incentive problem on task 1, making it easier to induce effort on this task.
The principal chooses more often to have the agent exerting effort only on task 1. Finally,
the agent receives higher powered incentives only on the less noisy task, the one which is
the most informative on his effort. This can be interpreted as saying that the principal
prefers that the agent focuses his attention on the more informative activity.
The Interlinking of Agrarian Contracts
In various contracting environments, a principal is not involved in a single transaction
with the agent but requires from the latter a bundle of different services or activities.
This phenomenon, called the interlinking of contracts, is pervasive in agrarian economies
where landlords offer sometimes consumption services, finance and various inputs to their
tenants. This bundling of different contracting activities also occurs in more developed
economies when input suppliers also offer lines of credit to their customers.
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This phenomenon can be easily modeled within a multi-task agency framework. To
see this, let us consider a relationship between a risk-neutral landlord and a risk averse
tenant similar to that described in Section 4.10.2. The landlord and the tenant want to
share the production of an agricultural product (the price of which is normalized to one for
simplicity). However, and this is the novelty of the multi-task framework, the tenant can
also make an investment I˜ which, together with his effort, affects the stochastic production
process. The probability that q¯ realizes becomes now pi(e, I˜) where effort e belongs to
{0, 1}. We will assume also that ∂pi
∂I˜
(e, I˜) > 0, i.e., a greater investment improves the
probability that a high output realizes. For simplicity, we will assume that I˜ can only
take two values, respectively 0 and I > 0. Denoting by R the interest rate, the cost
incurred by the agent when investing I is thus (1 + R)I. If I is not observed by the
landlord, the framework is akin to a multi-task agency model where the principal would
like to control not only the agent’s choice of effort e but also his investment I.
As a benchmark, let us suppose that the investment I is verifiable at a cost C by
the landlord. If the principal wants to make a positive investment, the incentive feasible
contract inducing effort must satisfy the following simple incentive constraint:
pi(1, I)u(t¯− (1 +R)I) + (1− pi(1, I))u(t− (1 +R)I)− ψ
≥ pi(0, I)u(t¯− (1 +R)I) + (1− pi(0, I))u(t− (1 +R)I). (5.64)
Similarly, the following participation constraint must be satisfied:
pi(1, I)u(t¯− (1 +R)I) + (1− pi(1, I))u(t− (1 +R)I)− ψ ≥ 0. (5.65)
The optimal incentive feasible contract inducing effort is thus a solution to the follow-
ing problem:
(P ) : max
{(t¯,t)}
pi(1, I)(q¯ − t¯) + (1− pi(1, I))(q − t)− C
subject to (5.64) and (5.65).
We will denote thereafter by t¯v and tv the solution to this problem.
Let us now assume that the investment is non-observable by the landlord. The choice
of the investment level cannot be included into the contract. An incentive feasible con-
tract must now induce the choice of a positive investment if the principal still finds this
investment valuable. Two new incentive constraints must be added to describe the set
of incentive feasible contracts. First, the constraint below prevents an agent who has
invested and exerted effort from reducing simultaneously his effort and his investment.
pi(1, I)u(t¯− (1 +R)I) + (1− pi(1, I))u(t− (1 +R)I)− ψ
≥ pi(0, 0)u(t¯) + (1− pi(0, 0))u(t). (5.66)
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Finally, we must also take into account the incentive constraint inducing investment
when the agent already exerts an effort:
pi(1, I)u(t¯− (1 +R)I) + (1− pi(1, I))u(t− (1 +R)I)− ψ
≥ pi(1, 0)u(t¯) + (1− pi(1, 0))u(t)− ψ. (5.67)
To simplify the possible binding constraints, let us assume that:
∆pi(I) = pi(1, I)− pi(0, I) > pi(1, 0)− pi(0, 0) = ∆pi(0). (5.68)
This assumption ensures that investment has more impact on the probability that q¯ real-
izes when the agent already exerts a positive effort. There is thus a strong complementarity
between effort and investment.
In this case, any contract inducing effort at minimal cost when the investment is
performed will not induce this effort when no such investment is made. Indeed, to check
this assertion note that:
u(t¯)− u(t) < u(t¯− (1 +R)I)− u(t− (1 +R)I) = ψ
∆pi(I)
<
ψ
∆pi(0)
. (5.69)
The first inequality uses t > t, and the fact that u(·) is concave. The equality uses the fact
that (5.64) is binding if the effort is induced at minimal cost. The second inequality finally
uses the assumption (5.68). Therefore, (5.66) is more stringent than (5.67). (5.66) may
thus be the more constraining of the incentive constraints when both investment and effort
are nonverifiable. In this case, the contract offered when I˜ is verifiable, namely (t¯v, tv),
may no longer be optimal. When I˜ is nonverifiable, a simultaneous shirking deviation
along both the effort and the investment dimensions may occur.15 The principal must now
take into account the simultaneous deviations along both the effort and the investment
dimensions which arises in the multi-task environment. The benefit from controlling the
agent’s investment comes therefore from the reduction in the agency cost. Of course, this
benefit should be traded-off against the possible fixed cost C that the principal must incur
if he wants to establish the monitoring system making I˜ directly controlable.
To conclude, the interlinking of contracts can thus appear as an institutional response
to the technological complementarity between effort and investment in a world where
investment is too costly to be verified.
Braverman and Stiglitz (1982) analyze a model of tenancy-cum-credit contracts
and show that the landlord may encourage the tenant to get indebted to him when, by
15The reader will recognize here the similarity of the analysis with the case of strong complements
analyzed in Section 5.3.3. The difference comes from the fact that the cost of investment is now taken in
monetary terms.
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altering the terms of the loan contract, he induces the landlord to work harder. Bardhan
(1991) reviews the other justifications for interlinking transactions. The interlinking of
contracts may help, in nonmonetized economies, by reducing enforcement costs or may
be a way around the incompleteness of markets.
Vertical Integration and Incentives
Sometimes the return on some of the agent’s activities may be hard to contract on.
A retailer’s building up of a good reputation or his goodwill, the maintenance of a pro-
ductive asset are all examples of activities which are hard or even impossible to measure.
Even though no monetary payments can be used to do so, those activities should still
be incentivized. The only feasible contract is then to allocate or not the return of the
activity to the agent. Such an allocation is thus akin to a simple “bang-bang” incentive
contract. Henceforth, some authors like Demsetz (1967), Holmstro¨m and Milgrom (1991)
and Cre´mer (1995) have argued that ownership of an asset entitles its owner with the
returns of this asset. We stick to this definition of ownership in what follows and analyze
the interaction between the principal’s willingness to induce effort from the agent and the
ownership structure.
Let us thus consider a multi-task principal-agent’s relationship which is somewhat
similar to that in Section 5.3.2. By exerting a maintenance effort e1 normalized to one,
the risk averse agent can improve the value of an asset by an amount V . This improvement
is assumed to take place with probability one to simplify the analysis. We assume that V
is large enough so that inducing a maintenance effort is always optimal. The important
assumption is that the proceeds V cannot be shared between the principal and the agent.
Who owns the asset benefits directly of all proceeds from this asset. The only feasible
incentive contract is the allocation of the asset returns between the principal and the
agent.
The agent must also perform a productive effort e2 in {0, 1} whose stochastic return
is, on the contrary, fully verifiable. As usual, with probability pi1 (resp. pi0) the return to
this activity is S¯ and, with probability 1 − pi1 (resp. 1 − pi0), this return is S when the
agent exerts e2 = 1 (resp. e2 = 0). Efforts on production and maintenance are substitutes
so that ψ2 > 2ψ1. Finally, we assume that the inverse utility function is again quadratic:
h(u) = u+ ru
2
2
for some r > 0.
In this context, a contract entails first a remuneration {(t¯, t)} contingent on the re-
alization of the contractible return and, second, an allocation of ownership for the asset.
We analyze in turn the two possible ownership structures:
Case 1: The principal owns the asset. When the principal owns the asset, he benefits
from any improvement on its value. Since the agent does not benefit from his maintenance
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effort but bears all the cost of this effort, he exerts no such effort and e1 = 0. Of course,
when V is large enough, this outcome is never socially optimal.
The optimal contract in this case can be derived as usual. The following second-
best optimal transfers t¯SBP = h
(
ψ1 +
(1−pi1)ψ1
∆pi
)
and tSBP = h
(
ψ1 − pi1ψ1∆pi
)
implement a
positive productive effort.
Conditionally on the fact that the maintenance effort is null, e1 = 0, inducing effort
on the productive task is then optimal when:
∆pi∆S > CSB1 = ψ
2
1 +
rψ21
2
+
rψ21pi1(1− pi1)
2∆pi2
. (5.70)
Case 2: The agent owns the asset. When V is large enough, the agent is always willing
to exert the maintenance effort. Nevertheless, inducing also effort on the productive task
requires now to have the following incentive constraint being satisfied:
pi1u(t¯+ V ) + (1− pi1)u(t+ V )− ψ2 ≥ pi0u(t¯+ V ) + (1− pi0)u(t+ V )− ψ1, (5.71)
as well as the participation constraint
pi1u(t¯+ V ) + (1− pi1)u(t+ V )− ψ2 ≥ 0. (5.72)
As usual, both constraints above are binding at the optimum of the principal’s prob-
lem. This yields the following expression of the second-best transfers: t¯SBA = −V +
h
(
ψ2 +
(1−pi1)∆ψ
∆pi
)
and tSBA = −V + h (ψ2 − pi1∆ψ∆pi ) .
Under agent’s ownership, the principal gets the following payoff by inducing a produc-
tive effort:
V A1 = pi1S¯ + (1− pi1)S + V − CSB2 , (5.73)
where
CSB2 = pi1h
(
ψ2 +
(1− pi1)∆ψ
∆pi
)
+ (1− pi1)h
(
ψ2 − pi1∆ψ
∆pi
)
= ψ22 +
rψ22
2
+
r(ψ2 − ψ1)2pi1(1− pi1)
2∆pi2
. (5.74)
By offering a fixed wage t¯ = t = t, no productive effort is induced and t is chosen so
that the agent’s participation constraint u(t+ V )− ψ1 ≥ 0 is binding. One easily finds:
V A0 = pi0S¯ + (1− pi0)S + V − CFB1 , (5.75)
where CFB1 = ψ
2
1 +
rψ21
2
.
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When V is large enough, the agent should own the asset to obtain this socially valuable
proceed. The principal induces then a productive effort only when V A1 > V
A
0 , i.e., if and
only if ∆pi∆S ≥ CSB2 − CFB1 .
Under the assumption that tasks are substitutes, it is easy to check that CSB2 −CFB1 ≥
CSB1 . Hence, when the agent owns the asset, inducing a productive effort becomes more
costly for the principal than when the agent does not own it. The principal chooses less
often to induce a productive effort than when he owns himself the asset.
However, it is worth noting that, conditionally on the fact that inducing effort remains
optimal, the agent should be put under a higher powered incentive scheme when he also
owns the asset. Indeed, under agent’s ownership, we have:
t¯SBA − tSBA = h
(
ψ2 + (1− pi1)∆ψ
∆pi
)
− h
(
ψ2 − pi1∆ψ
∆pi
)
,
=
∆ψ
∆pi
(
1 +
r((1− 2pi0)ψ2 − (1− 2pi1)ψ1)
2∆pi
)
. (5.76)
When the principal owns the asset, the power of incentives is instead given by:
t¯SBP − tSBP = ψ1
∆pi
(
1 +
r(1− 2pi0)ψ1
2∆pi
)
. (5.77)
If r is sufficiently small, the comparison of those incentive powers amounts to compar-
ing ∆ψ and ψ1. For substitute tasks, the agent is thus given higher powered incentives
when he owns the asset.
The intuitive explanation is the following. Under vertical separation, the agent has
greater incentives to exert effort on maintenance. The only way for the principal to
incentivize the agent along the production dimension is then to put him also under a
high powered incentive. Otherwise, the agent would systematically substitute away effort
on production to improve maintenance. Asset ownership by the agent comes also with
high powered incentives akin to piece rate contracts. Instead, less powered incentives, i.e.,
fixed wages, are more likely to occur under principal’s ownership.
Holmstro¨m and Milgrom (1994) have discussed the strong complementarity be-
tween asset ownership and high powered incentive schemes, arguing in a model along the
lines above, that this complementarity comes from some substitutability between efforts
in the agent’s cost function of effort. They build their theory to fit a number of empir-
ical facts, noticeably those illustrated by the studies of Anderson (1985) and Anderson
and Schmittlein (1984). Those latter authors have argued that the key factor explaining
the choice between an in-house sales office and an external sales firm is the difficulty of
measurement of the agent’s performance. More costly measurement systems calls for the
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choice of in-house sales. Even if our analysis above is incomplete and does not consider
cases where V is small enough to justify vertical integration of the agent’s asset, this model
is certainly useful to understand how a more precise measure of the production16 reduces
the second-best cost of implementation and makes it more likely that high powered in-
centives arise under vertical integration. Holmstro¨m (1999) has also pushed forward the
idea that measurement costs may be part of an explanation of the firm’s boundaries.
5.4 Nonseparability in the Utility Function
5.4.1 Non-Binding Participation Constraint
Let us now assume that the agent has a general utility function defined over transfers
and effort, namely U = u(t, e). Contrary to the standard framework used so far, we no
longer postulate a priori the separability between transfer and effort. Effort can still take
either of two values e in {0, 1} and to simplify notations, let us denote u1(t) = u(t, 1) and
u0(t) = u(t, 0). Effort being costly, we obviously have u1(t) < u0(t) for all t. Moreover,
for i in {0, 1}, ui(·) is still increasing and concave in t for all t (u′i(·) > 0, u′′i (·) < 0).
For what follows, it is also interesting to define the inverse function of u0(·) as h0(·)
which is increasing and convex (h′0(·) > 0 and h′′0(·) > 0). We denote by g(·) = u1 ◦ h0(·)
the composition of u1(·) by h0(·). g(·) is increasing. We will also assume that g(·) is
concave. u1(·) is thus a concave transformation of u0(·). Intuitively, this means that
exerting effort makes the agent more averse to monetary lotteries.
In this framework, incentive and participation constraints write respectively as:
pi1u1(t¯) + (1− pi1)u1(t) ≥ pi0u0(t¯) + (1− pi0)u0(t), (5.78)
and
pi1u1(t¯) + (1− pi1)u1(t) ≥ 0. (5.79)
Extending the methodology of Chapter 4, we now introduce the following change
of variables u¯0 = u0(t¯) and u0 = u0(t). With these new variables, the incentive and
participation constraints (5.78) and (5.79) write respectively as:
pi1g(u¯0) + (1− pi1)g(u0) ≥ pi0u¯0 + (1− pi0)u0, (5.80)
and
pi1g(u¯0) + (1− pi1)g(u0) ≥ 0. (5.81)
16Such a more precise measure is obtained for instance by having pi1 being closer to one so that the
incentive cost is close to zero.
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The risk neutral principal’s problem writes thus as:
(P ) : max
{(u¯0,u0)}
pi1(S¯ − h0(u¯0)) + (1− pi1)(S − h0(u0))
subject to (5.80) and (5.81).
The fact that g(·) is concave ensures that the constrained set C of incentive feasible
contracts (u¯0, u0) is a convex set. Since the principal’s objective function is strictly con-
cave, the first-order Kuhn et Tucker conditions will again be necessary and sufficient to
characterize the solution to this problem.
Instead of proposing a general resolution of this problem, we restrict ourselves to a
graphical description of the possible features of the solution for general functions u1(·) and
u0(·) satisfying the above properties. As a benchmark, it is useful to represent graphically
the usual case of separability where, in fact, we have u1(t) = u0(t)−ψ for all t. In this case,
we have immediately g(u) = u − ψ for all u, and u1(·) is simply a linear transformation
of u0(·).
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Figure 5.8: Graphic Representation of the Solution in the Case of Separability.
In Figure 5.8, we have represented the set C of incentive feasible contracts in the case
of a separable utility function. It is a dieder turned downwards and lying strictly above
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the 450 line. The principal’s indifference curve is inverse U -shaped with its maximand
on this full insurance 450 line. It is graphically obvious that the optimal contract must
therefore be on the extremal point A of the dieder. We easily recover our usual analytical
result of Chapter 4. The risk averse agent receives less than full insurance at the optimum
and the agent’s participation constraint is also binding.
Let us now turn to the case of non-separability. We have then Figure 5.9.
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Figure 5.9: Graphic Representation of the Solution in the Case of Non-Separability.
With nonseparability, the binding incentive constraint (5.80) defines a locus of con-
tracts which is no longer a straight line but a strictly convex curve in the plan (u0, u¯0).
Moreover, note that this curve is increasing whenever 1−pi0
1−pi1 > g
′(u¯0) > g′(u0) >
pi0
pi1
.
Similarly, the binding participation constraint (5.81) defines also a convex locus. The
set C of incentive feasible contracts is again strictly convex with an extremal point A still
obtained when both constraints are binding. However, the strict convexity of C leaves now
some scope for the optimal contract being at point B where only the incentive constraint
is binding. In this case, the best way to solve the incentive problem is to give up a strictly
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positive ex ante rent to the agent. This case is more likely to take place when the IC
constraint defines a very convex curve, i.e., when g(·) is very concave. This occurs when
the agent is much more risk averse when he exerts a positive effort than when he does
not. In this case offering a risky lottery to induce effort and keeping the agent’s expected
utility relatively low is costly for the principal. The principal prefers to raise the agent’s
expected utility to move towards areas where a risky lottery is much less costly.
Remark: Before closing this section, let us notice that we have already presented in
Chapter 4 a simple example of a contracting environment where the agent’s participation
constraint is slack at the optimum, that is when the risk neutral agent is protected by
limited liability.
5.4.2 A Specific Model with no Wealth Effect
Sometimes, even without any separability between transfer and effort in the agent’s utility
function, the agent receives zero ex ante rent. To see that suppose now that the agent’s
cost of effort is counted in monetary terms. The agent’s utility function is no longer
separable between income and effort and it writes as u(t − ψ(e)) where u(·) is again
increasing and concave. With our usual notations, the moral hazard incentive constraint
writes now as:
pi1u(t¯− ψ) + (1− pi1)u(t− ψ) ≥ pi0u(t¯) + (1− pi0)u(t). (5.82)
The participation constraint is now:
pi1u(t¯− ψ) + (1− pi1)u(t− ψ) ≥ u(0), (5.83)
where u(0) is the agent’s reservation utility obtained when refusing the contract.
Let us now assume that the agent has a constant risk aversion, namely u(x) =
− exp(−rx). When facing a binary lottery yielding wealths a and b with respective prob-
abilities pi and 1− pi, this agent obtains a certainty equivalent of his final wealth defined
as:
we = pia+ (1− pi)b− c(pi, a− b), (5.84)
where c(pi, x) = 1
r
ln(pi exp(r(1 − pi)x) + (1 − pi) exp(−rpix)) is a risk premium. One can
check that c(pi, x) is increasing with x for all x ≥ 0.
Using this formulation based on certainty equivalents, we can now rewrite (5.82) and
(5.83) as
pi1t¯+ (1− pi1)t− ψ − c(pi1, t¯− t) ≥ pi0t¯+ (1− pi0)t− c(pi0, t¯− t), (5.85)
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and
pi1t¯+ (1− pi1)t− ψ − c(pi1, t¯− t) ≥ 0. (5.86)
The principal problem becomes:
(P ) : max
{(t¯,t)}
pi1(S¯ − t¯) + (1− pi1)(S − t)
subject to (5.85) and (5.86).
It is important to note that these constraints depend in a separable way on, first, the
average transfer (pi1t¯ + (1 − pi1)t) received by the agent and, second, the risk on these
transfers (t¯− t). More precisely, the principal can ensure that the participation constraint
(5.86) is binding by reducing the agent’s average transfer without perturbing the power of
the incentive contract, i.e., still keeping satisfied the incentive constraint (5.85). Indeed,
this latter constraint can also be written as:
∆pi∆t ≥ ψ + c(pi1,∆t)− c(pi0,∆t), (5.87)
where ∆t = t¯− t is the incentive power of the contract. We let the reader check that this
incentive constraint is as costless as possible for the principal when ∆t is such that (5.87)
is binding. The second-best power of incentives ∆tSB is thus the unique positive solution
to:
∆pi∆tSB = ψ + c(pi1,∆t
SB)− c(pi0,∆tSB). (5.88)
Being given that (5.86) should be binding, optimal second-best transfers are thus:
t¯SB = ψ + c(pi1,∆t
SB) + (1− pi1)∆tSB (5.89)
and
tSB = ψ + c(pi1,∆t
SB)− pi1∆tSB. (5.90)
By inducing effort, the principal gets therefore:
V SB1 = pi1S¯ + (1− pi1)S − ψ − c(pi1,∆tSB). (5.91)
When not inducing effort the principal would offer t¯ = t = 0. He would finally get an
expected payoff V0 = pi0S¯ + (1− pi0)S. Henceforth, the principal prefers to induce effort
when ∆pi∆S ≥ ψ+ c(pi1,∆tSB). Under complete information, the principal would induce
a first-best effort by offering a constant wage t¯ = t = ψ and the effort would be positive
when ∆pi∆S ≥ ψ.
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Therefore, as in a model with separability between consumption and effort, the prin-
cipal induces an effort less often than in the first-best world since c(pi1,∆t
SB) is strictly
positive.
Remark 1: The fact that the principal can play independently on the agent’s expected
transfer to insure his participation and on the power of incentives to induce him to exert
effort is, of course, a direct consequence of the agent having CARA preferences. The
agent’s average wealth level is not useful as an incentive instrument.
Remark 2: The second direct consequence of this model is that the power of incentives
and the decision to induce effort would be the same if the agent’s certainty equivalent
from not working with the principal was w instead of zero as we have assumed above. The
solution to this new problem is directly translated from the solution in the case where
w = 0 and we obtain t¯SB = t¯SB + w, and tSB(w) = tSB + w. This translation result will
be particularly useful in Section 9.4.2.
Remark 3: When r is small enough, we have c(pi, x) ≈ rpi(1−pi)x2
2
. The model is then akin
to assuming that the agent has mean-variance preferences E(t˜) − ψ − r
2
var (t˜) over the
monetary payoff t˜− ψ. In this more general case, we can solve explicitly (5.88) for ∆tSB
and we find
∆tSB =
−1 +
√
1 + 2rψ
∆pi
(1− pi1 − pi0)
r(1− pi1 − pi0) ,
which is approximatively equal to ψ
∆pi
when r is small.
5.5 Redistribution and Moral Hazard
In Chapter 3, we have already seen how the conflict between incentive compatibility and
budget balance leads to the under-provision of output in an adverse selection model. The
same qualitative result still holds in a moral hazard environment. Expected volume of
trade may be reduced by the threat of moral hazard. To see this, we consider a simple
model of redistribution and moral hazard. There is a unit mass population of agents
who are all ex ante identical and have a utility function U = u(t) − ψ(e) where u(·)
(u′(·) > 0, u′′(·) < 0) is defined over monetary gains and ψ(e) is a disutility of effort. Each
of those agents exerts an effort e ∈ {0, 1}, and, may be successful or not in producing
output. When successful (resp. unsuccessful), i.e., with probability pi(e) (resp. 1− pi(e)),
the return of this effort is q¯ (resp. q < q¯). Agents being all ex ante identical, the
government maximizes an objective function V = U which corresponds to utility of a
representative agent.
A redistributive scheme is a pair of transfers {(t¯, t)} depending on whether the agent
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is successful or not. To be incentive feasible, such a scheme must satisfy the following
budget constraint :
pi1(q¯ − t¯) + (1− pi1)(q − t) ≥ 0, (5.92)
as well as the usual incentive compatibility constraint:
pi1u(t¯) + (1− pi)u(t)− ψ1 ≥ pi0u(t¯) + (1− pi0)u(t). (5.93)
Note that (5.92) means that the budget is balanced in expectations over the whole
population of agents. Indeed, by the Law of Large Numbers, pi1 can also be viewed as the
fraction of successful agents in society.
When effort is verifiable, the government solves the following problem if it wants to
implement a high level of effort:
max
{(t¯,t)}
pi1u(t¯) + (1− pi1)u(t)− ψ1
subject to (5.92).
Let us denote by µ the multiplier of the budget constraint (5.92). The necessary and
sufficient Kuhn and Tucker optimality conditions with respect to t¯ and t lead then to:
µ = u′(t¯FB) = u′(tFB) > 0. (5.94)
The complete information optimal redistributive scheme calls for complete insurance
and the constant transfer received by each agent in both states of nature is:
tFB = t¯FB = tFB = pi1q¯ + (1− pi1)q, (5.95)
i.e., it is equal to the average output. The optimal redistributive scheme amounts to a
perfect insurance system.
Let us now consider the case where effort is non-observable by the government. If the
government wants to induce zero effort, he relies still on the complete insurance scheme
similar to that above and the agent gets an expected utility u(pi0q¯ + (1− pi0)q).
If the government wants to induce a high effort, it solves instead the problem below:
(P ) : max
{(t¯,t)}
pi1u(t¯) + (1− pi1)u(t)− ψ1
subject to (5.92) and (5.93).
Denoting by µ and λ the respective multipliers of those two constraints. The first-order
conditions for optimality with respect to t¯ and t can be written respectively as:
u′(t¯SB)(pi1 + λ∆pi) = pi1µ, (5.96)
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and
u′(tSB)(1− pi1 − λ∆pi) = (1− pi1)µ. (5.97)
Dividing (5.96) by u′(t¯SB) and (5.97) by u′(tSB), and summing we obtain that µ is
strictly positive since µ = u
′(t¯SB)u′(tSB)
pi1u′(tSB)+(1−pi1)u′(t¯SB) > 0. Therefore, the budget constraint is
binding. Similarly, we also find that λ = pi1(1−pi1)
∆pi
(
u′(tSB)− u′(t¯SB)) > 0, since t¯SB > tSB
is necessary to satisfy the incentive compatibility constraint (5.93) and u(·) is concave.
Hence, this latter constraint is also binding and t¯SB and tSB are obtained as solutions to
the following system:
pi1t¯
SB + (1− pi1)tSB = pi1q¯ + (1− pi1)q (5.98)
and
u(t¯SB)− u(tSB) = ψ
∆pi
. (5.99)
Under moral hazard, it is socially optimal to induce a high effort when:
pi1u(t¯
SB) + (1− pi1)u(tSB)− ψ1 ≥ u(pi0q¯ + (1− pi0)q). (5.100)
Because u(·) is strictly concave and t¯SB > tSB, Jensen’s inequality implies that the
left-hand side above is strictly lower than:
u
(
pi1t¯
SB + (1− pi1)tSB
)− ψ1 = u (pi1q¯ + (1− pi1)q)− ψ1. (5.101)
Hence, the second-best rule (5.100) is more stringent than the first-best rule which
calls for a positive effort if and only if
u
(
pi1q¯ + (1− pi1)q
)− ψ1 ≥ u (pi0q¯ + (1− pi0)q) . (5.102)
A high effort is less often implemented under moral hazard because the benefit of doing
so is lower. The reader will have recognized the similarity of this section with Section
4.10.5. Indeed, the redistributive scheme analyzed above is akin to the insurance contract
which would be offered by a competitive sector.
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APPENDIX 5.1: Proof of Proposition 5.5.
We first write the Lagrangean of problem (P ):
L(u¯, uˆ, u) = (pi1)
2(2S¯ − h(u¯)) + 2pi1(1− pi1)(S¯ + S − h(uˆ)) + (1− pi1)2(2S − h(u))
+λ`
(
pi21u¯+ 2pi1(1− pi1)uˆ+ (1− pi1)2u− ψ2
−
(
pi1pi0u¯+ (pi1(1− pi0) + pi0(1− pi1))uˆ+ (1− pi1)(1− pi0)u− ψ1
))
+
+λg
(
pi21u¯+ 2pi1(1− pi1)uˆ+ (1− pi1)2u− ψ2 −
(
pi20u¯+ 2pi0(1− pi0)uˆ+ (1− pi0)2u
))
+µ
(
pi21u¯+ 2pi1(1− pi1)uˆ+ (1− pi1)2u− ψ2
)
, (5.103)
where λ`, λg and µ denote respectively the multipliers of (5.42), (5.43) and (5.44).
Optimizing L(·) respectively with respect to u¯, uˆ and u¯ yields:
pi21h
′(u¯) = λ`∆pipi1 + λg∆pi(pi1 + pi0) + µpi21, (5.104)
2pi1(1− pi1)h′(uˆ) = λ`∆pi(1− 2pi1) + 2λg∆pi(1− pi1 − pi0) + µ2pi1(1− pi1), (5.105)
(1− pi1)2h′(u) = −λ`∆pi(1− pi1)− λg∆pi(1− pi1 − pi0) + µ(1− pi1)2. (5.106)
Taking into account that h′(u) = ru and summing equations (5.104) to (5.106) yields:
rE(u˜) = µ, (5.107)
where E(·) denotes the expectation operator with respect to the distribution of q˜1 and q˜2
induced by high efforts. Because (5.44) must hold, we have µ ≥ rψ2 > 0 and thus (5.44)
is binding. Inserting into (5.107), we obtain that µ = rψ2.
We now investigate three classes of solutions to (P ) depending on the parameter values
ψ1 and ψ2.
Case 1: Only the local incentive constraint is binding. Let us first assume that
λ` > 0 and λg = 0. Using (5.104) to (5.106) allows us to express all utility levels as
functions of λ`:
u¯ = ψ2 +
λ`∆pi
rpi1
, (5.108)
uˆ = ψ2 +
λ`∆pi(1− 2pi1)
2pi1(1− pi1) , (5.109)
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u = ψ2 − λ`∆pi
1− pi1 . (5.110)
Inserting those values of u¯, uˆ and u into the binding local incentive constraint yields
the value of λ`, namely λ` =
2r(ψ2−ψ1)pi1(1−pi1)
∆pi2
. Inserting this value into (5.108) to (5.110),
we obtain:
u¯ = ψ2 +
2(ψ2 − ψ1)(1− pi1)
∆pi
, (5.111)
uˆ = ψ2 +
(ψ2 − ψ1)(1− 2pi1)
∆pi
, (5.112)
u = ψ − 2(ψ2 − ψ1)pi1
∆pi
. (5.113)
The global incentive constraint (5.43) is strictly satisfied when
pi20u¯+ 2pi0(1− pi0)uˆ+ (1− pi0)2u < 0. (5.114)
Inserting the corresponding values of u¯, uˆ and u given by (5.111) to (5.113) into (5.114)
yields (after some computations) the condition ψ2 > 2ψ1, i.e., tasks are substitutes.
Case 2: Only the global incentive constraint is binding. Let us now assume that
λ` = 0 and λg > 0. Using (5.104) to (5.106) allows us again to express all utility levels as
functions of λg:
u¯ = ψ2 +
λg∆pi(pi1 + pi0)
rpi21
, (5.115)
uˆ = ψ2 +
λg∆pi(1− pi1 − pi0)
rpi1(1− pi1) , (5.116)
u = ψ2 − λg∆pi(2− pi1 − pi0)
r(1− pi1)2 . (5.117)
Inserting those latter values of u¯, uˆ and u into the binding global incentive constraint
yields λg =
rψ2pi21(1−pi1)2
∆pi2(∆pi2+2pi1(1−pi1)) . Inserting this value into (5.115) to (5.117) yields:
u¯ = ψ2 +
ψ2(pi1 + pi0)(1− pi1)2
∆pi(∆pi2 + 2pi1(1− pi1)) , (5.118)
uˆ = ψ2 +
ψ2(1− pi1 + pi0)pi1(1− pi1)
∆pi(∆pi2 + 2pi1(1− pi1)) , (5.119)
u = ψ2 − ψ2(2− pi1 − pi0)pi
2
1
∆pi(∆pi2 + 2pi1(1− pi1)) . (5.120)
The local incentive constraint (5.42) is strictly satisfied when:
pi1u¯+ (1− 2pi1)uˆ− (1− pi1)u > ψ2 − ψ1
∆pi
. (5.121)
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Inserting the values of u¯, uˆ and u obtained in (5.118) to (5.120) into (5.121) yields the
condition ψ2
(
pi1(1−pi1)+∆pi2
2pi1(1−pi1)+∆pi2
)
< ψ1.
Note that pi1 > pi0 implies that
pi1(1−pi1)+∆pi2
2pi1(1−pi1)+∆pi2 >
1
2
.Hence, the global incentive constraint
is the only binding one in the case of a strong complementarity between both tasks.
Case 3: For the intermediate case, i.e.,
(
2pi1(1−pi1)+∆pi2
pi1(1−pi1)+∆pi2
)
ψ1 < ψ2 < 2ψ1, both the local
and the global incentive constraints are simultaneously binding. This case is somewhat
less interesting. Using (5.104) to (5.105) and the binding constraints (5.42) to (5.43) yields
a system of 6 equations with 6 unknowns, the solutions of which can be easily computed.
APPENDIX 5.2: Second-best Cost of Implementation
We compute the second-best cost CSB2 of implementing two high levels of effort in the
case of substitutes:
CSB2 = pi
2
1h(u¯
SB) + 2pi1(1− pi1)h(uˆSB) + (1− pi1)2h(uSB), (5.122)
where u¯SB, uˆSB and uSB are given by equations (5.111) to (5.113). Using the quadratic
specification of h(·), we can rewrite:
CSB2 = E(h(u˜
SB)) = E(u˜SB) +
r
2
(E(u˜SB))2 +
r
2
var (u˜SB), (5.123)
where E(·) and var(·) denote respectively the expectation and the variance operators
with respect to the joint distribution of output (q˜1, q˜2). We finally find CSB2 = ψ2 +
rψ22
2
+
r
2
var(u˜SB), where var(u˜SB) = 2(ψ2−ψ1)
2pi1(1−pi1)
∆pi2
. Simplifying, we obtain:
CSB2 = ψ2 +
rψ22
2
+
r(ψ2 − ψ1)2pi1(1− pi1)
∆pi2
. (5.124)
In the case of strong complements, we have again
CSB2 = E(u
SB) +
r
2
(E(uSB))2 +
r
2
var(uSB), (5.125)
where still E(uSB) = ψ2 and now using (5.118) to (5.125) we get that var(u˜
SB) =
ψ22pi
2
1(1−pi1)2
∆pi2(∆pi2+2pi1(1−pi1)) . Finally, using (5.124) we get:
CSB2 = ψ2 +
rψ22
2
+
rψ22pi
2
1(1− pi1)2
∆pi2 (2∆pi2 + 2pi1(1− pi1)) . (5.126)
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APPENDIX 5.3: Optimal Contracts with Asymmetric Tasks
Proof of Proposition 5.7: We first denote by λ1, λ2 and µ the respective multipliers
of (5.57), (5.58) and (5.60). Forming the Lagrangean corresponding to problem (P ) where
(5.59) has been omitted and optimizing with respect to u¯, uˆ1, uˆ2 and u yields respectively:
pi11pi
2
1h
′(u¯) = λ1∆pi1pi21 + λ
2∆pi2pi11 + µpi
1
1pi
2
1, (5.127)
pi11(1− pi21)h′(uˆ1) = λ1∆pi1(1− pi21)− λ2∆pi2pi11 + µpi11(1− pi21), (5.128)
(1− pi11)pi21h′(uˆ2) = −λ1∆pi1pi21 + λ∆pi2(1− pi11) + µ(1− pi11)pi21, (5.129)
(1− pi11)(1− pi21)h′(u) = −λ1∆pi1(1− pi21)− λ2∆pi2(1− pi11) + µ(1− pi11)(1− pi21).(5.130)
Summing equations (5.127) to (5.130) and taking into account that h′(u) = ru, we
obtain µ = rE(u˜) = rψ2 where E(·) is the expectation operator with respect to the joint
distribution of outputs (q˜1, q˜2) induced by a positive effort on each task.
We let the reader check that the linear system (5.127) to (5.130) plus the binding
constraints (5.57) and (5.58) admits the following solutions:
λ1 =
r∆ψpi11(1− pi11)
∆pi1
> 0, (5.131)
λ2 =
r∆ψpi21(1− pi21)
∆pi2
> 0, (5.132)
and
u¯SB = ψ2 +∆ψ
(
(1− pi11)
∆pi1
+
(1− pi21)
∆pi2
)
, (5.133)
uˆSB1 = ψ2 +∆ψ
(
(1− pi11)
∆pi1
+
(1− pi21)
∆pi2
)
, (5.134)
uˆSB2 = ψ2 +∆ψ
(
− pi
1
1
∆pi1
+
(1− pi21)
∆pi2
)
, (5.135)
uSB = ψ2 +∆ψ
(
− pi
1
1
∆pi1
− pi
2
1
∆pi2
)
, (5.136)
where ∆ψ = ψ2 − ψ1, ∆pi1 = pi11 − pi10 and ∆pi2 = pi21 − pi20. We check that (5.59) is slack
at the optimum. For this to be true, we must have:
pi10pi
2
0u¯
SB + pi10(1− pi20)uˆSB1 + (1− pi10)pi20uˆSB2 + (1− pi10)(1− pi20)uSB < 0, (5.137)
or using equations (5.133) to (5.136) and simplifying, we obtain ψ2 > 2ψ1.
Chapter 6
Non-verifiability
6.1 Introduction
It is often the case that, when two parties engage in a relationship, they are uncertain
about the values of some parameter which will affect their future payoffs. This uncertainty
is represented by assuming that the parameter can take several values, two values in this
chapter, corresponding to two different states of nature whose probability distribution is
common knowledge. Even though they will both learn the value of the parameter in the
future, they cannot write ex ante contracts contingent on the state of nature because this
state of nature is not verifiable by a third party, a benevolent Court of Justice, which
could enforce their contract. As this quote from Williamson (1975) p. 32 suggests, such
situations might entail transaction costs:
“Both buyer and seller have identical information and assume, furthermore,
that this information is entirely sufficient for the transaction to be completed.
Such exchanges might nevertheless experience difficulty if, despite identical
information, one agent makes representations that the true state of the world
is different than both parties know it to be and if in addition it is costly for an
outside arbiter to determine what the true state of the world is”.
However, in this chapter, we show that the non-verifiability of the state of nature alone
does not create transaction costs, as long as a benevolent Court of Justice is available as
we assume throughout this whole volume.
Section 6.2 considers first the case where the principal and the agent do not write any
contract ex ante. Bargaining over the gains from trade takes place ex post. If the principal
has all the bargaining power ex post,1 the first-best allocation is implemented with the
1In Chapter 2, we have assumed that the principal has all the bargaining power either at the ex ante
stage (before the state of nature realizes) or at the interim stage (after the agent has learned the state of
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agent being put at his status quo utility level. However, ex post the agent might have
gained some bargaining power from the relationship. Then, the first-best quantity is still
implemented, but the principal obtains a lower level of utility. This possible evolution
of the bargaining power between the ex ante and the ex post stages may induce the
principal to sign a contract at the ex ante stage when he still has all the bargaining
power. In Section 6.3, we argue that the simple incentive contracts already analyzed in
Chapter 2 in an adverse selection context with ex ante contracting perform quite well in
the case of non-verifiability and risk neutrality of the agent. Efficiency is achieved when
the Spence-Mirrlees conditions are satisfied for the agent’s objective function. However,
in the case of non responsiveness or when the agent is risk averse, the optimal ex ante
contract entails inefficiencies.
In Section 6.3, we elaborate a more complex mechanism to achieve the first best with
Nash implementation. The principal offers a mechanism which is designed to ensure
that the non-cooperative play of the game yields the desired first-best allocation. In this
context, we first extend our methodology of Chapter 2 and prove a Revelation Principle
when both the principal and the agent report messages over the state of the world to
a benevolent Court of Justice. In playing such a two-agent mechanism, the principal
and the agent adopt a Nash behavior. An allocation rule is said to be implementable in
Nash equilibrium if there exists a mechanism and a Nash equilibrium of this mechanism
where the agents choose strategies which induce the desired allocation in each state of the
world. We show that the standard principal-agent models are such that the first-best is
implementable in Nash equilibrium with rather simple mechanisms.
In more complex models, Nash implementation may not be sufficient to ensure that
there exists a unique equilibrium in each state of nature yielding the desired allocation.
Multiple equilibria may arise, with some being non-truthful. In other words, an allocation
rule may fail to be uniquely implementable. We then define the notion of monotonicity
of an allocation rule and show that unique Nash implementation implies monotonicity.
With a more involved model which lacks monotonicity and thus do not allow unique
Nash implementation, we ask the following question: Is it possible to design an extensive
form game whose subgame perfect equilibrium implements uniquely a given allocation
rule? In Section 6.5, instead of providing a full theory of subgame perfect implementation,
we construct a simple extensive form which solves the problem in our specific example.
Finally, Section 6.6 presents some extensions about the case of risk aversion, and Section
6.7 offers some concluding remarks about the paradigm of non-verifiability.
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6.2 No Contract at Date 0 and Ex Post Bargaining
With the same model as in Chapter 2, we assume now that the parameter θ is unknown
at the contracting date (date 0) but becomes common knowledge between the two parties,
the principal and the agent, later on (at date 1). We examine first the case of no initial
contract being signed at date 0.
At date 1, the principal is informed about θ and can make a take-it-or-leave-it offer
to the agent at date 2 under complete information. See Figure 6.1 for the timing of the
game.
- Time
t = 0 t = 1 t = 2
? ??
No contract θ is learned by
both P and A
P makes a
take-it-or-leave-it
offer to A
Figure 6.1: Timing with No Ex Ante Contract.
These take-it-or-leave-it offers implement the first best volumes of trade and obviously
leave no rent to the agent since the principal has all the bargaining power at date 2. For
instance, when the agent is efficient, his output q∗ satisfies S ′(q∗) = θ and the transfer t∗
he receives from the principal is t∗ = θq∗. Similarly, the inefficient agent produces q¯∗ such
that S ′(q¯∗) = θ¯ and the transfer t¯∗ he receives just covers his cost: t¯∗ = θ¯q¯∗.
In this volume, we have assumed that the principal was endowed with all the bargaining
power both at the ex ante and at the interim stages, i.e., before the agent has learned
the piece of information θ or just after. In the non-verifiability paradigm, the common
knowledge of the state of nature ex post may suggest a more even distribution of the
bargaining power at date 2. For example, the principal may have performed a specific
investment in the relationship, so that he finds himself in a position of bilateral monopoly
vis-a`-vis the agent, justifying thereby a non-zero bargaining power ex post.
Changing the principal and the agent’s bargaining powers at date 2 does not affect
allocative efficiency. To see that, let us assume that the principal and the agent bargain
ex post, i.e., at date t = 2, over the entire surplus. See Figure 6.2 below.
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- Time
t = 0 t = 1 t = 2
? ??
No contract θ is learned by
both P and A
Bargaining
between P and A
over (t, q)
Figure 6.2: Timing with No Ex Ante Contract and Ex Post Bargaining.
To model this bargaining, we use the cooperative Nash bargaining solution with the
principal and the agent having now equal weights in the negotiation. In state θ, they
agree on a transfer t and production q which are solutions to the following problem:
(P ) : max
{(q,t)}
(S(q)− t)(t− θq).
We easily find that the Nash bargaining solution consists of the first best output q∗(θ)
and a transfer tNB(θ) which satisfy:
tNB(θ) =
S(q∗(θ)) + θq∗(θ)
2
, (6.1)
and
S ′(q∗(θ)) = θ. (6.2)
As a result, both the principal and the agent receive an equal share of the first-best
gains from trade. Denoting respectively by V NB(θ) and UNB(θ) the principal and the
agent’s shares of the surplus, we have thus:
V NB(θ) = UNB(θ) =
1
2
(S(q∗(θ))− θq∗(θ)) = 1
2
W ∗(θ), (6.3)
where W ∗(θ) is the first best surplus in state θ.
Hence, waiting for date t = 2 to contract is detrimental to the principal if he loses
some bargaining power ex post. This justifies that the principal may prefer to offer a
contract at the ex ante stage.
Remark: Similar results would also hold with any kind of cooperative or non-cooperative
bargaining solution like the Rubinstein (1982) alternative offers bargaining game. The
particular way of splitting the ex post surplus has no allocative impact. The volume of
trade remains always at its first best value.
6.3 Incentive Compatible Contract
Instead of waiting for the realization of the state of nature, the principal can offer to the
agent, at the ex ante stage (date 0), a contract which may ensure ex post efficiency under
some rather weak conditions as we see below.
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This contract can only be written in terms of the verifiable variables available to the
trading partners at date 0, namely the transfer t and the production q. For instance, a
contract saying “If state θ realizes, the agent must produce q∗(θ) and be paid t∗(θ) by the
principal” cannot be enforced because the state of nature θ is not verifiable at the ex
post contracting stage and consequently cannot be written into a contract. However, a
nonlinear price t(q) or a menu {(t, q); (t¯, q¯)} are feasible instruments at the ex ante stage.
When he accepts such a contract, the agent anticipates that his choice of outputs q(θ)
in state θ will satisfy the following constraints:
t(q(θ))− θq(θ) ≥ t(q˜)− θq˜, (6.4)
for all q˜ where t(·) is defined and all θ in Θ.
These constraints are the same as the standard incentive compatibility constraints
highlighted in Chapter 2 as the reader will have recognized. Henceforth, there is a formal
correspondence between the case where contracting takes place under asymmetric infor-
mation between the principal and the agent and the case of ex ante contracting when the
state of nature is not verifiable. The Revelation Principle also applies in this context and
the class of direct revelation mechanisms of the form {(t, q); (t¯, q¯)} is enough to describe
all feasible contracts which command trade at date 2 and which can be signed at date
0 between the principal and the agent. Pushing this analogy, we call from now on these
contracts incentive compatible contracts.
The benefit of such incentive compatible contracts is that there is no need for the
principal to act ex post (i.e., at date 2) as shown in Figure 6.3 below. The fact that the
principal knows θ ex post is not used in such a mechanism. The mechanism is thus not
very demanding on the communication side.
- Time
t = 0 t = 1 t = 2
? ??
P offers a menu
{(t, q); (t¯, q¯)} to A
θ is learned by
both P and A
A chooses an
element of the menu.
P does not act.
Figure 6.3: Timing with Ex Ante Contracting and Non-verifiability.
We already know from Section 2.12.1 that the first best outcome can still be achieved
with ex ante contracting provided that the agent is risk neutral in a two type environment.
Note nevertheless that the transfers with ex ante contracting are different from those
obtained with no contract at date 0, as we can easily observe by comparing the results of
Sections 2.12.1 and 6.2.1. The reason for this difference is simple. With no contract at
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all, the transfers t∗ = θq∗ and t¯∗ = θ¯q¯∗ which are offered by the principal at date 2 are no
longer incentive compatible2 as it is requested with ex ante contracting.
However, this result generalizes to several types and more general utility functions
U = t − C(q, θ) for the agent only if the Spence-Mirrlees condition Cθq > 0 is satisfied.
Otherwise, the second-order conditions for incentive compatibility may create some inef-
ficiencies and may require some bunching as in the case of non-responsiveness of Section
2.11. The superiority of ex ante contracting over ex post contracting with less bargaining
power is then questionable.
Similarly, as also shown in Section 2.12, ex ante contracting fails also to achieve ef-
ficiency when the agent is risk averse. The non-verifiability of the state of nature may
conflict with the insurance concerns of the agent if the principal offers an incentive com-
patible contract. Section 2.12.2 provides, therefore, also an analysis of the efficiency loss
incurred when ex ante contracting limited to incentive compatible contracts takes place
in a world of non-verifiability and risk aversion.
6.4 Nash Implementation
In Section 6.3, we have just seen how the principal and the agent can achieve ex post
efficiency through an ex ante contract when they are both risk neutral. This contract uses
only the agent’s message but fails to achieve efficiency when the agent is risk averse or when
non-responsiveness occurs. We propose now a slightly more complicated implementation
of the ex post efficient allocation which works also in these cases. The new feature of this
implementation comes from the fact that both the principal and the agent must send a
report on the state of nature at date 2. Requesting both the principal and the agent to
report the state of nature moves us somewhat beyond the focus of this volume which has
been to emphasize incentive mechanisms in a single agent environment. However, under
complete information, the analysis of two-agent mechanisms is relatively straightforward.
In this context, a general mechanism should involve two message spaces, one for the
principal, say Mp, and one for the agent Ma. Still denoting by A the set of feasible
allocations, we have the following definition.
Definition 6.1 : A mechanism is a pair of message spaces Ma and Mp and a mapping
g˜(·) from M =Ma×Mp into A which writes as g˜(ma,mp) = {q˜(ma,mp), t˜(ma,mp)} for
all pairs (ma,mp) belonging to M.
Let us assume that the principal and the agent have respective utility functions V =
2Indeed, we have 0 = t∗ − θq∗ < t¯∗ − θq¯∗ = ∆θq¯∗.
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S(q, θ) − t and U = t − C(q, θ). In this context, the first-best allocation rule a∗(θ) =
(t∗(θ), q∗(θ)) is such that:
Sq(q
∗(θ), θ) = Cq(q∗(θ), θ) (6.5)
and
t∗(θ) = C(q∗(θ), θ). (6.6)
When the players face a mechanism, a Nash equilibrium (m∗a(θ),m
∗
p(θ)) of their mes-
sages satisfies the following incentive conditions: For the principal,
S(q˜(m∗a(θ),m
∗
p(θ)), θ)− t˜(m∗a(θ),m∗p(θ)) ≥ S(q˜(m∗a(θ), m˜p), θ)− t˜(m∗a(θ), m˜p), (6.7)
for all θ in Θ and m˜p in Mp;
and for the agent,
t˜(m∗a(θ),m
∗
p(θ))− C(q˜(m∗a(θ),m∗p(θ)), θ) ≥ t˜(m˜a,m∗p(θ))− C(q˜(m˜a,m∗p(θ)), θ), (6.8)
for all θ in Θ and m˜a in Ma.
When the principal conjectures that the agent’s reporting strategy is given by m∗a(θ)
in state θ, he reports his best response m∗p(θ). Similarly, the agent’s report strategy m
∗
a(θ)
is a best response to the principal’s behavior. Then, the pair of strategies (m∗a(θ),m
∗
p(θ))
forms a Nash equilibrium of the game form induced by the mechanism g˜(·).3
An allocation rule a(θ) from Θ to A is implemented in Nash equilibrium by a mecha-
nism (M, g˜(·)) if there exists a Nash equilibrium (m∗a(θ),m∗p(θ)) in M such that a(θ) =(
q˜(m∗a(θ),m
∗
p(θ)), t˜(m
∗
a(θ),m
∗
p(θ))
)
for all θ in Θ.
When the message spaces Ma and Mp are reduced to the set of possible types Θ, we
have the following definition:
Definition 6.2 : A direct revelation mechanism is a mapping g(·) from Θ2 to A which
writes as g(θ˜a, θ˜p) = {q(θ˜a, θ˜p), t(θ˜a, θ˜p)} where θ˜a (resp. θ˜p) is the agent (resp. principal)’s
report in Θ.
We have also:
Definition 6.3 : A direct revelation mechanism g(·) is truthful if it is a Nash equilibrium
for the agent and the principal to report truthfully the state of nature.
3We focus on pure-strategy equilibria for the sake of simplicity, but without loss of generality.
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Denoting by Ng(θ) the set of Nash equilibria of the direct revelation mechanism g(·)
in state θ, we have the following definition:
Definition 6.4 : The allocation a(θ) is implementable in Nash equilibrium by the direct
revelation mechanism g(·) if the pair of truthful strategies of the principal and the agent
forms a Nash equilibrium of g(·) ((θ, θ) ∈ Ng(θ) for all θ in Θ) such that a(θ) = g(θ, θ)
for all θ in Θ.
Truthful direct revelation mechanisms must thus satisfy the following Nash incentive
constraints:
S(q(θ, θ), θ)− t(θ, θ) ≥ S(q(θ, θ˜p), θ)− t(θ, θ˜p) (6.9)
for all (θ, θ˜p) in Θ
2,
and
t(θ, θ)− C(q(θ, θ), θ) ≥ t(θ˜a, θ)− C(q(θ˜a, θ), θ), (6.10)
for all (θ˜a, θ) in Θ
2.
We can now prove a new version of the Revelation Principle.
Proposition 6.1 : Any allocation rule a(θ) which is implemented in Nash equilibrium by
a mechanism (M, g˜(·)) can also be implemented in Nash equilibrium by a truthful direct
revelation mechanism.
Proof: The mechanism (M, g˜(·)) induces an allocation a(θ) = (q˜(m∗a(θ),m∗p(θ)), t˜(m∗a(θ),m∗p(θ))).
Let us define a direct mechanism g(·) from Θ2 into A such that g = g˜ ◦ m∗ where
m∗ = (m∗a,m
∗
p). For all states of nature θ, we have thus g(θ) = (q(θ), t(θ)) ≡ g˜(m∗(θ)) =
(q˜(m∗a(θ),m
∗
p(θ)), t˜(m
∗
a(θ),m
∗
p(θ))). We check that it is a Nash equilibrium for the players
to report the truth when they face the direct revelation mechanism g(·). For the principal,
we have indeed:
S(q(θ, θ), θ)− t(θ, θ) = S(q˜(m∗a(θ),m∗p(θ)), θ)− t˜(m∗a(θ),m∗p(θ))
≥ S(q˜(m∗a(θ), m˜p), θ)− t˜(m∗a(θ), m˜p)
for all m˜p in Mp and for all θ in Θ.
Taking m˜p = m
∗
p(θ
′) for any θ′ in Θ, we obtain:
S(q(θ, θ), θ)− t(θ, θ) ≥ S(q˜(m∗a(θ),m∗p(θ′)), θ)− t˜(m∗a(θ),m∗p(θ′))
for all (θ, θ′) in Θ2.
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Finally, we get:
S(q(θ, θ), θ)− t(θ, θ) ≥ S(q(θ, θ′), θ)− t(θ, θ′),
for all (θ, θ′) in Θ2.
Hence, the principal’s best response to a truthful reporting strategy by the agent is
also to truthfully report.
Proceeding similarly for the agent, we prove that the agent’s best response is also
truthfully reporting his type. Hence, truthfully reporting is a Nash equilibrium.
The important question at this point is to determine which restrictions are put on allo-
cations by the incentive compatibility constraints (6.9) and (6.10). In particular, we would
like to know under which conditions the first-best allocation rule a∗(θ) = (t∗(θ), q∗(θ)) is
implementable as a Nash equilibrium of the direct revelation mechanism played by the
principal and the agent. It turns out that incentive compatibility in this multi-agent
framework imposes very few restrictions on the set of implementable allocations.
Let us first consider the simple case where the principal’s utility function does not
depend explicitly on θ, i.e., his utility is given by V = S(q) − t. The agent has also
the standard linear cost function of Chapter 2, U = t − θq. We know that the first-best
allocation entails producing outputs q∗(θ) such that S ′(q∗(θ)) = θ and using transfers
t∗(θ) = θq∗(θ) to extract all the agent’s rent.
A direct revelation mechanism g(·) which implements in Nash equilibrium the first-
best allocation rule a∗(θ) = (t∗(θ), q∗(θ)) can be summarized by a matrix (see Figure 6.4
below) where the lines (resp. columns) represent the agent (resp. principal)’s possible
reports in Θ = {θ, θ¯}. In each box of the matrix, we have represented the output-transfer
pair corresponding to the reports made by the principal and the agent.
P ’s strategy
θ θ¯
θ (t∗, q∗) (0, 0)
A’s strategy
θ¯ (0, 0) (t¯∗, q¯∗)
Figure 6.4: Nash Implementation of the First-Best
with the No-Trade Option as Punishment
For instance, when both the principal and the agent report to the Court that θ has
realized, the contract (t∗, q∗) is enforced. The principal gets then a net surplus S(q∗)− t∗
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and the agent gets t∗ − θq∗ if the true state of nature is θ. If they disagree the no-trade
option is enforced, with no output being produced and no transfer being made.
The important point to note is that the same game form must be played by the
agent and the principal whatever the true state of nature θ. Indeed, the state of na-
ture being nonverifiable, the transfers and outputs in each box of the matrix cannot
be made contingent on it. The goal of this mechanism is to ensure that there exists
a truthful Nash equilibrium in each state θ which implements the first-best allocation
a∗(θ) = (t∗(θ), q∗(θ)).
Let us check that telling the truth is a Nash equilibrium of the direct revelation
mechanism g(·) in each state of nature. Consider first state θ. Given that the agent
reports θ, the principal gets S(q∗) − t∗ = S(q∗) − θq∗ by reporting the truth and zero
otherwise. By assumption, trade is valuable when θ realizes (S(q∗)− θq∗ > 0) and telling
the truth is a best response for the principal. The agent is indifferent between telling the
truth or not when the principal reports θ since t∗ − θq∗ = 0. Hence, he weakly prefers to
tell the truth as a best response.
Consider now state θ¯. Given that the agent reports θ¯, the principal gets S(q¯∗)− t¯∗ =
S(q¯∗) − θ¯q¯∗ by reporting the truth and zero otherwise. By assumption trade is valuable
also when θ¯ realizes (S(q¯∗) − θ¯q¯∗ > 0). Telling the truth is a best response for the
principal. Similarly, the agent is indifferent between telling the truth or not when the
principal reports truthfully since t¯∗ − θ¯q¯∗ = 0. He weakly prefers to tell the truth.
Importantly, note that, when θ realizes, the pair of truthful strategies is not the
unique Nash equilibrium of the direct mechanism g(·). (θ¯, θ¯) is indeed another Nash
equilibrium. The agent strictly gains from misreporting if the principal does so since
t¯∗ − θq¯∗ = ∆θq¯∗ > 0. Also, the principal prefers to report θ¯ if the agent does so since
S(q¯∗)− t¯∗ > 0.
There are two possible attitudes vis-a`-vis this multiplicity problem. First, one may
forget about it and argue that telling the truth should be a focal equilibrium. This is a
relatively shaky argument in the absence of a theory of equilibrium selection. Moreover,
some authors have argued in related models that the non-truthful equilibrium may Pareto
dominate the truthful one from the players’ point of view.4 This second argument is less
effective in our context since the two equilibria cannot be Pareto-ranked: in the non-
truthful equilibrium the agent does better than in the truthful one, but the principal does
worse.
The second possible attitude towards the multiplicity of equilibria is to take it seri-
ously and to look for mechanisms which ensure that the first-best allocation is uniquely
4See Demski and Sappington (1984) for such a model.
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implementable.
Definition 6.5 : The first-best allocation rule a∗(θ) is uniquely implementable in Nash
equilibrium by the mechanism (M, g˜(·)) if the mechanism has a unique Nash equilibrium
for each θ in Θ and it induces the allocation a∗(θ).
In the definition above, we do not restrict a priori the mechanism g˜(·) to be a direct
one. It could well be that the cost of obtaining unique implementation is to expand a
little bit the space of messages that the agent and the principal use to communicate with
the Court. Such extensions are often used in multi-agent (more than three) frameworks.
In our principal-agent model, those extensions are often not needed provided that one
defines conveniently the out-of-equilibrium path punishments.
For the time being, let us consider a direct revelation mechanism as in Figure 6.5
below.
P ’s strategy
θ θ¯
θ (t∗, q∗) (tˆ2, qˆ2)
A’s strategy
θ¯ (tˆ1, qˆ1) (t¯
∗, q¯∗)
Figure 6.5: Nash Implementation of the First-Best
with More General Punishments.
The outcomes (tˆ1, qˆ1) and (tˆ2, qˆ2) may be different from the no-trade option in order
to give more flexibility to the Court in designing off-the-equilibrium path punishments
ensuring both truthful revelation and uniqueness of the equilibrium.
The conditions for having a truthful Nash equilibrium in state θ are: For the principal
S(q∗)− t∗ > S(qˆ2)− tˆ2, (6.11)
and for the agent
0 = t∗ − θq∗ > tˆ1 − θqˆ1. (6.12)
Similarly, the conditions for having a truthful Nash equilibrium in state θ¯ are: For the
principal
S(q¯∗)− t¯∗ > S(qˆ1)− tˆ1, (6.13)
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and for the agent
0 = t¯∗ − θ¯q¯∗ > tˆ2 − θ¯qˆ2. (6.14)
Let us now turn to the conditions ensuring that there is no non-truthful pure-strategy
Nash equilibrium in either state of nature. Let us consider a possible non-truthful equi-
librium (θ¯, θ¯) when state θ realizes. Given that (6.13) is needed to satisfy the principal’s
incentive constraint in state θ¯, the only way to break the possible equilibrium is to have:
t¯∗ − θq¯∗ < tˆ2 − θqˆ2. (6.15)
Let us consider also a possible non-truthful pure-strategy Nash equilibrium (θ, θ) when
state θ¯ realizes. Given that (6.11) is needed to ensure the principal’s incentive constraint
in state θ, the only way to break the possible equilibrium is to have:
t∗ − θ¯q∗ < tˆ1 − θ¯qˆ1. (6.16)
A truthful direct revelation mechanism g(·) which uniquely implements the first-best
as a Nash equilibrium exists when the conditions (6.11) to (6.16) are all satisfied by a
pair of off-the-equilibrium path contracts (tˆ1, qˆ1) and (tˆ2, qˆ2). We have:
Proposition 6.2 : A truthful direct revelation mechanism g(·) which uniquely imple-
ments in Nash equilibrium the first-best allocation rule a∗(θ) exists.
Proof: The clearest way of doing this proof is to draw a picture. In Figure 6.6 below, we
have represented the first-best allocation a∗(θ) and the possible punishments (tˆ1, qˆ1) and
(tˆ2, qˆ2).
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Figure 6.6: Off-The-Equilibrium Path Punishments.
In the figure, the indifference curves of the principal are tangent to the zero-profit lines
of the agent in each state of nature. First, the θ-agent incentive compatibility constraint
(6.12) and (6.16) define a subset C where (tˆ1, qˆ1) may lie (crossed area in Figure 6.6).
Within this subset, the principal’s incentive constraint (6.13) further reduces the set of
possible punishments (tˆ1, qˆ1) to the area E close to the origin (shaded area in Figure 6.6).
This set is non-empty since the principal’s indifference curve W¯ ∗ = S(q)− t does not go
through the origin when trade is valuable in state θ¯(S(q¯∗)− t¯∗ > 0).
Similarly, the agent’s incentive constraints (6.14) and (6.15) define a subset D of
possible values for the punishment (tˆ2, qˆ2) (crossed area in Figure 6.6). In Figure 6.6, this
full set satisfies the principal’s incentive compatibility constraint (6.11). More generally,
by strict concavity of the principal’s indifference curve W¯ ∗ = S(q)− t going through B∗,
there exists a non-empty subset of D which lies strictly above this indifference curve. All
those points lie obviously above the principal’s indifference curve W ∗ = S(q) − t going
through A∗.
Proposition 6.2 yields a quite striking result. It says that direct revelation mechanisms
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are enough to ensure always efficiency if the Court can design punishments in a clever way.
There is no need to use more complex mechanisms in this simple and rather structured
principal-agent model.
More generally, one may wonder if the requirement of unique Nash implementation
imposes some structure on the set of allocation rules a(θ) = (t(θ), q(θ)) which can be
implemented this way. Indeed, this structure exists. Before describing it, we need another
definition that we cast in the general case where V = S(q, θ)− t and U = t− C(q, θ).
Definition 6.6 : An allocation rule a(θ) = (t(θ), q(θ)) is monotonic if and only if for
any θ in Θ such that a(θ) 6= a(θ′) for some θ′ in Θ, there exists an allocation (tˆ, qˆ) such
that one of the two conditions below is true:
(P )


S(q(θ), θ)− t(θ) ≥ S(qˆ, θ)− tˆ
and
S(qˆ, θ′)− tˆ > S(q(θ), θ′)− t(θ),
or
(A)


t(θ)− C(q(θ), θ) ≥ tˆ− C(qˆ, θ)
and
tˆ− C(qˆ, θ′) > t(θ)− C(q(θ), θ′).
These inequalities have a simple meaning.5 The allocation rule a(·) selects the pair
a(θ) = (t(θ), q(θ)) in state θ and not in state θ′, if there exists another allocation (tˆ, qˆ)
such that either the principal or the agent prefers this allocation to a(θ) when the state
of nature is θ′.
Under the assumptions of Proposition 6.2, the first-best allocation rule a∗(·) is mono-
tonic. Indeed, first we note that a∗(θ) 6= a∗(θ¯). Second, the principal’s utility function
being independent of θ, there does not exist any allocation (tˆ, qˆ) such that condition (P )
holds. Lastly, there exist (tˆ, qˆ) such that condition (A) holds. In state θ, the set of such
pairs is contains the set C in Figure 6.6. In state θ¯, it is the set D.
The monotonicity of allocation rules is an important property which follows immedi-
ately from unique implementation as it is shown in Proposition 6.3 below.
Proposition 6.3 : Consider an allocation rule a(·) which is uniquely implemented in
Nash equilibrium by a mechanism (M, g˜(·)); then the allocation rule a(·) is monotonic.
5An alternative definition which explains better the expression “monotonicity” is intuitively as follows.
If a(θ) is selected in state θ and if the allocation a(θ) “progresses” in the preferences of both players in
another state of nature θ′, a(θ) must also be chosen in state θ′.
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Proof: The mechanism (M, g˜(·)) uses the message spacesMa andMp. If the allocation
rule a(·) is uniquely implementable in Nash equilibrium by g˜(·), we know that, in state θ,
there exists a pair of strategies (m∗a(θ),m
∗
p(θ)) such that (q(θ), t(θ)) = (q˜(m
∗
a(θ),m
∗
p(θ)),
t˜(m∗a(θ), m˜
∗
p(θ))) and:
S(q˜(m∗a(θ),m
∗
p(θ)), θ)− t˜(m∗a(θ),m∗p(θ)) ≥ S(q˜(m∗a(θ), m˜p), θ)− t˜(m∗a(θ), m˜p) (6.17)
for all m˜p it Mp;
t˜(m∗a(θ),m
∗
p(θ))− C(q˜(m∗a(θ),m∗p(θ)), θ) ≥ t˜(m˜a,m∗p(θ))− C(q˜(m˜a,m∗p(θ)), θ)(6.18)
for all m˜a in Ma.
Moreover, a(θ) being different from a(θ′) for a θ′ different from θ, a(θ) is not a Nash
equilibrium in state θ′. This means that either the principal, or the agent, finds then
strictly better to send a message m˜p rather than m
∗
p(θ) or m˜a rather than m
∗
a(θ). For the
principal this means that:
S(q(θ), θ′)− t(θ) < S(q˜(m∗a(θ), m˜p), θ′)− t˜(m∗a(θ), m˜p). (6.19)
For the agent this means that
t(θ)− C(q(θ), θ′) < t˜(m˜a,m∗p(θ))− C(q˜(m˜a,m∗p(θ)), θ′). (6.20)
In each case show that the allocation rule a(·) is monotonic. Take (tˆ, qˆ) = (t˜(m∗a(θ), m˜p),
q˜(m∗a(θ), m˜p))) in the first case (principal’s deviation) and (tˆ, qˆ) = (t˜(m˜a,m
∗
p(θ)), q˜(m˜a,m
∗
p(θ)))
in the second case (agent’s deviation).
The intuitive meaning of Proposition 6.3 is rather clear. In order to prevent an allo-
cation implemented in one state of nature θ to be also chosen in another state θ′, either
the principal or the agent must deviate and choose another message in state θ′. Hence,
the mechanism g˜(·) which uniquely implements the allocation rule a(·) must include an
allocation (tˆ, qˆ) which is worse than (t(θ), q(θ)) for both agents in state θ, but better for
at least one in state θ′. In this case, the latter player’s preferences are reversed between
states θ and θ′, breaking a possible equilibrium which would implement a(θ) also in state
θ′.
The monotonicity property is a necessary condition satisfied by an allocation
rule which is uniquely implementable in Nash equilibrium. The remaining question is
to know how far away this property is from sufficiency. With more than two agents
(n ≥ 3), Maskin (1999) shows that monotonicity plus another property, no veto power,6
6This property says that whenever n − 1 agents prefer an allocation to all others in one state of
nature, the nth agent cannot veto it and this allocation belongs to the allocation rule. The no veto power
property is a rather innocuous property to satisfy in economic contexts with more than two agents.
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is also sufficient for unique Nash implementation. With two agents only, Dutta and Sen
(1991) and Moore and Repullo (1990) have provided necessary and sufficient conditions
for unique Nash implementation in more general environments than those analyzed in
this chapter.
6.5 Subgame Perfect Implementation
From Proposition 6.3, a necessary condition for unique Nash implementation is that an
allocation rule a(·) be monotonic. Any allocation rule which fails to be monotonic will also
fail to guarantee unique Nash implementation. Then, one may wonder if refinements of the
Nash equilibrium concept can be used to still ensure unique implementation. A natural
refinement is to move to a game with sequential moves where the principal and the agent
take turn in sending messages to the Court. An allocation rule a(θ) is implementable
uniquely in subgame perfect equilibrium by a mechanism g˜(·) if the unique subgame
perfect equilibrium yields allocation a(θ) in any state θ.
Instead of presenting the general theory of subgame perfect implementation which is
quite complex, we propose a simple example showing the mechanics of the procedure.
Let us first single out a principal-agent setting where the first-best allocation rule is non-
monotonic. Consider a principal with utility function V = S(q) − t independent of the
state of nature θ. For simplicity, we will assume that S(q) = µq − λq2
2
where µ and λ are
common knowledge. The agent has instead a utility function U = t − θ1q − θ2q22 where
θ = (θ1, θ2) is the bidimensional state of nature.
First-best outputs q∗(θ1, θ2) are given by the first-order conditions S ′(q∗(θ1, θ2)) =
θ1 + θ2q
∗(θ1, θ2). We immediately find that q∗(θ1, θ2) =
µ−θ1
λ+θ2
.
We assume that each parameter θi belongs to Θ = {θ, θ¯}. A priori, there are 4 possible
states of nature and 4 first-best outputs. Assuming that µ−θ¯
λ+θ
= µ−θ
λ+θ¯
, i.e., µ − λ = θ + θ¯,
we are left with three first-best outputs q∗ = µ−θ
λ+θ
, qˆ∗ = µ−θ¯
λ+θ
= 1 and q¯∗ = µ−θ¯
λ+θ¯
that we
assume to be positive.
Of course, even if the production level is the same in states (θ, θ¯) and (θ¯, θ), the agent
has different costs and should receive different transfers tˆ∗1 and tˆ
∗
2 from the principal. We
denote by t∗ and t¯∗ the transfers in the other states of nature.
In Figure 6.7, we have represented the first-best allocations corresponding to the dif-
ferent states of nature.
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Figure 6.7: First-Best Allocations
Importantly, the indifference curve of a (θ, θ¯)-agent going through C∗, i.e., the first-
best allocation of a (θ¯, θ)-agent, (dotted curve in Figure 6.7), is tangent to that of a
(θ, θ¯) and always above.7 This means that one cannot find any allocation (tˆ, qˆ) such
that condition (A) holds. In other words, the first-best allocation a∗(θ) is non-monotonic
in this bidimensional example. Henceforth, there is no hope of finding a unique Nash
implementation of the first-best outcome. Indeed, any mechanism g˜(·) implementing the
first-best allocation a∗(θ¯, θ) must be such that:
t˜(m∗a(θ¯, θ),m
∗
p(θ¯, θ))− θ¯q˜(m∗a(θ¯, θ),m∗p(θ¯, θ))−
θq˜2(m∗a(θ¯, θ),m
∗
p(θ¯, θ))
2
≥ t˜(m˜a,m∗p(θ¯, θ))− θ¯q˜(m˜a,m∗p(θ¯, θ))−
θq˜2(m˜a,m
∗
p(θ¯, θ))
2
, for all m˜a in Ma.
But, from the observation made above about Figure 6.7, this inequality also implies
7Since θ¯ > θ, the second derivative of the (θ, θ¯) indifference curve at C∗ is greater in absolute value
than the second derivative of the (θ¯, θ) indifference curve at C∗.
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that:
t˜(m∗a(θ¯, θ),m
∗
p(θ¯, θ))− θq˜(m∗a(θ¯, θ),m∗p(θ¯, θ))−
θ¯q˜2(m∗a(θ¯, θ),m
∗
p(θ¯, θ))
2
≥ t˜(m˜a,m∗p(θ¯, θ))− θq˜(m˜a,m∗p(θ¯, θ))−
θ¯q˜2(m˜a,m
∗
p(θ¯, θ))
2
, for all m˜a in Ma.
Since the principal’s utility function does not depend directly on θ, the pair of strate-
gies (m∗a(θ¯, θ);m
∗
p(θ¯, θ)) which implements the allocation a
∗(θ¯, θ) = (tˆ2, qˆ∗) remains an
equilibrium in state (θ, θ¯).
Let us now turn to a possible unique implementation using a three stage extensive
form mechanism and the more stringent concept of subgame perfection.
The reader should be convinced that there is not too much problem in eliciting the
preferences of the agent in states (θ, θ) and (θ¯, θ¯). Hence, we will focus on a “reduced”
extensive form which is enough to highlight the logic of subgame perfect implementation.
The objective of this extensive form is to have the agent truthfully reveal the state of
nature when (θ¯, θ) or (θ, θ¯) occurs.
In Figure 6.8 below, we have represented such an extensive form.
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Figure 6.8: Subgame Perfect Implementation.
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The mechanism to be played in both states (θ, θ¯) and (θ¯, θ) is a three stage game with
the agent moving first and announcing whether (θ, θ¯) or (θ¯, θ) has realized. If (θ, θ¯) is
announced, the game ends with the allocation (tˆ∗1, qˆ
∗). If (θ¯, θ) is announced, the principal
may agree and then the game ends with the allocation (tˆ∗2, qˆ
∗) or challenge, and then the
agent has to choose between two possible out-of-equilibrium allocations (tˆ1, qˆ1) and (tˆ2, qˆ2).
This is a greater flexibility with respect to Nash implementation since, now, the agent has
sometimes to choose between two allocations which are non-equilibrium ones instead of
between an out-of-equilibrium one and an equilibrium one as under Nash implementation.
We want to use this flexibility to obtain (tˆ∗1, qˆ
∗) in the state of nature (θ, θ¯) and (tˆ∗2, qˆ
∗)
in the state of nature (θ¯, θ). To do so, we are going to choose the allocations (tˆ1, qˆ1) and
(tˆ2, qˆ2) in such a way that the agent prefers a different allocation in different states of the
world. Specifically, we choose them to have:
tˆ1 − θ¯qˆ1 − θqˆ
2
1
2
> tˆ2 − θ¯qˆ2 − θ qˆ
2
2
2
, (6.21)
and
tˆ2 − θqˆ2 − θ¯qˆ
2
2
2
> tˆ1 − θqˆ1 − θ¯qˆ
2
1
2
. (6.22)
Then, since at stage 3 the agent chooses (tˆ1, qˆ1) in state (θ¯, θ), to obtain (t
∗
2, qˆ
∗) the
principal should not be willing to challenge the agent’s report at stage 2 of the game.
This means that one should have:
S(qˆ∗)− tˆ∗2 > S(qˆ1)− tˆ1. (6.23)
Finally, the agent with type (θ¯, θ) should prefer to report truthfully that (θ¯, θ) has
realized, i.e.:
tˆ∗2 − θ¯qˆ∗ −
θqˆ∗2
2
> tˆ∗1 − θ¯qˆ∗ −
θqˆ∗2
2
. (6.24)
Now let us see how we can obtain (t∗1, qˆ
∗) in the state of nature (θ, θ¯). Since the agent
chooses (tˆ2, qˆ2) in state (θ, θ¯), the principal should be willing to challenge, i.e.:
S(qˆ2)− tˆ2 > S(qˆ∗)− tˆ∗2. (6.25)
Expecting this behavior by the principal, the agent should not be willing to announce
(θ¯, θ) when the state of nature is (θ, θ¯). This means that the following inequality must
hold:
t∗1 − θqˆ∗ −
θ¯qˆ∗2
2
> tˆ2 − θqˆ2 − θ¯qˆ
2
2
2
. (6.26)
The remaining question is: does there exist (tˆ1, qˆ1) and (tˆ2, qˆ2) satisfying constraints
(6.21) to (6.26). The response can be given graphically (see Figure 6.9 below).
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Figure 6.9: Subgame-Perfect Implementation.
By definition, (tˆ1, qˆ1) (resp. (tˆ2, qˆ2)) should be above (resp. below) the principal’s
indifference curve going through C∗. Note that for q > qˆ∗, the indifference curves of an
agent with (θ, θ¯) have a greater slope than those of an agent with type (θ¯, θ). This helps
to construct very easily the out-of-equilibrium allocations (tˆ1, qˆ1) and (tˆ2, qˆ2) as in Figure
6.9.
Remark: Subgame perfect implementation is beautiful and attractive but it should be
noted that it has been sometimes criticized because it relies excessively on rationality.
The kind of problem at hand can be illustrated with our example of Figure 6.8. Indeed,
when state (θ, θ¯) realizes and the principal has to decide to move at the second stage, he
knows that the agent has already made a suboptimal move. Why should he believe that
the agent will behave optimally at stage 3 as needed by subgame perfect implementation?
Moore and Repullo (1990) present a set of conditions ensuring subgame perfect
implementation in general environments, noticeably those with more than two agents. The
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construction is quite complex but close in spirit to our example. Abreu and Matsushima
(1992) have developed the concept of virtual-implementation of an allocation rule. The
idea is that the allocation rule may not be implemented with probability one but with very
high probability. With this implementation concept, any allocation rule can be virtually
implemented as a subgame perfect equilibrium.
6.6 Risk Aversion
6.6.1 Risk Averse Agent
When the agent is risk averse, an incentive contract performs badly since there is a trade-
off between insurance and efficiency. However, the Nash (and subgame) implementation
performs rather well since it allows to implement the first-best outcome, providing also
full insurance to the agent.
6.6.2 Risk Averse Principal
Clearly, signing no contract at the ex ante stage can no longer be optimal. Indeed, ex
post take-it-or-leave-it offers impose some risk to the principal from an ex ante point of
view. An incentive contract {(t, q); (t¯, q¯)} can still implement the first-best as we have
seen in Section 2.12.2. Making the agent residual claimant for the hierarchy’s profit is
again optimal in the case of non-verifiability.
Finally, Nash unique implementation of the first best outcome can also be obtained
using a game form similar to that in Figure 6.5. In our standard example, efficiency still
requires to produce q∗ and q¯∗ such that S ′(q∗) = θ and S ′(q¯∗) = θ¯. Providing insurance to
the principal also requests that the principal gets the same payoff in each state of nature:
V = S(q∗)− t∗ = S(q¯∗)− t¯∗. (6.27)
Finally, the agent’s ex ante participation constraint should be binding:
ν(t∗ − θq∗) + (1− ν)(t¯∗ − θ¯q¯∗) = 0. (6.28)
Since trade is more valuable in state θ than in state θ¯, we have W ∗ = S(q∗) − θq∗ >
S(q¯∗)− θ¯q¯∗ = W¯ ∗. Solving (6.27) and (6.28) yields therefore U∗ = t∗−θq∗ = (1−ν)(W ∗−
W¯ ∗) > 0 and U¯∗ = t¯∗ − θ¯q¯∗ = −ν(W ∗ − W¯ ∗) < 0.
In Figure 6.9 we have represented the out-of-equilibrium contracts (tˆ1, qˆ1) and (tˆ2, qˆ2)
which implement uniquely the first-best. Proceeding as in Section 6.4, these contracts
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must again satisfy the following constraints:
tˆ1 − θqˆ1 < t∗ − θq∗, (6.29)
tˆ1 − θ¯qˆ1 > t∗ − θ¯q∗, (6.30)
S(q¯∗)− t¯∗ > S(qˆ1)− tˆ1; (6.31)
and
tˆ2 − θ¯qˆ2 < t¯∗ − θ¯q¯∗, (6.32)
tˆ2 − θqˆ2 > t¯∗ − θq¯∗, (6.33)
S(q∗)− t∗ > S(qˆ2)− tˆ2. (6.34)
We let the reader check that the set E (crossed area) (resp. F (dotted area ◦))
of possible values of (tˆ1, qˆ1) (resp. (tˆ2, qˆ2)) satisfying constraints (6.29) to (6.31) (resp.
(6.32)) to (6.34) can be represented as in Figure 6.10.
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Figure 6.10: Nash Unique Implementation with Risk Aversion.
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6.7 Concluding Remarks
The overall conclusion of this chapter is that the non-verifiability of the state of nature ex
ante is not enough to impose any transaction cost in contracting if the Court of Justice can
credibly enforce punishments out of the equilibrium path. The non-verifiability paradigm
becomes only useful under various incomplete contracting assumptions such as the inabil-
ity to commit to ex post inefficiency or the possibility of collusion in environments with
at least three agents.8
8See Volume III.
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Chapter 7
Mixed Models
7.1 Introduction
The pure models of Chapter 2 for adverse selection, Chapter 4 for moral hazard and
Chapter 6 for the case of non-verifiability were highly stylized contracting settings. Each
of those models was aimed at capturing a single dimension of the incentive problems
that may be faced by a principal at the time of designing the contract of his agent. In
Chapters 2, 4 and 6 respectively, the analysis of each of these respective paradigms has
already provided a number of important insights which concern, on the one hand, the
conflict (if any) between allocative efficiency and the distribution of the gains from trade
and, on the other hand, the form of the optimal compensation schedule. Moreover, our
investigation of more complex models than those of Chapters 2 and 4 has also shown how
the insights gleaned from these simple models turn out to be quite robust to changes in
the economic environment.1
In real world settings, contracts are rarely designed with the objective of solving a
single dimension of the incentive problem. Most often, the principal’s control of the agent
requires to deal simultaneously with both adverse selection and moral hazard, or with
both the non-verifiability of the state of nature and moral hazard. The most important
question is thus to know how the agency costs due to the different paradigms interact.
More precisely, we would like to assess whether the lessons from the pure models continue
to hold in those more complex environments and, if they do not hold anymore, one would
like to understand in which directions those lessons should be modified.
This chapter is not aimed at giving a complete overview of the huge and extremely
heterogeneous literature which analyzes settings where several paradigms are simultane-
ously useful to understand the economic problem at hand. Instead, we have tried to
1See Chapter 3 for adverse selection and Chapter 5 for moral hazard.
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isolate three important lessons from those models. More specifically, we assess whether
blending together more incentive problems increases or decreases allocative distortions.
This simple criterion allows us indeed to clarify somewhat the rather noisy messages of
these mixed models.2
Lesson 1: Adding the agency costs of the different paradigms may lead to more alloca-
tive inefficiency: Consider first a model where the agent knows perfectly his type before
contracting with the principal and performing a task on his behalf. For instance, as in
Chapter 2, an agent who is privately informed on his marginal cost of production may
be supplying a good for the principal, but may also exert some costly and nonverifiable
effort affecting the probability that an efficient trade with the principal will take place.
Adverse selection occurs before moral hazard. With a risk neutral agent protected by
limited liability, we know from Chapter 4 that the principal cannot costlessly structure
the payments given to the agent for providing the moral hazard incentive. A limited lia-
bility rent must be given to the agent to induce effort provision. This rent plays the role
of an added fixed cost from the principal’s point of view. Inducing participation by the
agent becomes now more difficult. The conflict between the participation and the adverse
selection incentive constraints is thus exacerbated by the moral hazard dimension. This
leads to possibly more shut-down of types and to greater allocative distortions than in the
absence of any moral hazard.
One archetypical kind of contracts where adverse selection and moral hazard strongly
interact are insurance contracts. A risk averse driver has often private information on how
good a driver he is and also how safely he drives. To induce the high risk agent to reveal
his probability of accident, we saw in Chapter 3 that the low risk agent must receive less
than full insurance. Under pure moral hazard, both types of agent should instead receive
incomplete insurance to induce them to exert safety care. When adverse selection takes
place before moral hazard, the mere fact that the high risk agent should now bear some
risk to solve the moral hazard problem makes his adverse selection rent more costly for
the principal. This leads to more distortion for the low risk agent who now bears an even
greater amount of risk than under pure adverse selection.
The general insight gleaned from this latter two models is that solving the moral
hazard problem ex post leads the principal to introduce distortions in the agent’s payoff
which increase the cost of his adverse selection information rent. This leads to further
allocative distortions and to a reduction in the expected gains from trade with respect to
the case of pure adverse selection.
2Of course, as we have seen in Chapter 2, allocative efficiency is not the principal’s criterion for
evaluating different contracting environments. However, taking the principal’s objective as a criterion
would lead to the straightforward conclusion given that adding incentive problems leads always to a more
constrained (at least weakly) problem from the principal’s point of view.
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Lesson 2: Adding the agency costs of the different paradigms may lead to less allocative
efficiency: Let us now consider the case where moral hazard takes place before adverse
selection. For instance, an agent may endeavor a task for the principal which affects
stochastically the value of trade, but its value is privately known by the agent. The
simplest way to do so is to merge the models of Chapter 2 and 4. By choosing a non-
observable and costly effort, the agent increases the probability that a low marginal cost
realizes. Contrary to Chapter 4, we now assume that the random state of nature, i.e.,
how large are the gains from trade, is a piece of information which is privately learned by
the agent. In such a context, the principal must offer a contract with a double objective
in mind. On the one hand, the contract must provide the agent with enough incentives
to exert effort at the ex ante stage. On the other hand, the contract must also induce the
agent to reveal his private information at the ex post stage.
Of course, ex ante contracting has no cost for the principal if he deals with a risk neutral
agent. Both adverse selection and moral hazard can be solved costlessly by making the
agent residual claimant for the value of trading with the principal, as we have seen in
Chapters 2 and 4. Hence, a second-best analysis arises only with risk aversion or limited
liability. To fix ideas, we consider the case of a risk neutral agent who is protected by
limited liability. One of the main lessons of Chapter 2 is that the agent should receive a
higher ex post rent when he turns out to be efficient rather than inefficient in order to
satisfy his adverse selection incentive compatibility constraint. This is precisely this rent
differential which also helps the principal to incentivize the agent to exert effort. The
rent necessary to solve the adverse selection problem may be either below or above the
limited liability rent necessary to solve the moral hazard problem. Different regimes of
optimal contracts can be found depending on the parameters of the model. To solve the
moral hazard problem, the principal might have to raise the agent’s rent and does so by
increasing the volume of trade. Then, the interplay between adverse selection and moral
hazard improves allocative efficiency with respect to the case of pure adverse selection.
Lesson 3: Adding the agency costs of the different paradigms may have no new impact
on allocative efficiency: We already know from the analysis of Chapter 6 that the non-
verifiability of the state of nature does not put any real constraint on the ability of the
contractual partners to achieve the first-best by agreeing to contract, before the state of
nature realizes, on a game form to be played ex post, i.e., once they both know which state
of nature has realized. In addition, we suppose that the agent can perform a nonverifiable
effort affecting the probability that an efficient trade with the agent takes place. If the
state of nature were verifiable, this setting would be akin to a pure moral hazard model
similar to Chapter 4 and the principal and the agent would sign the pure moral hazard
contract leading to an allocative distortion which is now quite well known. Once the non-
verifiability of the state of nature is taken into account, the principal and the agent can
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agree, on top of this moral hazard contract, on a game form solving the non-verifiability
constraint ex post, just as in Chapter 6. We are then back to a standard pure moral
hazard problem.
In Section 7.2, we first analyze the case of adverse selection taking place before moral
hazard. With an example, we show that solving the moral hazard problem exacerbates the
allocative distortions due to adverse selection. This section also provides a version of the
Revelation Principle generalizing its applicability to models with both adverse selection
and moral hazard. Lastly, we analyze “false moral hazard problems” where the moral
hazard and the adverse selection unknowns are blend together in a deterministic way into
a single observable available for contracting. These models end up being pure adverse
selection models. They have been extensively used in the regulation and in the optimal
taxation literatures. In Section 7.3, we change the timing above and focus on models
where moral hazard takes place before adverse selection. We show that those models tend
to reduce allocative efficiency with respect to the case of pure adverse selection. Finally,
Section 7.4 analyzes the case of moral hazard followed by the nonverifiabilty of the state of
nature. We show there that non-verifiability does not put a real constraint on contracting.
7.2 Adverse Selection Followed by Moral Hazard
In the standard moral hazard framework of Chapter 3, it was first assumed that the
agent had no private information of his own. In insurance markets, insurees have often
some prior information on how risky they are before exerting any effort to prevent this
risk. Similarly, in credit markets, a borrower may know the average return of his project
before exerting any effort and sharing the resulting profits with a lender. Those examples
illustrate how frequent the interwining of adverse selection and moral hazard is. A general
formulation of these mixed models where adverse selection takes place before moral hazard
would be cumbersome to present. However, a few dimensions of the analysis can already
be singled out by studying some examples. To simplify the analysis, we start with the
case where adverse selection takes place before moral hazard.
7.2.1 Random Surplus and Screening
In the pure adverse selection framework of Chapter 2, the principal was able to verify
and contract on all the agent’s actions. Of course, when moral hazard also occurs, this
complete contractibility is no longer possible: some actions of the agent are, by definition,
under his own control only.
Consider a situation where moral hazard affects the random benefit that the principal
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draws from his relationship with the agent. In the mixed model we analyze below, the
principal has already at his disposal a screening device to start with. The random benefit
S˜(q) he gets from dealing with the agent depends indeed on an observable, the agent’s
production q¯, which can be used to screen the agent’s type.
Let us thus assume that, with probability pi(e) (resp. 1−pi(e)) the benefit of production
obtained by the principal is Sh(q) (resp. Sl(q)) with Sh(q) > Sl(q) where, the moral hazard
variable e belongs to {0, 1}. Of course, we assume that Si(·), for i = h, l, is increasing and
strictly concave (S ′i(·) > 0 and S ′′i (·) < 0) and satisfies the Inada condition S ′i(0) =∞. To
motivate this random surplus model, one can think of effort as improving the quality of the
product sold by the agent to the principal. Of course, exerting effort costs a non-monetary
disutility ψ(e) to the agent with, as always, the normalization ψ(0) = 0 and ψ(1) = ψ.
Moreover, the agent produces at a constant marginal cost θ. As usual, we assume that θ
belongs to Θ = {θ, θ¯} with respective probabilities ν and 1 − ν. For simplicity, we also
assume that the agent is risk neutral and protected by limited liability.
In this framework, the principal has two observables to screen the agent’s efficiency
parameter and we are, in fact, in a special case of the multi-output framework studied in
Section 2.11. These two observables are first, whether the good sold has a high or a low
quality and second, the amount of this good which is actually produced.
The timing of the contractual game with adverse selection being followed by moral
hazard is as in Figure 7.1:
- time
t = 0 t = 1 t = 2 t = 3
? ? ? ?
θ is realized
Only A
learns θ
P offers
a contract {t(q)}
to A
A accepts
or refuses
the contract
A exerts
an effort e
chooses
an output q
and receives t(q)
Figure 7.1: Timing of the Contractual Game
with Adverse Selection Followed by Moral Hazard.
Typically, a direct revelation mechanism is thus a menu of triplets {(th(θ˜), tl(θ˜), q(θ˜))}θ˜∈Θ
stipulating the transfers th and tl made to the agent depending on the quality of the good
and an output q as functions of the agent’s report on his type, θ˜.3 Moreover, we assume
3For the time being, we leave unanswered the question of whether the Revelation Principle applies in
our framework and refer to Section 7.2.2 below for a formal proof that it does.
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that contracting takes place at the interim stage, i.e., after the agent has learned his
private information, but before the quality of the good realizes.4 In what follows, we
also assume that the principal finds extremely valuable to always induce a high level of
effort from both types of agent.5 Using our usual notations, the efficient agent’s adverse
selection incentive constraint writes then as:
U = pi1th + (1− pi1)tl − θq − ψ ≥ max
e∈{0,1}
pi(e)t¯h + (1− pi(e))t¯l − θq¯ − ψ(e), (7.1)
with, in addition, the moral hazard incentive constraint
th − tl ≥
ψ
∆pi
, (7.2)
so that the efficient agent exerts a positive effort.
Similarly the inefficient agent’s adverse selection incentive constraint becomes:
U¯ = pi1t¯h + (1− pi1)t¯l − θ¯q¯ − ψ ≥ max
e∈{0,1}
pi(e)th + (1− pi(e))tl − θ¯q − ψ(e), (7.3)
and his moral hazard incentive constraint is:
t¯h − t¯l ≥ ψ
∆pi
. (7.4)
Since contracting takes place at the interim stage, the agent’s participation constraints
write respectively as:
U ≥ 0, (7.5)
U¯ ≥ 0. (7.6)
Finally, the following limited liability constraints must be satisfied. For the efficient
type:
th − θq ≥ 0, (7.7)
tl − θq ≥ 0; (7.8)
and for the inefficient type:
t¯h − θ¯q¯ ≥ 0, (7.9)
t¯l − θ¯q¯ ≥ 0. (7.10)
4Note that the agent must decide how much to produce before he knows whether his good will be
a good or a bad match with the agent. Transfers are instead delayed until the quality of the good is
learned.
5Hence our focus is not on determining the conditions ensuring that the high effort level is second-best
optimal.
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The number of constraints is huge and our first goal should be to get rid of some of
them. A preliminary remark is useful to simplify significantly this problem. Indeed, note
that both types must be given the same transfer differential th − tl to exert effort at a
minimal cost for the principal, namely t¯h − t¯l = th − tl = ψ∆pi . Hence, the right-hand sides
of both incentive constraints (7.1) and (7.3) can be simplified to yield respectively:
U = ul +
pi0ψ
∆pi
≥ u¯l +∆θq¯ + pi0ψ
∆pi
, (7.11)
and
U¯ = u¯l +
pi0ψ
∆pi
≥ ul −∆θq +
pi0ψ
∆pi
, (7.12)
where ul = th − θq and u¯l = t¯l − θ¯q¯ must remain positive by (7.7) and (7.10).
We let the reader check that the only relevant constraints are the adverse selection
incentive compatibility constraint of an efficient type (7.11) and the limited liability con-
straint of the inefficient type (7.10). The principal’s problem writes thus as:
(P ) : max
{(q,ul);(q¯,u¯l)}
ν
(
pi1Sh(q) + (1− pi1)Sl(q)− θq − ul −
pi1
∆pi
ψ
)
+(1− ν)
(
pi1Sh(q¯) + (1− pi1)Sl(q¯)− θ¯q¯ − u¯l − pi1ψ
∆pi
)
subject to (7.10) and (7.11).
This optimization leads immediately to ul = ∆θq¯ + u¯l and u¯l = 0. Hence, we can
compute the rent of each type of agent respectively as
U = ∆θq¯ +
pi0ψ
∆pi
, (7.13)
and
U¯ =
pi0ψ
∆pi
. (7.14)
The reader will have recognized that those rents are precisely those obtained under
pure adverse selection (∆θq¯ and 0 respectively, as in Chapter 2) added up with the limited
liability rent obtained under pure moral hazard (pi0ψ
∆pi
, as in Chapter 4). In this simple
model with a risk neutral agent protected by limited liability constraints, the agent’s rent
coming from the mixed model is simply obtained by adding up the rents due to adverse
selection and moral hazard.
Solving for the optimal contract, the optimal outputs are obtained by equating ex-
pected marginal benefits and marginal virtual costs. For the efficient type, we find no
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output distortion as in a pure adverse selection model. Indeed, we have qSB = q∗ where
the first-best production is defined by:
pi1S
′
h(q
SB) + (1− pi1)S ′l(qSB) = θ. (7.15)
For the inefficient type, we have instead:
pi1S
′
h(q¯
SB) + (1− pi1)S ′(q¯SB) = θ¯ + ν
1− ν∆θ. (7.16)
The production of the inefficient type is distorted downwards below the first-best q¯∗
given by pi1S
′
h(q¯
∗) + (1 − pi1)S ′l(q¯∗) = θ¯. As in the case of pure adverse selection, this
downward distortion helps to reduce the agent’s information rent coming from his private
information on θ.6
The reader might think that adding moral hazard in this model has no allocative
impact on the distortion due to adverse selection which is exactly the same as if effort
was observable. This is not completely true. Indeed, the output q¯SB is only the solution
as long as shut-down of the least efficient type is not optimal, i.e., as long as the expected
surplus that the inefficient type generates is greater than the expected rent given up to
both types. This leads to the condition:
(1− ν) (pi1Sh(q¯SB) + (1− pi1)Sl(q¯SB)− θ¯q¯SB)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Expected Surplus with a θ¯-Type
− ν∆θq¯SB︸ ︷︷ ︸
Adverse
Selection
Rent of the
θ-Type.
− pi0ψ
∆pi︸︷︷︸
Limited
Liability
Rent
of both Types
> 0.
With this condition, we see the role played by moral hazard in hardening the adverse
selection problem. Inducing effort requires to give up a limited liability rent to the ineffi-
cient type. This rent plays exactly the same role as a fixed cost in a pure adverse selection
framework (see Section 2.7.3) and it makes the shut-down of the least efficient type more
valuable for the principal.
In this particular example, we can thus conclude that moral hazard hardens the adverse
selection incentive problem. We state this as a general (but rather imprecise) proposition.
Proposition 7.1 : In mixed models with adverse selection before moral hazard, pre-
venting moral hazard hardens the adverse selection problem and allocative distortions are
greater than in a pure adverse selection setting.
6Note that the Inada condition ensures that q¯SB remains always positive.
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Laffont (1995) analyzes a related model of environmental regulation where Sl(q) =
Sh(q) − d(q) and d(q) is an environmental damage. The added complexity of his model
comes from the fact that the disutility of effort depends on the level of production.
7.2.2 The Extended Revelation Principle
In Section 7.2.1, we have studied a simple example, assuming a priori that the Revelation
Principle holds in this context with both adverse selection and moral hazard. We prove
now this principle, still using for pedagogical purposes the basic structure of the model
of Section 7.2.1. The framework is nevertheless slightly more general since we allow now
the probability of having a high quality good to be a function of both the agent’s effort e
and his type θ. This added complexity turns out to be a useful intermediate step before
analyzing the more complex model of the insurance market covered in Section 7.2.3.
Just as in Section 2.10, let us first consider a general mechanism in this context. As
usual, a mechanism stipulates a message space M and an outcome function. Since the
quality of the good is observed, a mechanism is a triplet {t˜h(m), t˜l(m), q˜(m)} stipulating
a transfer for each quality and an output level, as functions of the agent’s message m
which belongs to M.
Our goal is to show a Revelation Principle in such a context and to do so, we must first
describe the agent’s behavior in front of any such mechanism. This description is more
complex than in Chapter 2. Indeed, given his type, the agent must now choose not only
a message to be sent to the principal but also, given this message, what is the best effort
that he should exert. Denoting by m∗(θ) and e∗(θ) these optimal message and effort,7 we
have:
(m∗(θ), e∗(θ)) ∈ argmax
(m˜,e)
pi(θ, e)t˜h(m˜) + (1− pi(θ, e))t˜l(m˜)− θq˜(m˜)− ψ(e)
for all θ in Θ, e in {0, 1}, and m˜ inM. (7.17)
Rewriting (7.17), we find:
pi(θ, e∗(θ))t˜h(m∗(θ)) + (1− pi(θ, e∗(θ)))t˜l(m∗(θ))− θq˜(m∗(θ))− ψ(e∗(θ))
≥ pi(θ, e˜)t˜h(m˜) + (1− pi(θ, e˜))t˜l(m˜)− θq˜(m˜)− ψ(e˜)
for all θ in Θ, in e˜ in {0, 1} and m˜ inM. (7.18)
Just as in Section 2.10, let us construct a direct revelation mechanism {th(θ˜), tl(θ˜), q(θ˜)}
as follows th(θ˜) = t˜(m
∗(θ˜)), tl(θ˜) = t˜l(m∗(θ˜)) and q(θ˜) = q˜(m∗(θ˜)) for all θ in Θ. We can
now state our version of the Revelation Principle.
7These optimal message and effort may not be unique. The Revelation Principle below holds for any
possible selection within these optimal choices.
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Proposition 7.2 : There is no loss of generality in restricting the principal to offer a
truthful direct revelation mechanism {th(θ˜), tl(θ˜), q(θ˜)}θ˜∈Θ and to recommend a choice of
effort e∗(θ˜). With such a mechanism, the agent truthfully reveals his type to the principal
and obeys to his recommendation on the choice of effort.
Proof: The proof is straightforward and follows almost the same path as that of Propo-
sition 2.2.
Using (7.18) and the definition of the direct revelation mechanism {th(θ˜), tl(θ˜), q(θ˜)}
associated with any mechanism {t˜h(m˜), t˜l(m˜), q˜(m˜)}, we have from (7.18):
pi(θ, e∗(θ))th(θ) + (1− pi(θ, e∗(θ)))tl(θ)− θq(θ)− ψ(e∗(θ))
= pi(θ, e∗(θ))t˜h(m∗(θ)) + (1− pi(θ, e∗(θ)))t˜l(m∗(θ))− θq˜(m∗(θ))− ψ(e∗(θ))
≥ pi(θ, e˜)t˜h(m˜) + (1− pi(θ, e˜))t˜l(m˜)− θq˜(m˜)− ψ(e˜)
for all θ in Θ, e˜ in {0, 1} and m˜ inM. (7.19)
This latter inequality being true for all m˜ it is in particular true for m˜ = m∗(θ˜) for all
θ˜ in Θ. Hence, we have:
pi(θ, e∗(θ))th(θ) + (1− pi(θ, e∗(θ)))tl(θ)− θq(θ)− ψ(e∗(θ))
≥ pi(θ, e˜)tl(θ˜) + (1− pi(θ, e˜))tl(θ˜)− θq(θ˜)− ψ(e˜),
for all pairs (θ, θ˜) in Θ2, and e˜ in {0, 1}. (7.20)
This latter constraint means that the agent with type θ prefers to reveal his type to
the principal and obey to his recommendation on what should be the level of effort.
The Revelation Principle that we have just proved above has the same flavor as in a
pure adverse selection framework. The logic is similar: the principal can always replicate
the agent’s choices by incorporating the agent’s optimal message strategy into the initial
contract he offers. However, on top of requesting that the agent sends a truthful message
on his type, the principal also recommends now that the agent chooses a particular level
of effort.
Myerson (1982) developed in a more abstract setting the extended Revelation
Principle above. He used the expression “obedience” to characterize the fact that the
agent must follow the principal’s instructions on his choice of effort.
Remark: Instead of insisting on the principal recommending a choice of effort to the
agent, one could view this choice as being completely delegated and incorporated into the
adverse selection problem in a way that affects the different parties’ utility functions. To
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see more precisely this point, let us define the agent’s indirect utility function U I(·) as:
U I(θ, q, th, tl) = max
e∈{0,1}
pi(θ, e)th + (1− pi(θ, e))tl − θq − ψ(e). (7.21)
The Revelation Principle can be directly applied at this stage to get the following pure
adverse selection incentive compatibility constraints:
U I(θ, q(θ), th(θ), tl(θ)) ≥ U I(θ, q(θ˜), th(θ˜), tl(θ˜)), for all (θ, θ˜) in Θ2. (7.22)
The difficulty for the modeler comes then from the fact that those incentive compat-
ibility constraints may not be as easily ordered as those of the pure adverse selection
models of Chapters 2 and 3. The indirect utility function U I(·) can indeed fail to satisfy
the Spence-Mirrlees property even in highly structured settings.
7.2.3 Insurance Contracts with Adverse Selection and Moral
Hazard Simultaneously
Insurance contracts are good examples of contracts designed to solve simultaneously an
adverse selection problem, how risky the agent is, and a moral hazard problem, how to
induce enough safety care from the agent. We have already touched on the analysis of
each of those two problems separately in Chapters 3 and 4. This section is aimed at
explaining how those two problems interact.
Remark: In view of the analysis of Section 7.2.1, with an insurance contract, the principal
has now only two instruments, namely a transfer whether an accident occurs or not,
to perform two tasks: incentivizing the agent to exert effort and inducing information
revelation. This creates much of the complexity of this kind of models.
Let us thus assume, that a monopoly insurer, the principal, offers an insurance contract
to agents having an initial wealth w. Agents differ ex ante according to their risk type θ.
To make things simpler, we assume that for each agent θ belongs to Θ = {θ, θ¯} and that
those types are independently drawn between agents with respective probabilities8 1− ν
and ν. θ¯ (resp. θ) corresponds to a high (resp. low) risk for all levels of the moral hazard
variable e. By exerting an effort e, an agent with type θ increases his probability pi(θ, e)
of not having an accident. We have thus piθ(θ, e) < 0 and pie(θ, e) > 0 for all pairs (θ, e).
Of course, the agent suffers from a disutility ψ(e) when exerting an effort. As usual, we
assume that effort belongs to {0, 1} with ψ(1) = ψ and ψ(0) = 0.
The insurance company requests from the agent a payment tn when no accident occurs
and gives a transfer ta in case of an accident. Its objective function is thus V = pi(θ, e)tn−
8Note that θ which refers to the “good” type has now probability 1− ν.
